But - and this is the audacity of QM - Wheeler is entirely right. Of course we participate in the universe. We participate in the universe just like everything else participates in the universe. We do not stand apart from the universe as though we are not of the same stuff as it. This is why consciousness is irrelevant. We are physical systems no different to other physical systems, which means that physics can teach us something about ourselves and not just things that are 'out there, independent of us'. I don't think you even realise just how horrible this line of thought is for people like you, and that you're basically defending the noose from which idealism will hang. This is the real lesson of QM, and I'm quite glad that you've stumbled across it.

ON the contrary - as Wheeler says [although SLX says I don’t understand anything he says] - that we are ‘a patch of the Universe coming to know itself’. And I can’t see how that can possibly be incorrect? What else is there for us to be?

Oh, and sorrry I was impolite, I take it back.

We are a patch of the universe coming to know itself. No-one is disagreeing with Wheeler there.

It in being that minute patch of the universe which kills these sort of issues of consciousness. If our consciousness were to be the definition of other parts of the world, of anything we might observe, encounter or be in relation with, we would be claiming to be more than one small patch of the universe.

If my consciousness is going to define the existence of almost other things, I am literally claiming all those things belong to my patch, that they are there by my existence. It would mean I was no one small patch, but a huge patch of everything, a sort of small scale solipsism, where everything I see (for example) is literally my existence.

You make a valid point that this quest for a coherent explanation for consciousness should not be reduced to solipsism. Kastrup, for those who may be inclined to read him, makes the case against solipsism in his model, which at least attempts to put that argument against idealism to rest.

This is why consciousness is irrelevant. We are physical systems no different to other physical systems, which means that physics can teach us something about ourselves and not just things that are 'out there, independent of us'. I don't think you even realise just how horrible this line of thought is for people like you, and just how much this totally and utterly ruins idealist thought. This is the real lesson of QM, and I'm quite glad that you've stumbled across it. — StreetlightX

As I just said to Willow, and as I read Wheeler as saying - humans are 'the universe coming to know itself'. But that is not something 'physical' - or rather, the realisation that this is the case means that what we previously thought of as physical, actual stuff, entities and particles and the like, are not actually fundamental. What is fundamental? Well, Wheeler says that our participation actually creates the Universe out of the cloud of possibilities. He said, and I quoted it, that the source of all physical things is an 'immaterial mystery'. 'No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon'. John Archibald Wheeler

What kind of 'physicalism' is that?

And what other 'physical systems' are we 'no different to'? Which other 'physical systems' can you nominate, that discover physics, argue philosophy on forums, weigh and measure the Universe?

You know that many of the first-generation quantum physicists were idealist philosophers in their own right? Arthur Eddington, James Jeans ('the universe appears more a great mind than a great machine'), Schrodinger (lifelong student of Schopenhauer and Vedanta)? Right? (See this review). Are you familiar with Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy, which is a pretty well full-blown endorsement of 'Plato over Democritus'? Are you familiar with Neils Bohr's Coat of Arms, which he devised because he felt his 'principle of complementarity' was reflected by the Tao?



So - what can you possibly mean by 'not idealist'?

Well, Wheeler says that our participation actually creates the Universe out of the cloud of possibilities. What kind of 'physicalism' is that? — Wayfarer

I don't know Wheeler's self-identification on such a metaphysical issues, but going on the content given, the best kind: some sort non-reductive physicalism or materialism which recognises materiality is in being a state of existence, as opposed to underlying particles which explain everything.

In this the supposed problem of materiality is deflated because each existing thing is defined in its meaning. An instance of a red light, for example, would be a material state. The conceptual meaning is of the state itself rather than just our consciousness. No longer is our experience need to ground the definition of the object. It can be there when no-one is looking at it because the concept is of the existing state itself. We are not required for it to be.

'No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon'. John Archibald Wheeler — Wayfarer

Yep, where 'observation' is 'an irreversible act of amplification such as the blackening of a grain of silver bromide emulsion or the triggering of a photodetector' (Wheeler's words). Which of course is physical. Coupled with the fact that '''Consciousness' has nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum process' - again, Wheeler's line - it doesn't leave much room for equivocation indeed. Our participation does indeed 'create the Universe out of the 'cloud of possibilities'' - but then, so does the participation of everything else, of which we are just a 'patch'. Observation = measurement = interaction, where our interaction - that of a bunch of moderately clever apes on a small watery rock in the middle of nowhere - is the same as all interaction, everywhere.

The implications of QM count among the most radically anti-humanist, non-anthropormophic levelling operations I know. It places us smack bang in the middle of the universe, and because of which, make of us perishable, finite, and contingent 'patches' destined to irredeemable extinction, just like all the other patches, of which we do not differ from in any interesting way.

Not to mention "There is no out there out there" ... Was that not Wheeler? Does this not implicitly bring into doubt the notion of a consciousness-independent cosmos?

