Morality is subjective because it is a view taken by (a) person/s. It not only CAN be a view but it without exception has always been and will be a view.

My rejoinder here is that the same can be said for the golden rule you propose. "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" leads to a contradiction -- because what you want may not be what someone else wants, especially if the standard is necessity. — Moliere

This is odd, because I would say when it comes to necessity, all men want the same thing: food, shelter, clothing, and health. What else would you mean by necessity?

The platinum rule is odd. Either we want the same things (primarily) or we don't. If we don't, then how can I know what everyone wants at all time, to abide to the rule? If we do, then it is simpler to go back to the golden rule.

Even so, I would also say that justice isn't about pleasing others at all. Justice is about fairness. It's different from moral goodness, as I see it. They are actually very often in conflict with one another. — Moliere

I would not use the word 'pleasure' because this sounds like it includes tastes (like in movies and music), which are subjective. But aside from tastes, we all 'want' the same things like honesty, respect, safety and health. I think justice is indeed synonymous to fairness. Would you have an example where justice and moral goodness are in conflict?

My long term strategy here is to explore one of the main arguments for moral nihilism -- the argument of diversity in ethical commitments leading to a reasonable inference that there is nothing objective about them. — Moliere

As per above, aside from tastes, I claim that all men want the same things: we all want food, shelter, health, honesty, respect, and pleasure, and all avoid starvation, homelessness, diseases, dishonesty, disrespect, and pain. This is because we all have the same human nature. Men are men and not plants. This is why the golden rule is adequate for moral acts from man to man.

even if you come up with something that sounds universally agreeable, that we only do so by abstracting moral norms to a point that they say virtually nothing about proper conduct. — Moliere

I think I see your point here. We need to differentiate between innate desire and sense of duty. While we all have the innate desire of the things listed above for ourselves, we do not necessarily have that same desire for others. This is where the sense of duty comes in; to remind us to not only take care of ourselves but others too, as all have the same nature or ontological value.

No, it's merely a means to an end, the end being the benefit, not the equality itself. — BlueBanana

What then is the benefit, if not the equality?

If you could give 1€ to two poor people each, or 5€ for one of them, it'd be just to give 1€ to both but (imo) morally right to give 5€ to one. — BlueBanana

This depends on the foreseeable results. For clarity, let's inflate this example to the extremes. (1) What if we could give 1€ to two poor people each, or 1 000 000€ to only one of them? In that case, even the one that gets nothing would still likely agree that the second choice is better, as 1€ does not result in much anyways. As such, this choice seems morally good, but also just, because it does not break the golden rule. (2) What if we could give 500€ to two poor people each, or 501€ to only one of them? Now the first choice seems more just, and also morally good. Your example is less clear and may fall closer to (1) or closer to (2), depending on the foreseeable results; but I think in either case, the justice does not conflict with the morality.

People disagree on morality, and if justice is objective, someone's opinion must contradict it. For example, let's take abortions. What's the just way to act? Whichever it is, there are people who disagree. — BlueBanana

People disagree only on matters on fact, not on the moral sense in theory. In the case of abortion, the main disagreement is about the fact of whether fetuses are human beings or not. If they are, then abortion is infanticide, which I believe everyone agrees to be wrong. If not, then it is merely a group of cells, and then abortion is not morally wrong, inasmuch as it is not wrong to cut your own hair.

I'm certain there are people out there that would, being found guilty, be willing to suffer a punishment that they wouldn't want to suffer. — BlueBanana

If they were rightfully found guilty, then being punished is just. If they were wrongfully found guilty, then being punished is unjust; but then would anyone accept the punishment out of duty?

What then is the benefit, if not the equality? — Samuel Lacrampe

Depends on the case. Could be anything. Well-being, happiness, money, health, etc. etc.

(1) What if we could give 1€ to two poor people each, or 1 000 000€ to only one of them? In that case, even the one that gets nothing would still likely agree that the second choice is better, as 1€ does not result in much anyways. As such, this choice seems morally good, but also just, because it does not break the golden rule. — Samuel Lacrampe

But the distribution of money isn't equal. I see how the outcome can be argued to be equal but that's merely a subjective interpretation of the situation. As I've stated, equality as a concept becomes far too vague when people's wills are considered, to an extent no objective statement can be made about which way to treat people is the equal one.

People disagree only on matters on fact, not on the moral sense in theory. — Samuel Lacrampe

What about nihilism? Or religious fundamentalists that believe the will of their deity is the absolute law? Or the trolley problem?

but then would anyone accept it out of duty? — Samuel Lacrampe

I wouldn't draw any generalizations out of 8 billion humans.

