Or even less than that. It is a mere universal tendency. — apokrisis

Yes, that's better put: purpose, function, tendency.

But still, the least action principle shows that there is something "mysterious" going on in the very heart of reductionist physics. — apokrisis

Entanglement?

it was you who said it wasn't about stasis, except that it was. — apokrisis

You left out:

that it is the Good, the supreme goal and the one and only consummation of life.

I was going to say there's probably a genetic resemblance to Animaxander's 'apeiron' and the Buddhist 'unconditioned' - in fact the 'unconditioned' or 'uncreated' is universal in world philosophies and religious traditions. (I have a book called The Shape of Ancient Thought, by an art critic and historian by the name of Thomas McEvilly, which expresses the (generally unorthodox) view that there are much more profound connections between ancient Indian and Greek philosophy and science than is generally accepted. I will look into that later and see if he has anything to say on the topic.)

the Kyoto School. — apokrisis

Interesting. I encountered some of the Kyoto School authors when doing Buddhist Studies a few years back - Masao Abe, in particular.

However, a caveat in respect of the translation of śūnyatā as 'nothing' or 'nothingness'. ('No-thing-ness' is acceptable!) The reason for that - when Buddhism was first discovered in the West, there was a widespread view that Nirvāṇa was indeed nothingness or non-being and that Buddhism is therefore a nihilist philosophy. This was certainly the view of Nietzsche, who characterised it as the 'sigh of an exhausted civilisation.' Likewise for Schopenhauer and others. And the Hindus generally characterised the Buddha as a nihilist because he refused to acknowledge the Vedic gods and scriptures.

The second passage puts paid to that mis-interpretation. But there's an important point in that passage about the Buddhist understanding that samsāra and nirvāna are 'not two'. That's characteristic of Mahāyāna - the Theravada don't hold that view. Whereas the non-dualist understanding of Nāgārjuna and subsequent schools is that there is only one 'domain', but that because it is seen wrongly, or clung to, then it is experienced as 'samsāra'. If it is seen rightly, then this very world is nirvāna. Hence the aphorism: 'samsāra is nirvāna grasped, nirvāna is samsāra released'. (This is where the 'perspectival' nature of Buddhist teachings become apparent, although it's very hard point to grasp.)

There's a saying in Buddhism, that 'emptiness and compassion are like the two wings of a bird' - you need both in order to stay aloft. So the question I sometimes contemplate is: where does the energy of compassion (bodhicitta) come from? What is the source of that energy, that equips the Buddhist to 'work diligently for the salvation of all sentient beings'? I don't think it has a physical source; nor do I think it's just 'nothing'.

But again the tendency to return to equilibrium absent any inherent intention in things to behave that way (according to a spiritual reality that this world is an expression of, perhaps, or the direction of a God) would tend to look more like function than purpose. :smile: — Janus

Agree.

//ps// - the section in the SEP article on Nishida's topology of nothingness - this is starting to make sense to me now, when I first encountered it years ago I couldn't make head or tail of it.

__//|\\__

You are talking about two incompatible things. I'm talking about two complementary limits.

A dichotomy is logically that which is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. So Apeiron and Nous would have to "exist" as the inverse or reciprocal of each other. They would be the mutually opposed limits on being, and hence Being would be that bit - the actual or substantial bit - left in the middle. The limits themselves are not part of what is actual because they are the extremes that mark the limit of what even could be actual. We might give them names, like Apeiron and Nous. But they are the names of the complementary limits on being. — apokrisis

Now, instead of addressing my post, you've completely changed the subject. You said "nature can check every possible option to find the most locally effective choice to actualise". And also you said, "my own metaphysics is founded on vagueness, apeiron, quantum foam or firstness.". Clearly, nature checking every possible option is not a limit, it is a thing, nature, acting. And the apeiron you propose is not proposed as a limit, it is proposed as an existent thing. What you stated earlier was two distinct principles of existence, two distinct ontological principles, a mind which organizes, and the chaos which it organizes. Now you want to talk about a dichotomy of opposing limits.

You cannot produce an ontology from limits, because you need existents. Now you do not want to talk about what exists anymore, you just want to talk about the limits of existence.