Which of course is physical. — StreetlightX

It’s an act of interpretation - which is the entire point.

Sure, if you want to call bromide emulsion 'interpretation', be my guest. But you no longer get to whine about 'observation' being used in a way in which mummy and daddy didn't teach you. Turns out, you can do violence to language too.

Observation = measurement = interaction, where our interaction - that of a bunch of moderately clever apes on a small watery rock in the middle of nowhere - is the same as all interaction, everywhere. — StreetlightX

:roll:

It can be there when no-one is looking at it because the concept is of the existing state itself. We are not required for it to be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, the Idealist take on this is that there is an existing state in itself that remains in the absence of a finite locus of mind, and yet exists as an emanation of some some source that transcends that finite locus of mind, while at the same time not being separate from it. In other words, a model of a self-observing cosmos, as per Wheeler ...

As usual, the fact that Wheeler explicitly disavows the role of consciousness is quietly ignored, as though a minor inconvenience to a position trying to ventriloquize others to say the opposite of what they do. The usual mendaciousness from a position defined by its dishonesty.

Here it is again, for good measure: '''Consciousness' has nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum process'.

It's also perhaps worth mentioning that when a picture of a coat of arms becomes one's lynchpin for a discussion of quantum physics, one can only presume that the barrel of argument has been scraped so low that the floor is now showing.

↪Andrew M Fair enough, I stand corrected. But I still think it’s a legitimate question as to whether any actual ‘registration’ has occurred in the absence of an observer, who in such cases, creates the very machine which records the observation. — Wayfarer

Isn't that just a question of the logic of the language used? But whether or not a conscious observer is present (say, before life emerged on Earth), physical systems interact as described by the rules of quantum mechanics. Would you agree?

Can you explain what Wheeler is referring to in this interview, when he speaks of "We by our choice of observing device ...", if not an inextricable connection between the device and the conscious entity that is using it as an extension of one's sensory capacity, since the device itself, being comprised of nothing but quantum interaction, must also be observer-dependent.

Sure. The measurement we get is defined by how we set up our devices for measurement. We may choose one way, or another way, but whatever we choose, the measurement is determined, for all that, by the set-up of the apparatus. That this process is an entirely determined one is important to understand: our choice of this or that apparatus may be arbitrary, but once we've chosen the set-up, the results will always be consistent and determined by that set up. This is what makes quantum measurement always a matter of pure objectivity: the results will always be invariant relative to the particular physical set-up. Bohr himself was very clear about this:

"In the first place, we must recognize that a measurement can mean nothing else than the unambiguous comparison of some property of the object under investigation with a corresponding property of another system, serving as a measuring instrument, and for which this property is directly determinable according to its definition in everyday language or in the terminology of classical physics."

And elsewhere: "In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it is of
course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed in the measuring processes. Since, however, all those properties of such agencies which, according to the aim of the measurement, have to be compared with corresponding properties of the object, must be described on classical lines, their quantum mechanical treatment will for this purpose be essentially equivalent with a classical description. The question of eventually including such agencies within the system under investigation is thus purely a matter of practical convenience, just as in classical physical measurements; and such displacements of the section between object and measuring instruments can therefore never involve any arbitrariness in the description of a phenomenon and its quantum mechanical treatment.

The only significant point is that in each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales and clocks which determine the frame of space-time coordination—on which, in the last resort, even the definitions of momentum and energy quantities rest—must always be described entirely on classical lines, and consequently kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical treatment". (quoted in Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, my bolding). Or to put it otherwise, there is no role - at all - for subjectivity in the measurement of quantum phenomena.

Well I remain unconvinced ... Since the device itself is not other than a potential field of possibilities unless an observer is factored in, the idea that the device is 'observing' something seems entirely dependent upon the conscious agent that is observing it, making the whole system of wave-function collapse, measuring device and conscious agent inextricably entangled, in turn making the distinction between a self-observing system and a self-conscious system rather ambiguous. But we may never resolve this while we are coming at it from completely different and incongruent ontological premises. And so, alas, I'm not sure that I'm much further ahead in my search for a model that adequately explains one's conscious experience, or that much progress is going to made in this debate. But it has fostered some very interesting, entertaining and much appreciated discussion, input and feedback if nothing else.

Since the device itself is not other than a potential field of possibilities unless an observer is factored in... — snowleopard

This sentence doesn't make any sense.

Still, there is narrow sense in which you are right about your general point: that we are inextricably involved in the set-up of a particular apparatus plays a role - however ambiguous and distant - in the realization of one measurement outcome rather than another. But this doesn't warrant any philosophical generalization insofar as it's ultimately a tautology: we are involved in the things that we are involved in. To which one must add: and we are not involved in the things that we are not involved in.