As per the OP, justice is equality in treatment among all humans (not falling for that one again).

So if your personal moral sense demands to seek justice and avoids injustice, and that justice is objective, then you follow a morality that is objective, even if you believe that the original moral sense is itself subjective.

Criteria, evaluation, and value are subjective (i.e. occurring in minds only). — numberjohnny5

That doesn't sound right. Criteria is defined as: The factors that determine the validity of a judgement or proposition. These factors are not always chosen subjectively. E.g.: The criteria to determine if an object is a triangle is for it to be a 'flat surface' with '3 straight sides'. These factors are not chosen subjectively.

Same goes for some values, such as physical values. What is physically good or bad or us is not chosen subjectively. This is why medicine is a science.

Hello.
Morality is the science of duty, not of facts; the science of 'what ought to be', not of 'what is'. If we are not treating each other equally, then it is our duty to change our behaviour to reach equality. If we already are treating each other equally, then it is no less our duty to preserve equality.

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What I meant is that yes, the law makers might change their minds when they are actually in that situation. But majority of them won't ever end up in that situation. So in their minds they may have no problem with truly believing that they should go to prison should they become drug addicts because they think the addicts are bad people and that they'll never end up as one. — SonJnana

But they still break the golden rule, even if they don't see it, from not thinking the treatment all the way through.

Also, it's even possible that if the law makers do become drug addicts, they may
may willingly go to jail out of a "change of heart" or sense of duty
— Samuel Lacrampe
while others want rehabilitation. — SonJnana

Hey! Don't quote me out of context :wink: . While it is possible out of duty to accept a punishment that fits the crime, no one would accept a punishment that exceeds the crime, even out of duty. Going to jail for stealing may fit the crime. Going to jail for a drug addiction, especially one that came through not fault of ours, clearly exceeds the "crime".

Person A thinks justice for drug addicts is rehabilitation. Person B truly thinks it is wrong and they should go to prison for sense of duty. Do you not think this is possible? — SonJnana

As described above, person B has not found true justice because that treatment breaks the golden rule.

Some people think having sex outside of marriage for everyone is immoral. Some people think it's okay to have as much consensual sex as you want. — SonJnana

By "sex outside of marriage", do you mean "extramarital sex"? I am fairly sure that nobody wants to be cheated on, and as such, this act clearly breaks the golden rule.

Some think it is immoral for a 30 year old to get involved with younger than 18 year old. Yet in other cultures, they truly think it's acceptable for a 15 year old to be with a 30 year old. — SonJnana

While I agree that this behaviour is frowned upon and illegal in some places, I think the reason is not really a moral one. Instead, I think it is either because it is thought that people younger than 18 are not old enough to make such important decisions, inasmuch as it is not permitted to quit school before a certain age, or it could be because of health concerns.

But they still break the golden rule, even if they don't see it, from not thinking the treatment all the way through. — Samuel Lacrampe

I see your point.

Hey! Don't quote me out of context :wink: . — Samuel Lacrampe

Couldn't resist quoting you there. Sorry, lmao!

While it is possible out of duty to accept a punishment that fits the crime, no one would accept a punishment that exceeds the crime, even out of duty. Going to jail for stealing may fit the crime. Going to jail for a drug addiction, especially one that came through not fault of ours, clearly exceeds the "crime". — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure, but my point is that people don't always agree on a punishment for a crime. Where I'm losing you is that you are suggesting everyone agrees that for a crime, a certain punishment is acceptable via Golden rule because of natural inclinations. And everyone agrees that any more severe punishment exceeds the crime. Do you really believe that there are not differences between individuals and cultures of what they think fits a crime via Golden rule? We will just have to break down specific examples to get to the bottom of this.

As described above, person B has not found true justice because that treatment breaks the golden rule. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see why it breaks the Golden rule. In the case of going out of your way to get drugs without coercion, then become addicted - many people would say that is immoral. While others disagree.

By "sex outside of marriage", do you mean "extramarital sex"? I am fairly sure that nobody wants to be cheated on, and as such, this act clearly breaks the golden rule. — Samuel Lacrampe

I meant sex without getting married, like virgin till marriage

While I agree that this behaviour is frowned upon and illegal in some places, I think the reason is not really a moral one. Instead, I think it is either because it is thought that people younger than 18 are not old enough to make such important decisions, inasmuch as it is not permitted to quit school before a certain age, or it could be because of health concerns. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why is it not a moral one? Some would say the 30 year old is being immoral because they're doing something with someone not old enough to make such important decisions. While others disagree and think they are old enough so the 30 year old is not immoral. This is the difference of values that I've speaking of.

