So just wondering if anyone here is familiar with his ideas, and if so, what might one make of them as a viable alternative to physicalism or panpsychism? — snowleopard
though I'm still a bit bemused that apparent 'cranks' get consideration in Scientific American, and seemingly reputable academic journals — snowleopard
For a rigorous, analytical summary of his philosophical ideas, see this freely available academic paper: http://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/2/2/10
Let us start by neutrally and precisely stating four basic facts of reality, verifiable through observation, and therefore known to be valid irrespective of theory or metaphysics:
Fact 1: There are tight correlations between a person’s reported private experiences and the observed brain activity of the person.
We know this from the study of the neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., [5]).
Fact 2: We all seem to inhabit the same universe.
After all, what other people report about their perceptions of the universe is normally consistent with our own perceptions of it.
Fact 3: Reality normally unfolds according to patterns and regularities—that is, the laws of nature—independent of personal volition.
Fact 4: Macroscopic physical entities can be broken down into microscopic constituent parts, such as subatomic particles.
However, with respect, that doesn’t seem reason enough to stop reading at that point. — snowleopard
Anyway, my intention here is not to defend his ontology on his behalf, but rather to get input on his version of idealism, and idealism in general, so as to make some sense of it, one way or the other. The main reason being that my intuitive feeling, being more mystical than analytical, is that materialism, as the prevailing metaphysical model, fails to adequately explain even ordinary experience, never mind extraordinary or paranormal experience, and hence the ongoing search for an alternate model -- e.g. Idealism. Clearly it is predicated on the premise of the primacy of Consciousness, as the ontological primitive, and thus avoids the ‘hard problem’ faced by materialism, as there is no longer any need to explain its emergence, there being no ‘prior to’ Consciousness, and therefore no point of origin or causation. From there -- this being an admittedly simplified synopsis -- as the word idealism implies, it posits the emanations of the ideations of Consciousness (Platonic forms/ideas), akin to a Cosmic Mind, as the basis for the phenomenal experience of the individuated loci of Consciousness, i.e. sentient beings, which comprises one’s apparent subject/object perception. Our thoughts then become the recapitulation, or iterations, of that greater cognitive process. But of course one realizes that, while this avoids the so-called ‘hard problem’, it has its own hard problems, the challenge being to tie it in with the findings of quantum theory, evolutionary theory, the origins of life, etc. — snowleopard
Nonetheless, it somehow seems important to conceive of an ontological/cosmological model upon which to base a cultural ethos. The question becomes, which one? — snowleopard
in that most folks don’t ever give ontology or cosmology much thought at all, if ever. — snowleopard
Evolution is one of the most well founded scientific hypotheses. But in the U.S it's regarded with suspicion by a very large percentage of the population. — Moliere
I'm not so sure that people, at large, lap up scientific theses as a Biblical truth, either. Some people do -- it's something which some groups have fallen into the habit of doing without much critical reflection -- but I'd be pretty hesitant to say that there is a successful brainwashing program based on the sciences in practice, and much less so that it is successful even if there happens to be one. — Moliere
Anyway - I'm reading Kastrup's essay, Making Sense of the Mental Universe, and it seems pretty carefully reasoned to me. — Wayfarer
Contextuality is a formidable challenge to the viability of realism. — Bernardo Kastrup
In order to prevent the reader from channeling his/her thoughts in the wrong direction, let me anticipate a few terminological remarks. By using the word “observer” I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other manner special, system. I use the word “observer” in the sense in which it is conventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that an object has a velocity “with respect to a certain observer”. The observer can be any physical object having a definite state of motion. For instance, I say that my hand moves at a velocity v with respect to the lamp on my table. Velocity is a relational notion (in Galilean as well as in special relativistic physics), and thus it is always (explicitly or implicitly) referred to something; it is traditional to denote this something as the observer, but it is important in the following discussion to keep in mind that the observer can be a table lamp. — Relational Quantum Mechanics - Carlo Rovelli
Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation [Rovelli, 2008], on the other hand, sticks to plain quantum theory and embraces contextuality. Instead of loading it with unnecessary baggage, it simply interprets what quantum theory tells us about the world and bites the bullet of its implications. Rovelli’s goal “is not to modify quantum mechanics to make it consistent with [his] view of the world, but to modify [his] view of the world to make it consistent with quantum mechanics” [Rovelli, 2008: 16]. — Bernardo Kastrup
There have been attempts to preserve some form of realism by finding a subset of
physical properties whose values can be determined in a non-contextual manner under certain circumstances. The idea is then to claim that this subset is the objective physical world. For instance, Philippe Grangier [Grangier, 2001], inspired by Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’s view of what constitutes physical objectivity, contends that the quantum state of a system, defined by the values of a set of physical quantities, which can be predicted with certainty and measured repeatedly without perturbingin any way the system, is an objective physical entity.
The problem with this approach is highlighted by Grangier himself: the “definition [of
the quantum state] is inferred from observations which are made at the macroscopic level”. In other words, the supposedly physically objective quantum state of a system depends on the a priori existence of a physically objective classical world surroundingthe system. This begs the question of physical objectivity instead of rendering it viable under contextuality. Because “a quantum state‘involving the environment’ cannot be consistently defined” [Grangier, 2001: 4], Grangier’s approach fails to reconcile contextuality with a supposedly physically objective world
There have been attempts to preserve some form of realism by finding a subset of
physical properties whose values can be determined in a non-contextual manner under certain circumstances. The idea is then to claim that this subset isthe objective physical world. For instance, Philippe Grangier [Grangier, 2001], inspired by Einst
ein-Podolsky-Rosen’s view of what constitutes physical objectivity, contends that the qua
ntum state of a system, defined “by the values of a set of physical quantities, which can be predicted with certainty and measured repeatedly without perturbing in any way the system,” [Grangier, 2001: 1] is an objective physical entity.
The problem with this approach is highlighted by Grangier himself: the “defi
nition [of the quantum state] is inferred from observations which are made
at the macroscopic level” [Grangier, 2001: 2]. In other words, the supposedly physically
objective quantum state of a system depends on the a priori existence of a physically objective classical world surrounding the system. This begs the question of physical objectivity instead of rendering it viable under contextuality. Because “a quantum state ‘involving the environment’ cannot be consistently defined” [Grangier, 2001: 4], Grangier’s approach fails to reconcile contextuality with a supposedly physically objective world. — Kastrup
it is traditional to denote this something as the observer, but it is important in the following discussion to keep in mind that the observer can be a table lamp. — Relational Quantum Mechanics - Carlo Rovelli
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