The problem with the Romantic model of human psychology is that it is pathological rather than scientifically valid. The argument starts and stops with the facts. — apokrisis

I don't know what this means.

Another thing to point out here is that philosophical pessimists generally don't consider themselves "pessimistic", they consider themselves first-and-foremost "realistic" and pessimistic only-in-relation to everyone else's worldview. Hence why I don't think it's a very commonly-used term.

The "problem" with pessimism (life is essentially bad) is, in my view, that it lives in a state of contradiction. If life is bad, then suicide looks like the only consistent and heroic move.

Stoicism is better in this regard, but it too is "guilty" here. While I love the stoics, I also get the sense that strict stoicism is aborted suicide.

What works in both movements is the implicit self-sculpture. One learns to stop expecting the impossible and to stop getting one's panties tangled up in petty drama. There's a view from the mountain top in both cases that's maybe their "inner truth and greatness." Both movements deserve respect for their intense relevance. Both movements give us "wisdom writing." Thought, as always, one has to pick and choose carefully and adapt the words of long dead men to a very different technological and social reality.

The "problem" with pessimism (life is essentially bad) is, in my view, that it lives in a state of contradiction. If life is bad, then suicide looks like the only consistent and heroic move. — who

Indeed, it is, but this also falls into the Tu quoque fallacy. Life is problematic, and even Cioran himself wondered why he hadn't killed himself yet. But this is merely a problem of will, not a problem of doctrine.

It's not that suffering-management is bad, but Stoicism's response ends here. It stops short of proposing ways to prevent suffering from occurring in the first place. — OglopTo

But this is a ludicrous criticism, since there can only be one way to truly and absolutely prevent suffering from occurring, and that way is - rightly in my view - rejected by the vast majority: everyone - stoics included - other than those crazed few who propose it, accept it, endorse it...

Why should anyone take seriously this absurd reasoning? It's like offering the so-called solution of cutting off your hand to prevent getting a splinter, then having the gall to criticise other solutions for being imperfect. If it's not jumping to this extreme, it's some lame appeal to art.

(Y)

I think it is more correct to see ancient philosophies including Stoicism as sets of spiritual exercises designed to bring about genuine transformation in ways of being, than it is to see them as systems of speculative metaphysics, or comforting aphorisms that allow a follower to merely cope with inevitable suffering.

I think the latter kinds of interpretations of ancient philosophies are anachronistic projections of the modern paradigm. It is characteristic of modernity and even post-modernity (despite the latter's protestations to the contrary) to think that our paradigms are so far advanced beyond the ancient that they afford a lens through which everything ancient and 'superstitious' may be rightly viewed and explained. It's nothing more nor less than cultural chauvinism. It would be much better to start from a position of acknowledgement that at least as much has been lost, as has been gained.

So, to put this into the context of the OP: Stoicism is a completely different kind of philosophy than pessimism, because the latter does not consist in any sets of spiritual exercises designed to transform, but is the expression of a meta[physical belief about the nature of the world, and the purportedly consequently inevitable nature of human life as suffering. The most it can offer is a kind of aphoristic comfort similar to what our culturally distorted model of Stoicism is thought to. "Pessimism is more beneficial than optimism because at least with the former we are either never disappointed or even sometimes pleasantly surprised, whereas with the latter we are always, or at least mostly, disappointed".

(Such maxims are deplorably simplistic in that they fail to make a proper distinction between disposition and expectation; but that is another story altogether).

1) Forget about it.

2) Stoicism and Pessimism are inherently different. Pessimism might be described as a negative emotional or presumptive reaction, Stoicism as a counterpart or "cousin" would be "no-emotional reaction".

3) A Stoic would narrow their definition of suffering so as to minimize the amount of it they actually experience. A pessimist would expand their definition of suffering to include as much as possible so as to better actively avoid it.

Sorry if this is not a useful response! My 3 cents...

Why should anyone take seriously this absurd reasoning? It's like offering the so-called solution of cutting off your hand to prevent getting a splinter, then having the gall to criticise other solutions for being imperfect. If it's not jumping to this extreme, it's some lame appeal to art. — Sapientia

----

First, I don't think that the complexity of human life and suffering can be captured by the simple splinter analogy you gave. For one, I think that we both agree that one's hand obviously serves a purpose and it isn't worthwhile to cut off one's hand for the mere reason of a possibility of getting a splinter.

On the other hand, there is no unanimous agreement on the (cosmic) purpose served by a new being so you can't help people from arguing that it is not worthwhile to subject additional beings to inevitable suffering for this vague/unknown purpose. The motivation is born out of compassion and I think it is quite hurtful if you just call names without providing adequate alternatives yourself.