So here you are trying to assert the authority of the law of the excluded middle. Faced with a dichotomy, you say its complementary pair must be reduced to either/or. One thing or the other. You deny the third thing of the reciprocal relation that creates the separation and so also forms the interaction. You say - with the full force of an unexamined habit - that only a yes/no answer is logically acceptable. — apokrisis

No, you misunderstand. What was described is not a dichotomy. What was described is two principles, each excluding the possibility of the other. For example, "God exists", and "God does not exist". These are two incompatible principles, each excludes the possibility of the other, like Nous and Apeiron are two incompatible principles, each excludes the possibility of the other. Either you totally misunderstand, or you intentionally changed the subject, to now talk about a dichotomy.

So you misunderstand why the "reciprocal relation" is impossible. The reciprocal relation requires that we accept both principles as if they were limits of a dichotomy. But this is not a dichotomy of limits, it is two opposing principles, and acceptance of them both is impossible because they contradict each other. And, to accept just one is insufficient to explain reality. So it is necessary to reject both, neither the principle Nous (God exists) nor the principle Apeiron (God does not exist) is acceptable as a first principle.

You said "nature can check every possible option to find the most locally effective choice to actualise". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is as if that were the case. As if there was a sniffing out of all trajectories.

So the metaphysical challenge would be to understand that as a physically intelligible process. It is not saying that reality has some actual mindlike active choice. It has to be something much more deflationary in practice.

As I replied to Janus, we are only talking about generic propensities or tendencies at the physically simple level here. So we must both do justice to final cause without getting any more spooky about it than makes sense.

And also you said, "my own metaphysics is founded on vagueness, apeiron, quantum foam or firstness.". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. That is the "material" beginning. And finality is the "formal" end. That is how it works.

Clearly, nature checking every possible option is not a limit, it is a thing, nature, acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I use anthropomorphic language here, while also explaining that I use it in a deflationary sense.

So the principle of least action says that nature applies this limiting constraint on all material possibility. And what results is the actuality of a substantial action - some actual trajectory taken by a process or event.

You have to think of this holistically and triadically, not reductionistically and dually.

You cannot produce an ontology from limits, because you need existents. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not listen as usual. The actual is what emerges as a result of a complementary process of limitation. The existents are what are hylomorphically left after material possibility and formal necessity have had their combined say on the matter.

For example, "God exists", and "God does not exist". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah. That is addition and subtraction. Simple negation. Dichotomies are a reciprocal or inverse relation. Completely different.

Remember that division is the odd one out in arithmetic because it is a holistic relation, not a compositional one. And so this is like that difference at a logical level.

Either you totally misunderstand, or you intentionally changed the subject, to now talk about a dichotomy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or you aren't keeping up.

So it is necessary to reject both, neither the principle Nous (God exists) nor the principle Apeiron (God does not exist) is acceptable as a first principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who was talking about God here? Not me. That's your bag.

Yes, it is as if that were the case. As if there was a sniffing out of all trajectories.

So the metaphysical challenge would be to understand that as a physically intelligible process. It is not saying that reality has some actual mindlike active choice. It has to be something much more deflationary in practice. — apokrisis

The "sniffing out" is an apprehension of possibilities. This is what a mind does, apprehends possibilities choosing appropriate ones. Where your approach leads you astray is in the attempt to understand this as a "physically intelligible process". The physical and the intelligible are distinct, as material and immaterial, one excluding the other, like in the example of Nous and Apeiron, one excludes the other. If your goal is to maintain these two as real, then it is necessary to produce a separation between them which allows them to interact but also maintain their separation, in order that they can each stay true to their incompatible descriptions. Then we would have the two incompatible principles, with a separation between them, allowing them each to stay true. Instead, you portray "the metaphysical challenge" as uniting them under "physical process".

We could start with Whitehead's "prehension", as the means by which the immaterial, non-physical, is related to the physical. Notice that whatever is prehended by a mind, is necessarily in the past, and this consists of actualities, actual occasions. Now we need to account for how actual occasions, the past, comes to be, from the future. Whitehead proposes the concept of "concrescence". Concrescence is an ordering of the occasions, events, which will occur at the present, being prehended as they slide into the past. For Whitehead, future events can have no physical existence, we could call them possibilities. So concrescence is a non-physical, non-temporal, ordering. The present itself, being, existing at the present provides the boundary of separation between the actual events of the past, and the possible events of the future.

