I'm more into armagnac.

1 & 2.

Now what? — Banno

So it seems you accept that there is at least a para-linguistic translation going on here. There is something communicable between two states of mind.

If Jack is smart like my cat, he would also stand expectantly at the door to the garage, or scratch on my office door to get some attention.

It is not so unrieslingable to consider that states of mind or points of view are in play.

And thus any theory of truth needs to include a model of the “self” said to be the subject of a belief. Naive realism does not suffice.

On my view, it points out a certain kind of belief:One that is clearly existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

I agree that there are beliefs that are existentially dependent upon language, viz., beliefs that are linguistic (statements/propositions). Thus, if I say, "The Earth has one moon," by definition that is a statement of belief. I think we all agree with you on this.

It harks to what is state-able, and works from the long held view that all belief content is propositional. That vein of thought, however, can lead one astray when s/he begins to attempt to put a non-linguistic creatures belief into words/propositions. I mean, clearly an animal who does not speak English cannot have an attitude towards a proposition written in English. If we attempt to claim that the creature has a belief, and belief is a relation between the creature and a proposition, then we are saying that the creature has a relation to something that it doesn't understand. If it doesn't understand the proposition, then the only relation between it and the proposition is one that we draw. That would be meaningful to us, not the creature. It makes no sense to claim that a creature has a belief if that belief is not meaningful to the creature... — creativesoul

I also agree that what's leads us astray is that we are using language to talk about the beliefs on non-linguistic animals, including pre-linguistic man. However, I'm not sure what you mean by "...having a belief that is not meaningful to the creature," i.e., maybe you mean in terms of language, it's not meaningful to the creature?

You seem to be saying what I was saying a while back, i.e., that people seem to be confusing beliefs, the linguistic expression of beliefs, with an act that shows the belief apart from language. There is no way for these creatures to understand the belief as we understand the belief, since the belief as we are expressing them are necessarily linguistic. They have no concept called belief. So part of the problem is that our talk of these beliefs is a necessary function of language, which in turn leads to the assumption that the belief itself, as shown in the animal/human, is a necessary function of language. It is a necessary function of language if we are to express beliefs using language, but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding.

Another way to think of this, is when we talk about the Earth having one moon, we can only do this in language, i.e., the concept has an instance in reality. So the concept has a referent (i.e., the object Earth) quite apart from the concept and the linguistic use. In the same way, there is a referent to the word belief, viz., particular actions that an animal expresses in life. We see these same actions (a kind of referent) in us, i.e., in our daily actions. I open the door, shows the belief that a door is there, regardless of any expression of the belief in language. So the action is the referent, granted, it is different from the referent Earth, but it's still part of reality as something that is instantiated. Thus, these acts are referred to in language by the concept belief/s. Just as we use the concept Earth to refer to the object. Maybe this helps, not sure.

There are all sorts of cases one might use here, Hanover, of where actions do not reflect belief. It's a good point. And not a new one. Hence, I am assuming, your argument would proceed to conclude that since beliefs are not always reflected in action, the only thing they could be is some sort of mental object.

But this is not a very good argument; there may well be other things that would explain the oddities of belief.

Something else that needs exposition is the dynamics of belief. Beliefs are in a state of flux. They change over time, merge with each other, divide, become more or less distinct.

That's a great deal of similarity to the beetle in the box.

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real.

that people seem to be confusing beliefs, the linguistic expression of beliefs, with an act that shows the belief apart from language. — Sam26

Yes - that's right. I agree, so long as we note that giving a linguistic expression to a belief is also an act that shows the belief.

but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding. — Sam26

Again, yes.

The recursive capacity of language allows us to derive very complex sentences, and hence more complex beliefs. Jack can believe that i will feed him, not that I will feed him next Thursday.

I think we agree. However, you didn't respond to the most important part about referent. What do you think of this point?

This is to say that the language game of justification and belief in science, at least at this point and in this topic, is poorly modelled by a doxastic logic featuring material implication. It is more a history of trust, flaw finding, and the discovery of scope-limitations of previously 'universal' laws. — fdrake

Yes; the link between justification and belief is unwieldy. The philosophical brush and pan will not help us much here. And the issue applies as much outside the sciences as within. Basically folk can believe whatever they like. Our task has to be working out what it is that we ought believe.

THat's the other direction I might try to lead this thread.

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

The mental reality is of course often much vaguer or more indeterminate than the words called forth to account for it.

That just is a consequence of the human mind being composed of two levels of semiosis - the neural and the linguistic. Language imposes it’s more definite structure on the inherently less definite neurological goings on.

So a belief described to another in words takes the form of some overly concrete set of reasons.

