What you fail to see is that what you say about the nature of human life does not present the one 'correct' view, but is merely the projection of your state of mind onto the world. — John

Isn't this a given for everyone? Does anyone really know the 'correct' view? Aren't we all just projecting our own states of mind onto the world?

The questions posed stand on themselves and we have to make do with what we have to try to answer them, e.g. whether trying to invoke the transcendent or inherent goodness or not. Either approach is but a projection of our states of mind to the world. Neither is absolutely 'correct' nor 'incorrect', only 'makes sense' or 'does not make sense' in view of the purported assumptions.

The point is, for me, comments like this steers away from the really juicy discussions. It's my first time to use such terms in discussions but maybe this is what they call a red herring, "something that misleads or distracts from a relevant or important issue" (wiki).

The Stoics were concerned precisely with how to transform the state of mind and thus transform the view of the world.

Your mischaractization of the Stoics is thus the result of trying to push a simplistic opinion about something you obviously have no experience or understanding of. — John

What does calling out one's expertise on the subject matter attain in light of advancing the debate? Do the arguments presented get invalidated/watered down when the proponent is inexperienced?

Rather than focusing on trying to understand where the arguments are coming from and providing rebuttals, the attack is on the credibility of the proponent. Maybe this is what they call ad hominem, "directed against a person rather than the position they are maintaining" (wiki).

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TLDR: What is your intention in posting this comment? How did it contribute to the discussion?

OK so maybe you just want to point out that our worldviews are limited by our experiences. But supposing that there is really lack of expertise and experience, does it automatically invalidate the questions and arguments presented?

Sure, but that's what I was saying myself. I can't make use of Nature or Zeus's Will. I think the stoics were moved (probably without thinking of it this way) by a benevolent narcissism. They enacted a particular hero myth. In any case, what they did or did not think or feel is IMV secondary to the use we can make of their texts. I'm happy to throw it on the pile of "wisdom writing" with the jokes of Diogenes and God's spiel from the whirlwind in Job. — who

OK, but you said "the modern use of Stoicism would be stripped of this metaphysics and indeed be viewed in terms of spiritual exercises' which is not the same as to say that you "can't make use of Nature or Zeus's Will'.

And then, I think that in your next paragraph you launch into another tendentiously modern interpretation of what the Stoics were doing. And again, the use "we" can make of the texts is not coterminous with the use you may or may not be able to make of the texts. The question is; have you genuinely tried to make use of the texts in the ways suggested in them or have you simply and pre-judiciously thrown them "on the pile of "wisdom writing" with the jokes of Diogenes and God's spiel from the whirlwind in Job"?

Isn't this a given for everyone? Does anyone really know the 'correct' view? Aren't we all just projecting our own states of mind onto the world? — OglopTo

In some sense that's true enough, but schopenhauer1 does speak as though his or her view of the world is the only correct one. It might be OK to say that life is predominately suffering for me; or perhaps even that it is necessarily predominately suffering for me (although I have difficulty believing that view could come be supported by anything more rational than self-defeatism).

There is no warrant for claiming that life predominately consists in, or must predominately consist in, suffering for others.

Either approach is but a projection of our states of mind to the world. — OglopTo

Are you assuming that this subjectivism is the only correct view of the matter?

There is no warrant for claiming that life predominately consists in, or must predominately consist in, suffering for others. — John

The point of phenomenology is not to evaluate your own personal experiences but to make a science of consciousness, i.e. to create a generalized account of conscious experience/presentation. I think it's clear that life has suffering, what is the issue is whether it is predominantly suffering.

If you count aesthetic disillusionment and spiritual decay as suffering, then yes, the un-manipulated life is indeed filled with suffering.

There is no warrant for claiming that life predominately consists in, or must predominately consist in, suffering for others. — John

I think that the 'predominance' of suffering in life takes secondary importance. The fact that there is suffering that we need to overcome in the first place should be at least a matter of great concern -- more so given that a majority of humanity ignorantly/haphazardly create new beings who will inevitably experience this.

What is sufficient justification to subject new human beings to this inevitable fate?

Are you assuming that this subjectivism is the only correct view of the matter? — John

I don't understand the question. Is the question: "Am I assuming that [pessimism] is the only correct view of matter?"

If this is the question, I would like to reiterate that I think no one knows absolutely what is a 'correct' or 'incorrect' view. For me, the claim that 'life is suffering' and the arguments arising from this just makes much more sense from the view that X is inherently good, e.g. virtue is good in itself and must be pursued.