This ought to provide a brief explanation why the possibilities, possible trajectories, cannot be understood as a physical process. The world in its physical form, all the physical objects of the universe, cannot have any existence prior to the moment of the present. This principle is central to eastern metaphysics (arguably the principal feature of Awakening, found in nibbana, and where Whitehead and Buddhism share principles). But instead of giving the Awakened credit for understanding this feature of reality, the western world of physicalists tends to dismiss this as a confused falsity. However, consider the existence of a physical object, like a cup on a table. A human being with a free wiling mind, and a hammer, could sit there and smash that object, annihilate it, at any moment of the present. Since this could happen at any moment, it is demonstrated that the object cannot have physical existence in the future. We could extend this general principle to include all physical objects, and conclude as Whitehead states, that there is no physical, temporal, existence in the future, and as eastern metaphysics states, that the physical world must be created anew at each moment of time.

So the principle of least action says that nature applies this limiting constraint on all material possibility. And what results is the actuality of a substantial action - some actual trajectory taken by a process or event. — apokrisis

This is problematic. What is this "nature" which is acting to constrain or limit material possibility? You have invoked a "nature" which is outside of, transcending, material existence, which can have real influence over what occurs in the material world, by choosing from possible trajectories. Why not use "nature" in the customary way, to refer to what actually happens in the material world, and call this thing which transcends the material world, and can make free choices as to what happens in the material world, what we normally call it, God. If you would just replace "nature" with "God" here, you would greatly reduce the ambiguity of your writing.

Yeah. That is addition and subtraction. Simple negation. Dichotomies are a reciprocal or inverse relation. Completely different. — apokrisis

Right, dichotomies are completely different, that's why I accused you of wantonly changing the subject. If we could get to the point of establishing the necessary boundary, separation, between the two incompatible principles which negate each other, then we might be able to present them as a dichotomy, something like what I proposed above from Whitehead's perspective. But to class the two together, unite the contradictory principles, under "physical processes", rather than providing a real separation between them, is a mistaken approach.

Who was talking about God here? Not me. That's your bag. — apokrisis

Call it "nature", or call it "God", if it bears the same description, we're talking about the same thing under a different name. But you are in the wrong here, because you have no convention which allows you to say that "nature" transcends material existence, as you do. So you ought to relinquish such misleading use of terms.

Would the idea of Karma equate better with a conception of "harmony, perfection, or "the good"", or with a notion of "randomness and irreversibility"?

It's almost like you are asking if Ethics ought to be first philosophy, or if the irrational is the only other option. I think Karma is closer to luck.

A man goes to the market to buy fruit, runs into some one who owes him a lot of money and he confronts the man and the debt gets paid off. The purpose of going to the market was to purchase fruit, but the good end was that the debt was paid off.

The man was lucky. The question Aristotle asked is...was this man born lucky, is this part of nature's own irrationality (or perhaps nature's determinism) that some men are, quite unknown to themself, lucky.

That's an intriguing slant, but I am not seeing how it relates to what it is supposed to be responding to.

I wasn't trying to address any question of ethics, but to consider whether the conception of causation involved in karma, which is itself yet to be explained, (on here at least) would be more compatible with metaphysical ideas of "harmony, perfection, or "the good'" or with "randomness and irreversibility". I was wondering whether considering that question might help to clarify just what is the conception of causation involved in the notion of karma.

Considering that question further I think the conception of causation involved in karma is perhaps most akin to a mixture of formal and material causation. Our choices (whether deliberately or not) form what we become (they are thus formal causes), and then what we become acts as material cause in that it determines what kinds of interactions (experiences) are possible for us.

In addition to the "four causes" Aristotle considered two more, which you demonstrate here, "chance" and "fortune" (or luck). He decided that "chance" could not really be a cause in any proper sense of the word, but when it is considered in relation to final cause (intention), chance can be viewed as a cause of fortune (luck). This is what the example you've provided demonstrates. If "luck" or 'fortune" is considered to be a real thing, then the only thing which could cause this is chance. So by saying fortune or luck is real, then chance becomes a real cause.

