Mental state is involved in the expression of and comprehension of statements. Private or not, mental state can't be irrelevant.

I could start describing my phenomenal state now, looking out the window, hearing the rain, smelling the smells, thinking various thoughts, have various stresses, etc. and after thousands and thousands of pages, I'd still have left something out and you would not experience my experience. You'd just sort of know about it. — Hanover

Yes - but is there some particular aspect of this that cannot be written?

Such is the theory that given an infinite amount of time we could precisely describe a single thought. Like I said, maybe, but I doubt it. — Hanover

There is a difference between saying everything can be spoken of and saying that anything can be spoken of.

The beetle argument shows that anything can be talked about sets out what counts as a thing. It's a consequence of the extent* of our world being the extent of our language.

Of course this does not mean that our world cannot grow - show us something new, and we will bring it into our language and hence into our world.

*Usually written as "the limits of our world are the limits of our language" - but that makes folk get hung up on the word limits.

What?

Hanover seems to think I deny internal experiences. I don't. I'm saying that if they can not be shared, spoken about, then they are irrelevant. — Banno

Irrelevant to what, is the question.

Well, one's beliefs, for a start.

Belief entails consciousness. Whatever consciousness may be (expressable or not), it's relevant.

Were you thinking that consciousness reduces to a bunch of statements?

And am I by any chance speaking Swahili right now? You never seem to understand me.

But why would you suppose that I don't think consciousness is involved in belief?

You seemed to be considering the possibility that it's irrelevant. Obviously it can't be.

I'm going to go over the bit about belief and falsehood again, since it is more interesting than repeating the private language argument again and again.

Belief allows us to play the language game of correcting our errors. "I believed it, but it was wrong". It does this by acknowledging a distinction between what is true and what is stated, spoken, acted on and so on.

That's why beliefs are propositional attitudes - they have to be about stuff.

That's why they involve an individual - they have to be about what an agent does.

This is the best analysis I've seen so far.

You seemed to be considering the possibility that it's irrelevant. Obviously it can't be. — frank

Frank, do you think that being conscious and having 'phenomenal states" are the same?

I gather you do, since you equate my negative attitude to phenomenal states as a negative attitude towards consciousness.

But being conscious and having 'phenomenal states" are not the same. One has phenomenal states during a dream, when one is not conscious.

What?

Lol. Hope you have a good day. :)

Here's my beef with phenomenal states.

If they are ineffable personal experiences, then they cannot be discussed - that's what ineffable" means.

But if they can be spoken of, then they are our feelings, emotions and so on - stuff we already speak of.

So either phenomenal states do not enter into the discussion, or we have been talking aobut them for a very long time.

Either way, they do not add to the discussion.

If they are ineffable personal experiences, then they cannot be discussed - that's what ineffable" means. — Banno

The ineffability need not be absolute. The police sketch artist hears the words and draws the picture, but never gets it exactly right. The source of the information lies in the witness' mind, the language roughly estimates and transmits it, and the recipient loses something in translation. Why is the sketch never exact?

If you make a perfume (as you're known to do) and tell me it smells of roses, and I don't think it does, I'll tell you that, but don't expect me to tell you why. I just don't have any real language for smells. It's ineffable, but I know your perfume isn't roses.

Suppose you and I are driving down the road, you glumly staring out the passenger window. I, looking out the windshield since I'm driving, see a hot air balloon, and I say something like, "Wow, look at that!" Without turning, you say, "Yeah, that's awesome." (Maybe you're a sulky teenager in this scenario.)

Your phenomenal state is irrelevant, so it doesn't matter that you responded without turning to look at what I was remarking upon, right?

Yep. The 'effable' grows with the conversation.

Fill that in - what is it you think is going on here that is not in my account? Or are you agreeing with me?

But it never ends.

Which "it"?

The ineffable.

The ineffable never ends. — Hanover

You say things about that about which you can't say things.

There's the problem.

Back to error.

Truth results from falsehood. If every statement were true we would have no need to note that they were true. It is because some statements are false that we need to distinguish them from the ones that are true.

We need belief because we sometimes give assent to and act on statements that are false. There is a mismatch between what we do or say and what is the case. We can deal with this by using belief.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief.

Just trying to get a handle on this irrelevance.

If I invite you to look at something, I'm inviting you to have a particular phenomenal experience, aren't I? That phenomenal experience, according to you, is irrelevant to something, so I'm trying to figure out what difference it could make for you to accept or refuse my invitation.