I am fairly sure that nobody wants to be cheated on — Samuel Lacrampe

Sex outside marriage is not necessarily cheating. One could have an open relationship.

Hello.

Definitions a, b, and c: Notice how these definitions are circular because they contain the word 'justice' or 'just' in them.

Definition (2): It can indeed also mean "conforming to a principle or law", but this is not the meaning I am looking for here, because I would question whether these principles and laws are themselves just, that is, providing equal treatment to all.

Definition 3: "conforming to truth". Different meaning again.

Definition 2a: "Impartial". This is very close to my definition, because impartial is defined as "treating all rivals or disputants equally".

The dictionary is a good starting point to find the essence of concepts; although sometimes it is not perfect, as shown in definitions a, b, and c above. I like to use the good old socratic method of starting with real life examples where the concept is properly used, and arriving at the essential properties through induction.

Morality is subjective because it is a view taken by (a) person/s. It not only CAN be a view but it without exception has always been and will be a view. — Seastar

Your reasoning is circular. I would deny the premise that morality is only a view, and hence also the conclusion that it is subjective.

Depends on the case. Could be anything. Well-being, happiness, money, health, etc. etc. — BlueBanana

So anything like as stated above but not justice. So to clarify, if there is a net gain, say in the economy of a state, but for this slavery was introduced, you would find this good? Conversely, if justice was gained by abolishing slavery, but there was no net gain in anything else (also no net loss), then you would not find this to be good?

But the distribution of money isn't equal. I see how the outcome can be argued to be equal but that's merely a subjective interpretation of the situation.[...] — BlueBanana

Morality is intending for equality in treatment, but one still looks to reason on the foreseeable outcome to make the reasonable choice. If two persons had deadly allergic reactions and you had one EpiPen, and knowing that a whole shot is needed to be effective, it would be absurd to give half the shot to one and half the shot to the other, just to "preserve equality". The same goes for the money example. If the 1€ is expected to save lives, then that is the reasonable choice. But if the money is not critical and one of the poor can wait for the next donation, then that becomes the reasonable choice, and we can balance out the share next time.

Another extreme case is the Trolley problem, where equality in treatment is impossible, but that does not mean the person making the choice is immoral, because the intention for equal treatment remains.

What about nihilism? Or religious fundamentalists that believe the will of their deity is the absolute law? Or the trolley problem? — BlueBanana

I am not sure what you mean about nihilism. Could you expand on it? As for the will of a deity, you are here using the word 'duty' ambiguously. If the god is unjust, then a religious person may obey it "out of duty", but this "duty" is similar in meaning to how the nazis were carrying out their acts "out of duty", which has nothing to do with moral duty. In that case, we actually speak of an immoral god.

I wouldn't draw any generalizations out of 8 billion humans. — BlueBanana

8 billion already?! We're gonna fall off the edge soon.

Alright, we can remain skeptics on this. But then to be fair, neither can we assert that there exist people that commit injustice out of moral duty. The only data we can be certain of are from you and me. I have no sense of moral duty to commit an injustice. Do you?

So anything like as stated above but not justice. So to clarify, if there is a net gain, say in the economy of a state, but for this slavery was introduced, you would find this good? Conversely, if justice was gained by abolishing slavery, but there was no net gain in anything else (also no net loss), then you would not find this to be good? — Samuel Lacrampe

The economy only has an instrumental value. If the economic net gain also resulted in net gain in the happiness of people, slavery would then be morally right, but I don't see how that could be possible. In the hypothetical world where slavery didn't cause any kind of suffering to the slaves, I'd have nothing against it.

Morality is intending for equality in treatment, but one still looks to reason on the foreseeable outcome to make the reasonable choice. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? This goes against that morality is based on equality.

Another extreme case is the Trolley problem, where equality in treatment is impossible, but that does not mean the person making the choice is immoral, because the intention for equal treatment remains. — Samuel Lacrampe

People making different decisions in that situation proves that people disagree not only on the facts but moral sense as well. How is the decision to not pull the lever just?

I am not sure what you mean about nihilism. — Samuel Lacrampe

How can a nihilist believe in morality based on equality if they don't believe in morality in the first place? If they believe there is no moral or immoral way to act in any situation, how can the actions they believe to be the moral ones be considered just?

