Your hypothesis is that (i) there is a thing called the will, (ii) the will is not subject to causal laws (iii) the will causes human action. This is a substantive hypothesis, it is not an apriori truth by any way shape or form. — MetaphysicsNow
The question, then, is in any given case what leads up to the will causing a given human action or prevention of human action (nb, there is also the question how the causal mechanism between will and action works, but that is a different question). — MetaphysicsNow
You also seem to be implying that there is no rational account for that either. That seems to rule out any kind of research program into how the will is supposed to get in on the act. — MetaphysicsNow
(nb, there is also the question how the causal mechanism between will and action works, but that is a different question). — MetaphysicsNow
Why is this a relevant question? If the will is a start of physical action, and not a continuity of physical action, then what point is there in considering the physical conditions prior to the actions of the will?
So for example, "possibility" refers to something in which the fundamental law of excluded middle does not apply, and is therefore unintelligible. Do you see that?
and provided that the law of non-contradiction holds, possibilities are always going to be intelligible. — MetaphysicsNow
No I do not see that, because it is a contentious position you cannot just help yourself to. — MetaphysicsNow
Perhaps we can do without the law of excluded middle (intuitionist logics for instance) but the law of non-contradiction is a great deal more difficult to do without and provided that the law of non-contradiction holds, possibilities are always going to be intelligible. — MetaphysicsNow
Clearly the real existence of possibility violates at least the law of excluded middle,
Possibility does not pose a problem for intelligibility if what is possible is constrained by the laws of whatever logic you happen to prefer. — MetaphysicsNow
How? Are you confusing actuality with reality? They are different notions - indeed it is precisely the difference between them that modal realists like Lewis take advantage of. — MetaphysicsNow
You can have a fully consistent theory of modality that retains the law of excluded middle. You can also have one that rejects the law of excluded middle, but retains the law of non-contradiction. Let's call the former kind of modal thinker a BigEndian and the latter a LittleEndian Concerning the example for Aristotle, BigEndian and LItteEndian are totally in agreement that we cannot know or decide which of the statements "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" or "There will not be a sea battle tommorrow" is true the day before the event. The BigEndian will simply insist that this is only an epistemological fact, and does not entail that neither one nor the other is in fact true. Certainly, this requires a particular brand of realism about future events, but then BigEndians (and generally speaking everyone who favours classical logic) will be a realist about most things. The LittleEndian has a (perhaps more sophisticated) view of the interplay between epistemology and metaphysics that ties together in some way what can be known/decided and what exists. There is no simple way to decide whether the BigEndian or LittleEndian is correct. — MetaphysicsNow
In all cases, a modal realist is not going to allow the existence of non-real possibilities: all possbilities for a modal realist are equally real, although they might not all be equally likely. — MetaphysicsNow
Your points about infinity and possibility are not clear to me - modal realists of any kind can quite happily accept the idea that there are an infinite number of possibilities and that does not render possibilities unintelligible. — MetaphysicsNow
Possibility is something which is infinite, and an infinite thing is unintelligible.
There seems to be some element of talking past each other here between you and MetaphysicsNow. Perhaps you are right that because there are infinite possibilities we (as finite beings) cannot survey all of them at once. However, I think MetaphysicsNow is suggesting that this is to some extent irrelevant because it does not impact our abilities to entertain any specific possibility. — jkg20
"Possibility" is ambiguous between your two usages. For you it appears to be the sum of all possibilities. For MetaphysicsNow it appears to be just that which defines something as being a member of that group of infinite things. — jkg20
MetaphysicsNow is perfectly correct that possibility is intelligible if he means by "possibility" what I believe he means. — jkg20
Would you both agree with that? — jkg20
But physical illness is not necessarily neurological though. That is the problem, there are many possibly factors, diet, hormones, etc.
There are many instances where John might decide to vote "Yes", but actually vote "No". He might change his mind, as you mentioned, he might forget, as we already talked about, or he might just make a mistake in marking the ballot. Notice that even a mistaken action is a very real possibility and must be accounted for.
In all cases, a modal realist is not going to allow the existence of non-real possibilities: all possbilities for a modal realist are equally real, although they might not all be equally likely. — MetaphysicsNow
Modal realists who subscribe to either intuitionist or classical logic will both fall back on the law of non-contradiction. Modal realists who subscribe to paraconsistent logics might not (it depends how expansive they take the idea of a true contradiction to be). — MetaphysicsNow
But if you think that possibility is completely unintelligible, then given that what is unintelligible cannot be meaningfully talked about, you seem to be commiting yourself to have been talking nonsense whenever you discuss modality. — jkg20
Possibilities are real to the degree that some logic, some principle of intelligibility, constrains an unformed potency. — apokrisis
A little like @jkg20, I'm beginning to get a little lost, since what is unknown is not commonly what is unintelligible. Supposing I don't know what my birthday present is because it is wrapped in paper. Suppose that what is wrapped in that paper is the latest iPhone. That I do not know that my birthday present is an iPhone does not make either the iPhone nor the fact that it might be my birthday present unintelligible to me (indeed I may even hope or imagine that my birthday present is an iPhone) .We mention the unintelligible commonly, it is thought of as the unknown.