Well at least that's how I view it for now.

If the question is: "Are there really only subjective views?"...

...then my personal opinion is that yes, there are only but subjective views. It's difficult to imagine for anyone to ever really know The 'correct' answer, there are only our own projections and interpretations of the world. We make do with whatever it is we have, and from this, we extract value-judgments of the world.

In some sense that's true enough, but schopenhauer1 does speak as though his or her view of the world is the only correct one. — John

I see. I usually try to look past this and just focus on the meat of the argument. If the argument makes sense, it does not matter to me whether the poster believes it is the one and only correct one.

And if the argument does consist in claiming it is the only correct view, what then? Are you suggesting that your "focusing on the meat of the argument" is unbiased by your own prejudices?

I may agree that that 'meat of the argument' makes sense but at the same time question the claim that 'it is the only correct view'. Agreeing with a part of the argument does not necessarily mean that I agree with the rest.

I try to overlook the 'only-correct-view claim' because I don't think commenting on such points will lead anywhere. I'm much more interested in understanding what motivates such a claim, which is, whether the 'meat of the argument' makes sense or not.

And it is inherently biased. After all, my understanding and making-sense of claims greatly depends on my experiences and worldview. And of course, the ability of the poster to make himself sensible.

I think that the 'predominance' of suffering in life takes secondary importance. The fact that there is suffering that we need to overcome in the first place should be at least matter of great concern -- more so given that a majority of humanity ignorantly/haphazardly create new beings who will inevitably experience this.

What is sufficient justification to subject new human beings to this inevitable fate? — OglopTo

You don't have to reproduce if you don't want to. But there cannot be a universalization of any view concerning the moral rightness of reproduction, that it is either right or wrong, for the reason that moral philosophy can only concern itself with life, and dealing with the issues that arise out of living itself; and life is impossible without reproduction.

Again, that life is dependent on reproduction, and vice versa, does not justify either reproduction or life, because to achieve that one would have to justify either one in terms outside of both. But the same goes for condemnation of life and reproduction; to speak about life and reproduction in terms of approbation and disapprobation is simply to commit a category error.

And, in any case, again you are assuming that new human beings will be "subject to this inevitable fate" which is falling into the error of thinking that is the only correct way to view human life. This is unjustifiable, even it could be relevant; which in any case it cannot.

If the "meat of the argument" consists in making a blanket claim about the rightness or wrongness of life and/or reproduction, then any "sensible meat of the argument" is a chimera produced by a category error.

The point of phenomenology is not to evaluate your own personal experiences but to make a science of consciousness, i.e. to create a generalized account of conscious experience/presentation. I think it's clear that life has suffering, what is the issue is whether it is predominantly suffering.

If you count aesthetic disillusionment and spiritual decay as suffering, then yes, the un-manipulated life is indeed filled with suffering. — darthbarracuda

There is no doubt that "life has suffering". Whether or not it is "predominately suffering" is simply not determinable; so, for that reason, I think of it as a non-issue.

I would agree with you that the "un-manipulated" (in the strictly narrow sense that I am charitably taking you to be using the term) life, entails more suffering than the examined and disciplined life. However I don't like the term 'manipulated' because most of us manipulate ourselves and others in our neurotic search for gratification. It is learning to stop doing those kinds of manipulations that offers the best method to reduce suffering.

We can replace "predominantly" with "structurally necessary" and get the same general conclusion, albeit a more aesthetic one. Although I think it's largely both.

At this point, I am not ready to claim for the morality/immorality of procreation. I can only try to provide arguments why I think that procreation lacks sufficient justification in light of suffering.

And, in any case, again you are assuming that new human beings will be "subject to this inevitable fate" which is falling into the error of thinking that is the only correct way to view human life. — John

By 'inevitable fate', I mean, new beings will inevitably have to experience several levels of suffering. Whether few or many, they are sure to experience bodily pains, thirst, hunger, stress-inducing events, and probably the more problematic ennui, angst, and boredom. I think this is a given and makes sense, and using your own terms, a 'correct' fundamental view.

Whether one would like to attribute some value to this suffering or the overcoming of such suffering is the matter of debate. Because if one thinks that there is value to such things, then procreation is justifiable, i.e. the inevitable suffering that new beings will experience will be justified by some other good. On the other hand, if one does not see any value or meaning or purpose behind this suffering, one can feel unjustified in subjecting additional beings into such suffering.