As for the will of a deity, you are here using the word 'duty' ambiguously. — Samuel Lacrampe

I didn't use that word.

If the god is unjust, then a religious person may obey it "out of duty", but this "duty" is similar in meaning to how the nazis were carrying out their acts "out of duty", which has nothing to do with moral duty. In that case, we actually speak of an immoral god. — Samuel Lacrampe

If those people are deemed immoral because morality is based on equality and their god is unjust, that's circular reasoning.

this "duty" is similar in meaning to how the nazis were carrying out their acts "out of duty", which has nothing to do with moral duty. — Samuel Lacrampe

How so? Do not people do things out of duty because they believe it's morally right to do so? If not, why then?

I have no sense of moral duty to commit an injustice. Do you? — Samuel Lacrampe

Do you mean "to commit injustice" or "to do things that are unjust"? To the former, no, to the latter, yes. I think some unjust actions are morally right, but I don't think injustice in itself is morally right.

This is odd, because I would say when it comes to necessity, all men want the same thing: food, shelter, clothing, and health. What else would you mean by necessity? — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, this is different from what I understood you saying.

By "necessity" I just meant true or felt for all. So while "Do as you want" may lead to contradiction in desire as people compete over fulfilling desires which negate one another, the same would be said of the golden rule "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- so if you acted by said maxim you would still fall into conflict with the desires of others.

But you seem to mean something different than I thought.

So by necessity you just mean a need -- what all humans want: food, shelter, clothing, health.

I would not use the word 'pleasure' because this sounds like it includes tastes (like in movies and music), which are subjective. But aside from tastes, we all 'want' the same things like honesty, respect, safety and health. I think justice is indeed synonymous to fairness. Would you have an example where justice and moral goodness are in conflict? — Samuel Lacrampe

I think the most straightforward example is mercy. Consider the story of Jesus. In a lot of ways it is a story about mercy over justice. What would be fair would be for Jesus to walk free and for those who sinned to be punished for their sins. But mercy abrogates the demands of justice, and in some sense is thereby non-just (at least -- not sure if injustice quite fits either, but it's not just at least).

Just in case it's an issue -- I'm just using the story as a common reference point and allegory to demonstrate a difference between moral goodness and justice by way of the value of mercy, and not trying to weigh in on any factual content to said allegory. We can come up with other examples of mercy -- but mercy is the virtue I'm citing to give a clear delineation between moral goodness and justice.

As per above, aside from tastes, I claim that all men want the same things: we all want food, shelter, health, honesty, respect, and pleasure, and all avoid starvation, homelessness, diseases, dishonesty, disrespect, and pain. This is because we all have the same human nature. Men are men and not plants. This is why the golden rule is adequate for moral acts from man to man. — Samuel Lacrampe

See, I think this is where things get a bit too abstract. We may all have some needs. But we also want more than we need. We often even make choices against our needs for what we want.

And I'd contend that something we may want but do not strictly need are some kinds of moral attachments. So I may believe that homosexuality is a sin. Do I need this belief? Well, no. But I want it, at least in a bare sense of believing it to be so (I recognize that sometimes want indicates choice, but I'm not using that particular meaning at the moment). There are many such rules and maxims which people attach themselves to that they also call moral.

Now what you say here, by my reading at least, is that such attachments are somewhat extraneous to what you're getting at. You're getting at necessity as in need. We all have needs, and the golden rule should satisfy those needs since everyone wants them anyway.

I don't know if I'd agree with your list but I don't have a problem with the notion that we, or at least very many of us, have the same needs.

But then why does invocations of morality so very often not focus on such basic things as food, shelter, clothing, and so forth? Are these things morally good? Or is what is morally good the satisfaction of everyone's needs?

We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow.

In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste?

We need to differentiate between innate desire and sense of duty. While we all have the innate desire of the things listed above for ourselves, we do not necessarily have that same desire for others. This is where the sense of duty comes in; to remind us to not only take care of ourselves but others too, as all have the same nature or ontological value. — Samuel Lacrampe

hrm? I feel like this kind of came out of left field. Not that it's unrelated, only that I wasn't talking about duty -- only that agreeable moral maxims tend to say very little about what to actually do.

