What comes to my mind is how accuracy is entangled with beliefs that make us better and more functional. Why do we care about accuracy in the first place? Would we care about being scientific and rational if we didn't associate these things with physical and moral positive results? — fart

The moral element would be a shallow reason to stop caring. I'm the kind of person who is interested in the results irrespective of whether they're seen as good or bad - whether it's a cure for cancer or a meteorite that's going to wipe us out at some point in the future.

Others have (accurately I think) mentioned that we don't get to pick many of our beliefs. In this context I think it's pretty clear that you intend those cases where we have the sense of choice. To me this sense of choice is 'free will' enough, though I believe there are other arguments against determinism. Assuming that determinism is a sufficiently meaningful/specified position to be true or false, I've never been bothered by the idea that all is predetermined. In fact, I think it has its attractions --as long as we are indeed mortal as I think we are. — fart

Can you give an example of one or more of those cases where you think that "we" have the sense of choice? I for one do not have any genuine sense of choice with respect to what I believe, and I'm certainly not the only one like this.

It's one thing to consider how you feel about determinism, but it's another to think about whether it's plausible. The former shouldn't factor into to the latter, as that would be fallacious (under the category of an appeal to emotion). And it's the latter, not the former, which matters, philosophically.

I'm the kind of person who is interested in the results irrespective of whether they're seen as good or bad - whether it's a cure for cancer or a meteorite that's going to wipe us out at some point in the future. — Sapientia

I very much relate to this. For me intellectual heroes often have an 'amoral' edge. They are willing to think beyond the morality of their community ('evil' thinking) and/or immerse themselves in studies with no immediate application (aesthetic or curiosity-driven thinking).

Can you give an example of one or more of those cases where you think that "we" have the sense of choice? I for one do not have any genuine sense of choice with respect to what I believe, and I'm certainly not the only one like this. — Sapientia

All I intend is the state of mind in which we are really not sure what is going on. Imagine a person who hosts a party and then can't find something valuable afterward. Did someone steal it? Or is this just coincidence? Now they have the choice of whether to ask embarrassing questions. I can imagine a person spending a few angst hours on this decision. More examples are a person trying to figure out whether they should or should not go to grad school or ask a female friend about becoming romantic or a boss for a raise. Illusion or not, the burden of decision seems pretty real to me.

I do see, of course, that many of our beliefs are beyond our control.

All I intend is the state of mind in which we are really not sure what is going on. Imagine a person who hosts a party and then can't find something valuable afterward. Did someone steal it? Or is this just coincidence? Now they have the choice of whether to ask embarrassing questions. I can imagine a person spending a few angst hours on this decision. More examples are a person trying to figure out whether they should or should not go to grad school or ask a female friend about becoming romantic or a boss for a raise. Illusion or not, the burden of decision seems pretty real to me.

I do see, of course, that many of our beliefs are beyond our control. — fart

A state of mind in which one is really not sure what is going on is different from there being being a sense of choice with regard to what to believe, and a sense of choice with regard to what to believe isn't necessarily implied.

Yes, they would have the choice of whether or not to ask embarrassing questions, but that's a choice regarding what to do, not a choice regarding what to believe. If I was convinced that someone at that party stole my favourite tiara, then I might confront them about it, although I would probably just slip some poison into their drink. But the point is that my choice of action, if there really is one, would be based on a belief not of my choosing, but determined by what convinced me.

And likewise with your other examples. The burden of decision seems real to me, too. But the notion of deciding what to believe strikes me as strongly counterintuitive. So much so, that I don't just think that many of our beliefs are beyond our control, I doubt whether it's even possible for any belief to be otherwise, at least directly.

With regard to the known, one must stick to accurate beliefs about what exists and doesn't exist; with regard to the unknown, one's own guess is as good as anyone else's, you pays your money and you takes your choice. Regarding the over-arching context of ordinary, everyday experience, regarding what sort of setting the jewel of experience might have, everyone is equally ignorant, nobody seems to have a backdoor hotline to reality, nor a guarantee of knowing the way it really is.

What happens is that as we encounter things, we guess at what the world outside experience has to be like for experience to have been that way, and although we're usually right, if we're careful, it's always possible we might be wrong. So there is a gradual transformation of the unknown (about which one can guess) into the known (about which one knows or doesn't know) over time, gradual revelation of what is, but it's hard won.