How would this world differ from one without objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality (henceforth simply referred to as "morality")? — Yahadreas

As far as I could tell, it wouldn't differ at all.

As far as I can tell the world has no objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality, unless we force it upon the world via anthropomorphic bullying.

How would 'we' differ might be an entire different issue, except that we only have a sample size of one 'we' to go by and this one 'we' seems to have a lot of people within that 'we' that cannot seem to do without objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality.

Then again, I'm just me and can't really speak with certainty about 'we'.

Meow!

GREG

[...W]ould you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Yahadreas

It's not just the belief that matters. The cause of the belief matters too.

If one found, as a matter of fact, that it's moral, then is it not the case that the fact, and it's finding, are also of significance? Because presumably one could demonstrate that it's a fact, and thereby convince a reasonable person that it's moral, even if they had previously believed otherwise.

However, even in such a case, I doubt that I'd be able to act accordingly. I'd accept that I am immoral, and that morality is radically different to what I thought it was.

But for someone who is more committed to morality, the fact, it's discovery, the subsequent belief, and the decision to act accordingly would all matter.

In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Yahadreas

Beliefs are truth-apt. My belief is true IFF it is the fact of the matter. Could there be a world in which the statement "killing babies is moral" is true? Not if it's necessarily true that killing babies is immoral.

How do you find out if a statement is necessarily true?

If one found, as a matter of fact, that it's moral, then is it not the case that the fact, and it's finding, are also of significance? Because presumably one could demonstrate that it's a fact, and thereby convince a reasonable person that it's moral, even if they had previously believed otherwise. — Sapientia

How would this be any different to thinking (incorrectly) that one had found a moral fact, and successfully convincing others of this falsehood?

Again, it's not the fact of the matter that makes a difference but the belief.

Beliefs are truth-apt. My belief is true IFF it is the fact of the matter. Could there be a world in which the statement "killing babies is moral" is true? Not if it's necessarily true that killing babies is immoral.

How do you find out if a statement is necessarily true? — Mongrel

Whether or not it is true is beside the point. I want to know what difference the truth makes.

The truth of things like "e = mc^2" and "there's a kettle in the next room" have a causal affect in the world, irrespective of belief. But does the truth (or falsity) of "X is immoral" have a causal affect?

How would this be any different to thinking (incorrectly) that one had found a moral fact, and successfully convincing others of this falsehood? — Yahadreas

Demonstrating that something is the case will be more compelling to anyone capable of grasping it than some other means of persuasion. Without the fact, there can be no such demonstration. That's the difference.

You can conjure up a thought experiment in which this isn't the case, but I don't see the point of doing so.

In one possible world, all else being equal, there'd be a group of people capable of grasping the fact, who'd be convinced that it is the case upon grasping the fact, and they'd either act in accordance with it or not. In this world, the fact itself, amongst other things, is of significance, in that it has a causal role in determining belief and action.

The problem is that people can justifiably believe something to be true that is, in fact, false (assuming realism, which we are in the case). So there's no practical difference in believing a moral fact to be true and it being true and believing a moral fact to be true and it being false.

I agree that there's no practical difference in believing a moral fact to be true and it being true, and believing a moral fact to be true and it being false. My issue was with some of your other comments.

At first, I couldn't find any fault in your original post, and thought that I might have to play devil's advocate. We have a similar meta-ethical stance, I think. I'm a moral anti-realist and influenced to some extent by Hume.

Whether or not it is true is beside the point. I want to know what difference the truth makes.

The truth of things like "e = mc^2" and "there's a kettle in the next room" have a causal affect in the world, irrespective of belief. But does the truth (or falsity) of "X is immoral" have a causal affect? — Yahadreas

Whether a physical law and the existence of X can rightly be called causes is an interesting question, but I think I understand what you're asking.

Condemnation is an expression of abhorrence. It is a refusal to accept the world as it is. Morality exists where people are bound to that defiance. There is no morality in total acceptance.

My experience is that acceptance comes and goes. I go back and forth between amoral and moral perspectives. I have areas of inflexibility, but those areas probably aren't the same as yours. We each develop abiding wrath according to what we experienced and how we reacted to it.

