She is the one. Her only paper that I read is Decoupling emergence and reduction in physics, but it has been extremely enlightening. I've mentioned her a few times in this older thread where I had been discussing Weinberg's reductionism. — Pierre-Normand

I'll look for the paper on the web and I'll look at your thread.

By the way, StreetlightX also had referenced the excellent paper The Theory of Everything by R. B. Laughlin and David Pines. This paper pursued some of Anderson's earlier insights and developed a view a emergence that struck me as having many commonalities with Crowther's own. — Pierre-Normand

I've ordered it.

This is exactly the kind of question I was talking about. Why don't you start a new thread. I'll participate. — T Clark

I doubt there would be much interest (beyond yours).

I doubt there would be much interest (beyond yours). — frank

I used to feel bad if no one was interested in things I wanted to talk about. Now I just through things out there and find out without worrying if anyone else wants to participate. You never know what will catch people's interest.

So, if there are emergent laws, that are new to X, how do those laws relate to the laws of Y? Anderson doesn't say. — Pierre-Normand

Sorry I missed your comment. I think Anderson is assuming some relationship which is in principle knowable.

A modified Laplace's Demon could construct the next level from what's known down below. Am I mistaken there?

My own thoughts on the topic are a bit nebulous. My home base is Kant. Apokrisis seems to me to be giving voice to the critical ingredient (yin yang).

Well... I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang? — T Clark

So there are questions of this kind and there are questions about "the underpinnings of reason". The questions above are questions about which there is a fact of the matter. Either the capital of France is Bucharest or it isn't. Either neutrons are made of smaller particles or they aren't. The questions about the "underpinnings of reason" aren't factual in this way. We just agree to accept those 'underpinnings' when it is useful to accept them.

Could you give an example of a question about the "underpinnings of reason"? I sense that we have travelled over this before, but please humour me. I think having one specific example of such a question in front of us will be very helpful.

Could you give an example of a question about the "underpinnings of reason"? I sense that we have travelled over this before, but please humour me. I think having one specific example of such a question in front of us will be very helpful. — PossibleAaran

Some examples:
Does objective reality exist?
Do we have free will?
Is there an absolute morality?

This is what really helped me in the Anderson paper - the discussion of reductionist vs. constructionist views. — T Clark

Yep. Reductionism can mean two different things.

All modelling involves a reduction of a world to a model. So even holism is a reduction of the lived, messy complexity of the world to the abstracted simplicity of a model.

But then holism is opposed to reductionism as reductionism is about bottom up construction, and holism adds the other countering thing of top down constraint.

In reductionism, global organisation can emerge, but it is just a sum of all the parts. Nothing new of different arises. We might describe the global organisation with higher level macro laws. But in principle, the real explanation is all the detailed mechanics going on down at the base level.

It is like freewill. It can’t be real - according to bottom up construction - as ultimately it is the result of a whole mass of completely deterministic atomic actions.

But holism - as argued with mathematical clarity in hierarchy theory and cybernetics - says global organisation is a real level of causation as it has the power to bear down and shape the very parts making the whole.

The world on the microscale is actually pretty irregular, indeterminate, unconstrained. Global order then arises by constraining those parts so they are simplified and regularised in a way that makes them all fit.

You can think of a bee honeycomb. To squish a whole lot of wax tubes together, they must become hexagons. Maybe they could be all sorts of flattened shapes in principle. Triangular, octagonal, some kind of irregular never repeated lattice like your Mayan stone wall. But through the principle of least action, the regularity of a hexagonal pattern is the simplest way to tile that space.

And hexagonal patterns are what we see emerging in the classic examples of self organising chaos, or dissipative structure, like the hexagonal convection currents of Benard cells -https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh–Bénard_convection

So more is different gets at this constraints based view. Hierarchical organisation develops because higher levels can simplify the world enough to shape the parts, regular and numerous, needed to construct them.

It is cybernetic feedback. The system emerges from the noise as it tunes into its own grounding simplicity or regularity.

Does enlightenment = reductionism? — T Clark

It’s too sweeping a generalisation but there’s some truth in it.

I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang? — T Clark

You keep overlooking the so-called ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, specifically, that judgements about what is amenable to measurement are of a different order to judgements about what one ought to do or believe. It is not a smooth continuum awaiting only the revelation of further facts.

You keep overlooking the so-called ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, specifically, that judgements about what is amenable to measurement are of a different order to judgements about what one ought to do or believe. It is not a smooth continuum awaiting only the revelation of further facts. — Wayfarer

Let me think about that.

You can think of a bee honeycomb. To squish a whole lot of wax tubes together, they must become hexagons. Maybe they could be all sorts of flattened shapes in principle. Triangular, octagonal, some kind of irregular never repeated lattice like your Mayan stone wall. But through the principle of least action, the regularity of a hexagonal pattern is the simplest way to tile that space.

And hexagonal patterns are what we see emerging in the classic examples of self organising chaos, or dissipative structure, like the hexagonal convection currents of Benard cells -https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh–Bénard_convection — apokrisis

Columnar basalt

Columnar basalt — T Clark

Either that or Cretaceous bees were mighty big buggers.