Oftentimes, one's reason for procreating serves one's individual ideals or some institutional/instrumental purpose. I don't think this is fair and there's no reason to perpetuate this unfairness.

----

Second, I am not getting any argument/rebuttal from your comment which I can respond to, so I'll just return the question back to you.

Looking the other way, "why should anyone take seriously the absurd reasoning of procreating?".

It was argued in this thread that not procreating prevents additional people from experiencing 'pointless' suffering. This notion may not be so absurd as you might think. There was a comment earlier about celibacy and its relation to suffering and compassion. Arguments were raised and elaborated explaining this idea. It's OK if you're not convinced but if you want to criticize, calling names and giving inflammatory remarks wouldn't help.

If you'd like to discuss, would you mind giving a non-selfish reason why one ought to introduce a new being into this world?

essimism might be described as a negative emotional or presumptive reaction — VagabondSpectre

On the contrary, philosophical pessimism is a term meant to capture the realism of thinkers that others would label as pessimistic.

In that case, I guess simply maximization and minimization of the scope of what is considered "suffering" would then be a relationship or difference between the two terms.

First, I don't think that the complexity of human life and suffering can be captured by the simple splinter analogy you gave. For one, I think that we both agree that one's hand obviously serves a purpose and it isn't worthwhile to cut off one's hand for the mere reason of a possibility of getting a splinter. — OglopTo

No, not just possibility. It's practically inevitable that you'll get a splinter at some point in your life, just like it's practically inevitable that you'll experience suffering at some point in your life. I can't say I've ever met anyone who has reached adulthood without ever getting a single splinter.

Yes, one's hand is obviously a useful tool and a worthwile thing to have, much like the rest of one's body. Of course, this only makes sense with the prerequisite of there being a living being for whom these things can be of use, and anti-natalists don't want there to be any living beings. One's hand wouldn't be very useful at all if it wasn't attached to a living being, would it? And that is just one of an inconceivably vast number of advantages to being alive which the anti-natalist proposal would wipe out.

Fortunately, analogies don't have to be exactly alike in every respect, but only the key respects which are relevant to the point being made, which they are in my analogy. The point is that it's a ridiculously over-the-top proposal with obvious costs which are seen as simply unacceptable and undesirable by most.

On the other hand, there is no unanimous agreement on the (cosmic) purpose served by a new being so you can't help people from arguing that it is not worthwhile to subject additional beings to inevitable suffering for this vague/unknown purpose. The motivation is born out of compassion and I think it is quite hurtful if you just call names without providing adequate alternatives yourself. — OglopTo

There doesn't need to be a "cosmic purpose" for humanity or any future generations, nor does there need to be unanimous agreement on what it might be, if there even is such a thing.

Of course I can't stop people from making those arguments, other than by the power of persuasion. I'm simply arguing against these arguments because I disagree with them.

If their motivation is born out of compassion, then, as someone who is similarly motivated by compassion, I feel like I should point out the great costs to humanity their proposal would cause. The vastly detrimental consequences would far outweigh any admirable intent or hurt feelings at being scolded.

I don't know why you're speaking in plural when you speak of alternatives. What do you want from me? Some miraculous cure for suffering? The very set-up is misguided and is a superficial attempt at ruling out any alternative to anti-natalism. It seems fairly black-and-white to me. We either live or die, to be or not to be, reproduce or die out, persevere through the hard times, reap the reward during the good times, or simply give up, accept defeat, and bring about the extinction of humanity. Most of us make the right choice; anti-natalists are the exception.

I'll have to stop here because I have to go to work.

TBC?

I'm simply arguing against these arguments because I disagree with them. — Sapientia

It's OK to disagree but I think it is quite counter-productive to just call names. It would have been better if you shared the reason why you disagree. You can say that it's a personal preference and I would be OK with that.

I feel like I should point out the great costs to humanity their proposal would cause — Sapientia

And this is exactly one of the reasons why one ought to question the 'practice' of procreation.

It's 'instrumentalizing' new people for one's/societies' ideologies, ad infinitum. In blunter terms, "it's OK for them to be subjected to suffering because it's for <insert ideology here> sake". Hence the question,

Can you give a non-selfish reason for promoting procreation?

But I guess this is a bit off topic. :)

What do you want from me? Some miraculous cure for suffering? — Sapientia

I think there is already a concensus that suffering is inevitable in human existence. The question with procreation is, why would you want to create another batch of beings-who-will-inevitably-suffer? Right now, I can only think of instrumental reasons, e.g. for the sake of X ideology.

