But here we have Sellars saying that there are no facts, only objects. — Banno
And this is one of his best papers. — Banno
So we might have a world of objects, and a language consisting entirely of proper names? AM I on the right track?
....So - and I've just started catching up on this thread, so this might have become apparent in other posts - his point is that predication is something we do, and hence predicates are not something we find but something we use? — Banno
But here we have Sellars saying that there are no facts, only objects. — Banno
I'm very attracted to the idea that language is a matter of 'natural-lingustic' objects insofar it places language on the same plane as 'things'. Sellars' effects this incredible leveling where he essentially abolishes the metaphysical distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic (and with it, the question 'how do words 'hook up' with things') and instead sees the linguistic as a species of the extra-linguistic. — StreetlightX
whatever else language does, its central and essential function, the sine qua non of all others, is to enable us to picture the world in which we live. — StreetlightX
But is it? If we have a picture of the world, then that picture is distinct from the world, — Banno
Just some general reflections to feel my way back into this thread — StreetlightX
So if you didn't assert it, it wouldn't be so? And what is a fact? — Nagase
That may be so (though note that we have an appeal to types of rules here...), yet to learn this way of speaking is not to learn Jumblese. — Nagase
From the point of view of triadicism, nothing at all has been left out. There's the stoop, the non-stoop, and the third thing. You don't have to leave the stoop to understand it. Heck, there's war, non-war, and the third thing. Lazily explain that to the soldier going by, 'oh no, i get it, trust me' — csalisbury
If there is a type-token distinction that is parsed in some way and not another, it can only be with an eye to doing something with it; one fixes distinctions in place so as to be able to make intelligible moves in discourse. — StreetlightX
Sellars' effects this incredible leveling where he essentially abolishes the metaphysical distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic (and with it, the question 'how do words 'hook up' with things') and instead sees the linguistic as a species of the extra-linguistic. — StreetlightX
That appeal to equivalence classes again looks like it demands something we've just said we can't have, real ideals, real types to ground the equivalence, and that backing off to our practices instead is no help. My suspicion is that it does help because the project of communal living gives you a choice: provisionally deem someone to be speaking a language you can understand or give up.
The "abstract" triangle is still a particular, the one you imagine, the one printed in the book or drawn on the blackboard. The difference is in how you handle it. If you ignore none of its particularity, that might be taking it, say, as a work of art. But if you ignore many of its particular features -- its particular materiality, the thickness of its lines, etc. -- then you can treat it as an abstract triangle. — Srap Tasmaner
Thinking of them in terms of equivalence classes adds an extra layer of complexity for little gain — fdrake
I can't see how this view would not be an appeal to natural kinds or at least kind, which I had thought was what Sellars is purportedly wishing to get away from. — Janus
As Sellars puts it somewhere in NAO: there are attributes, but there aren't really attributes. — StreetlightX
Or better: what kinds of thing are kinds? — StreetlightX
I'll await your return, but in the meantime: do you read the above as some kind of phenomenal/ noumenal distinction?
Or is it more of a phenomenological distinction between experience and understanding? Or something else? — Janus
This is why I think rejecting the reality of types also entails rejecting the reality of particulars, insofar as even particulars already belong to the order of types (and vice versa!). — StreetlightX
It breaks down the categorical division between the object (particular), and what the object is doing (universal). — Metaphysician Undercover
Sellars's own students Paul Churchland and Alex Rosenberg appear to have inherited the scientistic foundationalist strand of his thinking. — Pierre-Normand
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