It’s more that he thinks that what passes for philosophy in modern culture is superficial. — Wayfarer
Yes, well, you haven’t addressed a single one of my three questions to you. — javra
If by sentient you mean "can sense," then yes. Some definitions of sentience go beyond that. Beyond sensing, I'm agnostic. More accurately, skeptic. I doubt, but I hold judgment in reserve. The problem is that the areas beyond sensing are not here well-defined for our purposes, and not anywhere well-defined, that I can find. It seems to imply human-like consciousness. If there's such a thing as plant consciousness, I'd like to know about it.Since it’s the capacity to sense—regardless of what and of means—which defines a sentient being as such, are you arguing that trees cannot sense either gravity or sunlight? — javra
Addressed differently, what set of processes differentiates trees from rocks if not awareness conjoined with goal-striving being found in the former but not the latter? And if trees are to be indistinguishable from rocks in being solely governed by entropy, then on what grounds does one argue that trees are lifeforms rather than inanimate matter? — javra
Start with your understanding of sentience. It's neither argument nor instructive if you beg the question with a fortuitous definition.Rather, I’m attempting to rationally argue that trees are sentient beings by virtue of being living things. Or at least attempting to figure out how it could rationally be supported that trees are not sentient. — javra
Then we see that living things grow, multiply, and carry out activities in the world, so the concept of "homeostasis" does not properly represent what the living system is doing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well neither [Maritain] nor you are likely to gain more than a superficial understanding of modern philosophy if you are disinclined to study it adequately on account of a pre-judgement that it is superficial. This is a really good example of putting the cart before the horse. — Janus
It’s only a marker for the key difference between living systems and minerals. Homeostasis is a chraracteristic of even the simplest organic forms but is absent from the most complex inorganic forms. — Wayfarer
I know that one of the books Apokrisis mentions from time to time on the question of the nature of life is a book by the name of ‘Life Itself’ by Robert Rosen which I understand is a well-regarded book. As it is rather a specialised biology text, I am not intending to read it, but it might be of interest to others here. There’s a pretty detailed review here which list some of Rosen’s philosophical premisses, a key one being his resistance to mechanistic reductionism. — Wayfarer
try Bernard Lonergan's Insight — Janus
This idea that is foundational in Maritain, that the intellectual intuition of being is a direct seeing that is superior to any discursive reasoning is an assumption that cannot cogently be argued for, and can be, in the last analysis, nothing more than purely a matter of faith — Janus
I have the intuition that it may take centuries of deep, complex philosophical thought — Janus
As you probably know, I am no materialist — Janus
I don't agree at all. I think 'the intuition of being' is understood as a genuine understanding or form of knowledge. — Wayfarer
Having dispensed with all the centuries of deep, complex philosophical thought that preceded us, it probably will - although, what with climate change and over-population, we're probably not going to have it. — Wayfarer
So you keep saying, but you invariably take issue with every counter-materialist argument I try and come up with. — Wayfarer
Homeostasis implies equilibrium, but the living systems are growing and reproducing. Growing and reproducing, which is what living beings do, cannot be represented as homeostasis which is a form of equilibrium. — Metaphysician Undercover
From what I've read, Rosen argues to maintain a distinction between living systems (as anticipatory systems) and inanimate systems, by describing living systems according to function rather than by describing them as material activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Life is managed instability. So homeostasis is central to that. — apokrisis
this excludes homeostasis, as instability excludes stability. — Metaphysician Undercover
If by sentient you mean "can sense," then yes. Some definitions of sentience go beyond that. Beyond sensing, I'm agnostic. More accurately, skeptic. I doubt, but I hold judgment in reserve. The problem is that the areas beyond sensing are not here well-defined for our purposes, and not anywhere well-defined, that I can find. It seems to imply human-like consciousness. If there's such a thing as plant consciousness, I'd like to know about it. — tim wood
Two things I can think of that are minimal life functions are using fuel to create energy, and reproducing. — tim wood
Start with your understanding of sentience. It's neither argument nor instructive if you beg the question with a fortuitous definition. — tim wood
It is homeostasis that is the process "excluding" instability and thus creating - dynamical - stability. — apokrisis
You said "life is managed instability". If homeostasis excludes instability, then it excludes life if life is managed instability. Either life is not managed instability, or it is not homeostatic. Which do you believe? — Metaphysician Undercover
It's blatant contradiction that I have difficulty with. — Metaphysician Undercover
It always seems that life is hard to define with respect to minimal criteria. — tim wood
Ever ridden a bike? Is there no homeostatic balance involved in managing its instability? — apokrisis
Homeostasis assumes that stability is the goal — Metaphysician Undercover
"Yes" means that the tree is responsive to some stimuli, like gravity and sunlight. To say the tree experiences them, or senses them, implies something that experiences or senses. I don't think the tree has that.Unfortunately, I’m not clear on what the “yes” answers — javra
you’ll notice that in our mode of thinking teleology will be intrinsic to both aspects you address: something being done for the purpose of some given X — javra
When the exact immediate proximate cause is given for a specific effect, then there's no more to be said. If anyone mentions purpose, motive, telos, or anything of the kind, they have either added something to the description not part of the proximate cause, or they have added nothing to the description. Motive, purpose, telos, to my way of thinking, are all non-proximate causes that are sometimes appropriate to include in the descriptions of events involving thinking beings. I do not think the usage is appropriate or correct when applied to plants. I was going to add not useful, but as an idea it may be useful, even if wrong.and so can be easily ignored in favor of the efficient causation which is specific to [the] given. — javra
Before you commit yourself to this kind of exit from a discussion, let me review my claims that you think lack justification.What I read in your post is a statement of your beliefs sans justification for them. — javra
If stability is achieved then there is no more instability to be managed. — Metaphysician Undercover
1. The tree is alive. — tim wood
The same applies when it comes to closing the explanatory gap between matter and symbol there. — apokrisis
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