It's OK to disagree but I think it is quite counter-productive to just call names. It would have been better if you shared the reason why you disagree. You can say that it's a personal preference and I would be OK with that. — OglopTo

I didn't just call names, though, did I? If that's all you've got from my posts, then I suggest you go back and read them more carefully. I don't mind elaborating if you want a further explanation, but please don't pretend that I haven't already delved into why I disagree. I have already spoken at considerable length throughout this discussion and in other similar discussions on numerous occasions. (Actually, not so much in this discussion, but certainly in this one, for example).

I feel like I should point out the great costs to humanity their proposal would cause. — Sapientia

And this is exactly one of the reasons why one ought to question the 'practice' of procreation.

It's 'instrumentalizing' new people for one's/societies' ideologies, ad infinitum. In blunter terms, "it's OK for them to be subjected to suffering because it's for <insert ideology here> sake". Hence the question, — OglopTo

I don't think that you can win this argument about which position entails a greater cost to humanity, since there is hardly a greater cost to humanity than extinction. Whatever the downfalls of procreation arguably are, they cannot be so great as to be worse than, or to warrant, the extinction of humanity. I'm not against questioning the practice of procreation, but I am against the anti-natalist conclusion regarding procreation.

I reject your exclusive focus on suffering. By giving birth, that baby will be subject to many a thing, and suffering is but one of them. It's about the bigger picture. If you're going to defend anti-natalism, then you ought to be more clear about what that entails, since it entails a whole lot more than the cessation of suffering. If it was as simple as that may appear, then we'd all be anti-natalists. But even that sort of thinking is ill-considered, since the cessation of suffering would not be desirable for most people when they really think about it, just like how immortality would not be desirable for most people when they really think about it, or, for that matter, being hooked up to a pleasure machine.

Can you give a non-selfish reason for promoting procreation? — OglopTo

Yes, but I don't need to. Not all conceivable selfish reasons for promoting procreation are immoral, and even if they were, the consequences are more important. I'm glad I'm here. I feel fortunate to be here. And I wouldn't feel any less glad or fortunate if I was born out of a selfish desire.

I think there is already a concensus that suffering is inevitable in human existence. — OglopTo

Yes, but it isn't clear what you expect when you ask for an alternative. Given that suffering is inevitable, it makes no sense asking for an alternative. You either live and suffer, as well as experience joy and pleasure and happiness and many good things which you seem all too ready to gloss over or sweep under the rug as inconvenient truths... or you die. There are no other alternatives. It's about how you deal with life's obstacles, and I believe that the best way of doing so is to seek to overcome them.

The question with procreation is, why would you want to create another batch of beings-who-will-inevitably-suffer? Right now, I can only think of instrumental reasons, e.g. for the sake of X ideology. — OglopTo

Only a philosopher would think of it in that odd way. People generally want to have children because it gives them joy, despite the great responsibility and despite the chore that's involved, and because they know the joys in life that their children will themselves experience, amongst many other things: new, frightening, wonderful and countless other emotions.

I suppose I don't want my will and my doctrine to get too far away from one another. Or let's say my practice and my theory. To be clear, suicide seems reasonable to me if life becomes sufficiently painful and/or hopeless. I see/feel no duty in either direction. As a matter of persona-sculpture, though, I'd rather blend what's great about influences into a new "writer-ly" voice.

You make some good points, but my recent reading suggests (along with my intuition) that the concept of Nature or Zeus's will is very important to the Stoic system. From my point of view, the modern use of Stoicism would be stripped of this metaphysics and indeed be viewed in terms of spiritual exercises. I just reread Epictetus (the notes by his disciple and the handbook). I didn't see self-conscious self-sculpture there, but maybe I did in Marcus years ago -- mixed with a piety toward Nature.

new, frightening, wonderful and countless other emotions. — Sapientia

So why does this tragicomedy have to be carried out in the first place? Why must there be someone to live out the "journey"? This seems like a hidden is-ought fallacy: because people live a mixed tragicomedy life of good/bad this must be carried out by future generations. Add to this the idea that we posses an overabundance of consciousness whereby we must try to forget that existence itself is simply instrumental striving-for-nothing (ya know- planet spins, sun goes up and down, we are always in a state of unrest and deprivation: we must kill time and survive by trying to get at any cultural/survival/entertainment goal we are lacking at any given time, all the while using mechanisms of distraction and achoring to try to cope.) Even if we see our condition for the vain striving that it is (when seen in its pure form), it does not stop the Will from willing. Not only this, but all the instrumentality plays out whilst experiencing varying degrees of intrusive and unwanted pain. Thus instrumentality at the core of our existence and unwanted pain eating away at the contingencies of our existence are thus two type of suffering that exist for the human animal.

