I could be misconstruing your worldview, but it would appear to be a QM interpretation that is still clinging to the materialist premise that there is a mind-independent world of matter 'out there', the very notion that Kastrup, or any idealist ontology, is dubious about ... as now am I.

To that point, curiously enough, I just learned that Mr. Kastrup has now been invited to a meeting of minds at the Vatican (not sure that's the most apropos venue), to discourse on the impact of science on culture and society. Perhaps, from the perspective of Idealism, a few more seeds thrown into the shifting winds of change.

Not least because of its use by culture warriors such as Jerry Coyne and Richard Dawkins to attack religion at every possible opportunity. — Wayfarer

Whether they are attacking religion or not -- evolution is a well-founded scientific theory. And a very large percentage of people do not believe it to be true (at least with respect to human beings). So it's just not the case that most people listen to science as the source of all truth, the way, and the light. By the link I provided it appears that the Bible is more influential in that regard.

Nothing in the data, or the formalisms, either. — StreetlightX

Nobody - well certainly not me in any case - is saying that the formal aspects of QM include reference to conscious observers. That's not the point. Take the Schrodinger wave equation, for instance - absolutely no explicit reference to a conscious observer at all. The solutions to that equation for a given system provide us values that the Schrodinger wave function can take for that system, but the philosophical issues (where there are very real distinctions between observation, measurement and interaction) begin when physical interpretations of those values are proposed. It's generally agreed that the wavefunction values generate probability distributions, but probability distributions of what? One response is along the lines "the probability of finding a particle to be at a particular location" and straight away you see a notion involving conscious activity being introduced (i.e. "finding").

I could be misconstruing your worldview, but it would appear to be a QM interpretation that is still clinging to the materialist premise that there is a mind-independent world of matter 'out there', the very notion that Kastrup, or any idealist ontology, is dubious about ... as now am I. — snowleopard

Yes, I think the world exists independently of mind (per Aristotelian realism rather than materialism).

My initial comment in this thread was to point out that quantum contextualism doesn't challenge mind-independent realism as Kastrup claims. In fact the major realist QM theories are all contextual, including RQM which, ironically, Kastrup thinks implies idealism.

It's more a matter that a secular, non-religious outlook is normalised in a secular culture such as ours. As you say - this doesn't mean that holding this kind of view has necessarily entails 'scientism'. But many are more likely to accept that whatever answers there are to be sought, are best sought, or can only be sought, by scientific means. But even that has existential implications, in that the scientific stance is one in which there is an implicit separation between the object of knowledge and the knowing subject. Whereas in pre-modern cultures, there is a felt sense of 'relatedness' to the Cosmos; that sense of it being totally 'other' to the observer is not so pronounced as it has become in the modern age. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that the United States is a strictly secular culture. While religious life is in decline, it is still by the far the majority. I took a quick look over at gallup to make sure this was still the case and it seems to be.

I mean, you have an entire political block organized around religion with a fair amount of influence on how the state is run.

And the majority of people don't look strictly to science for what is knowable.

This monolithic secular view just does not exist in the United States. There are some secular people, and the state is meant to be secular. But the majority of people are still religious.

And, furthermore, while they are in a minority, there are still many scientists who are religious.

I'd say that there are other more likely culprits for a lack of relatedness to the Cosmos than a secular dogma.

And, to attempt getting back on topic, I don't think that a secular dogma is holding back idealism. Historically there have always been trends towards this or that metaphysical stance in philosophy -- including idealism!

From my perspective this all just seems way off the mark. I get that you have issues with a secular worldview. But I don't think that non-religious outlook is so normalized as you seem to believe, and I certainly don't believe that secular beliefs are the reason why Kastrup is being criticized here.

I certainly don't believe that secular beliefs are the reason why Kastrup is being criticized here. — Moliere

:up: I, for one, am criticising him on the basis that he is a bad philosopher.

My initial comment in this thread was to point out that quantum contextualism doesn't challenge mind-independent realism as Kastrup claims — Andrew

Quite right - QM may or may not challenge mind-independent realism, but Kastrup certainly hasn't given us any reasons for thinking so.