Though I think that duty is an interesting thing to bring up in answering my original question/response with respect to needing a more robust theory of justice.

what do you mean by duty? — Pollywalls

Obligation; but we still have the freedom to go for or against it.

theoretically, morality does not even exist, because it is a concept. does your definition of objective define the laws of this universe as objective? — Pollywalls

Of course. Laws of physics are discovered, not man-made; and therefore objective. As it is for physical laws, so it could be with the moral law.

[...] people don't always agree on a punishment for a crime. Where I'm losing you is that you are suggesting everyone agrees that for a crime, a certain punishment is acceptable via Golden rule because of natural inclinations. [...] Do you really believe that there are not differences between individuals and cultures of what they think fits a crime via Golden rule? — SonJnana

I don't believe the challenge in finding the fitting punishment lies in the difference in primary values. Rather, I believe the challenge lies in the facts surrounding the crime. Was the criminal's act intentional, was the outcome foreseeable, etc. See below for examples.

In the case of going out of your way to get drugs without coercion, then become addicted - many people would say that is immoral. While others disagree. — SonJnana

The example changed. The original example was about people who got addicted through not fault of theirs. In this new example, the people intentionally broke the law before becoming addicted. This deserves a punishment of some sort. Note, I am not saying it is easy to separate the sincere from the insincere addicts, but the acts should aim to achieve justice as best as we can.

I meant sex without getting married, like virgin till marriage — SonJnana

Sex outside marriage is not necessarily cheating. One could have an open relationship. — BlueBanana

Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less.

Some would say the 30 year old is being immoral because they're doing something with someone not old enough to make such important decisions. While others disagree and think they are old enough so the 30 year old is not immoral. This is the difference of values that I've speaking of. — SonJnana

Your example points to disagreement on facts: whether a 15 y/o can make such important decisions or not; not a difference of values. It seems if people were to agree on the fact, then they would agree on the moral judgement, as per your reasoning.

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The economy only has an instrumental value. If the economic net gain also resulted in net gain in the happiness of people, slavery would then be morally right, but I don't see how that could be possible. In the hypothetical world where slavery didn't cause any kind of suffering to the slaves, I'd have nothing against it. — BlueBanana

Your position still sounds like it is for justice, dressed in different words. One more try: Your spouse cheats on you but you never find out. Your spouse is happy; you are happy. I see no net loss other than in justice. Do you find this act immoral or not?

Why? This goes against that morality is based on equality. — BlueBanana

This is a misunderstanding of my position (which, granted, was not explicit in the OP). Morality is the intention for justice. Sometimes, justice is not easily achievable or straight up impossible. But the intent can remain, and in which case the person is not immoral.

People making different decisions in that situation proves that people disagree not only on the facts but moral sense as well. How is the decision to not pull the lever just? — BlueBanana

Why both the facts and moral sense? Why not just the facts? The decision to not pull the lever may come from the belief that all choices result in the same amount of gain/loss. This belief is of facts, not of moral sense.

How can a nihilist believe in morality based on equality if they don't believe in morality in the first place? If they believe there is no moral or immoral way to act in any situation, how can the actions they believe to be the moral ones be considered just? — BlueBanana

This depends on why they are nihilists in the first place. Are they nihilists because they perceive no moral sense, or do they perceive no moral sense because they are nihilists?

If the former, then it may be possible to have a reduced moral sense, inasmuch as blind people have a reduced sense of vision. This does not entail that the moral law is not real, inasmuch as the visible object is not unreal. Note also that if there is no moral sense, then there is no moral sense against justice either.

If the latter, then it could be they choose to ignore the moral sense on the grounds that it is a false perception, based on nihilism.

If those people are deemed immoral because morality is based on equality and their god is unjust, that's circular reasoning. — BlueBanana

:brow: I see nothing circular here. Only since the Abrahamic religions did people associate moral goodness with god. Before and outside these religions, one can speak of an immoral god. And if we judge a god to be immoral, the criteria for judgement must be separate from the will of god.

How so? Do not people do things out of duty because they believe it's morally right to do so? If not, why then? — BlueBanana

I should clarify. Duty just means obligation, and is not necessarily for moral reasons. One may have a sense of duty for its country, and not for the belief that the country is always morally right. It could be other reasons like mere tradition, or feeling of belonging, or simply "somebody said so".

Do you mean "to commit injustice" or "to do things that are unjust"? To the former, no, to the latter, yes. I think some unjust actions are morally right, but I don't think injustice in itself is morally right. — BlueBanana

The only difference I think I see between your first and second quote is about intentions. In which case, I agree. One's action may results in injustice without being immoral, if the intention was not unjust. Conversely, one may not intend injustice without being immoral.