But supposedly certain schools of thought have a solution! We can 'overcome' our suffering by diminishing our own bad habits so as to live in accordance with Natural Reason. In this advanced mindset, we simply accept life in order to bare through it to the point of not even thinking about the suffering as suffering.. If we can build a warrior mindsets that can withstand bad, or not even look at the situation as bad, we can henceforth conquer the bad. Thus, the story goes, the "saintly" methodology of those who have cultivated virtuous lives will show the rest of humanity by virtue of their virtue the veracity of this mode of thought through diligent self-restraint, discipline, and practice. The true warrior Way is manifested as the adherent increases his power to master his own mind and become indifferent to that which unnecessarily causes pain. Overtime, that which seemed harmful to the warrior will not even be considered a harm. The long, arduous path of the disciplined saint will be deemed worth the effort, as towards the end equanimity of mind and the cultivated judgement of a good character will ensue... Or so the pipe dream ideal goes.

Why someone has to go through this warrior path of the disciplined virtuous saint in the first place is not explained other than it is good in and of itself which is of course begging the question. Rather, it does nothing to counter the many examples here of how people suffer, how people have to go through this "saintly" path in the first place just to get to a place so that harm supposedly makes little impact on a person.. All this work to "overcome' when it could have simply been avoided. The much more elegant and justified answer is antinatalism. There is no arduous journey to have to master, there is no unwanted pain, there is no instrumentality (whether just living it, (or even worse) the self-awareness of it.. ).

I don't see why a modern practice would necessarily be "stripped of this metaphysics"- at least when it comes to nature, and not even necessarily when it comes to Zeus; if the myth of Zeus was found to be productive for some practitioner's spiritual exercises. That said, I don't believe it is nature or Zeus 'as metaphysics' which is the Stoic's concern, anyway.

So, my point was that stoicism should not be understood as a system of metaphysics at all, but as a system of therapeutics and transformation; in that regard the point you make about metaphysics doesn't seem particularly relevant.

WARNING: Long post ahead!

I didn't just call names, though, did I? — Sapientia

OK, my bad. I only responded to your immediate reply.

At this point, I'm not sure if I'm ready to argue that procreation is immoral per se, but so far, I think it lacks sufficient justification.

I think we agree in some points like the inevitability of suffering in life and that there's no way to remove it from human existence so I'll just look at the other striking points.

---

From you reply, I get the following:

1. There is value in human existence and its perpetuation, hence, human extinction should be avoided.
2. Offsprings give parents joy. Parents want their offspring to experience joy.
3. You're glad to have been born, even if it was born out of selfish reasons. You see no harm in creating a new being.

For me, it wouldn't suffice to use one of the following as justification for procreation:

(1) I want a child because of <insert selfish reason here>.

E.g. I want someone to take care of me when I grow up, I want someone to take over the family business, I want someone to give me joy and inspiration as we both grow up, I want someone to solve the problem of world hunger, I want someone who will change the world, I want someone to finish what I have started, I want someone who will accomplish what I failed to accomplish, I want someone who will give joy to others, etc. etc.

I feel that it is unfair to project one's expectations to anyone to further one's own interests. The very idea of using somebody to fulfill one's desires and expectations just feels so wrong. It could be a different matter if the child can give his consent prior to being born, but we know that this is impossible -- all the more reason to take procreation seriously.

(2) I want to bring new beings who will experience joy.

If this is your reasoning, it is necessary to explain why we need to have new beings to experience joy. It's not like we need to have X billion enlightened people before life ceases in the universe and then its mission accomplished.

(3) There is inherent value in human existence so extinction must be avoided.

If this is the reason, one has to elaborate why perpetuating the human race is so important. If one cannot justify this fully, it is unfair to subject new beings to suffering for such an unclear justification.

Why must we prevent human extinction?

(4) I'm glad I'm born and I see no harm in creating new beings.

I think this is also selfish in the sense that you are projecting your (potentially limited, and probably subjective) worldview to a non-existent someone who cannot give his consent beforehand.

If you are truly compassionate for the suffering that this non-existent someone will surely experience, why would you gamble that he will eventually reach a similar worldview? What is it to be gained with this gamble? If you say that the joy is worth the suffering, are you not imposing your own value-judgment to someone who may not necessarily agree.

But then again, is it even fair to gamble with someone's life in the first place?

(5) It's just the way things are.

Err...

----

TLDR:

Most of these questions of purpose, I think, as I commented earlier, eventually leads to the realm of the metaphysical/transcendental/unknowable so it would be very difficult to get a coherent answer. However, if one is to rely solely on what can be observed about the human condition, it is difficult to justify why one ought to create new beings.

