Are you seriously suggesting that France could have a capital other than Paris? — John

:D

Sorry John, but this made me laugh heartily. France could have had another capital, just as the US could have had a different president. TG is right. If that's not empirical, then nothing is.

It seems bewildering because it's clearly false, and you're defending it apparently with a misreading of Kripke. Im not sure of any reasonable way to claim that France's capital being Paris is an essential property of France. In fact it seems insane. Maybe you can explain why you think that? — The Great Whatever

It has nothing to do with misreading Kripke. It has to do with your inflexibility about essence. I think there's a lot more duck/rabbit to this than you're realizing.

When we say something's an empirical proposition, we mean roughly it pertains to some contingent matter of fact that might have been otherwise. Clearly Paris doesn't have to be the capital of France. It's synthetic a posteriori pretty uncontroversially on anyone's standards.
It may not be an epistemic possibility, in that wwhat we know about France rules out that the actual world is one in which some place other than Paris is the nation's capital. But this is true of all sorts of empirical propositions. It's an empirical proposition that the sun is shining here and now, like you said, but given what I know about today's weather, there is no serious epistemic possibility that it isn't. — The Great Whatever

See, here you are talking about modal possibility, not empirical actuality. Paris is the capital of France because we designate it as such. Tomorrow, without changing the meanings of any words Avignon could be designated as the capital of France. The sun is not shining today because we designate it as such; it may be either shining or not; and the proposition that it is shining here and now, may thus be falsified or verified, true or false. So, the two cases of the Sun shining and Paris being the capital are not analagous.

I don't know what would possess someone to think that Paris being the capital of France is one of France's essential properties: this would commit you, among other things, to believing that France cannot change its capital, without being destroyed, which is false. Nor do I think any reading of Naming and Necessity will get you there. In any case, it's not an interesting point.

Of course i'm talking about modal possibility. That's what we're all talking about. That's what I was just pointing out. Whether a proposition is synthetic, empirical, contingent, or whatever, doesn't have to do with whether it's actually true, nor with whether it's a live epistemic possibility that it's actually true. You seem just to be misunderstanding the terms of the debate.

'Paris is the capital of France' is a plain empirical proposition, just like 'the sun is shining.' It can be verified or falsified just as easily as propositions about the sun shining. I'm not sure why you think otherwise. It's a matter of fact what city is France's capital.

:s

Well, I think you have not properly earned your hearty laugh, because I did not ask whether France "could have had" another capital, but whether it could have another capital right now, in this empirical world of ours, and given that nothing has changed from yesterday. To make it more clear, do you think it is possible that yesterday the capital of France was not Paris, in a way comparable to the possibility that at any given location and time yesterday the sun was shining or not?

If you think math is learned synthetically, then you're going to deny this.

I am unable to form an opinion on whether mathematics is learned synthetically, because I don't know what 'synthetic' means. If I did, I would then know what 'analytic' means, since my understanding is that they are supposed to be antonyms.

Okay, but that has nothing to do with the present topic or whether a proposition is empirical. You're talking about epistemic modality.

'Synthetic' means requiring the use of experience, rather than mere analysis of linguistic expressions and the internal structure of the language, to determine truth or falsity. In Kantian terms is means a cateogorical judgment in which the predicate is not contained within its subject (and you can define this containment relation is various ways).

I don't really understand the question, and I'm not sure I want to get into it right now anyway, as TG has hit the nail already. Plus I'm on a crappy iPad keyboard.

EDIT: But yes, fair point: I misread you. I agree that France as it now is, having Paris as its capital, cannot not have Paris as its capital. But as has been said already, that's not what is at issue here.

An empirical possibility is something that it is really possible could be an empirical actuality. Think of any set of coordinates on the earth. It is an empirical possibility in the sense I mean, that the sun is shining there now, or not. Is it an empirical possibility in this kind of sense that Paris is now not the capital of France (independently that is of any kind of event such as that the French government this morning declared that Avignon is now the capital)?

I don't understand why you don't understand the question; it seems perfectly straightforward to me.
:s

Is "epistemic modality" something different than "empirical terms"? It is relevant because Paris is defined as the capital of Paris in a way somewhat analogous to how bachelors are defined as unmarried men; whereas as whether the Sun is shining at some location is not a matter of definition at all.

EDIT: But yes, fair point: I misread you. I agree that France as it now is, having Paris as its capital, cannot not have Paris as its capital. But as has been said already, that's not what is at issue here. — jamalrob

I don't know what would possess someone to think that Paris being the capital of France is one of France's essential properties: this would commit you, among other things, to believing that France cannot change its capital, without being destroyed, which is false. — The Great Whatever

No. It wouldn't commit me to saying France can't change its capital. Among the essential features of what we call France is that for a period of time (including this date), Paris was its capital. Pretty simple.

I guess you're not a fan of alternate history literature.

Paris is not defined as the capital of France in any way. It is the capital of France, but that is not the same thing.

Whether Paris is the capital of France is not a matter of definition, it is a matter of fact, which city is the capital of the country. It might be a matter of some complex broader social agreement, but it's first of all not only a matter of that, and second of all this is not the same thing as it being a matter of definition.

No. It wouldn't commit me to saying France can't change its capital. Among the essential features of what we call France is that for a period of time (including this date), Paris was its capital. Pretty simple. — Mongrel

Except it's not, because we can say things like, 'if France's capital had been Cannes right now...' This would be literally unintelligible if it were an essential property of France to have Paris as its capital during some stretch of time.