By "necessity" I just meant true or felt for all. So while "Do as you want" may lead to contradiction in desire as people compete over fulfilling desires which negate one another, the same would be said of the golden rule "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- so if you acted by said maxim you would still fall into conflict with the desires of others. — Moliere

Got it. This is what I have been calling "primary values": What all consider to be good or bad. But I don't think this it leads to competitions. Primary values such as honesty, respect, safety and health can be received as well as given without competition. Situations like the Trolley problem are more challenging, but as discussed a few times in this thread, it can be resolved.

[...] We can come up with other examples of mercy -- but mercy is the virtue I'm citing to give a clear delineation between moral goodness and justice. — Moliere

We should come up with another example, not so much because I disagree with your interpretation of the story of Jesus, but because it is about justice from God to man, which is not as clear as justice from man to man. I still think that mercy cannot be morally good if unjust, but we can test specific examples.

We may all have some needs. But we also want more than we need. [...] — Moliere

This is why I prefer the term "primary value" over "need". Need sounds more like what is necessary for survival. As such, values like honesty, respect, and equality do not fit the category of need; and yet are considered good, and their opposites bad, by all. I have not met you, but I would still bet you do not want to be lied to, disrespected, or discriminated against.

As for homosexuality, it is true that this does not fall under the criteria of justice or the golden rule, and I am not sure where I stand on this. I briefly talk here about sexual acts and show that it does not harm the claim that morality is objective, but this may not be what you are looking for.

hrm? I feel like this kind of came out of left field. Not that it's unrelated, only that I wasn't talking about duty -- only that agreeable moral maxims tend to say very little about what to actually do. — Moliere

You were talking about "proper conduct" and "what to do". Duty is defined as "what we ought to do", and so I think you are talking about duty even if you did not call it that. Since what is pleasurable and what is just is not always in agreement, this is where duty is needed: to have a sense to do what is just even when the act is not pleasurable.

The example changed. The original example was about people who got addicted through not fault of theirs. — Samuel Lacrampe

The original example was simply if someone has a drug addiction. You responded with

Going to jail for a drug addiction, especially one that came through not fault of ours, clearly exceeds the "crime". — Samuel Lacrampe

With this statement you are still saying that going to jail for a drug addiction clearly exceeds the crime. And especially (which implies not necessarily) if it is no fault of ours - This part is irrelevant to me anyways, because that changes it to a completely different situation which is not the issue that I had intended for you to address - to clear up this misunderstanding

In this new example, the people intentionally broke the law before becoming addicted. This deserves a punishment of some sort. Note, I am not saying it is easy to separate the sincere from the insincere addicts, but the acts should aim to achieve justice as best as we can. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now here you are saying that going to jail does not exceed the crime, which is inconsistent with what you stated above.

Do you think a person intentionally going out of their way to do drugs and become an addict - do you think jail exceeds that crime or not? In the US many will say it doesn't. In Europe many will say it does. How do you reconcile this?

Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly. Whether or not it is unjust depends on an individual's views.

Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less. — Samuel Lacrampe

My point this whole time has been to say that justice is dependent on presupposed values. In extreme examples like this one, natural inclinations may fully account for what people consider to be just or unjust because other variables might not influence values that are consistent with not wanting to get raped. However, so many other variables like culture, parents, etc. can influence what people consider just in other situations, such as whether premarital sex is immoral or not. People may have the same presupposed values for extreme cases via Golden rule, but that doesn't mean it applies to every case.

Your example points to disagreement on facts: whether a 15 y/o can make such important decisions or not; not a difference of values. It seems if people were to agree on the fact, then they would agree on the moral judgement, as per your reasoning. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is the criteria of whether or not a 15 y/o is old enough to make those decisions? You could look at the facts about brain development in 15 year olds. Some would argue that development is sufficient at 15 while others would say it is not - both views via Golden rule after looking at the same facts.

Conventionally, objectivity means that the property described is part of the object of thought, independent of the subject of thought. Objective properties may be either necessary or contingent. To say "the Earth is flat" is an objective statement, because the Earth is either flat or not, independent of the subject saying it. It is also a contingent property because it could logically be not flat (like round if you can imagine). Speaking about morality, I use the term "objective" in the conventional sense (notwithstanding the possibility that it can be necessary too, but this is besides the point).

It is true that without free will, then there can be no moral acts. But why think there is no free will? Most people believe in free will, and it sure feels like we have free will upon self reflection. As such, the onus of proof is on the other side.