The chance meeting of the two men in the market, on its own does not cause anything. However, since there is a debt to be paid, and we allow that the chance meeting is the cause of the debt being paid, then we ought to allow that the chance meeting was for the sake of the debt being paid, in the sense of final cause. However, there was no intent by either of the individuals, so we cannot allow final cause, and we must turn to chance as the cause.

This is the very odd, and difficult to understand relation between chance and final cause. Once we take that event, the payment of the debt, which has an immaterial substance, the debt, and consider it as a real object or event, which was caused to occur, it gets placed into the immaterial realm of intent requiring final cause, purpose. However, there is no intent evident from either of the two parties, which is expressly stated by the example. Therefore we have no intent, or final cause to attribute to the occurrence of the immaterial event, the lifting of the debt, so we must turn to the physical event as the cause, which is designated as a chance occurrence.

In a deterministic system there are no chance events.
in a probabilistic system only the constituting (micro) events are chance (random) and there are no chance macro events.
Given human limitations of knowledge chance is thus an epistemic characteristic of macro events in both cases.

:up:

:down:

In a deterministic system there are no chance events.
in a probabilistic system only the constituting (micro) events are chance (random) and there are no chance macro events.
Given human limitations of knowledge chance is thus an epistemic characteristic of macro events in both cases. — Janus

Allowing that final cause is a true cause denies determinism, in favour of free choice. You cannot have a deterministic system and final cause, they are incompatible. If we opt for the free choice system, then we have to allow for the instances when one's desires, wants, or needs are fulfilled without the person willing the act which causes this. This is luck, and chance.

How would the reality of final cause entail free choice or chance?

The intended goal, not the efficient cause, is the cause of the act. So in Aristotle's example, the goal of "health" is the cause of the man's walking. The man is walking to be healthy. The cause of the act, walking, is therefore the freely willed choice of health, not some efficient cause.

The need for "chance" follows the acceptance of free choice, as described already. Perhaps the man becomes healthy without walking.

You cannot have a deterministic system and final cause, they are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

If final cause is understood as constraint, then you have a much simpler story where determinism is just the limits imposed on chance happenings.

Choice and freewill then become more complexly constrained degrees of freedom. So same story, just with more levels of organisation imposed.

I can hold out my hand straight. The hierarchical organisation of my nervous system makes this possible. But I can't control a slight wavering and tremor. The hand is never perfectly still as its position is only being constrained within limits. However I can hold it straight and still enough to the degree that is mostly matters.

The thing to note is that the kind of constraints that are choices are the counterfactually poised ones - the ones where we are regulating a material instability. We can act as if we were logical switches, doing either the one thing or its precise opposite.

So constraint is essentially an organic notion - not a mechanical or deterministic or computational kind of control. But choice is about constraints becoming machine-like - a logical switch - because the system itself is poised on an instability and so an informational or semiotic nudge is all it takes to flip action with counterfactual definiteness in one direction or the other.

This is why there is an irreducible wavering when a hand is held outstretched. The musculoskeletal system is designed on this control principle. Contraction and extension are opposing forces. To maintain the hand in some fixed position means a delicate balancing of those opposed "wills".

Good metaphysics is about describing the world as simply as possible. Final cause needs to be understood first at the physically basic level - as a system of constraints on degrees of freedom. Then the question is how it becomes more like what we mean by human meaningful choice due to hierarchical elaboration.

How does the generalised tendency become a particular function and eventually a counterfactually-definite goal?

The advantage of the semiotic view is that it adds the least metaphysical furniture to the story. It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom. Then it adds the twist that logic - information - is also "real" here. Latent in the notion of constraint is that it can become maximally definite - as in the choices made by a switch - to the degree that the freedoms in question are themselves maximal!

The two are connected reciprocally. The material aspect of the system - the degrees of freedom - must be as unstable as possible for the constraints, the semiotically-encoded bit, to be as sharply regulatory as possible.

So the story is a little complex - irreducibly triadic in being hierarchical. But it is immanent or self-organising. No need for the unexplained hand of transcendent causality.

Firstly, I would point out that although we can certainly say that the intended goal, in this example becoming healthy, is a cause of the act of walking, we can equally say that the material (bodily) conditions and efficient processes involved in walking are causes of the act of walking. We can also say that the form of the body is a cause of the act of walking. So, all four kinds of cause are involved.

