More specifcally, I'm asking about how to account for the 'hard problem of consciousness' insofar as physicalist models based on mind being an epiphenomenon of brain activity have so far been unable to adequately account for it, and therefore I'm inquiring into other possible ways to account for it, such as from the perspective of idealism, which posits consciousness, in the sense of a Mind-at-large, as the ontological primitive, and not as an emergent phenomenon. There could be other ways, such as Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', or some analogous VR-based models, digital informational models, etc. — snowleopard
I'm not quite sure I follow you. I thought we were at least all agreed that one of the interesting questions QM invites is how to explain the so-called collapse of the wave function. One answer to that question, with a pedigree almost as old as QM itself, is that it collapses at the moment of conscious observation. Now, whatever role that gives consciousness in QM phenomena is another question, but I don't see why you think it is irrelevant noise. Are the only "cool" implications, as far as you are concerned, implications that ignore the possibilty that idealism might be true?Does this entail some really cool philosophical implications? Definitely. But consciousness? Irrelevant noise. — StreetlightX
One answer to that question, with a pedigree almost as old as QM itself, is that it collapses at the moment of conscious observation. — jkg20
Anyway, there are QM theorists who believe that the wave function doesn't collapse in the first place. — jkg20
Couldn't agree more - in fact I think I wrote somewhere at the beginning of this thread that idealism can be argued for entirely independently of QM. I've never seen a convincing argument of the form: if QM is true, idealism is true; QM is true, therefore idealism is true. Of course, if idealism is true, then there will presumably have to be some correct idealistic interpretation of QM to be given.the argument for idealism could be accomplished just as well without referencing QM. — Moliere
It seems ever more apparent that given the absence of any consensus as to however or whatever consciousness may be, it's no wonder QM physicists can't rule it in ... and yet how can it be ruled out? — snowleopard
Isn't that just a question of the logic of the language used? But whether or not a conscious observer is present (say, before life emerged on Earth), physical systems interact as described by the rules of quantum mechanics. Would you agree? — Andrew M
Sure, people might not be able to agree about a definition, but - unless you are a cranky eliminative materialist - there is something being disagreed about. "flufffwumps" - well, if I were to ask you what that was, you wouldn't even be able to point me to a literature of disagreement with which to get started. That's one difference between "consciousness" and "flufffwumps", and its a pretty significant one, and goes someway to saving the former from "meaninglessness" whilst leaving the latter as drivel.I mean, people can't even agree on a mere definition of consciousness, let alone attempt to even speculate as to how - via what mechanism, or through what specific features - it might play a role in QM.
I don't think QM has much to say on idealism, either way. — Moliere
Bohr's "Copenhagen interpretation", which became orthodoxy for most of the century, still has the power to shock. What it states, baldly, is that reality is determined by the experiment the scientist chooses to perform. One kind of experiment will cause light to behave like a particle; another kind will make it act as a wave. There is no underlying truth about what light "really" is. And an electron doesn't have a definite position in space before you choose to measure it: in measuring it, you somehow oblige it to make up its mind as to where it is.
The whole import of the ‘delayed choice experiment’ seems anti-realist. — Wayfarer
At issue, is the very meaning of the word ‘physical’. The difficulty is that the precise nature of whatever it is that is being measured can’t be ascertained with certainty prior to the act of measurement. — Wayfarer
Again the whole question assumes a realist perspective which is the very thing being called into question. — Wayfarer
A realist interpretation (quantum or otherwise) may be coherent, but this comment sounds like you are suggesting that anything other than a realist interpretation of physical theory (for instance, an instrumentalist one) would be incoherent. You would need to have a strong argument for that, independent, of course, of the bare (and ceded) fact that a realist interpretation of QM is coherent.A realist perspective is assumed because that is the way to construct a physical theory that is conceptually coherent.
A realist perspective is assumed because that is the way to construct a physical theory that is conceptually coherent. — Andrew M
So - the ‘ontological implications’ of this are what was at issue in the debates between Bohr and Einstein. It’s all about what is really there, prior to it being measured. Is it a wave or a particle? Is it in a particular place? I think the so-called ‘copenhagen’ view is that there is no ‘it’ until it is measured. And that’s why it has a philosophical dimension: we’re purportedly debating the most fundamental reality, and yet can’t say what it is independent of the act of measuring it. — Wayfarer
Not being a physics graduate, I am restricted to reading popular books on the topic — Wayfarer
A realist interpretation (quantum or otherwise) may be coherent, but this comment sounds like you are suggesting that anything other than a realist interpretation of physical theory (for instance, an instrumentalist one) would be incoherent. You would need to have a strong argument for that, independent, of course, of the bare (and ceded) fact that a realist interpretation of QM is coherent. — jkg20
Ontological realism isn't necessary to physics. There are idealistic and physical schemes that are compatible with any sort of physics. Scientists don't need to sort that kind of issue out. They dont need an extra label: idea stuff vs physical stuff.
Or were you talking about some other kind of realism? — frank
I don't see any connection between idealism and QM. The position of a photon is unknown until it is measured. Therefore, Idealism. What's missing in between to connect the two? — Moliere
from the get-go it just seems a strange thing to say that the statement "Consciousness is the fundamental base of all existence" has anything to do with it, from what I do know about it. — Moliere
During the nineteenth century, the development of chemistry and the theory of heat conformed very closely tot he ideas first put forward by Leucippus and Democritus. A revival of the materialist philosophy in its modern form, that of dialectical materialism, was this a natural counterpart to the impressive advances made during this period in chemistry and physics. The concept of the atom had proved exceptionally fruitful in the explanation of chemical bonding and the physical behavior of gases. It was soon, however, that the particles called atoms by the chemist were composed of still smaller units. But these smaller units, the electrons, followed by the atomic nuclei and finally the elementary particles, protons and neutrons, also still seemed to be atoms from the standpoint of the materialist philosophy. The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.
But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.
This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use then of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.
During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or—in Plato's sense—Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
But it makes sense for someone to know something before they have an opinion on its implications, doesn't it? — Moliere
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