Conventionally, objectivity means that the property described is part of the object of thought, independent of the subject of thought. Objective properties may be either necessary or contingent. To say "the Earth is flat" is an objective statement, because the Earth is either flat or not, independent of the subject saying it. It is also a contingent property because it could logically be not flat (like round if you can imagine). Speaking about morality, I use the term "objective" in the conventional sense (notwithstanding the possibility that it can be necessary too, but this is besides the point). — Samuel Lacrampe

Our claim about the property of the object depends on a prior claim that the object exists, so it can have a property. 'The Earth is flat' could be objective only if we also claim that there exists such an object i.e. the Earth.

But 'exists' in what sense? If we say its properties are either necessary or contingent and that this can be determined 'logically', then that is to say they can be determined purely from the way we have defined the subject. The existence of Earth would only be the existence of that definition. To say a claim about the shape of the Earth was objective we would only mean it related to the way somebody uses the word 'Earth',

Normally, I do not think that claims about the Earth are understood that way. Rather they are empirical. That 'the Earth exists' is 'exists as a material object' So to say 'the Earth is flat' is to make a claim about phenomena.

But claims about the existence of Morality are not usually understood to be about a material object. So to say that a claim about Morality was 'objective' is not be like an 'objective' claim about the shape of the Earth. It would only be a claim about 'how people use that word Morality' or 'what I mean by Morality'.

So to describe the Earth and Morality as both being 'objects of thought' is to blur a difference that makes all the difference.

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Got it. This is what I have been calling "primary values": What all consider to be good or bad. But I don't think this it leads to competitions. Primary values such as honesty, respect, safety and health can be received as well as given without competition. — Samuel Lacrampe

Cool.

We should come up with another example, — Samuel Lacrampe

Cool.

Say you have a friend who is an alcoholic. They have lost their house, life, and work to said disease. They turn to you for help to keep them off the street while they try to get their life together, and you agree to do so. While you are at work said friend takes some money laying around your house, buys booze, and gets drunk without telling you.

Let's suppose after sobering up he's penitent.

The path of justice would have him pay you back. The path of mercy wouldn't. (or, at least, a path)

This is why I prefer the term "primary value" over "need". Need sounds more like what is necessary for survival. As such, values like honesty, respect, and equality do not fit the category of need; and yet are considered good, and their opposites bad, by all. I have not met you, but I would still bet you do not want to be lied to, disrespected, or discriminated against.

As for homosexuality, it is true that this does not fall under the criteria of justice or the golden rule, and I am not sure where I stand on this. I briefly talk here about sexual acts and show that it does not harm the claim that morality is objective, but this may not be what you are looking for. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less. — Samuel Lacrampe

Just linking your response earlier about sexual mores for reference.

I'd say that, from my perspective at least, the difference in sexual mores still gets at what I was trying to say. Even "need" as you define it here -- to include more than brute survival -- people still want more than they need. And some of those wants are moral wants. They appear, on the surface, to be preferences but with more emotional "umph" behind them than mere preference.

They are considered moral. But, by your notion of need (which is not bare necessity survival type need, but needs of a broader set which are still considered generally universal), they are not needs -- so, while a bit cumbersome, for the purposes of our discussion I'd call them moral wants.

So it seems you would have to contend that moral goodness is the satisfaction of everyone's needs in this broader sense. But that brings me to my question from before --

We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow. In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste, with a little more emotional "umph", just like sanctions against certain sexual acts appear to be?

The original example was simply if someone has a drug addiction. [...] — SonJnana

I guess I was not very clear. My bad.

Do you think a person intentionally going out of their way to do drugs and become an addict - do you think jail exceeds that crime or not? — SonJnana

The correct answer is: it depends on the facts. First, is the defend truly at fault, that is, was the crime intentional and foreseeable? If not, then no punishment is deserved. If yes, then was someone else harmed, either physically, financially, etc? If yes, then the defendant must pay for the harm done. If not, then what punishment can be done with the end to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again? If it can be done with a mere warning, then so be it. If not, then the punishment would be raised so as to meet that end. At the extreme, if a criminal keeps escaping from prison and killing everyone, then the capital punishment may be adequate at that point.

I am not saying any of the above facts are easy to uncover; but they remain objective facts nonetheless.

Whether or not it is unjust depends on an individual's views. [...] My point this whole time has been to say that justice is dependent on presupposed values. — SonJnana

Not 'unjust'; 'immoral'. As defined in the OP, 'justice' is objective; and even when it comes to sex, justice is easy to determine by applying the golden rule. E.g., if I have premarital sex but am intolerant of my spouse having done it, then I am unjust.

