Calibrating one ruler by means of another may well be circular, but it doesn't follow that measuring a ruler with another ruler is circular. — Arkady
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there issomething it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.
Again, we are not trying to calibrate or justify the reliability of a given ruler by matching it against another ruler. — Arkady
We are assuming that the ruler with which we're performing the measurement is reliable or accurate, and then using that to measure other items, including, perhaps another ruler. — Arkady
But if you believe that we can reliably use rulers to measure objects why does it suddenly become problematic when said objects are other rulers? I think you have some 'splainin' to do, Lucy. — Arkady
Nope. You can measure a ruler for any reason whatsoever: for shits and giggles, because the hash marks have worn off and you no longer know how long it is, etc. You are attempting to make a logical claim (i.e. measuring a ruler with a ruler is circular) by appealing to the psychological motivations of the measurer (i.e. "why else would one measure a ruler with a ruler if not to calibrate them?").To measure a ruler with another ruler, is to calibrate or justify it's reliability by comparing it to another ruler. What else could measuring a ruler with another ruler possibly mean? — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure. Humans have culture, not all of which is likely reducible to evolutionary explanations. Nothing shocking about that. Most scientists would probably agree with you, actually (and I am sure that most cultural anthropologists would agree with you, as they tend to resist the infiltration of biological explanations into their field).Whereas, I say, that when h. sapiens actually reached the point of reasoning, story-telling and language, then their (our) being is no longer amenable to a simply biological explanation; we're no longer 'just animals'. I know that is a shockingly atavistic utterance but there it is. — Wayfarer
Having said that, I don't even see an inherent circularity in using a ruler to measure another ruler in order to calibrate the measured ruler's (as opposed to the measuring ruler's) accuracy: if we have good reason to believe that the measuring ruler is well-calibrated (say, by comparing it directly against the standard unit of measurement), then we can use that to calibrate other rulers (if two rulers disagree, and we have good reason to believe that one ruler is well-calibrated, then it follows that the other ruler is probably the inaccurate one). — Arkady
Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. You yourself said, "It is the calibration against the defined object which removes the circularity." Hence my point that there's nothing inherently circular about using one ruler to measure another.Yes, this is the point. Without comparing it to "the standard unit of measurement", the measuring of the ruler's accuracy by measuring it with another ruler will lead to an infinite regress of one ruler measuring another, or a circle of rulers measuring each other. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. — Arkady
Now what is Dennett's response to this? Very simple: he says there is no problem. He says the problem that Chalmers talks about doesn't exist or that it isn't real. — Wayfarer
So what exactly that primordial experience consists in; what the necessary conditions must be for its possibility and for its actuality can become metaphysical questions. Is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as physical: some sort of blind energetic or virtual process that gives rise to this world and the beings that experience it) or is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as mental: a spiritual and/ or intentional process. Or is it somehow both at once and/or neither? — Janus
[...] I am merely pointing out that, once you lose the lingering Cartesian dualist presuppositions, it is not inherently a self-contradictory view, as many of its critics seem to want to claim it to be — Janus
Dennett, in one of his characteristic remarks, assures us that “through the microscope of molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of agency, in the first macromolecules that have enough complexity to ‘do things.’ ... There is something alien and vaguely repellent about the quasi-agency we discover at this level — all that purposive hustle and bustle, and yet there’s nobody home.” Then, after describing a marvelous bit of highly organized and seemingly meaningful biological activity, he concludes:
Love it or hate it, phenomena like this exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe. [From Darwin’s Dangereous Idea.]
If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular.Do you recognize that the point being made is the necessity of the assumption? You say,there is nothing inherently circular, "if we assume...". Therefore I conclude that you recognize that there actually is something inherently circular about measuring one ruler with another, a circularity which is only removed by the application of that assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover
The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer
If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular. — Arkady
I don't even accept the premise that using a ruler to measure another ruler is circular per se. I agree that using one ruler to measure another in order to calibrate or justify the accuracy of a ruler by means of comparing it against another could be circular under certain circumstances. I was merely pointing out that you yourself accept that it is not circular to do under particular conditions (e.g. when the measuring ruler has been calibrated against some measurement standard).So you have removed the circularity of that act, of measuring one ruler with another ruler, by referring to a particular assumption. We can use "the assumption" to avoid circularity in this measuring act. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now that you understand this, we can move on to Wayfarer's concern, which I'll call the act of measuring assumptions.
The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer
I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties.Let's say that we can measure an assumption by comparing it to another assumption. But this is circular. How do we remove the circularity in this case? We cannot use "the assumption" to avoid circularity because this is the very circle which we are in.
