A dog barks at the mailman...

What can we say about this dog's behaviour, as it pertains to language and belief?

Well. Knowing what the dog is thinking is required, isn't it? I mean, if we are to claim that the dog is communicating with us, we would have to say what it is that is being communicated, wouldn't we?

I think so. So, we've already arrived at the mental ongoings of the dog.

Earlier it was suggested that the dog's barking communicated the dog's belief that an intruder was in the yard.

That's not too terrible an assertion is it? I mean, is it out of the realm of possibility that a dog can believe that an intruder is in the yard? It can certainly see an intruder.

The problem however, is this...

Does the dog see the intruder as an intruder?

A bit about mental states or phenomenal states.

I spoke earlier about wanting to deal with the dynamics of belief. I'm not at all happy with thinking of a belief as a state, a particular condition that presumably sometimes lasts over time.

A belief shows itself in a myriad of ways. Mad Mike manifests his belief verbally in interviews, as well a in tightening the nut on that bolt on his home-made rocket. Why? Because he believes that the earth is flat.

The one belief is used to explain a world of action.

Link this back to Wittgenstein's suggestion that we rid ourselves of the notion of a private belief by imagining that it changes over time.

Mad Mike says he believes that the Earth is flat, and this explains his behaviour. But in the long night of the soul he admits that the Earth is round, and holds himself up as the champion of empirical method who will show it to be so.

He never tells of this.

And yet both beliefs explain his behaviour.

I'm constantly being told under your account that I can't intuit things, . — Hanover

Odd.

that I can't know something without first articulating it linguistically, — Hanover

Sort of. You can drop the "first".

Knowing how to ride a bike is demonstrated by riding a bike; knowledge of addition is demonstrated by doing addition.

Knowledge of a fact is true and believed, and hence hence propositional. Hence any such knowledge can be articulated simply by speaking the proposition. Knowledge of fact can be demonstrated by stating that fact.

That's not a restriction; just a part of the grammar of knowledge.

I cannot really understand something prior to my village of idiots weighing in on it. — Hanover

Your village idiots set up the language in which you can articulate your knowledge. But your knowledge is not dependent on their agreement.

A very young child, say crawling on fours still, can learn that touching fire hurts by touching fire. They do not learn that "touching fire hurts" is a true statement. Statements are utterly meaningless to the child. — creativesoul

None of the following - the child, the fire, and the behaviour - are existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

And? The belief can still be stated.

I was left with the irony of there being this ineffable theory that could not be conveyed by you to me that denied ineffability. — Hanover

I rather like this.

A theory that could not be understood but with denies ineffability. Sweet! You can hear duck-rabbits marching!

And yet, since we understand it to deny ineffability, we understand at least part of it.

The story goes that if it cannot be said, it might be shown. So Mad Mike looks at a duck-rabbit and sees a rabbit. He is told it also looks like a duck, but he can't see it.

Perhaps he might move on by saying that Fred also sees a duck, but that he himself cannot; and thereafter remain silent.

Someone else (Apo?) comes along and says it's not really a duck or a rabbit, but a bunch of curved lines.

But Fred still sometimes sees the duck, sometimes the rabbit; Mike still sees the rabbit, but no duck.

Someone else says it's a dog. But secretly, they see the duck or the rabbit, and just threw the dog in to stir the pot.

A very young child, say crawling on fours still, can learn that touching fire hurts by touching fire. They do not learn that "touching fire hurts" is a true statement. Statements are utterly meaningless to the child.
— creativesoul

None of the following - the child, the fire, and the behaviour - are existentially dependent upon language.
— creativesoul

And? The belief can still be stated. — Banno

And... it follows that your earlier notion of "belief" cannot take proper account of this everyday situation.

It follows that the child's belief is not existentially dependent upon language. It follows that the content of the child's belief is not propositional. It follows that the child cannot have a disposition towards a statement.

Regarding this tired go-to notion of being state-able. We've been here before, it seems necessary to go there again...

There is a difference between our setting out what non-linguistic belief consists of and what non-linguistic belief consists of. This difference has multiple facets, all of which need to be properly understood in order to understand the import of what's being argued here.