And short of begging the question that we are involved in all quantum processes everywhere - as if this statement could even mean anything - there's no warrant to move from this to the idea that quantum processes require human or conscious intervention. Tautologies don't licence valid conclusions.

Well I remain unconvinced ... Since the device itself is not other than a potential field of possibilities unless an observer is factored in, the idea that the device is 'observing' something seems entirely dependent upon the conscious agent that is observing it, — snowleopard

One thing to note is that this discussion isn't really about the way the world works, its about what constitutes quantum theory. Therefore, the best resource would just be state of the art scientific opinions.

If it were about the way the world works, the resource would be the wider world of speculative physics, which is anything but static.

The nice thing about backing out of science into pure logic is that your opinion really does matter in that domain, plus its much less likely that the whole landscape will be washed away by the next successful theory (as is true in science).

This sentence doesn't make any sense. — StreetlightX

How so? According to QM, is the device not comprised of nothing other than interacting quantum fluctuations in the zero-point field? What is rendering that process observable, if not a conscious agent?

Yeah, I get that. The OP is really about accounting for conscious experience, and if and how idealism might account for it, which then became about how quantum theory might account for it, which apparently for some QM theorists is irrelevant and of no significant consequence. Kastrup and other idealists positing the primacy of consciousness happen to disagree with those theorists, but that's not likely to convince them otherwise, or vice versa. And thus I remain in a quandary, until some more convincing case can be made, whatever the ontological premise.

I am. The double-slit experiment does not imply that its outcomes are the result of consciousness.

If, for instance, a photon came across a double slit without it being built by anyone then the interference pattern would be the same. It's not that our setting up the double slit made the interference pattern -- any double slit would do, seen or not.

And if it's being seen is what's at issue here, then any old example would work just as well -- QM wouldn't need to be invoked. QM would be just as pertinent as any other example, such as a tree falling in a forest where no one is around.

I'm curious what you mean by 'accounting for consciousness.'

Again, as long as the mindsets involved are coming at this from different and incongruent ontological premises, one that includes the primacy of consciousness, and one that excludes it, it seems that unless those premises can somehow be reconciled, then this debate will not be resolvable, no?

According to QM, is the device not comprised of nothing other than interacting quantum fluctuations in the zero-point field? — snowleopard

Huh? QM has nothing to say about what a device 'is'. A double slit experiment might involve a device that includes a photographic plate, a light source, a double slit diaphragm, a single slit diaphragm, and ideally a dark room. This is what Bohr had in mind when he spoke of an apparatus:



This being, after all, his drawing. Perhaps you might want a mirror or a spring to create a 'which-path' detector. Bohr actaully spends a great deal of timing describing and talking about the apparatus, because he understood very well that the results one would see where vitally all about the apparatus set up.

I'm curious what you mean by 'accounting for consciousness.' — frank

More specifcally, I'm asking about how to account for the 'hard problem of consciousness' insofar as physicalist models based on mind being an epiphenomenon of brain activity have so far been unable to adequately account for it, and therefore I'm inquiring into other possible ways to account for it, such as from the perspective of idealism, which posits consciousness, in the sense of a Mind-at-large, as the ontological primitive, and not as an emergent phenomenon. There could be other ways, such as Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', or some analogous VR-based models, digital informational models, etc.

QM has nothing to say about what a device 'is' — StreetlightX

Huh? Quantum theory has nothing to say about what the device is in essence?! How else would a physicist explain what it is?

Yes. In fact I'd say that it's not a resolvable debate at all. We can always save a belief from refutation. That would include beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality.

But a debate need not be resolvable in order for it to be fruitful. For it to be fruitful we would need to have some points on which we do agree.

With respect to QM, though, I'd say I fall more in line with SX in that it just does not say anything about consciousness somehow being involved. There are seven posultes of QM -- http://web.mit.edu/8.05/handouts/jaffe1.pdf

"Observable" has a lot to do with classical mechanics. As in, the wave-equation on which an operator acts is not an observable (edit: and the operator functions a lot like an apparatus -- it operates on the unobservable and, when solved, derives what is observed). It has nothing to do with consciousness. Or, insofar that it does, there are just more straightforward ways of putting the same point without referencing something which most people do not have a good familiarity with -- such as a tree falling in the woods.

I'd say that with respect to physicalism/idealism one such necessary point of agreement in order that we may fruitfully disagree is that we at least understand the facts of a discipline as that discipline understands them before we use it as a point in our argument.

So we might say that QM supports a notion of idealism, but not because consciousness is somehow involved in the outcomes of QM experiments. That's just a misunderstanding of what is being said. (and, truth be told, I'd say that if one can't do the math of QM, then it's fair to say that that person doesn't understand QM -- the formalism is a big part of the theory)

Here is Schrodinger's equation. Where is the device in it?

Where is the device in it? — StreetlightX

Until it is observed by a conscious agent, everywhere and nowhere, aka non-locality.