There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to all created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest, derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy, more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system.
The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society; as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: whence it may reasonably be presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controlled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.
But though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. — Hume
These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. — Agustino
Sure, in that trivial sense everyone agrees. Hume isn't very deep in that way. He also misses the point that, of course, philosophical knowledge (that the goodness of the whole justifies present evil) does not eliminate the evil, or make the pain less - but it certainly provides a sort of comfort and easier psychological acceptance of the situation.In other words, people are bad reasoners (because they have competing passions in their souls). I agree with Hume. But this is clearly no reason to believe that any argument fails. ("People are bad reasoners, therefore, argument X is bad" is, er, bad reasoning). — Mariner
Yes, it can be argued, for example, that the pain and possibility of gout were necessary in order for us to exist in the first place as a result of evolution (on a purely naturalistic/atheistic view). So if you are thankful for other things in life, then you have to accept the possibility of gout and the associated pain as well.I've suffered from gout and suggest that no one can comment on his argument and fully understand it until they have also experienced that pain.
There is no argument which can point to the pain of gout being of any purpose or use. — charleton
Yes, it can be argued, for example, that the pain and possibility of gout were necessary in order for us to exist in the first place as a result of evolution (on a purely naturalistic/atheistic view) — Agustino
"Those remote considerations" -- metaphysical theories that do not taken into considerations individual experiences. Individuals have sentiments, emotions, identity, and individual decisions.The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution.
↪charleton I’m sorry you had to experience such pain. Can you possibly elaborate on what it means to say “pain beyond reason”? What can that mean? Would it make sense in a similar fashion to say you have experienced joy beyond reason? Thanks. — matt
Sounds like your gout helped you understand Hume's argument. Doesn't sound meaningless. — Noble Dust
I've suffered from gout and suggest that no one can comment on his argument and fully understand it until they have also experienced that pain. — charleton
*facepalm*That gets the silly post of the week award. I'm not talking about s stubbed toe or a paper cut. Gout is is pain beyond reason. That's why I made the comment. — charleton
True, however, the possibility of such useless pain as that of gout is required in order for other goods in the world to be possible (such as useful pain). You cannot have useful pain without also having the possibility for useless pain.There is no use to it and the pain of it is unreasonable since there is no evolutionary benefit to such extreme pain. — charleton
In what way helpful? It's not helpful in decreasing the pain you feel or making you recover from the pain faster. But it is helpful in the aid it provides to enable you to psychologically understand why you need to come to terms with the situation as it is.He is observing that people in general do not find such Leibnizian "All's for the best in this best of all possible worlds" arguments helpful. — andrewk
This doesn't make much sense to me. You don't need to appeal to God / religion in a consciously aware sense, in order to realise that the possibility of good in life hinges on the possibility of bad, and if we eliminate bad, we also thereby eliminate good. Why do you think this insight requires "speculative and remote" considerations? I don't see anything remote about this - just seriously think about your own life, you will see that it is so. In fact, quite the contrary from being remote, it is one of those facts which is closest to you, perhaps that's why it is difficult for some to see it.I think Hume has specifically in mind arguments where the good can only be speculatively assumed, not those where the good is well understood, such as a vaccination. To this end, note the following phrase in the second paragraph: 'such remote and uncertain speculations'.
Expectation of immunity from polio after a vaccination is not a remote and uncertain speculation. — andrewk
Sure, individuals have all that. How are they not taken into account? When I see that the possibility for useful pain, that helps me prevent a greater evil, requires the presence of useless pain - when I see this fact of nature in ALL my experiences - how is it possible to claim that my feelings, sentiments, emotions, identity, etc. aren't taken into account?"Those remote considerations" -- metaphysical theories that do not taken into considerations individual experiences. Individuals have sentiments, emotions, identity, and individual decisions. — Caldwell
Thus, you've gained something through pain, which, by your own logic, you would not have gained otherwise. — Noble Dust
He is observing that people in general do not find such Leibnizian "All's for the best in this best of all possible worlds" arguments helpful. — andrewk
Nope. That makes utterly no sense. The possibility of gout is necessitated by our biological structure, and our biological structure had to evolve the way it did for us to be who we are today, and have these bodies that we do today, which in many ways are absolutely wonderful. So you have to accept the possibility of the mistakes, the bad things, etc. as part and parcel of what it takes for such bodies as ours to evolve and to exist.The world could quite easily exist without the pain of gout - that's the bloody point!! — charleton
Do tell us why. — Agustino
LOL - do you even read what I write?! I said the POSSIBILITY of gout is necessitated by our biological structure. Not the actuality of it. So I don't have it right now, but it's always possible that I will get it. — Agustino
That is to suppose that we could get all the other good things without the bad ones. I don't grant that supposition, I see no reason for making it. The possibility for good seems to necessarily entail the possibility of evil. So nothing God can do about that.Hume's point was that were you to believe in God you would have to accept that He ought to be smart enough to figure out a world in which there was no gout at all. — charleton
Such as?Yes, I do read what you write, and I also notice the posts you refuse to answer or acknowlege. — charleton
so what is Hume's point? — Agustino
It depends what you mean by comfort. It doesn't take away the pain of those who are suffering, but it makes it easier to psychologically accept their situation, and in that sense, it does provide comfort. And this is undeniable, it's simply a matter of fact. Just look at the sheer number of people who have gone through tremendous suffering who are believers in God, and who have faith that God will redeem them.Hume's point seems to be that talk of cosmic harmony and theistic benevolence only comforts those who aren't suffering. — darthbarracuda
There is no implausibility there. Read, for example, Viktor Frankl's Man's Search For Meaning. Or read Solzhenitsyn. Or take your pick from the sufferers - you'll find more believers there than amongst those who never suffer.despite its implausibility from the perspective of those most acquainted with evil, must not truly understand what suffering or moral injustice is like. — darthbarracuda
So Hume is simply factually wrong if he wants to claim that theodicy does not provide psychological comfort to those who are suffering. He is right merely if we restrict what he says to mean simply that theodicy does not take the pain of those who are suffering away. — Agustino
What are you talking about? Dostoevsky was a religious man, he died with the Bible in his lap. And Levinas wasn't exactly an atheist either. Don't know about Jean Amery.Jean Amery, Dostoevsky, Levinas, to name three I am reading right now. — darthbarracuda
Just a minority though.Yet there are also many, many people who were believers, and who went through all sorts of awful experiences and came out stripped of their religious beliefs — darthbarracuda
There would be no desire if there was nothing that could fulfil that desire...This emptiness is mostly humans wanting God to be real when he is not. — darthbarracuda
What are you talking about? Dostoevsky was a religious man, he died with the Bible in his lap. And Levinas wasn't exactly an atheist either. Don't know about Jean Amery. — Agustino
Just a minority though. — Agustino
There would be no desire if there was nothing that could fulfil that desire... — Agustino
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.