Well Kastrup posits that the 'world' of Ideas, in the platonic sense, does indeed still exist absent a finite locus of mind, insofar as it immanently exists in a Cosmic Mind-at-large -- along the lines of Berkeley's take, seemingly in sync with Kastrup, to quote "Where does this leave the moon when everyone's gone to sleep? Berkeley's answer was that God never sleeps, and perceives all things at all times."

One difference to note is that Berkeley didn't believe in platonic ideas at all, he held (at least, it seems to me he held) a pretty extreme form of nominalism: the only things that existed for him were minds and their immediate contents, and even for God those immediate contents were particular datable locatable items, not timeless abstract forms.

Thanks for that edification, as it is clearly a critical distinction. Again, I'm not intending here to definitively defend Kastrup's model, which he must do himself, but rather to get feedback on his, or any version of Idealism that others here may offer for consideration, so as to be informed about all options. So I do appreciate the input.

I suppose for many contemporary metaphysicians, Kastrup included, the issue with Berkeley, and others, is precisely that he brings those 18th century ideas of God into the equation, with all of the problematic baggage that now comes with that term. With that in mind, do you feel that Idealism can be cogently articulated, without resorting to some such Divine Beingness -- for lack of a better term?

I think you are probably on to something that idealism tends to be regarded suspiciously because of its links with theism of one form or another. However, insofar as Berkeley is concerned, it's interesting to note that for him, at least, you could establish idealism independently of whether or not there was a God, and then use the fact that idealism is true to prove that there actually is a God. As for whether idealism can be cogently articulated, I believe it can - at least in its Berkeleian or phenomenalistic form (I cannot really speak to the Hegelian form, as I don't really understand Hegel). One recent academic philosopher who went against the grain and tried to do exactly that was John Foster. He is dead now, and as far as I know nobody has really picked up where he left off, but if you can get hold of a copy of his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism, you might find exactly what you're looking for.

but if you can get hold of a copy of his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism, you might find exactly what you're looking for. — jkg20

Hmm ... at $100-plus Cdn for a hard copy, I'll have to pass, unless there's some less-expensive, less-than-material (ha,ha) source available in cyberspace -- albeit, there would appear to be very little online presence of Foster's body of work, other than some synoptic reviews and excerpts, which I will delve into ... Thanks nonetheless for the suggestion.

One response is along the lines "the probability of finding a particle to be at a particular location" and straight away you see a notion involving conscious activity being introduced (i.e. "finding"). — jkg20

No, again, this is just equivocating on seemingly ambiguous words to create pseudo problems. 'Finding', of course, means being interacted with: probability is a question of the chance of physical interactions taking place at the time of measurement at a particular point, where measurement, again, just is physical interaction. It's telling that so many of the responses here hinge on basically abusing the English language, trying for 'gotchya' moments: 'ha, you used the word finding!', or 'ha! you used the word appear!'; 'observe!' - consciousness prevails! But these are nothing more than middling attempts to substitute elementary school word play for science. It's intellectual laziness at best, sophistic fraudulence at worst.

Wow, that's expensive - I had no idea. I don't have a copy of that work, but did pick up a version of his The Case for Idealism secondhand for 20 pounds sterling a couple of years ago. Sounds like I should be looking to make a return on my investment! The Case for Idealism is a more technical academic work, but essentially makes the same points as the apparently more accessible A World for Us. If, after reading around the various reviews you are intrigued enough, we'll see if we can't find a cheaper way to get you a copy of one or the other, one way or another.

I'm not trying to substitute science with anything, let alone elementary school English. I'm a scientist by profession, and I like my pay packet. I don't even happen to believe that QM can be used to prove idealism. The only point I insist on, is that once you start making physical interpretations of QM equations, philosophical issues arise, and the great names of 20th century science share that opinion: Heisenberg, Bohr, Einstein, Schrodinger...... Take a moment to google "interpretation of quantum mechanics" to get a glimpse of what has gone on and is still going on.

I absolutely agree that interpretations of QM have both relevant and interesting philosophical implications. But I would also insist that any attempt to wrangle those implications out of it do so with the utmost care. QM is a playground of intellectual abuse by those who harness its complexity to prey on the ignorant in favour of whatever pet metaphysics they'd like to peddle, so it's worth insisting, every now and then, on a bit of conceptual clarity.