None of this necessitates that the intended goal be freely chosen by the walker. And I cannot see how the possibility that one could become healthy some other way, by eating well, or cycling, or lifting weights, or Tai Chi, or whatever, has anything to do with chance.

If final cause is understood as constraint, then you have a much simpler story where determinism is just the limits imposed on chance happenings. — apokrisis

But this would not be keeping true to Aristotle's description of the four causes. Formal cause might be understood as constraint, but not final cause. Final cause is the intent, what is wanted, and this causes the person to act in a way accordingly. Final cause is associated with the freedom of the will to choose one's own actions, so constraint is contrary to final cause.

Good metaphysics is about describing the world as simply as possible. Final cause needs to be understood first at the physically basic level - as a system of constraints on degrees of freedom. Then the question is how it becomes more like what we mean by human meaningful choice due to hierarchical elaboration. — apokrisis

I don't think final cause can be understood as physical, because it is an idea, a notion of what is wanted. As such it is an immaterial object, intelligible but not sensible, having no physical existence.

How does the generalised tendency become a particular function and eventually a counterfactually-definite goal? — apokrisis

This seems like a good approach, any suggestions of how this is possible? Suppose I have a general feeling of hunger. This feeling, being completely general is not a tendency toward eating any particular food, nor could it be a desire for any particular food. As something "general", it is completely non-physical. However, I may consider physical objects which are available to me to eat, which I have sensed, and I may make a definite goal of making a particular type of sandwich. So the immaterial, and general, feeling of want, which is called "hunger", becomes the desire to eat a very specific, and particular material object, which I am now creating with my hands, the sandwich.

The advantage of the semiotic view is that it adds the least metaphysical furniture to the story. It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom. Then it adds the twist that logic - information - is also "real" here. Latent in the notion of constraint is that it can become maximally definite - as in the choices made by a switch - to the degree that the freedoms in question are themselves maximal! — apokrisis

So I think this oversimplification is not the proper approach. We cannot start "with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom", because we need to place the general feeling of desire as prior to the habit forming. The constraints of habit are produced from the individual's activities, and the activities follow from the general desire.

Firstly, I would point out that although we can certainly say that the intended goal, in this example becoming healthy, is a cause of the act of walking, we can equally say that the material (bodily) conditions and efficient processes involved in walking are causes of the act of walking. We can also say that the form of the body is a cause of the act of walking. So, all four kinds of cause are involved. — Janus

I know you can say this. You can also deny free will if you want. My point was that the necessity to consider luck and chance, follows from allowing that intention (final cause) is a real cause. So if you insist that the material body is the cause of the person walking, rather than the intent of health, and likewise in all other instances of intent, insisting that intent is not a cause, then you remove the need for luck and chance.

None of this necessitates that the intended goal be freely chosen by the walker. And I cannot see how the possibility that one could become healthy some other way, by eating well, or cycling, or lifting weights, or Tai Chi, or whatever, has anything to do with chance. — Janus

Do you understand Cavacava's example from Aristotle? When we allow that things are done with intent, we must allow that a particular action is good or bad in relation to the intended end. If it helps to bring about a desired end the action is good. If it hinders a desired end it is bad. So when we choose to act, the act is chosen because it is designated as good in relation to a desired end. The good act helps to bring about the end, and that act can only be said to be the cause of the desired end, if it is freely chosen. If it is not freely chosen there is a regress of causation, a causal chain, and the choice is not the true cause, because it is caused. Only if the act is freely chosen can it be said to be the true cause of the desired end, because otherwise there would be a chain of causation and the choice would not be the true cause.

The good act however, which is the act that brings about the desired end, may happen without being chosen. In this case we say that the desired end is brought about by chance. So it is a function of the determination of an act as good or bad, which brings about the need for "luck", and "chance". We can only say that an event is good or bad, if it is put in relation to some desired end or intent. If the event is directed toward that end, and caused to be, by a free willing agent, it is an intentional act. If it is not directed toward the end, and caused to be, by a free willing agent, it is still good or bad, but it is so by chance. If we remove the free willing agent, deny that free will is real, then we have no difference between the intentionally good act, and the act which is good by chance, because both are simply caused by a chain of efficient causes. Therefore "luck" and "chance" only make sense if one accepts free will, because it distinguishes the chosen (willed) good or bad act from the unchosen (chance) good or bad act.