Can we trace any events to this refusal to accept the world as it is? Oh yea. There's at least one case of it described on every page of every history book ever written.

You ask us to accept at the outset that a moral obligation can be a fact, but I think that would involve a category error, a moral obligation is not the kind of thing that can be a fact. So I don't think anything useful can come of the discussion. But I may be missing something.

The question, "Why should I be moral?" is not sensible, because it amounts to the denial of a tautology. By asking it, you are asking, "Why should I do what I should do?"

As to causation, I think that we're going to get into the metaphysics of causality here. Morals may or may not cause things, but there seem to be an awful lot of philosophers who insist that mathematical objects, while really existing independently of the mind, do not stand in causal relations.

Can you say something about the metaphysics of causality, Yahadreas? I'm not asking for a full-blown dissertation here, I just want to get the gist of how you think causality works before I write a detailed reply, since it seems to be necessary here.

But Yahadreas didn't ask "Why should I be moral?". The title question is broader than that. The title question is "Why be moral", which could mean "Why would I be moral (if such and such is the case)? He actually asks this form of question several times in the original post. If you re-read the original post, you'll see for yourself.

That's why I am curious as to his view on causality. He says,

Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.

Granted, the truth of a belief doesn't always effect the actions taken by the person who holds that belief. But suppose that we believe that X is moral, and our reason for believing it is because it's true? It would be a bit like beliefs about mathematics: presumably, I believe that 2+2=4 because 2+2=4.

But now we come to the sticky question as to whether the relationship between mathematical objects, such as 2 and 4, "caused" me to hold that belief. The answer would seem to turn on how causation works.

I'm not sure about your criteria here. It seems to me that behavior is obviously influenced by belief more than truth -- but that does not then mean that even regular, as opposed to moral, statements are not true or false.

Similarly, our behavior will be influenced by beliefs about morality. But this does not then entail that our beliefs are or are not truth-apt.

Though, perhaps in a round-about away, our meta-ethical beliefs could influence behavior -- whether they, themselves, are true or no, too.

It seems to me that the primary difference between the three worlds is:

1. Moral statements, theories, and beliefs are not truth-apt
2. Moral statements, theories, and beliefs are truth-apt.
3. Same as 2


If we want to simplify, anyways. I'm not sure that I really like the truth-apt statement approach anymore to meta-ethics. It just seems to miss the point.

In most cases, the fact of the matter makes quite a difference. Belief that you can fly can get you injured or killed, if you, in fact cannot fly, Being wrong about the facts entails misjudgments, which may be benign, or beneficial, but usually are neither, I would think.

I don't see why "moral facts", should be different. It may be the case that not believing some inconsequential falsehood could be life threatening. Say, a position on the colour of the creator of the universe's ear hair -- but then, the prudent fact would be where and when to commit to what, and not the inconsequential details of what is committed to.

So, what does it mean for killing babies to be moral? Does it mean that God has deemed it so? Does it mean that babies emit a poisonous gas, or don't actually exist by are disguised psychic parasites?

I also don't see this question as being different than asking if one would change their opinions about any state of affairs, despite powerful reason to believe the contrary. One can have extremely deep conviction, and attachment in blue ear hair, even after death, and eyeballing that the orange ear hair crowd was right all along. If you were them, would you change your opinion?

So, three points: Facts matter, and when they don't, then who cares what the case is?
Why should there be a difference between moral facts, and other facts? If there is no difference, then they either matter, or don't matter, as facts. Thirdly, opinions about any state of affairs can be deep seated, and are rarely not emotionally charged at all. I don't see why asking the question about "moral facts" is different than asking it about any fact.

I think the question assumes we have a choice in being moral or not. Morality as a term just cordons off a certain sphere of human activity for study, which is real enough, but concerning which we might not and probably do not have any control over. I tend to side with Plato, that the good attracts the good. We cannot help but be moral once in contact with it, so there is no "choice" to be so or not.

