pZombies ....It was Insane denial of the purpose of Consciousness. — SteveKlinko
Could it be the case that the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" is nothing more than a consequence of ill-conceived notions?
"Experience" being a central one. "Consciousness" being the main one. The "subjective/objective" dichotomy being another pivotal one. All three are involved. None of them are adequate for taking account of what's going on in the minds of thinking and/or believing creatures...
— creativesoul
↪Metaphysician Undercover You're right, I could be clearer in expressing my concerns. I think the issue I'm worried about has the principle of sufficient reason at its core. I'll have another go at explaining my confusion more clearly.
Let's suppose you believe that reality consists of two realms, we can neutrally call them realm A and realm B. If they are genuinely two distinct realms, then they are self-contained insofar as all the elements in one realm can be accounted for in terms only involving other elements of that same realm. This is real dualism about reality.
However, realm A becomes epiphenomenal with regard to realm B and vice-versa. But the principle of sufficient reason would then require us, from the perspect of realm B, to reject the existence of realm A, since realms that just "tag along for the ride" have no sufficient reason for existing. Similarly, the principle of sufficient reason would require us to reject the existence of realm B when considering things from realm A. We might want to try to take a third way, but we are assuming that reality just consists of two realms, so there is no third realm we can go to for adjudication.
So, we then suppose that realm A and realm B are not separate realms. We might think that everything we previously presumed to be in realm A can be accounted for by things in realm B, or vice-versa, but we thus eliminate one of the two realms we presumed to exist in the first place. We might want to try an approach that said that there is at least one thing in what we used to call realm A that cannot be accounted for by things in realm B, but then we are just keeping realm A as a self-contained realm, but with a shrunken domain, and once again from the perspective of the enlarged realm B, it becomes epiphenomenal and so its raison d'être is removed. And similarly, from the perspecive of this reduced realm A, realm B is redundant.
So, the principle of sufficient reason pushes us towards monism.
There might be some conceptual confusion going on in the above, maybe in my assumption that if reality consists of two realms, then the principle of sufficient reason is applicable in both realms individually. But if the alternative is to say that the principle of sufficient reason has to be applied from neither realm A nor realm B, then we seem to have two choices. First, we could suppose that the principle is to be applied from a perspective in reality. But then we have have to introduce a third realm to reality, and the same line of thought as applied above to realm A and realm B would reapply to realm A + realm B + realm C, and the pressure for monism remains. Alternatively, we could try the line that the principle of sufficient reason is not to be applied from any perspective in reality at all, but that requires that we be able to make a distinction between not applying a principle from within reality, on the one hand, and not really applying the principle at all, on the other, but that smells like a distinction without a difference. — jkg20
Let's suppose you believe that reality consists of two realms, we can neutrally call them realm A and realm B. If they are genuinely two distinct realms, then they are self-contained insofar as all the elements in one realm can be accounted for in terms only involving other elements of that same realm. This is real dualism about reality. — jkg20
But the principle of sufficient reason would then require us, from the perspect of realm B, to reject the existence of realm A, since realms that just "tag along for the ride" have no sufficient reason for existing. — jkg20
So, we then suppose that realm A and realm B are not separate realms. — jkg20
To separate two things as "distinct" things, does not require that those things do not interact with each other. You and I are distinct things yet we are interacting here. So I think you are placing unnecessary restrictions on your definition of "genuinely" distinct. If that is what is required to be genuinely distinct, then absolutely nothing could be genuinely distinct from anything else, because it would have to be self-caused. So that definition of "distinct" is unreal and unacceptable. We ought to allow that distinct things may interact with each other.
Let Realm A be the Conscious Realm where all our Conscious experiences happen. We can put all Conscious experience in it's own Realm because we don't know what Conscious experience is yet. For example Science does not say anything about what the experience of Red is. At this point it just Is. So it makes sense to put it into a separate Realm.
Descartes, for instance, gets into trouble at this point - he believes he has established the existence of two distinct realms (he calls them "substances"), the mental and the physical, but if they are genuinely distinct, how can they possibly interact? — jkg20
Metaphysical dualism requires two distinct realms, and the only way I can see of fleshing out the notion of separate realms is in terms of self-containment. — jkg20
It is only by your assumption of a third realm that you claim A and B are not separate. As I explained above, A and B may be distinct, and interacting. When you give reality to this "interacting", you make A and B parts of a larger whole, C, which contains this interacting. But there is no necessity to assume C. There is simply A interacting with B and the reality of the interactions is accounted for by the activities of A and the activities of B.