Therefore "luck" and "chance" only make sense if one accepts free will, because it distinguishes the chosen (willed) good or bad act from the unchosen (chance) good or bad act. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, that makes sense. I see what you were getting at now. :smile:

Suppose I have a general feeling of hunger. This feeling, being completely general is not a tendency toward eating any particular food, nor could it be a desire for any particular food. As something "general", it is completely non-physical. However, I may consider physical objects which are available to me to eat, which I have sensed, and I may make a definite goal of making a particular type of sandwich. So the immaterial, and general, feeling of want, which is called "hunger", becomes the desire to eat a very specific, and particular material object, which I am now creating with my hands, the sandwich. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is that how it works? If you are really hungry, you can't afford to be too fussy. Food in general will satisfy your need. But if you have a well-stocked fridge, then already you have constructed a world of forced choice. To make the ham sandwich is not to make the cheese sandwich, the tomato sandwich, the egg sandwich.

Maybe to help you make a sensible decision you would have sought out further criteria. You might have been guided by what was nearest its sell-by date, what was healthiest, what was easiest to throw together, or what left the most of what the rest of the family might like. Or maybe you didn't think much and chose ham out of general habit. Or maybe the choices were so evenly weighted that you might as well have tossed a coin. Your hand went to the first food that caught your eye, accidentally left prominent by the last person to raid the fridge.

But this would not be keeping true to Aristotle's description of the four causes. Formal cause might be understood as constraint, but not final cause. Final cause is the intent, what is wanted, and this causes the person to act in a way accordingly. Final cause is associated with the freedom of the will to choose one's own actions, so constraint is contrary to final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

You defend a scholastic view of Aristotle. So already we differ strongly. Your argument from authority comes from a secondary source.

And anyway, I am basing my position on modern psychological science. What we call freewill is about constructing these states of mental constraint - to the degree that the accidental actually needs to be ruled out in any of our actions.

So I defend a pragmatist metaphysics, not a theistically absolutist one.

Is that how it works? If you are really hungry, you can't afford to be too fussy. Food in general will satisfy your need. — apokrisis

I think you're missing the point. No one eats "food in general", we eat particular items. It doesn't matter whether the fridge is stocked or not, the person who has the general feeling of hunger must progress to choosing a particular item to eat, and therefore the desire for that particular item. So my criticism of your proposal remains. We cannot "start" with the habits of constraint if we want to understand this process, because these habits of constraint are particulars, while desire and want start in the general. Habits of constraint follow from particular choices which follow from the general, desire and want. So to say "It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom." is to utter a falsity. And if this is the basis of the semiotic metaphysic, then that is based in a false premise.

You defend a scholastic view of Aristotle. So already we differ strongly. Your argument from authority comes from a secondary source. — apokrisis

The Scholastics were well versed in Aristotle, as am I. That the Scholastics interpret Aristotle in a way similar to me doesn't mean that I am arguing from a secondary source. But that you interpret Aristotle in a way which strongly differs from us, indicates that you are probably not so well-read in Aristotle.

And anyway, I am basing my position on modern psychological science. — apokrisis

Well which is it? Is your notion of "final cause" based in modern psychological science, or is it based in Aristotle's description? If it is the former, then I would argue that this is not really "final cause" at all, and you are just pretending that it is compatible with Aristotle's "final cause".

No one eats "food in general", we eat particular items. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are hoping to evade my point. If your need is food and you haven't got the option of being particular, then any item will do just as well.

the person who has the general feeling of hunger must progress to choosing a particular item to eat, and therefore the desire for that particular item. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't necessary at all. But we may then supply further reasons - further finalities - that might make those particular choices count. Like sell-by dates or habitual preferences.

desire and want start in the general. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the general what?

How is a choice of the particular thing of the ham sandwich, given the variety of options in your fridge, a necessary expression of your general desire of your feeling hungry and so wanting an answer to that in the form of food?

Constraints/habits simply point to the top-down hierarchical structure of these things. Which - if you are Aristotelian - you will immediately recognise as his central metaphysical point. Food is the genus, ham sandwich is the species. And for the particular to relate to the general, it has to be either by virtue of accident or by necessity.