I'm not trying to convince anyone to not procreate per se. It's more an invitation to take a second look at the 'norm' of procreation and reviewing the motivations behind such norms. Because out of compassion, I think it is a serious issue to haphazardly/selfishly/ignorantly subject additional beings to additional suffering.

I think that if one decides on procreating, one must have a clear picture of why one wants to do so, in light of subjecting new beings through another cycle of suffering. You might say that it is unfair to focus only in the suffering in life, but we can't deny that there is suffering and this suffering that new beings would have to experience must be justified.

If your justification is one enumerated above, I'm not convinced. Its not that you need to convince me or anything, I'm just interested how far you can elaborate on your views.

So why does this tragicomedy have to be carried out in the first place? Why must there be someone to live out the "journey"? This seems like a hidden is-ought fallacy: because people live a mixed tragicomedy life of good/bad this must be carried out by future generations. — schopenhauer1

For starters, given our many discussions on this subject, you should know by now that "must" and "have to" have no place in my view about procreation.

I find it odd or perhaps convenient that you choose to bring up the is-ought issue now, on this particular topic, regarding what you take to be my views, when it is a general problem which applies across the board to virtually anyone... and you are no exception.

Add to this the idea that we posses an overabundance of consciousness whereby we must try to forget that existence itself is simply instrumental striving-for-nothing (ya know- planet spins, sun goes up and down, we are always in a state of unrest and deprivation: we must kill time and survive by trying to get at any cultural/survival/entertainment goal we are lacking at any given time, all the while using mechanisms of distraction and achoring to try to cope.) — schopenhauer1

Existence isn't accurately described as striving-for-nothing, I don't accept what you read into instrumentality, we aren't always in a state of unrest or deprivation, and it isn't all about survival, distraction or coping. That is just the expression of a blinkered view.

Even if we see our condition for the vain striving that it is (when seen in its pure form), it does not stop the Will from willing. — schopenhauer1

The will isn't bad, per se. Schopenhauer was wrong about that and other things.

Not only this, but all the instrumentality plays out whilst experiencing varying degrees of intrusive and unwanted pain. Thus instrumentality at the core of our existence and unwanted pain eating away at the contingencies of our existence are thus two type of suffering that exist for the human animal. — schopenhauer1

Sure, there are varying degrees of pain and suffering that we experience from time to time, and there are also varying degrees of pleasure, satisfaction, happiness and contentedness which we experience from time to time. That's life. I don't somehow jump from that to the absurd conclusion that extinction would be best.

But supposedly certain schools of thought have a solution! We can 'overcome' our suffering by diminishing our own bad habits so as to live in accordance with Natural Reason. In this advanced mindset, we simply accept life in order to bare through it to the point of not even thinking about the suffering as suffering.. If we can build a warrior mindsets that can withstand bad, or not even look at the situation as bad, we can henceforth conquer the bad. Thus, the story goes, the "saintly" methodology of those who have cultivated virtuous lives will show the rest of humanity by virtue of their virtue the veracity of this mode of thought through diligent self-restraint, discipline, and practice. The true warrior Way is manifested as the adherent increases his power to master his own mind and become indifferent to that which unnecessarily causes pain. Overtime, that which seemed harmful to the warrior will not even be considered a harm. The long, arduous path of the disciplined saint will be deemed worth the effort, as towards the end equanimity of mind and the cultivated judgement of a good character will ensue... Or so the pipe dream ideal goes.

Why someone has to go through this warrior path of the disciplined virtuous saint in the first place is not explained other than it is good in and of itself which is of course begging the question. Rather, it does nothing to counter the many examples here of how people suffer, how people have to go through this "saintly" path in the first place just to get to a place so that harm supposedly makes little impact on a person.. All this work to "overcome' when it could have simply been avoided. The much more elegant and justified answer is antinatalism. There is no arduous journey to have to master, there is no unwanted pain, there is no instrumentality (whether just living it, (or even worse) the self-awareness of it.. ). — schopenhauer1

I don't agree with all of that, and it's clear that your intention is to ridicule, but I think that it's still a better alternative to pessimism, especially when coupled with anti-natalism, which is far more ridiculous than stoicism.

From your reply, I get the following:

1. There is value in human existence and its perpetuation, hence, human extinction should be avoided.
2. Offspring give parents joy. Parents want their offspring to experience joy.
3. You're glad to have been born, even if it was born out of selfish reasons. — OglopTo

Yes.

You see no harm in creating a new being. — OglopTo

No. We live in a world in which one is susceptible to harm. I'm saying that that isn't sufficient reason to be against creating a new being.

(1) I want a child because of <insert selfish reason here>. — OglopTo

Sure, at least some of those will be bad reasons.

(2) I want to bring new beings who will experience joy.