And how does measuring a ruler with a ruler assume what is to be proven or demonstrated, which is the definition of circular reasoning?The circularity in using a ruler to measure a ruler is that the standard is arbitrary. The official 1 metre ruler has been picked as the standard, but there is no reason why any other object might not have been chosen to be the standard for '1 metre'. It is 1 metre not because we have measured it, but because we say it is. Nor is it exactly the case that the official 1 metre ruler is the same as 1 metre. The 1 metre is abstract, it is pure length, a single dimension. — Londoner
I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties. — Arkady
The study found that brain scans could detect what a subject was thinking based on the physical state of his brain. If this isn't detecting the "meaning" of thoughts (in terms of propositional content), then what would constitute such a demonstration? — Arkady
I also warned him against conflating the study of reason with the study of reasoning (the latter is much more in the purview of cog sci or neuroscience): they are not equivalent. — Arkady
And how does measuring a ruler with a ruler assume what is to be proven or demonstrated, which is the definition of circular reasoning? — Arkady
Again, if this process is so viciously circular, how do ruler manufacturers perform quality checks on their products if not by some measuring implement which has been calibrated in accordance with the standard of measurement? — Arkady
Sorry, but you totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're getting at.As Wayfarer explained, the circularity is only avoided by turning to first person experience. From this perspective we can ask questions such as "what is an assumption?", or "what does it mean to make an assumption?". Do you see a difference between determining the meaning of an assumption, and making an assumption? — Metaphysician Undercover
Firstly, it's not necessarily the case that "what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you:" different people may well glean the same meaning from the same proposition. If you wish to attribute some sort of extreme relativism to "meaning," wherein no two agents can possibly have the same understanding of a given proposition, speech act, or artifact's "meaning," then I don't even see how communication between agents would be possible. People disagree on occasion, yes, but it doesn't follow that said disagreement isn't sometimes just due to linguistic confusion on the part of one or both parties.I think this passage indicates that you do not apprehend "meaning" at all. That you think "meaning" may be expressed as "propositional content" betrays this. Do you not recognize that what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you? That this is the case indicates that it is impossible to express meaning as propositional content. Consider, that what Wayfarer sees as circular, you do not see as circular. Therefore the propositions involved have a different meaning for Wayfarer than they do for you.
Philosophy does the "thinking about thinking." Questions such as what reason is, which sorts of arguments and beliefs are reasonable or rational, etc. fall in the purview of philosophy. How agents reason, how the cognitive and neural mechanisms operate in their brain (and other relevant systems) when they're thinking is in the purview of cognitive science, neuroscience, and other allied fields.I don't know what you mean by "the study of reason". Nor do I know what you mean by "the study of reasoning". I've revisited your posts in an attempt to understand this distinction, but I haven't found it explained. Perhaps you could provide me with a description?
Sorry, but you totally lost me here. I have no idea what you're getting at. — Arkady
Firstly, it's not necessarily the case that "what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you:" different people may well glean the same meaning from the same proposition. — Arkady
...then I don't even see how communication between agents would be possible. — Arkady
People disagree on occasion, yes, but it doesn't follow that said disagreement isn't sometimes just due to linguistic confusion on the part of one or both parties. — Arkady
You seem to hold "meaning" in some sort of quasi-religious reverence. My point with regard to the brain scanning technologies discussed here was only that investigators can, with a certain degree of reliability under highly controlled experimental conditions, determine what a subject is thinking about using brain imaging. If you find it more "satisfying" to drop talk of "meaning" from any of this, then feel free to do so: I have no special affinity for the term. — Arkady
Philosophy does the "thinking about thinking." Questions such as what reason is, which sorts of arguments and beliefs are reasonable or rational, etc. fall in the purview of philosophy. How agents reason, how the cognitive and neural mechanisms operate in their brain (and other relevant systems) when they're thinking is in the purview of cognitive science, neuroscience, and other allied fields. — Arkady
We cannot even determine what someone is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying? I'm going to stop this farce right here, because this is just such a wad of nonsense that it beggars belief. The very fact that we're having a conversation falsifies that spurious claim.We cannot even determine what a person is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying, so how could you determine what a person is thinking about by using brain imaging? — Metaphysician Undercover
We cannot even determine what someone is thinking about by interpreting what they are saying? — Arkady
The number of times I've had to reply to this non sequitur argument at this forum is amazing. That you and I can hold a conversation says nothing about your ability to know what I am thinking. The existence of deception ought to dispel this faulty conclusion.The very fact that we're having a conversation falsifies that spurious claim. — Arkady
He's basically talking about Dennett, — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.