And that linguistic sharpening shows here in your own post. You - due to linguistic habit - reject vagueness as an option. It has to be a case of either/or. Hence if you can’t believe that our words describe some actual mental object, the only dialectical possibility is that there are no mental objects in any sense.

Yet ambiguity is part of the whole business, as we know. In practice, we have the art to navigate the gap and talk about our beliefs as if they were communicable objects while also retaining their individually experienced ineffability.

So you are imposing a false dichotomy on the situation. We regularly navigate the difficulties involved in using language to sharpen cognition. Our actual thinking copes well with ambiguity of reference.

In the same way, there is a referent to the word belief, viz., particular actions that an animal expresses in life. — Sam26

I'm not going to agree to this.

Firstly, it does not follow from the fact that we use a given word, that there is a something to which the word refers. For example, "red".

Secondly, there is the issue of the link between a belief and an action. Beliefs do not happen on their own, and given a suitable set of auxiliary beliefs, any action can be made compatible with any belief. (@Hanover's point?)

Firstly, it does not follow from the fact that we use a given word, that there is a something to which the word refers. For example, "red".

Secondly, there is the issue of the link between a belief and an action. Beliefs do not happen on their own, and given a suitable set of auxiliary beliefs, any action can be made compatible with any belief. — Banno

I understand that not all words refer to objects, but some words are used in this very way. Think of how we teach certain words to children. We teach some words by ostensive definition, but not all words, as Wittgenstein pointed out, but he never denied that some words are used in this way. In fact, Wittgenstein very first example of a language-game at the beginning of the PI reflects the fact that some words have a direct correlation between the concept and an object.

I don't see the connection between your second point and my comments.

I'm not sure that defining belief as ad hoc explanations really eliminates the need for mental and abstract objects. It just moves them from the front end of action to back, doesn't it?

Truth is a point of view. — apokrisis

:monkey:

They have no concept called belief. So part of the problem is that our talk of these beliefs is a necessary function of language, which in turn leads to the assumption that the belief itself, as shown in the animal/human, is a necessary function of language. It is a necessary function of language if we are to express beliefs using language, but that doesn't mean that an act cannot show a belief apart from a linguistic understanding. — Sam26

I don't follow the significance of what you're saying. An animal has no concept called anything because it has no language. They nonetheless have concepts, just no word that attaches to that concept. They fully understand what food is, yet they have no word for it. They may fully understand what a belief is, yet have no word for it. If they don't, that speaks to the simplicity and limited understanding of the animal, but I don't see where it's necessarily the case that a language-less creature could not understand the distinction between what he thought was true and what turned out to be actually true, thus drawing a distinction in his mind between what he believed to be true and what was actually true. Maybe I don't get what you were getting at.

Hence, I am assuming, your argument would proceed to conclude that since beliefs are not always reflected in action, the only thing they could be is some sort of mental object.

But this is not a very good argument; there may well be other things that would explain the oddities of belief. — Banno

What are those other things you refer to?

Something else that needs exposition is the dynamics of belief. Beliefs are in a state of flux. They change over time, merge with each other, divide, become more or less distinct. — Banno

Behaviors are in a state of flux and change over time and become ambiguous and whatnot. But just like beliefs, at any specific time, they are not in flux, but are a specific something.

That's a great deal of similarity to the beetle in the box. — Banno

Let's work off that thought experiment because I'm not sure it means to me what it means to you. I would concede you cannot know what my pain is or what any internal state of my consciousness actually is. It is the hidden beetle in the box. All we can talk about it is what we talk about. You cannot know my beliefs by looking into my head, and while I can see my beetle and talk all about it, and you can talk about your beetle and talk all about it, the beetle itself is irrelevant to our discussion because we've conceded the inability to see one another's actual beetles.

The crux of my argument is that irrelevance does not equate to non-existence. For the purposes of our discussion, should I agree entirely that it helps us none to talk among each other about belief in terms of it providing you any explanatory power, that hardly means I don't have a mental state called a belief that I can know intimately because I have the ability to see into my box.

It's like any sort of behavioristic theory. Skinner says psychology will never be a real science unless it limits itself to the study of the measurable and quantifiable. Your depression will therefore be measured in terms of the behaviors you engage in, including your own declarations of sadness. However, none of that is to suggest your depression is at all your sad behaviors, but it's simply to declare irrelevant for psychological study that depression is an ineffable, unlocatable phenomenal state hovering around somewhere in your mind. That is to say, it is irrelevant to the psychologist that he cannot identify your qualia, but that doesn't mean his true aim is anything less than altering that qualitative state. The psychologist is limited to seeing you in the third person and he must treat you that way, but his aim is to correct your first person account of yourself.