I think the question assumes we have a choice in being moral or not. Morality as a term just cordons off a certain sphere of human activity for study, which is real enough, but concerning which we might not and probably do not have any control over. I tend to side with Plato, that the good attracts the good. We cannot help but be moral once in contact with it, so there is no "choice" to be so or not. — Thorongil

I agree. My basis is a Witty-type one: we find the language contains 'should', and other people say it, and I find myself saying it too. As pattern-seeking animals, it makes sense for us to try to systematise these uses.
I think empirical testing of the question in the op is theoretically possible. But I wouldn't fancy formulating the study guidelines :)

In most cases, the fact of the matter makes quite a difference. Belief that you can fly can get you injured or killed, if you, in fact cannot fly, Being wrong about the facts entails misjudgments, which may be benign, or beneficial, but usually are neither, I would think. — Wosret

Sure, but are moral facts the sort of facts that can lead to measurable consequences if we act in light of false moral beliefs? For example, if I falsely believe that killing babies is (im)moral then what sort of outcome could I expect?

I'm not sure about your criteria here. It seems to me that behavior is obviously influenced by belief more than truth -- but that does not then mean that even regular, as opposed to moral, statements are not true or false.

Similarly, our behavior will be influenced by beliefs about morality. But this does not then entail that our beliefs are or are not truth-apt. — Moliere

I'm not questioning the truth-aptness of moral beliefs. I'm questioning the relevance of moral facts, both as motivating factors and consequences. Is there any empirical difference between a world in which killing babies is moral and a world in which killing babies is immoral? If you found out that killing babies is moral then would you kill babies, or would you act immorally and not kill babies?

Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true. What then? How would this world differ from one without objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality (henceforth simply referred to as "morality")? — Michael

You are assuming these don't exist? For many people (excluding myself), there are moral obligations.

I'm not questioning the truth-aptness of moral beliefs. I'm questioning the relevance of moral facts, both as motivating factors and consequences. Is there any empirical difference between a world in which killing babies is moral and a world in which killing babies is immoral? If you found out that killing babies is moral then would you kill babies, or would you act immorally and not kill babies? — Michael

I suppose if one is truly a dyed-in-the-wool realist about moral facts, and they were to find out that killing babies is morally good, then they would change their behavior and kill babies.

Actually, this reminds me of the recent question from New York Times Magazine, where -- for some people at least -- they were shown an example when killing a baby is morally good, and they said "yes"

Sure, but are moral facts the sort of facts that can lead to measurable consequences if we act in light of false moral beliefs? For example, if I falsely believe that killing babies is (im)moral then what sort of outcome could I expect? — Michael

I don't think that that on me. You said to suppose that there are moral facts. If they're the kinds of facts that don't matter consequentially in any sense, then who cares? I do happen to think that values are consequential to some extent, and I can't imagine a feasible scenario in which killing babies for fun would be a good thing to do.

But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible? What if we ought to kill babies for fun? Would we then wish to be good? Or would we deny morality -- not in the sense that we don't accept its validity; in the sense that we don't act in accordance to it? — Michael

For me, part of the answer is that morality doesn't work that way. It does not prescribe specific actions as good and obligated but prohibits impermissible action. We come to morality with a proposed action and ask if it is morally permissible to act in such a way. It would be peculiar for the moral agent to find right and moral action reprehensible because the moral agent has selected the action as preferential prior to moral judgement (exception would be when coerced to act reprehensibly). Where morality might find some resistance in reprehensible attitudes is when a prohibition is viewed as reprehensible (e.g., the inquiring ax murderer). In that case, the moral requirement is not judged as reprehensible but the supposed outcome of acting on the moral requirement is reprehensible. If a refusal to lie results in the murder of a close friend, then the moral agent finds the refusal to lie as reprehensible insofar as it resulted in a close friend being murdered. Here the end (i.e., protecting a friend from an ax murderer) is judged as good but the means (i.e., refusing to lie) is judged as bad because of the likelihood that it fails to secure the end. Suppose now, that the friend was able to sneak out of a window in a walkway beside the house. Upon hearing the lie, the murderer is turned away and sulks down the same walkway that your close friend has escaped into and by an unfortunate circumstance the murderer meets your friend and murders them. By reference to the outcome, the lie would have the same moral value as the refusal to lie insofar as the end is good but the means were bad. It is on the moral agent to reconcile the means and the end as morally permissible. If it is the aim of the moral agent to protect one's friends from ax murderers/Nazis, then the means towards that end ought to be suitable.