The QM interpretation issue can be put like this. Any quantum system is in a superposition of quantum states until such time as a specific kind of interaction occurs, at which point only one of those quantum states prevails. What accounts for this apparent "collapse" of the system to one definite state? As far as I am aware, von Neumann was the first to propose that such collapse can only occur in the presence of a conscious observer - his idea was then taken up by Heisenberg - I'm not sure about Bohr. It is idealist to the extent that a definite world, as opposed to a world in a superimposed flux, requires consciousness. However, it still allows for quantum superimposed states to exist independently of minds, just not the "classical" world we are all familiar with where things have definite locations and velocities and masses etc. One alternative to von Neumann's suggestion is the so-called "many-worlds" interpretation: every time such an apparent "collapse" occurs, there is in fact no collapse but instead a splitting of worlds, each one taking one of the previously superimposed states. Very quickly many worlds become too many for some people's tastes, since this splitting happens every time something definite occurs. It can also make personal identity over time a tricky notion to account for.
That is just one way of putting the metaphysical quandry that QM presents. But jkg20 brought out another insofar as answers to the question "what does the wave function represent" will have metaphysical consequences, and those who want to answer that question should not just help themselves to everyday notions of "observation", "measurement" and so on since those everyday notions are very definitely wrapped up with the idea of their being acts performed by conscious beings. One would be using the word "observer" in a most unusual way if one were to say that "lamps are observers", and to avoid misunderstanding it would be better not to use that word at all in that context.

That is just one way of putting the metaphysical quandry that QM presents. But jkg20 brought out another insofar as answers to the question "what does the wave function represent" will have metaphysical consequences, and those who want to answer that question should not just help themselves to everyday notions of "observation", "measurement" and so on since those everyday notions are very definitely wrapped up with the idea of their being acts performed by conscious beings. One would be using the word "observer" in a most unusual way if one were to say that "lamps are observers", and to avoid misunderstanding it would be better not to use that word at all in that context. — ProcastinationTomorrow

That usage of "observer" is conventional in special relativity and quantum mechanics. From Wikipedia:

Physicists use the term "observer" as shorthand for a specific reference frame from which a set of objects or events is being measured. Speaking of an observer in special relativity is not specifically hypothesizing an individual person who is experiencing events, but rather it is a particular mathematical context which objects and events are to be evaluated from. The effects of special relativity occur whether or not there is a sentient being within the inertial reference frame to witness them.
...
In quantum mechanics, "observation" is synonymous with quantum measurement and "observer" with a measurement apparatus and observable with what can be measured. — Observer (special relativity)

Physicists are always going to develop technical language in ways that they find useful to them. So I think the key to avoiding misunderstanding is to be aware of how language terms are used differently in that context compared to the everyday context. That is what Rovelli was pointing out with his lamp example.

Along with "observer", terms like "measurement", "information" and "action" similarly don't imply consciousness or mind in a physics context. So note the use of "observer" in the first sentence of the RQM Wikipedia entry:

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics which treats the state of a quantum system as being observer-dependent, that is, the state is the relation between the observer and the system. — Relational quantum mechanics

This simply means that, per RQM, the state of a quantum system is always indexed to some reference frame (termed an observer), rather than being absolute. It implies nothing about consciousness or mind.

Notwithstanding the fact that all apparatus are constructed by observers. (Sorry for intruding with a philosophical observation.)

One would be using the word "observer" in a most unusual way if one were to say that "lamps are observers", and to avoid misunderstanding it would be better not to use that word at all in that context. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Perhaps it would be better, and perhaps it might put a stop to the endless swarm of psuedo-scientific troglodytes who, too thick to understand that langage is what we make of it, aim to milk grammar from the stone of science to substantiate their idealist fantasies without a care in the world for the actual science. Perhaps. But then, that is their problem, and not science's. Witness Wayfarer, who thinks an irrelevancy is a 'philosophical observation', again content to play in toy-room of words as if there was any substance to it at all.

swarm of psuedo-scientific troglodytes — StreetlightX

Is it possible that you're over reacting?

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics which treats the state of a quantum system as being observer-dependent, that is, the state is the relation between the observer and the system.