Our setting out a non-linguistic belief is a metacognitive endeavor. We are thinking about belief. We are reporting upon non-linguistic belief. This endeavor requires language.

Non-linguistic belief does not - cannot.

If a belief does not consist of statements(does not have propositional content), but we can state what it does consist of, are we stating their belief? If so, then we agree, and the fact that the belief can be stated is irrelevant.

Do not confuse our report with what we're reporting upon.

Mad Mike says he believes that the Earth is flat, and this explains his behaviour. But in the long night of the soul he admits that the Earth is round, and holds himself up as the champion of empirical method who will show it to be so.

He never tells of this.

And yet both beliefs explain his behaviour. — Banno

This is a contradiction on it's face Banno.

If we could say that his behaviour is explained by virtue of his believing the world is flat, and setting out to prove that, but we could equally say that his behaviour is explained by virtue of his believing that the world is not flat, and setting out to prove that, then there is inadequate evidence to warrant stating either, for his behaviour supports both equally.

that I can't know something without first articulating it linguistically,
— Hanover

Sort of. You can drop the "first".

Knowing how to ride a bike is demonstrated by riding a bike; knowledge of addition is demonstrated by doing addition. — Banno

This isn't quite right either...

Some knowledge is not existentially dependent upon it's being demonstrated. The fire example. The child can know that touching fire hurts without articulating it linguistically. It can acquire such knowledge in a room with no one else around. There is no demonstration necessary.

The child is not making a knowledge claim. Having knowledge does not always require that the creature have ability to state it.

I suspect that there's a bit of underlying confusion here... old epistemological mistakes rearing their head.

A theory that could not be understood but with denies ineffability. Sweet! You can hear duck-rabbits marching!

And yet, since we understand it to deny ineffability, we understand at least part of it. — Banno

There are all sorts of ineffable theories. There are certainly some students that no amount of discussion is going to explain to them algebra, others are limited at geometry, others calculus, and certainly plenty of people can't begin to understand quantum mechanics. If we can assume that there exists a single person who cannot understand Theory X, I don't see why we can't logically assume there is a Theory X that one person and one person alone can understand.. It is possible that Einstein arrived at his theories by himself and it could have been possible that he alone could understand his conclusions, with no one else being able to comprehend what he said.

The story goes that if it cannot be said, it might be shown. So Mad Mike looks at a duck-rabbit and sees a rabbit. He is told it also looks like a duck, but he can't see it.

Perhaps he might move on by saying that Fred also sees a duck, but that he himself cannot; and thereafter remain silent.

Someone else (Apo?) comes along and says it's not really a duck or a rabbit, but a bunch of curved lines.

But Fred still sometimes sees the duck, sometimes the rabbit; Mike still sees the rabbit, but no duck. — Banno

And what do you see when you look at the duck/rabbit? I'd submit it's none of the things you've presented, but you actually use it as a symbol for the concept of symbol ambiguity and that context and perspective can influence an observer's understanding of meaning. Even should my summary of your thoughts be wrong, it is very clear to me that you aren't simply just trying to show me a cool optical illusion, but you mean to say something by it.

And so I don't see what you mean to invoke by the duck/rabbit in this discussion. It strikes me that if I continued to just say "Wow, that's a cool picture... I see a duck, now a rabbit, wait... now a duck." and I just kept doing that, you'd certainly think that I entirely failed to understand what you were saying. Is it not still the meaning of what you intend to convey (that mental thing in your head) that is what is relevant?

Hm.

Hm.

@Hanover
Hm.

One argues for their claims. This is done by setting out the ground. The act of convincing another(the justification process) that one's claim is justified does not make the claim justified, it just shows another why and/or how one should believe this or that. This is a way to discriminate between competing/contradictory claims. If a claim is well-grounded, it is justified, regardless of whether or not it has been argued for.

One may wonder what the relevance is here, and that would be a perfectly understandable pondering. It has to do with belief and knowledge.