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael

The difference between 1 and either 2 or 3 is the existence of moral agency (i.e., agents capable of making moral judgements). Morality is a nascent, emergent property that becomes realized in a universe that has evolved moral beings. Moral beings are ones that are capable of making and acting on judgements of practical reason (i.e., subjective principles).

"To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies.

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make?"

I wonder if it is that simple. There appear to be other motivations that have and continue to subvert a moral view of this world.

During the Holocaust 1.5 million Jewish were killed in order to purify the Aryan race from their 'taint'. The primordial or elemental kinship between people became racially motivated and it led to the slaughter of multitudes of innocent people. Racism became a nationalist goal. Isn't the ethnic cleansing we have seen, and continue to see, a continuation of that trend? Morality force is replaced by the force of nationalism, and blood.

Also, we live in a dangerous world where letting one's guard down can lead to tragedies such as 9/11. Societies response to this, here and many other countries has led to a defacto Big Brother society, where freedom is sacrificed for the Ideal of Safety.

The massive intrusion of the state, from the demanding of media data, to the nearly ubiquitous presence of cameras surveying the actions of the populations, coupled with an ever improving technology almost read like science fiction or perhaps a the prologue to a totalitarian state. Think about facial recognition software, which is being employed by many countries.

An essential aspect of what is or is not moral is the freedom of the agent. Benjamin Franklin once said: "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Our desire to be safe overturns our moral concerns.

Morality is very personal, and cannot be acquired from outside sources.

What I feel from interactions with the outside world determines my morality. There are no set rules that can be applied to every one.

Take for example the basic teachings of the past masters: 'Thou shall not kill', and 'Thou shall not steal'.
Now, say some one is about to kill your loved one, should you kill the assailant? The answer depends on the content of your heart; the level of mercy Vs. that of fear. History talks about persons with exalted minds, who forgave their killers. But to imitate them blindly can cause more grief in you heart than peace. We must act according to where we are on the ladder of mental evolution. It is a soldier's duty to kill, and a spy's duty to steal. If your children are starving, is OK for you to steal food?

The idea is not to succumb to flashes of passions in your heart, but to act according to your total mind.

What is right in one instance may be wrong in another, and what is right for one person may be wrong for another one.

The test lies in 'Do unto others as you would have done unto you'. This will keep you from stealing from your brother just for gratifying your senses, and will keep you from hurting others for smaller causes, or for twisted mental attitudes. If I have become rich after being poor all my life before, should I wish others to be poor to satisfy my pride, or should I help the poor to conquer my fear of the past?

Community sets rules and laws for it to live harmoniously together. For me to share the fruits of living as a member I should strive to obey the rules in normal circumstances. Because, if I violate the norms of the community because of my small greed or fear, I will be causing disruption in the system, thereby causing pain to brother members for frivolous selfish reasons. But when the threshold is crossed by some rule acceptable to the community, say child abuse becomes norm, it becomes my duty to revolt. That is, I am willing to sacrifice my morality in smaller amounts to create proportionally more happiness. Since, I am a member of the community, I try to follow the rules and customs to a limit. It is the judgment from your heart, that matters.

Wisdom from books and other from other sources, is valuable, as it gives me insight into my heart. But the final judgment belongs inside my mind. Just make sure, We follow our whole heart, and not spur of the moment passions.

Following such approach keeps raising mind to higher levels, by reducing the 'ME' factor, which is the root of all sins and pains, from the equation of life.

I know the question was asked a year ago, but I'll give my two cents.

In this post I'm assuming morality supplies us with reasons to act or not act (If something is morally wrong then you have a reason not to do it). If reasons, if they are to count as reasons for an action, are to play a role in justifying behavior, then it's by appeal to those reasons (not our beliefs in those reasons) that does the justifying. I say "justifying" because I'm assuming that's what you're after in your question of "WHY be moral?"

We may be ignorant of those reasons, and we may be wrong about what we ultimately claim we ought to do all things considered. World 2 and world 3 differ in many ways. I'm not sure why you would think they are the same. Unless if we adopt extreme skepticism of our epistemic access to moral truths, our beliefs in world 3 would be aligned with the fact that killing babies is morally permissible. (I'm also assuming you mean "morally permissible" or "supererogatory", and not "morally required", when you write "it is moral to kill babies"). Given a large chunk of the world believes it is morally permissible to kill babies, world 3 would have a lot more dead babies in it.

" Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral?"

Well... for the sake of the thought experiment, I'd imagine people would not find it morally problematic and so wouldn't really make concerted efforts to stop it from happening.

"In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter"

I'm not sure how this follows at all. It is my discovery of the fact that causes my belief. Without the discovery I would not believe it, or I would not have a reason to believe it. Insofar as rational people respond to reasons, and morality gives us justifying reasons to act or not act, and it is possible to know the fact that it is morally permissible to kill babies, then there really isn't any moral reason for me to refrain from killing babies.

If all that mattered were beliefs, then none of our actions would be justified. Why? Because the fact that I have a belief does not justify the belief. It's true that having a belief, plus a desire or other conative state perhaps, may give a motivating explanation of my behavior. My mental states in World 2 and World 3 may also be identical: I may believe in world 2 that killing babies is moral, and I may believe in world 3 that killing babies is moral. My beliefs and conative states would explain my behavior in both worlds. They may be "reasons" (as in motivating reasons) for why I act a certain way, but my having beliefs or certain pro-attitudes does not justify anything.

"Would you accept a morality that stands in stark opposition to your personal values? What would it mean for you if you'd found this to be the case? "

This seems rather contrived. If I was in world 3 and I didn't believe the truth that killing babies is moral, then of course I wouldn't accept it. If I came to discover the truth in it, then how would that be in opposition to my personal values? Categorical imperatives (if they exist) are principles that we have most reason to adopt. If I discovered I had an all-things-considered, sufficient reason to adopt the view that killing babies is morally required, permissible, or whatever, then that would not be in opposition to my values. In fact, that would be in direct alignment with them. After all, it is what I have determined to be what I have most reason to do. That means I have weighed my reasons already and killing babies won out.

I've been thinking about this a lot recently. Given that the "good" or the "moral" life (if that is even possible) is more demanding (sometimes exceedingly so), what rational reason do we have to be moral?

Personally the answer I prefer is self-evident: to ask the question "why be moral?" is to forget that morality is what we ought to do. Just because you don't wanna be moral doesn't mean you don't have to be moral. And I'm not talking about environmental constraints forcing you to act a certain way, I'm talking about the idea that moral facts may actually exist and act as justification for our intentional actions.

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael

The question is confused, since it assumes that things being wrong is something extra on top of the rest of the world and what happens in it.

Such an assumption not only begs the question, but profoundly misunderstands morality, which is concerned with things being wrong due to the way they are (in the world, where else).

Yes. "Why ought I to do what I ought to do?" is a confused question.

I suppose one could hypothesise that, if mind-independent moral facts existed, they would have causal powers that - through some mysterious, currently unknown and undetectable, process - cause most people to feel those facts as part of their personal morality. The people that didn't feel those facts in their morality would be like that because of faulty reception apparatus, which could be objectively assessed by dissection of their brain and comparison with a non-faulty brain.

In such a scenario, there would be some sort of Morality Field that transmitted through the aether like EM waves. A universe with no absolute morality would have no such field. One could imagine a clever enough scientist inventing a sophisticated detector to detect the Morality Waves.

Such a universe would be verifiably different from one in which there was no Morality Field, given a Morality Wave detector. People might act the same way in both universes, but in one they'd be doing it because of Morality Waves received and in the other they'd be doing it because of their genes and early upbringing. The detector could tell us which world was which.

That's a horribly materialist hypothesis, which makes me break out in a rash, since I am generally non-Materialist. But it is at least plausible.

Personally the answer I prefer is self-evident: to ask the question "why be moral?" is to forget that morality is what we ought to do. — darthbarracuda

Yes. "Why ought I to do what I ought to do?" is a confused question. — The Great Whatever

The question isn't "why ought I to do what I ought to do?". The question is just "why do what I ought to do?" It's a question of motivation. I don't think the existence of some claimed obligation is sufficient. If it could be shown that I was obligated to kill babies, I still wouldn't.