Maybe a philosopher (of a certain bent perhaps) finds talk of internal beliefs wasteful talk about beetles that advance the discussion no where. That hardly means I don't have beliefs entirely without language.

There is a critical difference between saying the actual beetle is irrelevant to us and that it is irrelevant to me. There is an even more critical difference between saying the actual beetle is irrelevant and the actual beetle does not exist.

Firstly, it does not follow from the fact that we use a given word, that there is a something to which the word refers. For example, "red". — Banno

Not every word has an objective referent, but every meaningful word has a subjective referent, namely its subjective meaning. The subjective referent oftentimes preexists the word, and I'd suppose often occurs without a word ever being designated to attach to that referent.

I don't follow the significance of what you're saying. An animal has no concept called anything because it has no language. They nonetheless have concepts, just no word that attaches to that concept. — Hanover

My point is that they have no concepts because concepts are a necessary feature of language. What is a concept apart from language? I have no idea what that would be.

They fully understand what food is, yet they have no word for it. They may fully understand what a belief is, yet have no word for it. If they don't, that speaks to the simplicity and limited understanding of the animal, but I don't see where it's necessarily the case that a language-less creature could not understand the distinction between what he thought was true and what turned out to be actually true, thus drawing a distinction in his mind between what he believed to be true and what was actually true. Maybe I don't get what you were getting at. — Hanover

I'm making a distinction between concepts and beliefs, in the sense that beliefs can be shown in our actions apart from language, but concepts not. It's clear to me that animals have understanding apart from language, but what that entails I don't know. I think this brings up the question, "What is consciousness apart from language?" What does it entail? I definitely don't know the answer to this question.

"Jack believes his bowl is empty" is a relation between a proposition and a cat who has only a limited vocab. That Jack cannot say "I believe my bowl is empty" is irrelevant.

But we keep repeating this discussion. It seems that you will not move away from the notion of a belief as a thing in a mind. But for me that view makes no sense. What counts is not a thing in Jack's minds, but what he does: meowing and staring at the bowl and following me around and so on, which all stops when I fill the bowl. These actions are not mental tables and chairs; they are Jack's interactions with the world. — Banno

"Jack believes his bowl is empty" is a report of Jack's belief.

We've returned to this discussion repeatedly. I've shown several issues with the account your offering. You've directly addressed none of those. I'm also unsure why it is that you keep insisting that I'm arguing for a notion of "belief" that is a thing in the mind. That isn't true. The nuance is left out in the cold. The nuance is where understanding is found.

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

Can you—or anyone else for that matter—find any difference between the semantics of “a maintained trust that [such and such is the case]” and “a belief that [such and such is the case]”?

If yes, I so far haven’t, and would like to hear about it.

If no, then do you still feel the same about “a maintained trust that” (given that it means the same thing as “belief that”)?

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

I'm not convinced, and neither should you be. However believable such an account might appear, to believe it would obviously be self-defeating. That ought to bring to a halt your increase, or at least make clear its futility.

My point is that they have no concepts because concepts are a necessary feature of language. What is a concept apart from language? I have no idea what that would be. — Sam26

What is a concept other than an abstract idea? I can only speak for myself, but I do arrive at concepts prior to articulating them into language. Couldn't I know nothing of baseball, but be able to derive the concepts of the game from the behavior even though I at no time create an inner dialog explaining to myself those concepts?

I'm making a distinction between concepts and beliefs, in the sense that beliefs can be shown in our actions apart from language, but concepts not. — Sam26

I guess I don't fully follow the distinction. The pre-lingual man leaves food for his prey to entice him near his arrow. Is that not an understanding of the concept of hunger?

I guess I don't fully follow the distinction. The pre-lingual man leaves food for his prey to entice him near his arrow. Is that not an understanding of the concept of hunger? — Hanover

The way I think of concepts is in relation to words, but you seem to want to say that concepts are much broader in scope. How do we normally use the word concept? I think there is an understanding apart from language, we see this in the behavior of animals and pre-linguistic man, but I'm not sure that that is in relation to concepts. Maybe the difference has to do with concepts verses being conceptual, there is a difference. I'm not sure Hanover. Moreover, what's the difference between understanding something and conceptualizing something? I haven't clearly thought through some of this, but it's interesting.

The other problem I see in this thread and in other threads, is the idea that we can come up with some clear cut definition that's going to explain all of this. There are a variety of uses of the word belief, but there is not going to be some definitive definition that's going to straighten this issue out. All I want to say is that I believe the word believe is wider is scope than what we express in language, that's my only point.

IS there anything more to a concept - any concept - than is found in our use of it in language?

If so, what?