If by necessity, constraints will be in play to ensure that. If by accident, then any particular is merely a material contingency and not a formal need.

So while you are quick to point out that Aristotle was concerned with true spontaneity or accident - the rock that for no reason falls off the cliff - you seem to forget that fact just as fast.

Perhaps you should make it basic to your metaphysics like others who have followed more truly in Aristotle's footsteps have managed to do.

Karma is only a type of causation, based on the moral hue of conscious free action.

1. Causation isn't simple. People talk of chain of causation. I prefer web of causation. Aristotle's classification is too simplistic to allow analysis of causation. It isolates a single entity for analysis and that's not possible. We're in a network and while what we do may have effect our actions can't be adequately extricated from the causal web for anything useful. Mr. A guns down Mr. B but there are so many causes acting on Mr. A that it would be unfair to hold Mr. A as solely and wholly responsible for the murder.

2. Free will. We all know that free will is an open question. Nobody knows if we are actually free to do what we want. Right?

3. Morality. Even where I stand, so very far from completely understanding philosophy, I can see that morality has no foundation. Morality is nothing more than a set of arbitrary rules to make society possible.

I think you are hoping to evade my point. If your need is food and you haven't got the option of being particular, then any item will do just as well. — apokrisis

That doesn't avoid my point. You still must choose something particular before you can eat. So you still must go through that process of transforming the general feeling of hunger, to the desire for something particular.

It isn't necessary at all. — apokrisis

You haven't produced any argument, just this assertion. If it's not necessary, then explain how a person goes from the general condition of being hungry, to the circumstances of eating something particular, without going through a process which transforms this general desire, similar to what I describe.

It seems like your claim is that people just eat particular things, out of habit, without ever having that general feeling of hunger, and then this general feeling of hunger develops out of a deprivation of the habit. Is that the point you are arguing?

In the general what? — apokrisis

It starts in a general feeling. The desire for food, like any other desire, is a general feeling of discomfort, a lacking, a feeling of dissatisfaction. The concept of suffering, which is a broad term, referring to many different types of deprivation, is derived from this general feeling. It is often very difficult to distinguish the particulars of the suffering, as is the case in many forms of mental illness.

How is a choice of the particular thing of the ham sandwich, given the variety of options in your fridge, a necessary expression of your general desire of your feeling hungry and so wanting an answer to that in the form of food? — apokrisis

That is not what I said. You are reversing the necessity here. What I said is that the general feeling is necessarily prior to the particular choice. But there is no reason to conclude from this, that a particular choice is a "necessary expression" of the general feeling. This is why the will is free, and we have the capacity to suppress our desires and be moral beings. There is, as I've argued, a logical necessity that if there is a particular choice, the general feeling is prior to the particular choice, as the feeling is necessary to produce a choice. But a choice, following the general feeling is not necessary. And because there is no necessity of any particular choice following a general feeling, the particular choice cannot be said to be " a necessary expression" of a general desire. However, a general desire is necessary to account for any particular choice.

Also, as I've been discussing with Janus, the thing needed to relieve one from the general condition of desire, suffering, may come to a person without that person intentional seeking it, and this we attribute to luck, and chance. The reality of chance demonstrates that the relationship between the general feeling, and the particular choice, really is not a relationship of necessity, and therefore the will is in fact free.

Constraints/habits simply point to the top-down hierarchical structure of these things. Which - if you are Aristotelian - you will immediately recognise as his central metaphysical point. Food is the genus, ham sandwich is the species. And for the particular to relate to the general, it has to be either by virtue of accident or by necessity. — apokrisis

I don't recall Aristotle ever talking about a top-down hierarchical structure of things. He seemed to be more interested in getting to the bottom of things, the substance. There is no top-down hierarchical structure to his logic. There is primary substance, as the individual, particular thing, and there is secondary substance, as the species. Further there is genus. All knowledge must proceed from the thing more well known toward the less well known. All assertions, propositions, or statements, must be validated, substantiated from the bottom up. This bottom-up substantiation is our defence against the deception of pie in the sky sophistry.