Making a knowledge claim is not equivalent to, nor is it necessary for, acquiring knowledge. What it takes to make a knowledge claim is not equivalent to what it takes to have knowledge.

The fire example. The child's belief is well-grounded. It is true. It is an example that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one can acquire justified true belief despite the fact that they have no language.

Is that child's belief ineffable? Certainly not, we're effin' it now. Does that child's belief consist of propositional content? I've no reason to conclude that. Our report of it most certainly consists of language. We can become aware of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our becoming aware of it. Non-linguistic thought and belief is one such thing.

Making a knowledge claim is not equivalent to, nor is it necessary for, acquiring knowledge. What it takes to make a knowledge claim is not equivalent to what it takes to have knowledge. — creativesoul

As a result, we can further know that knowledge can be gleaned by creatures' incapable of meaningful utterance.

All of this follows from a notion of "belief" that has it right.

Jack has true belief. All belief presupposes it's truth(as it's own correspondence to fact/reality). Non-linguistic belief coincidentally achieves this task by virtue of consisting entirely of mental correlations. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. Common language follows suit.

Some reports of "belief" talk about that which exists, in it's entirety, prior to our identifying, isolating and further examining it. All other senses of "truth", aside from the one which equates truth and reality, take about that which is existentially dependent upon language.

All belief presupposes it's own truth.

Statements of belief do so by virtue of presupposing to be telling it like it is; to be setting out the way things are, were, and/or will be. Statements of belief are social mechanisms, that work best when understood for what they are. The are an irrevocably necessary ingredient of a successful society.

All of this follows from a notion of "belief" that has it right.

A very young child, around a year old, cannot yet walk so she is in a walker. She is moving around as she can in this walker. At her fingertips, on the tray in front of her, are some small bits of chicken. She likes these, and eats them when she wants. She's in the kitchen.

Earlier in this child's life, around six months ago, she was bitten by a medium-large sized dog, a shepard of sorts. The dog bit her in the face, and the scar remains visible, although it's healed nicely and may disappear with enough time. That experience of being bitten frightened the child and left quite the impression within the child's thinking.

The kitchen she is now meandering around in the walker belongs to friends of her parents. She's been here before, and the owners have a rather large dog, a Rottweiler, who's walking around the house and enters the kitchen. The owners' of the dog and the girl's parents often tell the dog "Go away" when they want the dog to go somewhere else. The girl hasn't been taught how to do the same, at least not intentionally so. She doesn't speak in much else aside from "Dada" and "Mama". However, the girl sees the dog enter the kitchen and says for the very first time, with obvious and clear intention, "Go away!", and the dog leaves.

The girl's parents were amazed that she had behaved like this, for they did not attempt to teach her to do this, although in behaving the same way, they actually had... sort of. She put it all together, as one must when learning how to do things with words.

She had witnessed others saying "Go away!" and observed the dog leaving afterwards, and in doing so had drawn correlations between others' behaviour and what happened afterwards. I put it to you that the girl saw the dog, believed that the dog was there, and further believed that saying "Go away!" would result in the dog going away. Her belief ended up being true.

She didn't state her belief. She didn't state anything at all. She couldn't state her belief. We can. She cannot understand her own mental ongoings, although when the time comes, she'll surely assent to our report on them...

There are different kinds of belief. We all know this. We can take account of these kinds by virtue of looking at the different sense of the term "belief". If we look to draw a distinction between kinds of belief, and each and every kind(sense) has a set of common denominators, then we ought pay attention to that set.

If it is the case that all belief consists of the same basic(elemental) ingredients(amongst others), and those basic constituents alone are adequate and/or sufficient for belief, then we have the strongest possible justificatory ground to conclude that these are the basic elemental constituents of belief. Being comprised of these basic elemental constituents is what makes a belief what it is. The different kinds of belief are determined by the different elemental constituents; those aside from the common denominators(basic elemental constituents).

