I can and on occasion do confirm what I sense by discussing it with others who either agree or disagree, and typically we come to some sort of agreement. How do you do it? — Cavacava
Phenomenon, is by definition subjective, of the subject. I don't see how you manage to turn this around, and make the claim that it is objectively certain. — Metaphysician Undercover
From his commentators and translators come these as correctives: Kant was never for a single instant beguiled or confused by reality or practical knowledge of that reality. His ding an sich was more often ding an sich selbst: the latter being thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself. Kant knew the chair was a chair, and he knew that he knew it - as a practical matter. When he then reflected on exactly what he knew and how, he understood he was asking a different question, from the ground of Wissenschaft, science. His argument was that scientific thinking can't get to the chair in itself, as it is in itself. I understand this simply to mean that all knowledge falls under, can be brought under, either practical knowledge or scientific knowledge, with the consequence that all knowledge is human knowledge, and the corollary that there is no knowledge qua knowledge. Indeed, if you pursue a scientist with iterations of the question, "How do you know," if he's a good scientist, soon enough he'll acknowledge that, (at the level of questioning achieved) he doesn't, and that what passes for knowledge (at that level) is either a working hypothesis or an absolute presupposition, i.e., an axiom. So much for Kant, almost. — tim wood
I can handle "perception" in this context: it's just something that happens (in me, if it's my perception). Phenomenon seems to be what gives rise to the perception. Let's question it. First, is it? If we agree that the perception was caused, then there was something that caused the perception - seems trivial enough. Let's just call that cause the phenomenon. It would appear the objective certainty transfers to the phenomenon - it is! — tim wood
Now, it is not clear to me that the phenomenon (not to be confused with perception) has a content independent of itself. — tim wood
I see a tree: I perceive a tree. Some phenomenon caused me to see the tree. Let's suppose that the phenomenon in question either is the tree that caused my perception, or is not the tree & etc. — tim wood
You seem to be reading Cavacava as attaching "objective certainty" (OC) to the object, via perception/phenomenon. I read him as taking the step - to me, radical - of finding his OC in the perception, and the object doesn't enter into it. You have him anchored to the object; I read him as having cast off and sailed entirely away from it, his argument Cogito-like: I perceive, therefore perception.This is the problem with "objective certainty". We want to assume that how the subject perceives the world, as "objects" is how the world really is, independent of subjects. That is what we "want", therefore we want to validate "objects" as independent from subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover
Cavacava does seem to emphasize consensus. I'm thinking verification is more than mere consensus. By objective, I mean that the grounds for agreement are compelling and demonstrable.So we appeal to an inter-subjectivity as described by Cavacava, and we insist that this inter-subjectivity, agreement and convention concerning "objects", manifests as an objectivity which is independent of the subjects' minds. But all this really is, is an agreement amongst subjects concerning the objects within their minds. It does not validate objects which are external and independent from human minds. It is just agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we must reconsider true "objective certainty". Since objects are proper only to the minds of individual subjects, then "objective certainty" is that certainty which is proper to individual subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover
But don’t let that fool you into believing that they’re really ‘chairs and tables’; they simply fulfil that function, which is what makes them what they are. But, of course, that leaves a very large question; or should, anyway. — Wayfarer
If I read you right, things just are properties, and it/they are in continual motion, continually changing. This iincludes mental states (from above). — tim wood
From above, I argued that a bucket of chemicals does not explain your taste in neckties. I think you're in the position of claiming that it does. Please make your case. — tim wood
I have agreed that at some sub-atomic level, we're all electronic whizzies in constant motion - that as underlying ground, but not account. In the sense that metal is the "ground" of an automobile engine, but not the account of it. It's up to you to tell us how the sub-atomic particles that make up steel, for example, have in themselves the ability to become the engine. Or how your intestines, for example, cause you to favour striped over solid neckties. — tim wood
But the thing itself? What about the thing itself - is that abandoned? Apparently in Cavacava's view - we don't have to worry about it. And I think there's something to this. If the tree-in-itself really is as we perceive it, then we've gained, but not more than we already have. If it isn't, well, first question would be, how do we know it isn't. Second, what difference does it make? — tim wood
The tree, then, whatever it might be, gives rise to - causes - the perception of the tree. — tim wood
Where is - what is - the phenomenon, if it is not the tree itself? — tim wood