If this is your reasoning, it is necessary to explain why we need to have new beings to experience joy. It's not like we need to have X billion enlightened people before life ceases in the universe and then its mission accomplished. — OglopTo

It isn't necessary. It doesn't need to be and I never said it was. It isn't about necessity, yet for some reason that objection keeps coming up. That it is a good thing for new people to get to experience the joys in life, and that they won't necessarily - or likely in many cases - live a life that is so awful it isn't worth living, is reason enough. The risk doesn't outweigh the gamble. And for those relatively few cases in which a life is so awful that it isn't worth living, suicide is almost always an option, and you'd expect them to be determined enough to go through with it if their life really is so awful and not worth living (which it isn't in most cases, hence suicide isn't advisable).

(3) There is inherent value in human existence, so extinction must be avoided. — OglopTo

No, that's not my view. There is value, but I wouldn't exactly say that it's inherent.

(4) I'm glad I'm born and I see no harm in creating new beings — OglopTo

No, just the first part. My views are in spite of the harm, which I acknowledge.

I think this is also selfish in the sense that you are projecting your (potentially limited, and probably subjective) worldview to a non-existent someone who cannot give his consent beforehand. — OglopTo

It is limited, yes. But it's not just subjective. And it isn't selfish. We know things about human nature, and the world, and we know that the vast majority assent to being glad that they're alive, and that it is likely that, for the most part, a new generation will feel the same way. In that respect, it's the opposite of selfish; it's altruistic.

The issue of consent is a nonsense that doesn't and can't enter the equation. There is no realistic alternative where consent is an option.

If you are truly compassionate for the suffering that this non-existent someone will surely experience, why would you gamble that he will eventually reach a similar worldview? — OglopTo

Because the odds are in my favour.

What is to be gained with this gamble? — OglopTo

I can't believe you even have to ask that question. A life worth living is no small thing.

If you say that the joy is worth the suffering, are you not imposing your own value-judgment on to someone who may not necessarily agree. — OglopTo

No. That might be the reason for their existence, but they are free to judge for themselves. They'll probably reach the same conclusion, though, in spite of those times when emotions run high and they aren't thinking clearly.

But then again, is it even fair to gamble with someone's life in the first place? — OglopTo

We'd be worse off if we didn't, which I think is more important than this peculiar view of fairness. It appears to be the same notion that the petulant child appeals to when he has a tantrum and shouts that he didn't ask to be born, or something along those lines.

(5) It's just the way things are.

Err... — OglopTo

It is, though; and it's highly unlikely to change of our own accord. This is actually an important point, because it highlights the redundancy and detachment from real-world practical solutions involved in anti-natalism.

Thanks for responding. Here's what I get from your reply:

1. Presence of suffering in life is not sufficient reason not to procreate.

2. That it is a good thing for new people to get to experience the joys in life is reason enough [to procreate]. It is not necessary to explain why

3. There is some value in human existence. More specifically, you place value on a life-well-lived. You deem allowing new beings to experience this as altruistic.

4. Since majority are glad that they are alive, it is likely that the new generation will feel the same way.

5. You believe that life will, more often than not, turn out to be 'worthwhile'. You're willing to gamble that a new life will turn out to be good rather than bad because the odds are in your favor.

6. While you think it isn't advisable, for the unfortunate, in case of really awful situations, someone's offspring can opt for suicide.

7. That procreation is a one-way contract is a non-issue.

8. [Humanity] will be 'worse off' if it goes extinct.

9. That procreation is 'just the way things are' holds weight in the debate.

Wow. I think that we disagree on almost all of the above that I'm not sure if I can flesh out a detailed response.

So I guess I'll just leave it here for now. :)

For starters, given our many discussions on this subject, you should know by now that "must" and "have to" have no place in my view about procreation. — Sapientia

Yes, good to know. So there is a start. We both agree, no one "has" to do anything, although I am making the claim that it is worth looking into as to whether procreation really is the best choice even under the "best" of circumstances. I just think it is not necessarily as justified as you claim.

I find it odd or perhaps convenient that you choose to bring up the is-ought issue now, on this particular topic, regarding what you take to be my views, when it is a general problem which applies across the board to virtually anyone... and you are no exception. — Sapientia

Except that under my views the "ought" leads to no negative consequences and in your is-ought fallacy it leads to callousness- essentially "The world has a mix of suffering and thus since people are able to deal with it, it is justified for future people to deal with it". (I must make a non-sequiter here and point out that negative consequences does not happen to a species or an ideal, but rather to individuals, so any point about negative consequences to the species or to human experience seems moot and is only lamented by already-existing individuals whose attachment to this idea would subside or at the least would die out with them. To suggest the "pain" of a lost species trumps any individual pain of a future human would be indeed falling into the error of putting an "X" reason for someone else's suffering). I believe I brought this up many times in the past, and OglopTo has just brought it up, presumably independently, again here (meaning it is a glaring objection that multiple people can independently find in your argument..not that that in itself means something, just wanted to point that out).