I once posited a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic belief, and further attempted to work out the difference in terms of the belief content. That distinction finds significant trouble when it comes to a non-linguistic creature forming and/or holding belief about something that is clearly existentially dependent upon language. It only follows that non-linguistic belief can be about that which is existentially dependent upon language. Earlier I spoke of a toaster, a mouse, and a cat. Since a cat can believe that a mouse is behind a toaster, and toasters are existentially dependent upon language, it only follows that non-linguistic belief(drawn and held by non-linguistic creatures) can be about(in some way or other) that which is existentially dependent upon language.

If the content of non-linguistic belief cannot include that which is existentially dependent upon language, but can yet still be about something that is, then there is a distinction to be drawn between a belief being about something(about-ness) and belief content. When a non-linguistic belief is about something or other that is existentially dependent upon language(a toaster), that something or other need only to be perceptible to the creature. The toaster is part of the belief content, but not as a toaster. The cat doesn't perceive the toaster as a toaster, but rather the toaster is simply what the mouse is hiding behind. The cat also doesn't perceive the mouse as a mouse. Jack doesn't perceive the bowl as a bowl... an empty one not withstanding.

Hm.

It is possible that Einstein arrived at his theories by himself and it could have been possible that he alone could understand his conclusions, with no one else being able to comprehend what he said. — Hanover

We take care to distinguish the unexpressed,which might be said but so far hasn't, from the inexpressible, which cannot be said. And to this you now add a theory X which is expressible but not understood. And what you are saying is that Einstein might have been a crackpot.

I would replace this by saying that an unshared theory is not a theory at all; and further that a theory understood by only one person is not a theory.

:joke:

There are all sorts of ineffable theories. There are certainly some students that no amount of discussion is going to explain to them algebra, others are limited at geometry, others calculus, and certainly plenty of people can't begin to understand quantum mechanics. — Hanover

There is a difference between a theory not being understood by George and a theory not being understandable at all.

You haven't explained why the theory understandable only by George is not a theory.

What word do you use to describe a true explanation that no one in the kingdom of fools (minus one) understands?

Have a think about what a theory understandable only by George would be like. Does George say "I have a theory about X but I can't explain it"? Or is the theory just word salad to us?

Have a think about what a theory understandable only by George would be like. Does George say "I have a theory about X but I can't explain it"? Or is the theory just word salad to us? — Banno

His theory could be expressable in principle, but still kept private. He probably just got tired of dealing with mean girls.

Have a think about what a theory understandable only by George would be like. Does George say "I have a theory about X but I can't explain it"? Or is the theory just word salad to us? — Banno

If you can assume on an island of 2 people that George understands something that Bob does not, regardless of how hard George tries, then you would have a theory of only 1. Bob would hear the sounds and try to understand the theory, but he couldn't. I don't understand why you find that impossible.

I don't see your point here. Are you making an empirical claim about how knowledge is acquired where it must be understandable to another person in order for it to exist? Help me out here. Is it sufficient that George be able to explain it to himself just well enough for his homunculus gets it?

If you can assume on an island of 2 people that George understands something that Bob does not, regardless of how hard George tries, then you would have a theory of only 1. Bob would hear the sounds and try to understand the theory, but he couldn't. I don't understand why you find that impossible. — Hanover

Your framing of questions such as this shows a misinterpretation of what is going on. IT's how you picture the situation that is problematic. There isn't an answer to the situation you set up.

Are you making an empirical claim about how knowledge is acquired where it must be understandable to another person in order for it to exist? — Hanover

IF Knowledge is justified true belief, and if belief is propositional, then knowledge is propositional.

IF knowledge is being able to act in a specified way - knowing how to ride a bike - then it is demonstrated in that act.

Either way, knowledge is not private.

If you can assume on an island of 2 people that George understands something that Bob does not, regardless of how hard George tries, then you would have a theory of only 1. Bob would hear the sounds and try to understand the theory, but he couldn't. I don't understand why you find that impossible. — Hanover

Suppose that Bob's theory changes over the time spent on the island, but Bob doesn't notice. There's no written record to compare it to, and George has no idea.

Slowly, over time, Bob comes to think the exact opposite of what he first believed, but does not notice.

It would be very strange to claim here that Bob had a theory.