I think this yields - is - Cavacava's point. He extends it by way of consensus, which arguably leads to a community OC, almost as a kind of transitivity. I accept this for what it's worth, but extend it as a greater OC through verification. — tim wood
Stop right there! What do you say causes the perception. You seem to be saying the object is in the mind - if I see a tree, the tree is in my mind. Is that what you're saying?The point is that the "thing itself" is not an object. The object is produced in the mind of the perceiver, in the act of perception. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the first hurdle. Can we get past it? — tim wood
The point is that the "thing itself" is not an object. The object is produced in the mind of the perceiver, in the act of perception.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Stop right there! What do you say causes the perception. You seem to be saying the object is in the mind - if I see a tree, the tree is in my mind. Is that what you're saying? — tim wood
...it has lost that sense... — Wayfarer
The content of the phenomenon is a re-presentation, — tim wood
The misunderstanding is as tim woods says, that the external object causes the perception. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps the difficulty is with "cause." I only mean that for this perception of this tree, the tree is sina qua non. I'm giving no account as to how it works, simply that it does. We could parse it: no light, no perception - I can't see the tree. Light (then) reflects off the tree into my eye, and I see it : I perceive it.The perceiver causes the perception — Metaphysician Undercover
The Kantian answer to that is, we don't - we only ever know the tree as it appears to us. — Wayfarer
Perceptions, then, come and go. Can we say that they're caused? We can remain agnostic as to what, exactly, the cause is, but there must be one, yes? — tim wood
Perhaps the difficulty is with "cause." I only mean that for this perception of this tree, the tree is sina qua non. I'm giving no account as to how it works, simply that it does. We could parse it: no light, no perception - I can't see the tree. Light (then) reflects off the tree into my eye, and I see it : I perceive it. — tim wood
We affirmed above that when anyone says they see a tree, the one thing that does not happen is that they see a tree, agreed? There's a process, not well understood, that we call seeing the tree. But whatever it is, it involves something - we call it a tree. Is this MU's difficulty, on this understanding of cause? He (MU) appears to say that I create my own perceptions, and not only does the tree have nothing to do with it, but that apparently there ain't no tree. — tim wood
Let's suppose it real, it then puts the question to MU: either it (MU's experience of being whopped and perhaps returning the favour) is all in his head, or he has to 'fess up and say plain that something about it came from "outside" and caused his perception. Which is it? — tim wood
The content of the phenomenon is a re-presentation,
— tim wood
I don't believe there's any good reason to think this. On the contrary, phenomena are all direct presentation. — gurugeorge
Of course we commonly differentiate between things in dreams and things in perceptions, by saying that in the case of perception there is something present to the senses, and there is no such thing present to the senses in dreaming, but this does not dismiss the example, which indicates that objects present to the mind are created by the systems of the being which presents these objects to the mind, not by some external things. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of pain, I suppose, although we could ask if, of all the pain in your life, none of it is traceable to outside causes. But that wasn't the question. The question actually was, given the scenario, was it all in your head, or not?Clearly the pain derived from being whopped is a product of the living body. To move backward down the causal chain, looking for an outside cause, is to take a step away from understanding the cause of the pain. — Metaphysician Undercover
No problem here, for me. Umm, maybe one. If the phenomenal is mind-dependent, then what does "experienced phenomena" mean?Phenomena are mind-caused re-presentations of the mind-independent noumena regarded....To me at least, the phenomenal is mind-dependent, as MU states ... but not the Kantian noumena it re-presents to the perceiver.... Also, experienced phenomena (contra abstract understanding of phenomena at large) will always be experienced as a direct presentation of what is, as gurugoeorge states … but this does not of itself make phenomena when abstractly addressed non-representational of what is regarded. — javra
From his practical knowledge, we gather that, as a practical matter, none of this matters. The tree is a tree; the loaf of bread is just that; his table of friends - his biography tells us that however untraveled he was, he was also sociable and enjoyed company - were just as they seemed. What then of noumena? — tim wood
I'm in this thread because of a recent wrestling match with a small but (imo) good book, The Phenomena of Awareness, C. Tougas. — Tim Wood
I think there's two ways to understand "phenomena are presentation" - either in an idealistic/phenomenological sense, in which there's nothing (or there cannot be shown to be anything) "out there, behind" the phenomenon; or in what I believe to be the true sense, in which the "out there" is in causal continuity with the "in here." — gurugeorge
Actually, no matter. If a perception is caused by something present to the senses, then what is it that is present to the senses? — tim wood
If a "system of the being," how does that work; what gets it going? — tim wood
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