Sure, there are varying degrees of pain and suffering that we experience from time to time, and there are also varying degrees of pleasure, satisfaction, happiness and contentedness which we experience from time to time. That's life. I don't somehow jump from that to the absurd conclusion that extinction would be best. — Sapientia

But, you presume extinction is a real issue. Antinatalists, by and large are not thinking about "extinction" because they don't think about ethics in species-wide terms when it comes to the consequence of antinatalism. No one would be around to mourn a lost species and the mourning itself is misplaced as, it is the individual suffering which is prevented. You are projecting a future without humans (which will happen anyways) and then retroactively saying that this terror you feel trumps suffering of individuals. This seems misplaced at best.

I don't agree with all of that, and it's clear that your intention is to ridicule, but I think that it's still a better alternative to pessimism, especially when coupled with anti-natalism, which is far more ridiculous than stoicism. — Sapientia

Well, the ridicule is that there is this pretty hefty plan in place called stoicism as a model which is being purported in the philosophy community. It could be any other virtue-based system really. It is very much this regiment that is to be followed and apparently, this to these people, is to be enculturated by all humans who want equanimity and good judgement. Besides my natural aversion to such high-mindedness (and yes that would be subjective bias), presumably this path is a pretty hard one to fall in line with- otherwise it would be followed by everyone. I also go back to my own objection a while back that, it seems pretty odd that the stoic principles themselves (for those who believe in them) become the X reason a child needs to be born. Again, all this effort for what end, if really the end did not even need to be attained in the first place. No one has to be born to experience the enlightenment of the saints. So a) the efficacy of getting to this place may be very limited if it even exists (and not just hollow bragging by ancients who thought they had the keys to a good life), and b) the actual goal itself seems unnecessary when the alternative is no need to overcome anything, nor experience the suffering itself which needs to be overcome.

1. Presence of suffering in life is not sufficient reason not to procreate. — OglopTo

Yes.

2. That it is a good thing for new people to get to experience the joys in life is reason enough [to procreate]. — OglopTo

No. That is taking what I said out of context. The full context is important.

3. There is some value in human existence. More specifically, you place value on a life-well-lived. You deem allowing new beings to experience this as altruistic. — OglopTo

Yes.

4. Since majority are glad that they are alive, it is likely that the new generation will feel the same way.

5. You believe that life will, more often than not, turn out to be 'worthwhile'. You're willing to gamble that a new life will turn out to be good rather than bad because the odds are in your favor.

6. While you think it isn't advisable, in case of really awful situations, someone's offspring can opt for suicide.

7. That procreation is a one-way contract is a non-issue.

8. [Humanity] will be 'worse off' if it goes extinct. — OglopTo

Yes, more or less.

9. That procreation is 'just the way things are' holds weight in the debate. — OglopTo

I object to that phrasing, but I stand by my comment in response to that point.

Wow. I think that we disagree on almost all of the above that I'm not sure if I can flesh out a detailed response.

So I guess I'll just leave it here for now. :) — OglopTo

Okay. I think it has been a good conversation, thus far.

I believe I brought this up many times in the past, and OglopTo has just brought it up, presumably independently, again here — schopenhauer1

Segue: I actually first encountered this issue in the old site and I must say that I get a lot of the ideas from your and other's posts there. :)

Except that under my views the "ought" leads to no negative consequences and in your is-ought fallacy it leads to callousness- — schopenhauer1

Let's be clear about this: either neither of us are committing an "is-ought fallacy" or we both are. Please stop superficially attempting to make your own position appear to be stronger.

essentially "The world has a mix of suffering and thus since people are able to deal with it, it is justified for future people to deal with it". — schopenhauer1

That's not callousness. If they can deal with it, which most people can, then that's good, and should be encouraged. If anyone can't deal with it or has difficulty dealing with it, then they have my sympathy. But sympathy shouldn't drive one to endorse extreme, harmful and counterproductive measures. That is wrong. Fortunately, a sensible resolution is available in most cases, and we don't need to jump to extremes.

You, on the other hand, appear to have no sympathy for alleviating suffering in order to make the most out of life - which, I shouldn't have to point out, is contrary to seeking the extinction of life. That isn't humanitarian, that's anti-humanity.

In a sick twist, you seem to actually believe that you're on the side of humanity, and that you have compassion on your side, and that you get to take the moral high ground. This couldn't be further from the truth.