'Synthetic' means requiring the use of experience — TGW

Here's the first part of section IV of the intro to CPR (first edition):

In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical — Immanuel Kant

To me, that says they are antonyms. I also note that he does not mention experience.

you can define this containment relation is various ways — TGW

Can you provide an example of one? I have never seen an attempted definition. People just seem to assume that its meaning is obvious - which it isn't.

It is perfectly obvious how the empirical proposition that the sun was shining yesterday at 10 am Greenwich mean time at such and such coordinates can be falsified; by checking to see if it was shining there or not. So, tell me how the proposition that Paris was the capital of France yesterday at 10 am could be falsified, (and remember I'm ruling out changes of designation made by humans here, although it is obvious that most people would already know if the capital of France had been changed yesterday). How could you check whether Paris was the capital of France yesterday or not?

An empirical possibility is something that it is really possible could be an empirical actuality. — John

I think of "empirical" as a type of justification. You're talking about actuality. I think I understand what you're saying. Say I toss a die... however many possibilities I claim exist prior to its landing, there's only one possibility when it does land. Right?

To me, that says they are antonyms. I also note that he does not mention experience. — andrewk

Sorry, I messed up, being synthetic doesn't have to do with relying on experience, that's a posteriori. It has to do with conceptual analysis, of a proposition's truth not being discernible in virtue of the rules of the language or thoughts the language conveys.

Can you provide an example of one? I have never seen an attempted definition. People just seem to assume that it's meaning is obvious - which it isn't. — andrewk

Sure. For example let a property be a function from possible worlds to sets of individuals. Suppose that for some properties A and B, and for all possible worlds w, A(w) is a subset of B(w). Then the property A is contained within the property B, and it is impossible to be an A without being a B, and this is known to anyone who knows what the words denoting these properties mean.

You seem to be under the impression that's it's impossible to check whether a certain city is the capital of a nation, or else this question makes no sense. But I can't figure out why you would think that.

You can check whether the sun was shining, and so verify or falsify that it was; likewise, you can check what the capital of a nation is.

Except it's not, because we can say things like, 'if France's capital had been Cannes right now...' This would be literally unintelligible if it were an essential property of France to have Paris as its capital during some stretch of time. — The Great Whatever

Hopefully people who talk about alternate capitals for France know that they're talking about an alternate reality. The actual France can not be identical to the France in an alternate reality.

Kripke is not conducting philosophy by language analysis.

He's got another definition of analytic: a truth whose negation is a contradiction. Note that the question of how to define 'analytic' has been addressed by many philosophers. It is not just assumed to be obvious--although I think it does point at an intuitive distinction.

Yes, it can. That is Kripke's whole point, and the point of rigid designation, that the name denotes the same individual across possible worlds.

If we talk about what capital France might have had, we are not talking about some other thing besides France, we are talking about France. Pace Lewis, but I think Lewis is just wrong on this point.

(In fact to suggest that all modal considerations of France involve a different individual obviates the point of essential properties to begin with on many interpretations, since the whole point of an essential property is that it is invariant on an individual across worlds).

Paris is not defined as the capital of France in any way. It is the capital of France, but that is not the same thing. — The Great Whatever

Paris is designated the capital of France, and one of the definitions of the name 'Paris' is 'capital of France'.

In any case you still haven't told us how the purportedly merely empirical proposition 'Paris is the capital of France' could be falsified.

one of the definitions of the name 'Paris' is 'capital of France'. — John

No it isn't. If it were, then it would be impossible for anywhere else to be the capital, which it isn't. Paris is not defined as the capital of France, although it is the capital.

In any case you still haven't told us how the purportedly merely empirical proposition 'Paris is the capital of France' could be falsified. — John

I am trying to understand what your problem is, but I really don't. Do you think it's not possible to check what city is the capital of a nation? You would falsify it by checking, and seeing that it's not that city, in the same way as you'd check and see the sun wasn't shining.

Yes, it can. That is Kripke's whole point, and the point of rigid designation, that the name denotes the same individual across possible worlds. — The Great Whatever

The actual France (whose capital is Paris) can not be identical to an alternate France (whose capital is Caen). That's pretty basic. It's two different objects.

The rigid designator identifies an object across all possible worlds in which that object exists. Not all possible worlds period. Many possible worlds don't have the thing we call France (with its Paris capital.)

The actual France (whose capital is Paris) can not be identical to an alternate France (whose capital is Caen). That's pretty basic. It's two different objects. — Mongrel

There is no 'alternate France.' When we say 'if France had a different capital...' We are talking about France. We are not talking about some other thing. That is why we say, if France had a different capital... This is one of Kripke's most basic points.

The rigid designator identifies an object across all possible worlds in which that object exists. Not all possible worlds period. Many possible worlds don't have the thing we call France (with its Paris capital.) — Mongrel

First off, this is only one interpretation of rigid designation.

Second, it's moot because a world in which France has a different capital is one in which, a fortiori, France exists.

Yes, but you are avoiding the point that the proposition that the sun was shining at some place and time both can right now and could if the world were different be true or false; whereas the statement that Paris is the capital of France, perhaps could be false, if we were referring to a different world (although even that is controversial considering what Mongrel has been saying) but it cannot right now be actually false (given that nothing has changed as to which city in France is designated as the capital).

Sorry dude. I don't think we're talking about the same Kripke.