MetaphysicsNow is perfectly correct that possibility is intelligible if he means by "possibility" what I believe he means. — jkg20
No, if MetaphysicsNow is saying what you claim, this is not perfectly correct, it is unintelligible because "infinite possibilities" is self-contradictory, — Metaphysician Undercover
I think I've read somewhere that a Bayseian approach combined with some kind of idea of self-locating beliefs (i.e. beliefs about which world you are in) can help with this, but I've not dug into it in too much detail. — MetaphysicsNow
A little like jkg20, I'm beginning to get a little lost, since what is unknown is not commonly what is unintelligible. Supposing I don't know what my birthday present is because it is wrapped in paper. Suppose that what is wrapped in that paper is the latest iPhone. That I do not know that my birthday present is an iPhone does not make either the iPhone nor the fact that it might be my birthday present unintelligible to me (indeed I may even hope or imagine that my birthday present is an iPhone) . — MetaphysicsNow
jkg20 said of me, more or less, that when I use the word "possibility" in the abstract, it just stands for "criteria for what is possible". That's pretty much correct, and I do not see how it commits me to the unintelligibility of possibility or possibilities. The criteria will vary in varying circumstances - sometimes we will be interested only in what is physically possible (i.e. the criteria will include the idea that whatever is possible has to conform with the known laws of nature). At other times, perhaps when writing science fiction, we may want to think beyond those constraints, but still wish to insist that what we are imagining is a possible future, and in that case our criteria would be limited to excluding only logical contradictions (at least, to exclude obvious logical contradictions, some logical contradictions can be deeply buried). In both kinds of cases, laying down the criteria of possibility allows for an indefinite number of perfectly intelligible possibilities. Perhaps it also allows for an infinite number of possibilities, I don't know, it doesn't seem to me to matter much one way or another. — MetaphysicsNow
This is precisely the issue in reverse though - what are the criteria for impossibility? Are we talking about physical impossibility, logical impossibility.... Each will have different criteria presumably, just like "possibility" under my contention.If something, for whatever reason, is determined as impossible
I don't know who thinks of it as the unknown, but not me, and I gave you a reason why. You may have meant to say that being unknown is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being unintelligible, but thinking of one thing as another is (in usual parlance) to equate the two things in thought, which in this case would be to take being unknown as a necessary and sufficient condition for being unintelligible.....it is thought of as the unknown
I think the motivation behind my position is that where the condition involves action, it is always possible to reason through it (even if doing so requires emotional support etc). That being so I'd be committed to saying that there are no conditions of the type we are discussing that cannot be reasoned through.whereof one cannot reason through a condition
I think the motivation behind my position is that where the condition involves action, it is always possible to reason through it (even if doing so requires emotional support etc). That being so I'd be committed to saying that there are no conditions of the type we are discussing that cannot be reasoned through. — MetaphysicsNow
It's the fall back to medication - and specifically justifying that fall back by the argument that the actions are simply not under the sufferers control - that bothers me. — MetaphysicsNow
I agree 100% that getting OCD under control can be hard and that sufferers might need a great deal of emotional and practical support. However, the medications that are prescribed in these cases are antidepressants which are not harmless and there are arguments to be made that in many cases the OCD symptoms are to be preferred to the side-effects of taking antidepressant drugs. — MetaphysicsNow
But in any case, the philosophical issue here is largely independent of our sympathy for OCD sufferers, and concerns the metaphysical presuppositions behind the notion of self-control and (as Norman Malcolm put it) the conceivability of the mechanicistic stance in regard to human action. — MetaphysicsNow
Why would it be idiotic? I'm certainly not suggesting that people with schizophrenia or bipolar syndrome can just "snap out of it" all by themselves: that would be idiotic.I don't think self-control will solve the issues a schizophrenic or bipolar individual might experience. To say that would be idiotic.
Why would it be idiotic? — MetaphysicsNow
My response to that is that there are no grounds for treating the PLA any more or less heuristically than any other law of nature — MetaphysicsNow
As regards the constraints based ontology you talk about, could you expand a little on this and specifically what you mean by "material sponaneity" and "formal limitation"?
Do you regard the formal limitations as capable of evolution, or are they fixed and immutable? — MetaphysicsNow
This report reviews what quantum physics and information theory have to tell us about the age-old question, How come existence?
No escape is evident from four conclusions: (1) The world cannot be a giant machine, ruled by any preestablished continuum physical law.
(2) There is no such thing at the microscopic level as space or time or spacetime continuum.
(3) The familiar probability function or functional, and wave equation or functional wave equation, of standard quantum theory provide mere continuum idealizations and by reason of this circumstance conceal the information-theoretic source from which they derive.
(4) No element in the description of physics shows itself as closer to primordial than the elementary quantum phenomenon, that is, the elementary device-intermediated act of posing a yes-no physical question and eliciting an answer or, in brief, the elementary act of observer-participancy.
Otherwise stated, every physical quantity, every it, derives its ultimate significance from bits, binary yes-or-no indications, a conclusion which we epitomize in the phrase, it from bit.
http://cqi.inf.usi.ch/qic/wheeler.pdf
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