If John had belief, he believed something. — frank


If John had fleas, he flead something.
If John had bad hair, he bad haired something.
If John had apple pie, he apple pied something.
If John had smarts, he smarted something. — creativesoul — Sapientia

What creativesoul is missing with these supposed analogies is that believing is more of a process, a doing, than it is a having. I tried to point this out to him much earlier in this thread by arguing that animals believe, but do not have beliefs. 'Having a belief' suggests that one is the possessor of something or the holder of something; I hold a belief when I can formulate it such that I can grasp (understand) it reflectively. I say this reflective act requires language use, or at least we have no idea how it could be possible without language use, since we use language to do it.

Later on in the thread I proposed that it would be better to use the terms 'expectation' and 'frustration of expectation', rather than 'belief' and 'doubt' in relation to animals and non-linguistic humans because it does away with all the ambiguity concerning whether or not belief requires language. It is really just a terminological and locutionary issue; an issue of clarity; sometimes common usages can be equivocal, ambiguous, and create confusion that gives rise to the idea that there are genuine problems where there are none.

I find it quite incredible that this thread has so many posts, when really most of the argument is only over a terminological issue. To quote Shakespeare it is "Much ado about nothing" and " full of sound and fury, signifying nothing".

Those seven terms have been called "John's belief", "not John's belief", and "a state of affairs". I'm just pointing that out. Anyone can go look for themselves... — creativesoul

Yes, anyone can misinterpret what I'm saying. That's not unique to you.

This exchange is boring. I predict that you're just going to purposefully keep misinterpreting what I'm saying to suit your argument, as you've been doing so far, so I don't see why I should continue.

Those seven terms have been called "John's belief", "not John's belief", and "a state of affairs". I'm just pointing that out. Anyone can go look for themselves...
— creativesoul

Yes, anyone can misinterpret what I'm saying. That's not unique to you.
. — Sapientia

I didn't misinterpret. That's what you've done.

Set it out...

What is John's belief?
What is the object of John's belief?
What is the state of affairs?
What is the fact that John's belief is about?

A quick perusal through your recent posts will show that they all have the same answer... consisting of the same seven terms. That's not my problem.

That claim negates the other you keep making... — creativesoul

No, it doesn't, and I've explained why. If you want to disregard that explanation, ignore the subtext, and misinterpret what I'm saying, then be my guest. But I'm out.

I didn't misinterpret. That's what you've done.

Set it out...

What is John's belief?
What is the object of John's belief?
What is the state of affairs?
What is the fact that John's belief is about?

A quick perusal through your recent posts will show that they all have the same answer... consisting of the same seven terms. That's not my problem. — creativesoul

Your problem is that - and I say it again, though you'll probably ignore it again - resemblance is not equivalence, and different categories are not the same category.

That's your problem, and I hope you resolve it.

Let A = some state of affairs (whatever that turns out to mean)

Philosophers would usually call "that <A>" a fact, by which it is meant that A obtains. This is a little unfortunate, because it makes the grammar of "<S> believes that <A>" puzzling.

If someone S has a belief regarding A, it could be that A does or does not obtain, that A is possible or not, likely or not, etc.

It seems most natural to call the object of S's belief this obtaining or not obtaining of A (or its possibility, likelihood, etc.), rather than A itself, but a little ambiguity here might be harmless.

As I suggested a long time ago, it might be fruitful to treat A as something like the indirect object of S's belief: S believes of A that it obtains (is possible, is likely, etc). You can do this with the elements of A as well, something like, "S believes of the cat that it is on the mat."

(Two reasons to lean this way: we can separate the referential and predicative functions of the proposition; it's one simple, not overly unnatural step toward the lambda calculus -- (λx . x is on the mat)(the cat) -- and we like lambdas.)

