Yes I am. I know how to use the word properly, but I have zero confidence that I know what I'm talking about.
What's an idea? — frank
Where would you place the temporal genesis of this foundation of indifference? — frank
If you know how to use the word then you know what you are talking about. It seems to me that you are asking what an idea *really* is in some imagined ultimate or metaphysical sense. We don't need to know that to know that two atheists share in common the rejection of the idea of God, whatever the idea might *ultimately* consist in. — Janus
Some... belief is prior to language. All belief is meaningful. Some meaning is prior to language. — creativesoul
If you know how to use the word then you know what you are talking about. — Janus
Some... belief is prior to language. All belief is meaningful. Some meaning is prior to language.
— creativesoul
But is belief prior to syntactic structure? Is meaning prior to syntactic structure? — apokrisis
You are pushing the semantic content story, the mental object story. Words describe ideas. — apokrisis
What does syntactic structure consist of? I'm being reminded of mentalese here... — creativesoul
So, it only follows that non-linguistic belief content can include that which is existentially dependent upon language, as long as that is perceptible. — creativesoul
On my view, with my very limited understanding, there is no syntax of any kind without language. — creativesoul
On my view, with my very limited understanding, there is no syntax of any kind without language.
— creativesoul
But now the definition of language comes into play. If neural signals are syntactic... — apokrisis
So again, to identify syntax as strictly a property of human speech leaves you short when it comes to telling the deeper story of semiotic continuity. It sets up an explanatory hurdle where one need not be. — apokrisis
...that is what psychology does. Ecological or gestalt approaches to perception are seeking out the syntax that structures thought at an animal degree of development. — apokrisis
Sure, we can observe non-linguistic creatures and infer that they hold belief...
But that is just plain utterly inadequate for any in depth discourse about that belief. — creativesoul
You replied...
It's not inadequate, inadequate to whom? And what is inadequate here?
You seem to want to get to the essence of the belief. Here's how I see what we're talking about: Let's again use Wittgenstein's example of a game. I'm looking at baseball, chess, patience, monopoly, children playing catch, etc., as examples of games, which is the same as looking at people and animals doing a variety of things apart from language that are examples of beliefs. One can say, but there's much more to the game than these examples, the intentions of people, the correlations being made, the poor gamesmanship, the coach, but, I don't need to know all of this to properly use the word game. It seems to me that you are over-analyzing the word as if you're trying to find some precise definition that gives the word belief some final meaning, or some meaning that is special to your idea of belief. It doesn't exist. You also seem to be making the mistake that Wittgenstein said was one of the cardinal problems of philosophical analysis (viz., definitions and theories), i.e., that there is some final analysis that explains these concepts, but that's like looking at a family and thinking that there's some final analysis that will explain the many family resemblances there are between family members.
So your response that my use of the word belief is inadequate as I use it to say this or that example IS an example of a belief, is like saying that the word game is inadequate as I use it to say this or that IS an example of a game. Moreover, even your use of the word inadequate is improper. All you're saying is that it's inadequate to you.
There's a problem with treating a brick as merely a physical object. When you see a brick and recognise it as a brick, you activate knowledge about bricks you have. The knowledge about bricks that you have also prevents from seeing the brick as it is: brick-naively, so to say. What you see is always already an object-subject relation. This is especially the case with human artefacts, like bricks, which are made to purpose. Seeing a brick as a brick is not so different from understanding the meaning of a word, or not understanding the meaning of a word but recognising it as a word whose meaning you don't understand. So in that sense believing "that brick" could be affirming your learned world view, while centering your attention on a brick. Whether or not it's useful to stretch the term "belief" this far, again, is a question of what you're intending to do with the word. I could designate that sort of meaning to "I believe that brick," using an ungrammatical and thus unintutive phrasing to highlight an unintuitive concept.
If that's too long and confusing, my central point here is this: You can't just assume that a proposition is identical with its phrasing. Saying that a proposition has stable meaning, no matter how you formulate it, and saying that proposition is identical with its phrasing has different implications.
Physical objects are out there in the world and can be perceived by anyone (capable of perceiving physical objects), but you can only perceive them as a specific type of object (say, as a brick), if you have that type already in your mind. If you come to an object naively, you'll still have a world view, and your attempt to deal with an object will eventually create a type. As soon as we have a type, there's potential for calling that belief. I wouldn't, but it's not absurd. — Dawnstorm
I'm still waiting for you to explain the problem mentioned in the first sentence above. It does not follow from the fact that we have all sorts of knowledge about bricks that that knowledge is problematic for treating a brick as a physical object.
I really have difficulty with the way you're employing the notion of perception. Perception is not equivalent to understanding. We perceive a brick. We understand it as "a brick". The dog perceives the same brick. He doesn't understand it as(something called) "a brick". — creativesoul
I'm not sure. The previous discussion seemed to center around paint.
What I would say, is that belief has to have an object just like knowledge always does. Knowledge is always of something. Belief is always in something. That something is not a physical object like a brick, or paint. At the same time, the object of belief is something people share. The situation tempts the philosopher to come up with some alternative to endorsing a non-physical sharable object like a flaming objective idealist.
But I think any alternative will collapse into behaviorism, which is actually worse. What's your perspective? — frank
It seems to me that if we need to redefine the terms "language" and "syntax" in order to make sense of our viewpoints, then we are much better off coining new terms. — creativesoul
...Every individual, whether human or dog, faces the same stimulus: a brick. But we're not perceiving something and then interpeting it... — Dawnstorm
I believe that...
Belief is not always in something... — creativesoul
the action of believing
— frank
Even though "believe" is a verb, it's not obvious to me that believing is an action. Say you believe that X. That looks to me more like a partial description of your mental state than a description of something you're mentally doing. — Srap Tasmaner
What is the notion of "object of belief" doing here aside from unnecessarily overcomplicating the discourse? — creativesoul
The word "slap" is a verb that has to have an object. If I say, "John slapped.", it's just assumed that he slapped something or somebody.
Belief is just such a verb. It just has to have an object. If we abandon this scenario, I think it would be necessary to stop using the word belief and make up a new word. Sneag. Let's discuss sneag. — frank
Belief is not a verb. Belief is a noun. — creativesoul
If John had belief, he believed something. — frank
If John had fleas, he flead something.
If John had bad hair, he bad haired something.
If John had apple pie, he apple pied something.
If John had smarts, he smarted something. — creativesoul
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