2. Free will. We all know that free will is an open question. Nobody knows if we are actually free to do what we want. Right? — TheMadFool

By choosing free will we release ourselves from that complicated chain, that web of causation which you refer to in #1. No longer must we set out to analyze an immense complicated network of causes, seeking to understand the "why" of an individual's actions, because we see that this is impossible. The "why" is attributable to a free will act. And the free will act is a cause that starts a physical event, so there is no physical continuity prior to that event. Therefore that entire web of causation is completely irrelevant, and seeking the causes for the act in this web is impossible because the causes are not there..

You haven't produced any argument, just this assertion — Metaphysician Undercover

I argued that either further more particular constraints decide the matter, or it then becomes an accidental outcome.

Karma is only a type of causation, based on the moral hue of conscious free action. — TheMadFool

I'm not sure that the idea of karma can be associated with the idea of free will in the full libertarian sense that is to be found within some forms of Christianity.

1. I agree that causation isn't simple, and I think Aristotle's idea of four causes is an attempt to address the complexities. Is it ever a case of one cause or type of causation operating to the exclusion of all others, as it would be with the notion of radical libertarian free will?

2. Right. We experience ourselves as being (more or less) free. Are we really free at all? Is that even a coherent question? What could it even mean to experience ourselves as free, and yet not "really" be free at all? What could such a vision consists in other than an objectification of ourselves? And yet such an objectification could never be more than merely one of the possibilities inherent in our all-encompassing phenomenological experience, could it?

3. If certain moral rules are necessary to "makes society possible", then I don't see how they can be arbitrary.

I argued that either further more particular constraints decide the matter, or it then becomes an accidental outcome. — apokrisis

So there is no final cause, or intention behind the general feeling of hunger? It is not there for the sake of anything, it is just an accidental outcome? The feeling of hunger is clearly more general, and therefore not a more particular constraint, so this leaves us with "an accidental outcome".

I take it that you are arguing that the feeling of hunger is not essential to the human being, it's just accidental. Is this what you are arguing? This would require that not all human beings experience hunger, it's something that some experience and not others. I suppose that if a human being keeps up with its preprogramed activity of eating, it would never feel hunger. Only those whom for some reason decide not to keep on with this activity, or cannot do it, actually ever feel hungry. So hunger is accidental, the result of a failure to stick with the program, eating. How do you think eating ever came into existence in the first place?

So there is no final cause, or intention behind the general feeling of hunger? — Metaphysician Undercover

Keep on inventing things I never said. I'll sit back and watch you win arguments that are just against yourself.

I can see that morality has no foundation. Morality is nothing more than a set of arbitrary rules to make society possible. — TheMadFool

Steady on. If karma is actual, then the quality of the intentions behind your actions will always have consequences. And that is not arbitrary but actual.

— Janus

Causation is very interesting. It requires rules or laws so that we may abstract a causal inference. Thirst is quenched by water. If this relation quench-water weren't consistent over time and space we won't be able to infer causation at all.

Perhaps some forms of causation like the one above can be isolated from the causal matrix and inferred.

However, something interesting happens when we step back and take the whole instead of the parts. Brownian motion is the erratic/random movement of matter particles. It's interesting that Brownian motion is described as erratic/random even when we know that each particle is actually follwing the laws of mechanics just like balls on a pool table.

What I'm saying is that while causation requires the existence of general laws that govern interaction at all levels, the laws themselves are no guarantee for order in a system.

This clearly shows that Karma, dependent as it is on causality, can't be considered at indvidual levels, especially concerning the amount of control we have over our destinies.

Strangely, nirvana, the Buddhist goal, is exactly about letting go - to extricate oneself from the causal matrix. This can be done if one gives up the notion of free will because we must act without intention for benefit or anything else. We must turn off our egos and that translates to giving up on free will.

The early Buddhist texts are full of passages exhorting the listener to ‘hasten and strive’, to make great effort, to ‘work out your own salvation with diligence’.

Keep on inventing things I never said. I'll sit back and watch you win arguments that are just against yourself. — apokrisis

OK keep watching then. I'm pretty good at it, maybe you'll learn something.

You didn't state an argument to support your premise:

It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom. Then it adds the twist that logic - information - is also "real" here. — apokrisis

So I had to provide one for you. Got a better one? My contention is that habits must be formed, therefore it is impossible that it all starts with habits of constraint. Have you a solution to this problem? Maybe logic is really prior to habits of constraint?