What creativesoul is missing with these supposed analogies is that believing is more of a process than a having. I tried to point this out to him much earlier in this thread by arguing that animals believe, but do not have beliefs. 'Having a belief' suggests that one is the possessor of something or the holder of something; I hold a belief when I can formulate it such that I can grasp (understand) it reflectively. I say this reflective act requires language use, or at least we have no idea how it could be possible without language use, since we use language to do it. — Janus

I'm not missing it, Janus. I'm rejecting it. If we say that having a belief requires formulating it and understanding it, then we automatically set out a criterion for having belief that is existentially dependent upon language, for that criterion requires thinking about one's own thought and belief.

And yet, prior to being able to think about one's own thought and belief, there must first be something to think about. So, the criterion you suggest cannot even take account of thinking about thought and belief.

Well, I need not argue anymore about the notion of "object of belief" adding nothing but unnecessary confusion. That much is clear enough...

Again you are missing the distinction between pre-linguistic believing (which I think should be called 'expecting') and linguistic having of beliefs. Of course the latter is derivative of the former; the latter is a making explicit of what is merely implicit in the former.

Let A = some state of affairs (whatever that turns out to mean)

Philosophers would usually call "that <A>" a fact, by which it is meant that A obtains. This is a little unfortunate, because it makes the grammar of "<S> believes that <A>" puzzling.

If someone S has a belief regarding A, it could be that A does or does not obtain, that A is possible or not, likely or not, etc.

It seems most natural to call the object of S's belief this obtaining or not obtaining of A (or its possibility, likelihood, etc.), rather than A itself, but a little ambiguity here might be harmless.

As I suggested a long time ago, it might be fruitful to treat A as something like the indirect object of S's belief: S believes of A that it obtains (is possible, is likely, etc). You can do this with the elements of A as well, something like, "S believes of the cat that it is on the mat." — Srap Tasmaner

I'm with you so far, I find it agreeable, I don't have any problem with it, and I don't think that it poses any problem for my stance.

(Two reasons to lean this way: we can separate the referential and predicative functions of the proposition; it's one simple, not overly unnatural step toward the lambda calculus -- (λx . x is on the mat)(the cat) -- and we like lambdas.) — Srap Tasmaner

I just don't quite follow this part because of a lack of familiarity, but it gives me something to look into and figure out.

Again you are missing the distinction between pre-linguistic believing (which I think should be called 'expecting') and linguistic having of beliefs. Of course the latter is derivative of the former; the latter is a making explicit of what is merely implicit in the former. — Janus

Actually, this doesn't strike me as wrong. In fact, you're saying much the same thing as myself. The difference is that you hold that not all believing requires forming and/or holding belief. Whereas, on my view that makes no sense.

John believes that "The cat is on the mat" is a true statement. He holds this belief about the cat's whereabouts as a result of looking at the facts(the current situation). If it is the case that there is a cat on the mat, then the belief is true because the facts obtain. This is my report of John's belief. If John does indeed believe that the cat is on the mat, and the cat is on the mat then John's belief is true, and my account accurate(or true, because the facts obtain).

The cat's whereabouts are what John's belief is about. The 'object of belief' to some circles...

John has belief. John believes something. That something is not Johns belief. Rather, it is what John's belief is about. John's belief is about the whereabouts of the cat. So...

John believes the cat's whereabouts.

That's not right...

I could agree that pre-linguistic believing involves forming expectation(s) ("forming" in the sense that expectations could be changing), but what, over and above that would "holding" them involve, on your view? I could see the sense in saying that expectations could hold (until they change) but not they are held.

I don't think that it poses any problem for my stance. — Sapientia

Wasn't meant to. Just chiming in. Endless one-on-one around here can get tiresome.

I could agree that pre-linguistic believing involves forming expectation(s) ("forming" in the sense that expectations could be changing), but what, over and above that would "holding" them involve, on your view? I could see the sense in saying that expectations could hold (until they change) but not they are held. — Janus

Yeah. I can see how the term "holding" could be problematic. However, it means nothing more and nothing less than the creature has formed a belief by virtue of drawing correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or itself. When that belief begins to show it's efficacy, the behaviour will follow. Hence, the belief is held. Expectation is most certainly indicative of this...

which I think should be called 'expecting' — Janus

It's a nice word. You can do a whole lot with just "expectation" and "preference" and translating everything else into those two.