If the "meat of the argument" consists in making a blanket claim about the rightness or wrongness of life and/ or reproduction, then any "sense of the argument" is a chimera produced by a category error. — John

I see. But in the end, one has to settle down for some kind of worldview which makes some inkling of (personal) sense.

In the above example, for me, claiming (A) that procreation is not justified is derived from the value-judgment (B) that there is no value in suffering. Judging whether (A) is sensical or not depends on whether you accept (B) or not. What I'm saying from this thread is that if one accepts (B), then (A) makes sense.

On the other hand. as I understand, claiming that (C) procreation is OK (can be justified) is derived from (D) that there is some value in human existence. For me, (D) is less sensible than (B) simply because I still haven't found a convincing narrative what this value is in human existence.

I feel that what you disagree with is the claim (B) and not per se (A). If so, I agree that this is not the only view there is, more so the 'correct' one. (A) is only invalid in so far as you deem (B) unacceptable -- a matter of which is highly subjective and of which no one really knows the 'correct' claim.

However, if you disagree with (B), and claim (C), I feel it is just calling names and doesn't help advance the discussion if you merely say that "I disagree with (B)" without expounding on some sort of something like (D).



There are a lot of nuances in the terminologies that I left out for simplicity. I'm not sure though if this will work out in trying to convey what I mean to say...

I'm not sure what you mean by "structurally necessary". Pain and pleasure are structurally, or perhaps better, functionally, necessary to the biological organism; is that what you have in mind?

Suffering is not the same as pain, though. While some degree of pain might be unavoidable as long as one remains embodied I don't believe that suffering is necessarily ineliminable (although it is doubtless no easy task); although I would agree that living an unexamined and undisciplined life would be expected to involve some degree of suffering. In any case, must any life be totally free of all suffering no matter how minor, for you to give it your ticket of approval?

I can only try to provide arguments why I think that procreation lacks sufficient justification in light of suffering. — OglopTo

As I have already said, I think the very notion that reproduction requires moral justification is mistaken, the result of a category error. unless we are talking about the question in relation to various life circumstances. To try to think about it in relation to life in general is an impossible, incoherent task.

So, I won't attempt to engage with any of your detailed arguments because I think they are all examples of the same category error; they simply cannot get off the ground in the first place, such that they would need to be dealt with. To try to deal with them individually would just involve repeating myself again and again; which would be a waste of time for both of us.

I think the very notion that reproduction requires moral justification is mistaken, unless we are talking about the question to varying life circumstances. — John

But I think some sort of justification is needed, which may or may not necessarily be about morality.

A simple answer to "why one would opt to procreate" would have to be answered. Because at the very least, we're talking about the welfare of a new life here. I don't think it's just a simple matter of just 'going with the norm' or 'just wanting to have a baby'.

If you think that the question depends on life circumstances, then what makes procreation acceptable in some circumstances and not in others? And as you may have noticed, I'm more interested in how procreation becomes acceptable in the cases where you think it is acceptable or deem it as a sort of a non-issue.

To try to think about [procreation] in relation to life in general is an impossible, incoherent task. — John

For me it makes sense if you accept certain claims. Its sad to hear to just dismiss this issue altogether and just go with the flow...

A simple answer to "why one would opt to procreate" would have to be answered. Because at the very least, we're talking about the welfare of a new life here. I don't think it's just a simple matter of just 'going with the norm' or 'just wanting to have a baby'. — OglopTo

But, it's not that at all. Many people don't want children and don't have them; I for one don't and haven't; and I'm glad for that.

"Why would one opt to procreate?' can only be coherently answered in relation to one's own life circumstances and personal wishes. Any decision cannot be justified or condemned in relation to some notion of 'the way life is in general'. That said, if one has a very negative view of life in general, then it might be better if that one does not procreate; but moral principle would be applicable only to that one, or to those kinds of ones, not to others

but moral principle would be applicable only to that one, or to those kinds of ones, not to others — John

OK, so I guess you're saying that the decision of procreation depends on one's own circumstances.

