Not grammar. It's whether the word is being used properly.

Not grammar. It's whether the word is being used properly. — frank

That's part of grammar, though.

Is it? Then yes, grammar. :nerd:

I'm not so certain, but I'm still trying to think up counterexamples. Maybe you're onto something, but how significant is it? Is anyone actually claiming that a physical object is, or can be, the object of belief? Or that, "I believe that brick", makes sense?

Can you clarify what it is to be the object of belief? Is that just what it is that's believed?

Some words are used to refer to objects, but not all words, and since many words refer to objects, the tendency is for us to look for something that corresponds to all words. For many words (exists, two, nothing, time, consciousness, etc) there are no corresponding objects. To get clear on these words one must look at the many ways they are used. The same is true of the word belief, if we want to understand the concept belief, we must look at it in the many contexts of use. However, we must be careful not to conclude that context drives meaning, it's only part of what drives meaning.

Can you clarify what it is to be the object of belief? Is that just what it is that's believed? — Sapientia

Exactly.

Is anyone actually claiming that a physical object is, or can be, the object of belief? Or that, "I believe that brick", makes sense? — Sapientia

I'm not sure. The previous discussion seemed to center around paint.

What I would say, is that belief has to have an object just like knowledge always does. Knowledge is always of something. Belief is always in something. That something is not a physical object like a brick, or paint. At the same time, the object of belief is something people share. The situation tempts the philosopher to come up with some alternative to endorsing a non-physical sharable object like a flaming objective idealist.

But I think any alternative will collapse into behaviorism, which is actually worse. What's your perspective?

The same is true of the word belief, if we want to understand the concept belief, we must look at it in the many contexts of use. — Sam26

I'm a bit befuddled here Sam.

I find it quite problematic to look at every conception of the term belief as a means for 'understanding the concept'(scare-quoted intentionally). It's almost as if you're planting the seeds of equivocation. Sure, all the different uses need to be looked at in order to understand all the different accepted usages(sensible conceptions; language games; linguistic constructs; conceptual schemes).

If we look at every conception of the term, it makes no sense whatsoever to say that we understand 'the' concept(again, the scare-quotes are intentional). That's understanding each and every conception thereof. A good thing to strive for.

We then look at each conception in order to assess whether or not it's content is existentially dependent upon language, or not. Any notion which cannot take account of this cannot be trusted to take proper account of non-linguistic belief. Ought not.

On object of belief is precisely what grabs the agents' attention. An object of belief is but one necessary element within thought and belief formation. The term "object" is a bit misleading though, to me at least. I deny the subjective/objective dichotomy.

The object of belief can't be a physical object anyway. I believe that brick. That makes no sense. I believe that the brick is red. That makes sense. — frank

What's your criterion for what makes sense? Grammar? And what is it to be the object of belief? Must it be limited to what would render the sentence grammatical? — Sapientia

I'll start from here, because it's easiest for me.

Whether or not a physical object can be the object of belief cannot be determined by saying that "I believe that brick," makes no sense. "I believe that brick," is ungrammatical and has no immediate meaning (though you might guess at any itended meaning depending on the context of the utterance). It's ungrammatical because the pattern is "I believe that [clause]", but here you have "I believe that [noun]". A noun doesn't always describe a physical object. ("I believe that justice," is equally meaningless.)

The usual phrasing when you make a single entity the object of believe is with "in": "I believe in bricks," or "I believe in a/the/this/some brick." These result in grammatical sentences. What remains is a question of meaning. What would I be saying, if I said "I believe in bricks?"

If you say something like "I believe in bricks," do you have to be able to analytically detail what it is that you believe in? If we take the definition of this thread of believe as a propositional attitude, "I believe in bricks," would be a blanket formulation that references but does not spell out a bundle of propositions. But do you have to be able to provide an exhaustive list, before you can be said to believe in "bricks"?

In my first post, I used the example "I believe that God exists," rather than "I believe in God," precisely to avoid this problem. But it's sort of important.