[...] However, so many other variables like culture, parents, etc. can influence what people consider just in other situations, such as whether premarital sex is immoral or not. People may have the same presupposed values for extreme cases via Golden rule, but that doesn't mean it applies to every case. — SonJnana

Even in the case of sex, justice is a necessary criteria for morality, even though it is not a sufficient criteria. Note, this does not exclude the possibility that other criteria to determine morality are also objective. But I concede that justice alone is not sufficient in all cases. Can we agree to this: If just, then it is not necessarily moral, but if unjust, then it is necessarily immoral.

What is the criteria of whether or not a 15 y/o is old enough to make those decisions? You could look at the facts about brain development in 15 year olds. Some would argue that development is sufficient at 15 while others would say it is not - both views via Golden rule after looking at the same facts. — SonJnana

Whether or not the criteria is easily found, it does not make it less objective. Would anyone disagree that a 15 y/o is better suited to make this decision, than a 5 y/o? If no one, then the property of "being suited to make this decision" is objective.

If not, then what punishment can be done with the end to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again? If it can be done with a mere warning, then so be it. If not, then the punishment would be raised so as to meet that end. At the extreme, if a criminal keeps escaping from prison and killing everyone, then the capital punishment may be adequate at that point. — Samuel Lacrampe

There are people who believe that if someone intentionally goes out of their way to do drugs while not harming anyone, the person deserves to go to prison. And there are also people who think prison exceeds the crime. How do you reconcile these two opposing views?

How can you say one is more objectively right than the other when people of both opposing views see their own view as just via Golden rule?

Not 'unjust'; 'immoral'. As defined in the OP, 'justice' is objective; and even when it comes to sex, justice is easy to determine by applying the golden rule. E.g., if I have premarital sex but am intolerant of my spouse having done it, then I am unjust. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your viewpoint is that if it is unjust, then it must also be immoral. How can you say that it is not unjust but it is immoral?

You would be unjust in that case, but there are also people of an opposing viewpoint who have premarital sex are not intolerant of their spouse having done it, and therefore are not unjust. So how can premarital sex itself be just or unjust? It depends on the viewpoint of the person.

Even in the case of sex, justice is a necessary criteria for morality, even though it is not a sufficient criteria. Note, this does not exclude the possibility that other criteria to determine morality are also objective. But I concede that justice alone is not sufficient in all cases. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree justice is necessary and that it is not sufficient. That is because justice requires presupposed values. One's Golden rule is based off of their values. The presupposed values are the criteria by which to judge an act as just or unjust. As you've now acknowledged, people can have different values and therefore different different judgements about what is just via Golden rule.

Can we agree to this: If just, then it is not necessarily moral, but if unjust, then it is necessarily immoral. — Samuel Lacrampe

If it is just by one's view and unjust by another's view, how you even then determine if the act is moral or immoral. I don't really understand this.

I think it makes more sense to just say that an action is moral if it is just according to the criteria. The Golden rule is dependent on one's values therefore the presupposed values are the criteria. People have different values therefore the presupposed values will be dependent on an individual. And that is what I believe people mean when they say morality is subjective

Whether or not the criteria is easily found, it does not make it less objective. Would anyone disagree that a 15 y/o is better suited to make this decision, than a 5 y/o? If no one, then the property of "being suited to make this decision" is objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

When judging something, that is dependent on the criteria you are using. The criteria itself is constructed. And my point is that since people differ on the criteria they are using when they use the word morality - they have different values - that is why you can't just say something is objectively morally right. If everyone were to use the Golden rule in a situation, everyone wouldn't always come to the same judgements about what is just or unjust.

I agree that what is objective is found either because the property is necessary, or because we observe it empirically. I also agree that we can find what is necessary from definitions, or essence of things; although we do not create essences, we discover them.

I disagree that all that is empirical is material. To observe an inner sense of moral duty is empirical, though the sense is not necessarily material. And if we all have the same inner moral sense of duty to seek justice and avoid injustice, then this justice-based morality is objective because justice is objective.

Free will does not mean we have freedom in every way. We seem to not be free to choose to abide to the laws of physics, and we are certainly not free from the laws of logic. Rather, free will means freedom of intentions, and acts that follow the intentions, insofar that the acts abide to the laws of logic and physics. As far as I can tell, we cannot prove that we do not have freedom of intentions.