Wasn't meant to. — Srap Tasmaner

Didn't mean to suggest otherwise.

Just chiming in. Endless one-on-one around here can get tiresome. — Srap Tasmaner

S'all good. I appreciate the distraction. It was indeed tiring. Could you tell? :grin:

I still love ya Sapientia...

:heart:

And I love hating you, creative. :heart:

It's a nice word. You can do a whole lot with just "expectation" and "preference" and translating everything else into those two. — Srap Tasmaner

Indeed! I would like to add 'seeing' to that list, though.

My God your a bloviating bastard! :heart:

However, it means nothing more and nothing less than the creature has formed a belief by virtue of drawing correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or itself. — creativesoul

I don't think it is appropriate to talk in terms of the subject/object dichotomy when it comes to pre-reflective experience. This kind of talk is a projection of our own (linguistically enabled) reflections.

I can plausibly speak of an animals expectation, on the other hand, insofar as it is manifest in its body language.

I don't think it is appropriate to talk in terms of the subject/object dichotomy when it comes to pre-reflective experience. This kind of talk is a projection of our own (linguistically enabled) reflections. — Janus

The funny thing is that I'm not at all comfortable with that term either... I reject the objective/subjective dichotomy... For now, it's as close as I can muster to what I want to say is going on...

Hence, the scare-quotes...

I can plausibly speak of an animals expectation, on the other hand, insofar as it is manifest in its body language. — Janus

Expectation is belief-based though, wouldn't you agree?

No, I would say the opposite; that belief is primordially expectation-based. With language of course it may become more elaborate and free itself from mere expectation based on habit. With the linguistic-based ability to consider the past and future, belief may become based on desire, and aspiration.

My cat hears certain rustling of certain plastics, and she comes...

She is clearly expecting to be given treats. I'm claiming that that expectation is the efficacy of her belief being put on display. The content of her belief is correlations. She has drawn a correlation between the particular sound and what happened afterwards... Thus, when she hears that sound she expects to be given treats because of the belief she has formed and held since.

How would you explain this situation if she had no belief?

I'm not sure there's any harm in adding belief talk here. But if the idea is that explicit appeal to induction will explain everything, that might not work out.

Say your cat has formed an inductive generalization that A is always followed by B, and given A concludes that B must be coming. That seems to explain the expectation of B.

But what explains your cat making the inference at all? The cat's belief that A is always followed by B, together with the appearance of A -- still gives you nothing. Either the cat makes the inference for a reason -- hard to see that working out -- or the cat is caused to make the inference. No explanation in the offing for that.

So if bare expectation is considered unsatisfactory, shifting to belief talk instead leaves bare unexplained inference. Maybe that's progress, I don't know.

Does everybody agree with Janus that if you know how to use words like "belief" and "idea", then you know what they are, and there's no need for any metaphysical hoodoo? I like that.

.

I'm not sure there's any harm in adding belief talk here. But if the idea is that explicit appeal to induction will explain everything, that might not work out.

Say your cat has formed an inductive generalization that A is always followed by B, and given A concludes that B must be coming. That seems to explain the expectation of B.

But what explains your cat making the inference at all? The cat's belief that A is always followed by B, together with the appearance of A -- still gives you nothing. Either the cat makes the inference for a reason -- hard to see that working out -- or the cat is caused to make the inference. No explanation in the offing for that.

So if bare expectation is considered unsatisfactory, shifting to belief talk instead leaves bare unexplained inference. Maybe that's progress, I don't know. — Srap Tasmaner

The cat's belief, strictly speaking in terms of it's content, are the correlations drawn between the sound and getting treats. I would err on the side of involuntary when it comes to the 'cause' of her belief formation. Why need there be a reason in these rudimentary examples? That it happens, and we can take proper account of it suffices. I'm not even sure that I would call her drawing the correlation an inference, seeing how loaded the term is. It is certainly not unexplained, however...