Either that or Cretaceous bees were mighty big buggers. — Pierre-Normand

Apisodactyl.

Columnar basalt — T Clark

Nice. Cooling causes contraction. Hexagonal cracking expresses the outcome which distributes the effort of rupture in the most symmetric or general fashion possible. The highest number of the smallest sides - given the cooling is slow enough, the liquid even enough, not to insert any local preferences into the story.

Metaphysics constitutes the following . .

Intrusive thoughts suffering from constipation

The Vietnam War writing movie reviews

Press conferences becoming scientists

Different religions taking turns to laugh at the same nation

Gravity visiting Buckingham Palace

Metaphysics constitutes the following . .

Intrusive thoughts suffering from constipation

The Vietnam War writing movie reviews

Press conferences becoming scientists

Different religions taking turns to laugh at the same nation

Gravity visiting Buckingham Palace — Thomas H Cullen

You complain about being censored, but your comments are not responsive and don't contribute to the discussion.

The examples you choose create some difficulties. My goal here is just to understand what your distinction between fact of the matter questions and underpinning questions really amounts to.

The free-will question quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word "free-will". I don't read much in that area because of this, so I'll leave this one aside.

The question about absolute morality is one of some interest to me. You call it a question about the 'underpinnings of reason' and you contrast it with questions like "are neutrons made of smaller particles?". There is a fact of the matter about the latter but, you say, not about the former. We just decide whether to think about morality as absolute or not, but there is no truth to be had. I am not sure why you think this. Perhaps it has something to do with what can be "rationally established"? I remember previously you had said that whether or not there is an absolute morality cannot be verified by sense perception. Maybe that is why you think there is no fact about it?

The question about objective reality is serious tangle. When you say that there is a fact of the matter about whether neutrons are made of particles, this claim itself seems to already presuppose that there is an objective reality. After all, what is a 'fact of the matter' if it isn't an objective truth? And so the positive answer, "yes" is something which you presuppose in even stating your distinction. It all depends what you mean by "objective" when you ask your question. What do you mean?

Keep in mind that my understanding of the the distinction between matters of fact vs. matters of underpinning is itself a matter of underpinning.

The free-will question quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word "free-will". I don't read much in that area because of this, so I'll leave this one aside. — PossibleAaran

One test for a question that doesn't have a yes or no answer is if it "quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word ..." Not always true, but often.

We just decide whether to think about morality as absolute or not, but there is no truth to be had. I am not sure why you think this. Perhaps it has something to do with what can be "rationally established"? I remember previously you had said that whether or not there is an absolute morality cannot be verified by sense perception. — PossibleAaran

Of course, many disagree with my contention that the question of whether there is an objective morality is not a matter of fact. All I can tell you is that I don't make my moral decisions based on a belief in absolute moral standards. I just don't. It's not a matter of principle, it's just how I work. I can give a rational justification as to why it's a useful way to behave, but that really comes after the fact. Even so, in most, but not all, cases, my moral decisions will likely be consistent with most of the people in my community, however you want to define that. That includes people who do believe in such absolute standards.

The question about objective reality is serious tangle. When you say that there is a fact of the matter about whether neutrons are made of particles, this claim itself seems to already presuppose that there is an objective reality. After all, what is a 'fact of the matter' if it isn't an objective truth? And so the positive answer, "yes" is something which you presuppose in even stating your distinction. It all depends what you mean by "objective" when you ask your question. What do you mean? — PossibleAaran

What we are calling underpinning matters are situation dependent. I come from science and I'm comfortable with the concept of objective reality. I use it. At the same time, in some situations I think it is deeply misleading. It often degenerates into a belief that reductionist science is the only valid approach to understanding the universe. Even when I am understanding the world from the viewpoint of objective reality, in the back of my mind I remember that viewpoint is provisional. In my heart, I don't feel as if there is a fixed reality. After all, every story about how the world works; science, theistic religion, Eastern philosophy, Western philosophy, Scientology, ....is talking about the same world.

In my heart, I don't feel as if there is a fixed reality — T Clark

Do you just find it useful to believe that there is no fixed reality, or is it a fact that there is no fixed reality?

Do you just find it useful to believe that there is no fixed reality, or is it a fact that there is no fixed reality? — PossibleAaran

To me, whether or not there is a fixed reality is not a matter of fact. Use what works best in a particular situation.

Isn't it objectively true that there are mountains on earth? Isn't it objectively true that you exist? That I exist? Aren't these 'fixed realities'?

Isn't it objectively true that there are mountains on earth? Isn't it objectively true that you exist? That I exist? Aren't these 'fixed realities'? — PossibleAaran

On a day to day basis, I certainly act and feel as if those things exist without thinking about it. I've already acknowledged the value of an objective point of view. There are also other ways of looking at things. In a very real, non-mystical, naturalistic, practical sense, reality does not come into existence until it is conceptualized. The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. That is always in my mind, even when I am acting on the basis of an objective view. It's the way I see the world. And no, it's not a matter of fact. It's an understanding I've chosen, that chose me. For me, it is very useful.