— Relational quantum mechanics

This simply means that, per RQM, the state of a quantum system is always indexed to some reference frame (termed an observer), rather than being absolute. It implies nothing about consciousness or mind. — Andrew M

So - it's acknowledged to be 'observer dependent', but by designating the observer as 'a reference frame' rather than as an actual scientist, then the pesky 'observer problem' with its attendant philosophical problems of 'mind' or 'consciousness' is removed from the equation. Or so it is said.

What accounts for this apparent "collapse" of the system to one definite state? As far as I am aware, von Neumann was the first to propose that such collapse can only occur in the presence of a conscious observer - his idea was then taken up by Heisenberg - I'm not sure about Bohr. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Von Neumann came later than Bohr and Heisenberg. The point is, I think the idea that 'consciousness causes the collapse' incorrectly suggests the whole question as being a matter in which the mind of the observer actually does something. The observer doesn't cause anything, in that sense, in the way that a spark ignites a flame. What it means is that all of the possibilities described by the wave equation are zeroed at the exact moment the measurement is taken - just by taking the measurement!

So up until that moment, there is no 'actual particle' - it's not as if it's somewhere in some definite place that hasn't been determined yet. Up until the measurement is taken, it's not in any place - literally all there is, is a field of possibilities (which is what the so-called 'super-position' describes). Then at the instant the measurement is taken, one possibility becomes 100% and all the others become 0. That is what 'the collapse of the wave-function' describes.

That's why I mentioned the Ruth Kastner article on 'potentia' - Heisenberg had the idea that the mode of the existence of sub-atomic particles was like the Aristotelian 'potentia' that are then 'actualised' by the act of measurement - as per this paper.

Someone correct me if I'm wrong on that.

Notwithstanding the fact that all apparatus are constructed by observers. (Sorry for intruding with a philosophical observation.) — Wayfarer

All that is required is two physical systems that interact to produce information. Those physical systems need not have been constructed by anyone.

Here's Rovelli in Edge:

We say that there is "relative information" between two systems anytime the state of one is constrained by the state of the other. In this precise sense, physical systems may be said to have information about one another, with no need for a mind to play any role.
...
The world isn’t just a mass of colliding atoms; it is also a web of correlations between sets of atoms, a network of reciprocal physical information between physical systems. — Relative Information

So - it's acknowledged to be 'observer dependent', but by designating the observer as 'a reference frame' rather than as an actual scientist, then the pesky 'observer problem' with its attendant philosophical problems of 'mind' or 'consciousness' is removed from the equation. — Wayfarer

It's removed from the Schrodinger equation, yes.

So - it's acknowledged to be 'observer dependent', but by designating the observer as 'a reference frame' rather than as an actual scientist, then the pesky 'observer problem' with its attendant philosophical problems of 'mind' or 'consciousness' is removed from the equation. Or so it is said. — Wayfarer

Step 1 in quantum sophistry: reverse the terms. Pretend that a reference frame designates the 'observer', rather than the other way around; Step 2: imply that some kind of problem has been removed, rather than created by the abuse of the English language.

With these two easy steps, you too could botch the science and pretend QM implies things it does not! Order now for an extra dose of snake oil.

Still, I'm getting the impression that as long as there is an ongoing dismissing of a coherent explanation of consciousness as being of no significant consequence, there will be no end to the conundrum of multiple incongruent interpretations of QM precisely because the factoring in of such an explanation of consciousness is of paramount significance for arriving at a truly comprehensive theory.

Perhaps it would be better, and perhaps it might put a stop to the endless swarm of psuedo-scientific troglodytes who, too thick to understand that langage is what we make of it, aim to milk grammar from the stone of science to substantiate their idealist fantasies without a care in the world for the actual science. — StreetlightX

Is it possibly your intention here to create polemic, rather than engage in respectful debate?

What is ‘sophistry’ about claiming that ‘an observer’ is in fact an observer? Claiming that an apparatus constitutes an observer is the only ‘sophistry’ in play here.

Claiming that an apparatus constitutes an observer is the only ‘sophistry’ in play here. — Wayfarer

I'd even go so far as to say that panpsychism is in play