If you can believe in single entities without being able to detail an exhaustive list of implied propositions, what does this mean for the act of believing. Is "believing" this way the commitmental equivelant of blank checque?

Once again, the question is whether a proposition is a sentence, or a special type of meaning expressable in varying degrees of success by varying sentences. If it's the latter, you might well "believe that brick" (a non-native speaker, for example, or a very small child might not know better), but you'd be advised to actually come up with a better formulation. If a proposition <i>is</i> a sentence, rather than simply being expressed by one, "I believe that brick," is ungrammatical nonsense, and not a proposition at all.

This is also the tie-in with belief in non-human entities (from dogs to thermostats). If a proposition is not a sentence, but expressed by one, then maybe propositions can be expressed also by actions, or maybe even by mere behaviour.

And finally, there's a problem with treating a brick as merely a physical object. When you see a brick and recognise it as a brick, you activate knowledge about bricks you have. The knowledge about bricks that you have also prevents from seeing the brick as it is: brick-naively, so to say. What you see is always already an object-subject relation. This is especially the case with human artefacts, like bricks, which are made to purpose. Seeing a brick as a brick is not so different from understanding the meaning of a word, or not understanding the meaning of a word but recognising it as a word whose meaning you don't understand. So in that sense believing "that brick" could be affirming your learned world view, while centering your attention on a brick. Whether or not it's useful to stretch the term "belief" this far, again, is a question of what you're intending to do with the word. I could designate that sort of meaning to "I believe that brick," using an ungrammatical and thus unintutive phrasing to highlight an unintuitive concept.

If that's too long and confusing, my central point here is this: You can't just assume that a proposition is identical with its phrasing. Saying that a proposition has stable meaning, no matter how you formulate it, and saying that proposition is identical with its phrasing has different implications.

Physical objects are out there in the world and can be perceived by anyone (capable of perceiving physical objects), but you can only perceive them as a specific type of object (say, as a brick), if you have that type already in your mind. If you come to an object naively, you'll still have a world view, and your attempt to deal with an object will eventually create a type. As soon as we have a type, there's potential for calling that belief. I wouldn't, but it's not absurd.

Whether or not a physical object can be the object of belief cannot be determined by saying that "I believe that brick," makes no sense — Dawnstorm

That's correct. No one uses the way we speak as an argument for the way things are. I wasn't doing that. :)

I asked earlier what the alternative to the standard scheme might be with the standard scheme being that propositions are the objects of belief. I think the outcome of rejecting the standard scheme is behaviorism.

What I would say, is that belief has to have an object just like knowledge always does. Knowledge is always of something. Belief is always in something. That something is not a physical object like a brick, or paint. At the same time, the object of belief is something people share. The situation tempts the philosopher to come up with some alternative to endorsing a non-physical sharable object like a flaming objective idealist. — frank

I wonder about this because I'm not sure whether you're making an epistemological claim about what you can believe in or whether you're just making a claim about English sentence structure and grammar. The sentence structure as it relates to a knowledge based claim (as you've submitted) would be "I know there are bricks" or something similar ("I know bricks exist), but I would think that in order for you to say you know something of bricks existing, you will necessarily have to use the existence verb "to be" or explicitly use the word "exists."

You really wouldn't say "I know bricks" in regular discourse. You'd say you know there are bricks. By the same token, you wouldn't say "I believe bricks," but you'd say "I believe there are bricks," which demands the same reliance on the "to be" verb as when speaking of knowledge.

Keep in mind too that English has largely abandoned the subjunctive mood, but the antiquated "I believe there be bricks" is correct because you change the "to be" verb when you're speaking about something that exists in a subjective capacity like beliefs, wishes, and the like (e.g. "I wish I were there," not "I wish I was there."). Anyway, as noted, this is turning into a grammar lesson as opposed to an epistemological or metaphysical one, but it is a well established notion in Western languages that statements of belief receive different grammatical treatment than indicative statements.