And no, it's not a matter of fact. It's an understanding I've chosen, that chose me. For me, it is very useful. — T Clark

The distinction you made earlier between facts and useful perspectives has vanished. The "fact of the matter" side has collapsed into the useful perspectives side. Even something like "there are mountains" or " I exist" is just a useful perspective among others. Thinking of things as "facts" itself turns out to be a merely useful perspective. But then your distinction is between things its useful to believe and things its useful to believe. No distinction at all!

I'm not sure if this is really coherent. Isn't it an objective fact that "believing X is useful"? And if something is useful to believe, isn't there an objective fact about who its useful for? And these facts cannot just be more useful beliefs. Well, I suppose they could be, just like the earth could rest on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle...etc.

First, there is a mountain. Then there is no mountain. Then there is.

The distinction you made earlier between facts and useful perspectives has vanished. The "fact of the matter" side has collapsed into the useful perspectives side. Even something like "there are mountains" or " I exist" is just a useful perspective among others. Thinking of things as "facts" itself turns out to be a merely useful perspective. But then your distinction is between things its useful to believe and things its useful to believe. No distinction at all! — PossibleAaran

Exactly, exactly, exactly! But I'll say this again - I acknowledge that in many, maybe most, situations acting as if an objective reality exists is the way I operate.

I'm not sure if this is really coherent. Isn't it an objective fact that "believing X is useful"? And if something is useful to believe, isn't there an objective fact about who its useful for? — PossibleAaran

For me, usefulness is a question of value, not fact, like beauty or wonderfulness.

And these facts cannot just be more useful beliefs. Well, I suppose they could be, just like the earth could rest on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle...etc. — PossibleAaran

Just to be clear - I'm really serious about this. I'm not just being a contrarian. What I'm saying is really no odder than what Descartes said.

I don't just think that your position here is odd. I think its incoherent.

Take any proposition, P, which most people believe is objectively true. You say that there are no objective truths, only things its useful to believe. So, the most you will say about P is:

(1) it is useful to believe that P

One wonders again whether it is an objective fact that (1), but you have already shown that you aren't scared to ride the infinite stack of turtles so lets try something else.

Is it objectively true that there are people? You say, no, because there are no objective truths. But if there aren't any people what sense does (1) make? How can it be useful to believe that P if there is nobody for whom it is useful? You might say that its useful to believe that there are people, but how can that be useful unless there are people to whom it is useful?

Utility only makes sense against a background in which there are creatures to whom these things are useful.

Compare me saying that a hammer is useful. I say that its useful, but not for smacking nails or breaking things. It cannot be useful for those things, since there is no objective fact about whether there are any nails or any things to break. The hammer can't even be useful to me [/] because there is no fact about whether I even exist.

I am not sure why you made the comparison to Descartes. Maybe you could elaborate.

I am not sure why you made the comparison to Descartes. Maybe you could elaborate. — PossibleAaran

Descartes started out doubting everything. Back when I was in college for the first time in the 1970s that kind of thinking always bothered me. I remember reading something by Wittgenstein where he went on about doubt and how we could know anything. Then, at the end, he just said - since we can't be sure of anything, just go ahead and make decisions, live your life, based on your opinions. I remember thinking - there, you and every other philosopher have spent thousands of years and millions of words arguing about what we can know and you, in once sentence, resolve the whole stupid issue. Everything humans know, everything we do, is based on opinions. All of science and philosophy. Just opinions. No truth, just opinions. We need knowledge to figure out what to do next. Opinions are conditional knowledge.

As for your comment on the incoherence of my position, I don't agree, but I don't know how to make my point any clearer or more convincing. I'll just start repeating what I've already said.

As you no doubt expect, I disagree with your short assessment of the project Descartes takes up. I also disagree that "everything is based on opinions" if this is to mean that we cannot have any good reason to believe anything. An honest reading of Descartes also shows that he never thought his doubts had to be answered before you can "live your life" and "make decisions". He thought his project was important, but not because somehow life has to be on stand still until you solve it. He says this repeatedly both in the Meditations and in the Discourse, so its so strange to me that people constantly think he was holding all of their day to day lives ransom pending his project of radical doubt. I also don't think its a "stupid issue", but one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy.

So much for my disagreements. Perhaps we can discuss Descartes and his project another time and I can convince you to be more sympathetic to it. But, concerning your views which are the topic of the thread, this view still strikes me as incoherent, and I've tried to show why with argument. Perhaps here is a good stopping point, since we both understand each other yet neither of us is likely to convince.

I disagree with your short assessment of the project Descartes takes up. I also disagree that "everything is based on opinions" if this is to mean that we cannot have any good reason to believe anything. An honest reading of Descartes also shows that he never thought his doubts had to be answered before you can "live your life" and "make decisions". He thought his project was important, but not because somehow life has to be on stand still until you solve it. He says this repeatedly both in the Meditations and in the Discourse — PossibleAaran

I wasn't trying to put down Descartes or his ideas, I was only responding to your question about why I don't my consider my ideas

odder than what Descartes said. — T Clark