If I complain that you didn't even look, does it make sense for you to explain that your phenomenal state is irrelevant?

If all our belief were true, there would be no need to discriminate between true/false belief. But... not all our belief is true.
— creativesoul

Yes.

Creatures with the ability to think about their own thought and belief - and those without - are capable of having true and false belief. Only the former can become aware of it.
— creativesoul

Hence belief and language go together. — Banno

Perfect Banno. The difference between our accounts is clear.

That doesn't follow, but I suspect you know that already. It's a matter of existential dependency. Thinking about thought and belief is dependent upon language. Becoming aware of thought and belief is dependent upon thinking about thought and belief. It follows that becoming aware of thought and belief is dependent upon language. Hence...

Becoming aware of belief and language 'go together'...

Not all creatures capable of having belief are capable of thinking about thought and belief.

Do not neglect the distinction between what belief requires, and what thinking about belief requires. The latter includes language. The former does not. The latter requires the former. The former does not require the latter.

Belief presupposes truth.
— creativesoul

Yes - and falsehood. — Banno

Well, no. As above, the awareness of belief presupposes falsehood.

Belief allows us to play the language game of correcting our errors. "I believed it, but it was wrong". It does this by acknowledging a distinction between what is true and what is stated, spoken, acted on and so on.

That's why beliefs are propositional attitudes - they have to be about stuff.

That's why they involve an individual - they have to be about what an agent does.

This is the best analysis I've seen so far. — Banno

It's a fine analysis of reports/accounts of belief. These are not equivalent to belief. A report/account of belief is about belief. The game of correcting errors is noting the difference(s) between belief and fact/reality.

Truth results from falsehood. If every statement were true we would have no need to note that they were true. It is because some statements are false that we need to distinguish them from the ones that are true.

We need belief because we sometimes give assent to and act on statements that are false. There is a mismatch between what we do or say and what is the case. We can deal with this by using belief.

Hence belief becomes and explanation for our actions, such that when we act erroneously, we might explain it by noting that we held a false belief. — Banno

To say "Truth results from falsehood" is to neglect to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between truth/falsehood and our awareness of truth/falsehood. I refer you to my last post. It is relevant here as well...

If I invite you to look at something, I'm inviting you to have a particular phenomenal experience, aren't I? That phenomenal experience, according to you, is irrelevant to something, so I'm trying to figure out what difference it could make for you to accept or refuse my invitation. — Srap Tasmaner

This language is fraught.

What more is said in "I'm inviting you to have a particular phenomenal experience" than is said in "Take a look at this"? If they are the same, then dispense with the excessive talk of phenomena; if more is being said, then exactly what?

Again, note the if: IF the phenomenal experience is ineffable, then it is irrelevant to the discussion.

And if the phenomenal experience is part of the discussion, then again, what more is it than "look at this"?

The attraction of talking about phenomena seems to be that it somehow allows us to get inside the head - inside the other person's beetle-containing box. It doesn't.

What underwrites our different positions is that I draw a distinction between notions of "belief", "falsehood", and "truth" and what they're taking account of, whereas you do not. Most of our notions are indistinct from our language. I would agree with you that there is no such distinction to be drawn between our notions and the monikers we give them, if it were not for the fact that some of our notions point towards that which is not existentially dependent upon our awareness of them. Such things exist in their entirety prior to our attempts at accounting for them. This allows us to be able to say that true belief does not require our awareness of it. Nor does false belief.

No it's not. You have this truly odd identity theory that equates the phenomenal state to its linguistic description, as if telling you the ball is round is somehow equated to my phenomenal state of the round ball. Telling you I saw an awe inspiring sunset hardly places you in awe.

Is there no irony in your inability to convey your position to me despite the thousands of words expended?

...my phenomenal state of the round ball. — Hanover

See, Hanover, I cannot make sense of this at all. Your position and my own are similar in that we both claim a distinction between monikers for mental ongoings and the mental ongoings. However, this kind of talk looks like a conflation between mind/not mind.

The attraction of talking about phenomena seems to be that it somehow allows us to get inside the head - inside the other person's beetle-containing box. It doesn't. — Banno

No, the attraction is that it is the cause of our speaking to one another in the first place and it forms the basis all of our communication.

I don't understand your confusion. Can I not have a phenomenal state of a round ball.