Anyway, as noted, this is turning into a grammar lesson as opposed to an epistemological or metaphysical one, — Hanover

It's never occurred to me that philosophers who stated that propositions are the objects of belief were making metaphysical claims. It's really more along the lines of drawing out a schematic.

To believe is a verb that has to have a receiving object (something that receives the action of believing). That is a grammatical fact. I suppose we could try out the scenario that all we're really doing here is drawing schematics based on language use and we should refrain from imagining that our schematics thus drawn have anything to do with reality.

Let's just stop for a second and soak in the implications of that. Wow. Philosophy can close up shop and go home. Take up teaching kindergarten, maybe.

Maybe I could back up and just put it this way: there is a standard scenario. What is the alternative to it? And is that alternative not behaviorism or something equally science-fictiony?

the action of believing — frank

Even though "believe" is a verb, it's not obvious to me that believing is an action. Say you believe that X. That looks to me more like a partial description of your mental state than a description of something you're mentally doing.

I suspect a belief is even more like a rule that guides your thought and behavior. If you believe Trump is a good man, among other things when asked if you think he's a good man, you'll answer "yes" (if speaking candidly). If you believe a knife is sharp, you'll handle it carefully, and so on.

Not an action, and not just behavior, but a way of thinking and acting.

The object of belief can't be a physical object anyway. I believe that brick. That makes no sense. I believe that the brick is red. That makes sense. — frank

A report is not equivalent to what's being reported upon. A belief is not equivalent to a report thereof. The above seems to neglect this.

A belief is not equivalent to a report thereof. — creativesoul

Of course not.

To believe is a verb that has to have a receiving object (something that receives the action of believing). That is a grammatical fact. — frank

If that is a rule which sets forth how to sensibly, correctly, and/or properly use the term "belief", then it is itself based upon an emaciated understanding of what belief is and/or how it is formed and held.

What is the notion of "object of belief" doing here aside from unnecessarily overcomplicating the discourse?

I suspect a belief is even more like a rule that guides your thought and behavior. If you believe Trump is a good man, among other things when asked if you think he's a good man, you'll answer "yes" (if speaking candidly). If you believe a knife is sharp, you'll handle it carefully, and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

Belief is a yes. Works for me.

A belief is not equivalent to a report thereof.
— creativesoul

Of course not. — frank

Good.

Focusing upon how we report upon our belief aims at the wrong target.

OK.

What is the notion of "object of belief" doing here aside from unnecessarily overcomplicating the discourse? — creativesoul

The word "slap" is a verb that has to have an object. If I say, "John slapped.", it's just assumed that he slapped something or somebody.

Belief is just such a verb. It just has to have an object. If we abandon this scenario, I think it would be necessary to stop using the word belief and make up a new word. Sneag. Let's discuss sneag.

Belief is not a verb. Belief is a noun.

...

:up:

The word "slap" is a verb that has to have an object. If I say, "John slapped.", it's just assumed that he slapped something or somebody.

Belief is just such a verb. It just has to have an object. — frank

If you say "John believed" then your report must have an object... John believed what? You state what you claim John believed.

Your report is not John's belief.

I'm not sure if there is agreement, given the fact that you do not always seem to believe what you write...

If John had belief, he believed something.

not sure if there is agreement, given the fact that you do not always seem to believe what you write... — creativesoul

Have a wonderful day. Take a long look at my avatar before you take a walk in the sprung spring. :)

Given your belief that DJT is a good man, you might also vote for him, campaign for him, give him money, etc.

Btw, grammatical form isn't necessarily logical form. Classic example:

• The king's carriage was pulled by black horses.

vs.

• The king's carriage was pulled by four horses.

"Black" is a type of horse, in some sense, but "four" isn't.

↪creativesoul If John had belief, he believed something. — frank

If John had fleas, he flead something.
If John had bad hair, he bad haired something.
If John had apple pie, he apple pied something.
If John had smarts, he smarted something.


If John had belief, he has drawn correlation(s) between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or himself. We correctly report upon John's belief by virtue of setting out these meaningful connections...