This is why there appears to be a "problem" of consciousness. We keep assuming that if A and B interact, the "interaction" itself ought to be evident. So we look for the interaction. But this is a mistaken procedure because the assumption of this third realm, the realm of interaction, is not supported logically. there is no need to assume a realm of interaction. We have activity occurring in A, and activity occurring in B. Some of the activity in A might be the cause of some activity in B, and vise versa. There is no need to assume C, the realm of interaction, unless your intent is to make A and B two parts of a larger whole, C. But that is simply the intent to reduce the two distinct realms to one realm, C. It is a monist intent. If the realm of interaction is not supported by evidence, then this is an incorrect procedure, and the monist intent is a misguided attempt to simplify what cannot be simplified — Metaphysician Undercover
So how does one define distinctness of metaphysical realms if not in terms of self-containment of that realm? Perhaps I'm overlooking something in your post, but I don't see a definition. — jkg20
Perhaps the descriptor 'apparently' distinct realms would be pertinent here. The realm of mind being not other than its phenomenal, experiential appearances, in some sort of self-observing sense, echoing the revelation of Buddhism that formlessness is not other than form, but within the context of Idealism. — snowleopard
The Correlations are predictable and consistent enough that we must assume there is some kind of causal Interaction between A and B. I think we need a C Realm, at least as a place holder, for the Interaction to take place in. — SteveKlinko
I think we really need this Realm C to keep us concentrating on what the problem really is. — SteveKlinko
No I wouldn't agree. The whole point I am arguing is that the distinction is real, not apparent. — Metaphysician Undercover
Doesn't that miss jkg20's point? After all, the way you make this statement assumes you've already settled that there are two realms for different attributes to apply in. Jkg20, as far as I can tell, is posing some very abstract metaphysical questions (metametaphilosophical ?) concerning making the kind of divisions that some people are kind of helping themselves to.I don't see how "self-containment" is even relevant. I would think that if the descriptive terms used to describe the properties or attributes of the members of one realm are distinct from, and not reducible to the descriptive terms of the other, then the two are distinct.
I've nothing against speculative philosophy, as opposed to the dry analytic kind that jkg20 seems more focussed on, but there's some terminology in what you say that does cry out for clarification before someone like me could even begin to understand what you're talking about. I suppose for "finite locus of mind" you mean something like the traditional "subject of experience"? But what is this "Mind-at-large", you mention, and what are its emanations?Yes, to elaborate, it implies that what a 'finite' locus of mind can only know as experiential phenomenal appearances, by definition, is a limitation imposed upon what would be the potentially infinite emanations of Mind-at-large. As if it is the trade-off, so to speak, for the sake of this relational experience.
If the idea is that realm C contains the necessary and sufficient conditions for causal occurences, the passing of time won't cut it. Time passing might be necessary for causation, but since we can imagine nothing happening over a period of time, it is not sufficient.Do you agree, that the passing of time satisfies the conditions required of the place holder (realm C)? We do not need the realm C as a place holder if the passing of time is real and common to both A and B, allowing for causal relations.
The Physical Realm is real and the Conscious Realm is real. The Interaction is completely real, we just don't know what it is yet.The Correlations are predictable and consistent enough that we must assume there is some kind of causal Interaction between A and B. I think we need a C Realm, at least as a place holder, for the Interaction to take place in. — SteveKlinko
The C realm here is completely imaginary. What is real is the activity of A and the activity of B. That there is a "causal interaction" is your description, so it is something which is completely a product of your mind, imaginary. If you want to assign "reality" to this causal interaction you would need to base it in something real, independent of your mind. You could assign reality to the passing of time, to make the causal interaction real, but this is not introducing another "realm", it is just assuming that the passing of time is real, and is common to both realms. — Metaphysician Undercover
Just because Causal Processes can happen over time doesn't mean you don't need a C Realm. Any Causal Process of the C Realm must deal with Physical Realm Activity and translate that to Conscious Realm Activity. Maybe these Causal Processes are in Realm A and Realm B but somehow a Bridge between Realm A and B must be constructed.I think we really need this Realm C to keep us concentrating on what the problem really is. — SteveKlinko
Do you agree, that the passing of time satisfies the conditions required of the place holder (realm C)? We do not need the realm C as a place holder if the passing of time is real and common to both A and B, allowing for causal relations. — Metaphysician Undercover
One approach, and perhaps this was more like what you are getting at, is to say the dualism issue isn't about two distinct realms at all, but just about two distinct kinds of attributes that are possessed by things that are in one and only one realm. — ProcastinationTomorrow
If the idea is that realm C contains the necessary and sufficient conditions for causal occurences, the passing of time won't cut it. Time passing might be necessary for causation, but since we can imagine nothing happening over a period of time, it is not sufficient. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Just because Causal Processes can happen over time doesn't mean you don't need a C Realm. Any Causal Process of the C Realm must deal with Physical Realm Activity and translate that to Conscious Realm Activity. Maybe these Causal Processes are in Realm A and Realm B but somehow a Bridge between Realm A and B must be constructed. — SteveKlinko
↪Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how "self-containment" is even relevant. I would think that if the descriptive terms used to describe the properties or attributes of the members of one realm are distinct from, and not reducible to the descriptive terms of the other, then the two are distinct.
Doesn't that miss jkg20's point?
So, what would motivate, from the perspective of this realm, the idea that there might even be another realm at all? — jkg20
Now that is very different from the way 'mental substance' is usually depicted, but I think this is because the sense of 'mind-substance' is indeed fatally mistaken. It's not a ghostly ethereal stuff or protoplasmic entity. I would say the appropriate analogy is that of the relationship between words and meaning. — Wayfarer
So, I remain currently unconvinced that dualism is a genuine alternative to monism. — jkg20
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