If not, then our talk is all there is to concepts.

How do we normally use the word concept? — Sam26

Normally it means an idea - particularly an abstract idea or an idea that is a mental picture of a set of relations.

For example, a "right angle" is a concept. Giving it a name, and even that name a definition, doesn't seem to be enough. You would need go draw it, measure it, experience it in enough contexts, to really get the idea involved.

Now pigeons can be taught to recognise the concept of right angles. They can indicate which of two images is of a more "right angled world".

And certainly in cognitive psychology, a concept or schema is understood as the abstract or general structure that we impose to create organisation in our states of impression. It is standard linguistic practice within the relevant science to think that animals are conceptual in that fashion.

Is there anything more to a concept - any concept - than is found in our use of it in language?

If so, what? — Banno

I suspect you have some idea as to what that might be.

If not, then our talk is all there is to concepts. — Banno

That's as absurd as saying that our concepts are all there is to talk. These are two distinct, albeit related, things. They cannot reasonably be reduced in this kind of way.

The other problem I see in this thread — Sam26

I tried to be clear at the outgo that the purpose of this thread is to investigate belief; I agree with you that we will not come up wiht a clear cut definition. Perhaps we will come up with a better understanding.

IF so, what?

If so, what? — Banno

You didn't get the clue? Our use in language is an expression which represents the referent, which, for sake of argument, we can assume is a concept or an idea. It's not the referent itself. If you examine language, then that's what you'll find, whereas if you examine understanding, then you might find an idea.

@Banno,@Sam26

I think it's likely that animal minds are capable of similar activity and directed mind-states to humans in a lot of respects.

Animals typically have much reduced episodic memory capabilities when compared to humans, so it is likely that an animal's 'self concept' isn't sufficiently stable across time to coagulate experiences into an interwoven network of memories which involve them as an agent which has expressible beliefs. Put another way, cognitive heuristics and methods of thinking in animals are more limited.

Humans also learn a much broader variety of cognitive heuristics and exploratory tools than most animals - things like representational heuristics of quantitative aspects of phenomena which I'll reference if anyone actually cares. There's also the capacity to allow a representative to stand in for an object or abstract object/memory in general, the manifestation of a semiotic freedom @apokrisis usually brings up. This latter capacity, along with the reality of animal cognition and substantial family resemblances between the flesh of our forms of life and theirs' vouchsafe the possibility for sense in this endeavour.

Animals can learn complicated tasks; dealing with chains of events and experiment with causes. If animal belief is seen as something close to a category error, there is still the problem of providing an analytic framework that gives animals a sufficiently rich and temporally extended mode of being for complex problem solving and experimentation with an environment.

A start of this approach is the idea of ecological affordances, in which the functions of familiar aspects of the environment are habitually endowed to them through an interplay of memory and exploratory tools; this occurs largely involuntarily when functioning in its usual way, and is part of our perceptual post-processing too (and can also be trained in humans, will give examples if anyone cares).

That there is a discourse about animal ability to do this, and forms of life studying animal cognition should serve as a Wittgensteinian demonstration that such practices need not be thrown away with the supposedly disavowed ladder - conspicuous in its absence but here behaving as if it was always-already discarded, and not simply chosen to be as such.

It is interesting, to me at least, how much agreement there is regarding much of this...

With Banno I agree that no language, no concept. Think of a concept as a container. The container is akin to a name/identity. The conceptual understanding is everything falling under that name/identity. As before, our concepts point towards something, so they're abstract understanding. I would argue against any notion of anything close to that when/where there has been and/or is no language.

The difficulty, it seems, is in our parsing all this out with language. I still strongly believe that there is a common thread underwriting all of this talk of ours.

When we attempt to figure out what non-linguistic thought and belief is, we must put it into words. That is our report/account of it. Our reports are not equivalent to what we're reporting upon. That is true of our own belief as well.

Earlier Sam mentioned confusion between our linguistic representation(reports) and what we're reporting upon. If we are to make progress in the endeavor of properly and accurately taking account of non-linguistic thought and/or belief, we must first know it's content, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for it's emergence onto the world stage. I think that fdrake is leaning that way...

Belief must be significant and/or meaningful to the believer. Our reports are not always, nor need they be. However, we cannot claim that our reports are equivalent to the belief itself. That is my issue with claiming that belief is a relation between a proposition/statement and the believer. The only relation that non-linguistic beasties have with that is one we make.

The beast would have the belief even if we didn't report upon it. However, the statement/proposition wouldn't be there. It only follows that either there are non-linguistic propositions/statements or non-linguistic beasts do not have what it takes for belief.

Neither is acceptable. That account is found wanting, lacking, begging for truth...