(I must make a non-sequiter here and point out that negative consequences does not happen to a species or an ideal, but rather to individuals, so any point about negative consequences to the species or to human experience seems moot and is only lamented by already-existing individuals whose attachment to this idea would subside or at the least would die out with them. To suggest the "pain" of a lost species trumps any individual pain of a future human would be indeed falling into the error of putting an "X" reason for someone else's suffering). — schopenhauer1

I'm talking about humanity as a whole, which is of course composed of numerous individual humans. There is nothing unreasonable about addressing the consequences to humanity. Consider it a shorthand.

It isn't true that your position has no negative consequences. On the contrary, you'd have to be very out of touch to reach that conclusion. Lots and lots of people want to have children, and there are good reasons for having children, and there is much to be gained from life. Your anti-natalism would of course prevent that. Your "cure" is indeed worse than the "illness". The "illness" comes and goes in phases and is treatable. The prognosis isn't as dire as you make out. Again, for most cases, this will be a case of cutting off your hand because of a splinter.

But, you presume extinction is a real issue. Antinatalists, by and large are not thinking about "extinction" because they don't think about ethics in species-wide terms when it comes to the consequence of antinatalism. No one would be around to mourn a lost species and the mourning itself is misplaced as, it is the individual suffering which is prevented. You are projecting a future without humans (which will happen anyways) and then retroactively saying that this terror you feel trumps suffering of individuals. This seems misplaced at best. — schopenhauer1

That anti-natalists, by and large, are not thinking about extinction is not anything to write home about. It is nonetheless an objectionable logical consequence of anti-natalism. Not thinking about it won't change that. They should bloody well start thinking about it, and think long and hard.

Of course there wouldn't be mourners. There wouldn't be anyone. And that would be a travesty. You shouldn't feel proud at the thought of chucking the baby out with the bathwater as if that would be some great achievement. The bathwater pales in comparison to the baby, and that you would've succeeded in getting rid of the dirty water would be of little consolation. It'd be what is known as a Pyrric victory.

Let's be clear about this: either neither of us are committing an "is-ought fallacy" or we both are. Please stop superficially attempting to make your own position appear to be stronger. — Sapientia

Actually I guess we both agree that no one "ought" to do anything so that is not necessarily the case. However, your justification does in fact lead to suffering, whether you mitigate it with other explanations or not, that is simply a fact- baby w/bathwater, splinters, and all other justifications aside. Mine effectively, whether too heavy-handed or not, prevents it. That again, is a fact.

You, on the other hand, appear to have no sympathy for alleviating suffering in order to make the most out of life - which, I shouldn't have to point out, is contrary to seeking the extinction of life. That isn't humanitarian, that's anti-humanity.

In a sick twist, you seem to actually believe that you're on the side of humanity, and that you have compassion on your side, and that you get to take the moral high ground. This couldn't be further from the truth. — Sapientia

I am not on the side of humanity, that is correct but rather a particular instance of a potential human that has the ability to occur and thus ability to experience the world's sufferings. Whether or not good is also in the world matters not to that which never was. Even if they go about exclaiming life's greatness retroactively, this does not have any ethical implications where it does seem true that preventing suffering would be ethical. No one usually feels sympathy for that which might have existed but did not get to experience joy.. People are more likely to feel sympathy for the suffering that one would experience than the deprived joy that they may not.

I'm talking about humanity as a whole, which is of course composed of numerous individual humans. There is nothing unreasonable about addressing the consequences to humanity. Consider it a shorthand. — Sapientia

Humanity is a genus and a human is a particular. You cannot conflate the two. The species is one level up from the individual.

Regarding "self-sculpture" in the Stoics; I came across the idea in reading Pierre Hadot, that sculpting was not understood by the Greeks and Romans as a 'building up' (as we most commonly conceive it) but as a 'stripping away'.

What you fail to see is that what you say about the nature of human life does not present the one 'correct' view, but is merely the projection of your state of mind onto the world.

The Stoics were concerned precisely with how to transform the state of mind and thus transform the view of the world.

Your mischaractization of the Stoics is thus the result of trying to push a simplistic opinion about something you obviously have no experience or understanding of.

"So, my point was that stoicism should not be understood as a system of metaphysics at all, but as a system of therapeutics and transformation."

Sure, but that's what I was saying myself. I can't make use of Nature or Zeus's Will. I think the stoics were moved (probably without thinking of it this way) by a benevolent narcissism. They enacted a particular hero myth. In any case, what they did or did not think or feel is IMV secondary to the use we can make of their texts. I'm happy to throw it on the pile of "wisdom writing" with the jokes of Diogenes and God's spiel from the whirlwind in Job.