I'm assuming from here that you don't have a strong personal stand on this issue so I don't think I'll have other follow-up comments. :)

Yes, indeed, pain is not equivalent to suffering. But pain without meaning (amongst other factors) constitutes suffering. Zapffe touched on this: humans have a metaphysical concern for meaning that their environment cannot give. All meaning is thus contrived, artificial, and a pseudo-solution, and thus everything we do can be seen as a way of escaping our higher-level concerns. If that doesn't count as suffering, or at least something undesirable, I don't know what would, other than extreme pain.

Yes, I have a view about what is and has been right for me regarding the question of procreation, and I don't think any view, one way or the other, regarding the general question about procreation, as such, can be rationally supported.

Anyway, thanks for engaging.
:)

But the view that life cannot offer the meaning that is sought for is one-sided. Apparently Zapffe thinks life does not have what he is looking for, but perhaps he is defeating himself from the start by virtue of his prejudices, or is looking in the wrong places, or in the wrong ways, or asking the wrong questions.

All meaning is thus contrived, artificial, and a pseudo-solution, and thus everything we do can be seen as a way of escaping our higher-level concerns. — darthbarracuda

That is nothing more than one narrow, tendentiously self-defeating view. You are fucked from the start, before you even begin, if you hold a view, and begin with a disposition, like that.

Anyway, thanks for engaging. — John

Same here.

You should read The Last Messiah. It's a short essay available online outlining his metaphysical views on all this. Humans require meaning in a meaningless universe.

I had a look but couldn't easily find a free version (and I aint going to pay to read Zappfe). In any case, I have read some of his work before, and was not particularly impressed. "Humans require meaning in a meaningless universe" sounds like Camus. At least Camus proposed that we make our own meaning by rebelling in a kind of Stoic way against the purported meaninglessness of life. The problem I see with this supposed meaninglessness of life, though, is that actuality life is always already meaningful, and the view that says it is meaningless is a secondary derivative view of life as an object we are trying to look at dispassionately, rather than the primary view of life as a process we are participating in. The former view is parasitic on the latter, and not the other way around. The mistake made by Zappfe and other nihilists consists in thinking that the view of life as meaningful is some kind of secondary parasitic illusion; this is absurd, because life is never, prior to a certain kind of artificially attenuated abstract reflection, discovered to be devoid of meaning; on the contrary it is always experienced as being replete with meaning.

Camus' rebellion would be a pseudo-solution, though. What would make life already meaningful?

Yes, I agree Camus' rebellion is a pseudo-solution...to a pseudo-problem...which seems appropriate enough...

What makes life already meaningful is the meaning we always already find in it; what else could make it meaningful?

That's what I enjoy about writers like Zappfe and Ligotti. In their analysis of human life and suffering, they clearly show suffering is a meaning. All solutions are pseudo because the meaning of suffering overwhelms them.

Not even Jesus can overwhelm sin. He's merely a distraction and fiction used to draw attention away from the suffering of the world and our finite nature. The absolute infinite is incapable over overcoming the finite--we still die, cause others pain, are unable to give everyone a just life, no matter how much we believe in Jesus or how much we are forgiven.

Philosophical pessimism's insight is there is no solution. There cannot be one. The meaning of suffering is too great. When there is suffering, nothing can be done about it.

Alas, some philosophical pessimists to not fully realise this. They treat suffering as if it has a solution we just don't have. Like the optimists they target, they believe in a myth which distracts us from suffering--if only everyone would die, then the problem of suffering would be resolved.

While this is true in sense, if everyone was dead there would be no new suffering, it does nothing to resolve suffering which has already occurred.

These pessimists aren't pessimistic enough. They think preventing any future suffering resolves the problem of suffering. Sin is supposedly paid for with the sacrifice of life. They've been caught in the distraction and promise of a fiction.


Preventing suffering does nothing to make the suffering which has already occurred better. For anyone who has suffered, the world is still just as bad as it ever was. Suffering is still unresolved where it counts.

The point was that it is lack of meaning that purportedly causes suffering; and I proposed that lack of meaning is a pseudo-problem...because there is no lack of meaning. Solutions are not pseudo because suffering overwhelms them, but because the problems they purport to solve are pseudo. Or else the purported solution is thought to consist in solving a puzzle for the intellect; when the problem itself is not, and cannot be properly understood to be, merely a puzzle for the intellect.

Whether suffering (understood as being the attachment to pain) is caused by lack of meaning or by inappropriate projection of meaning doesn't matter. Suffering is not a problem to be solved by thinking about it; but to be dissolved by letting go of attachment to it. Zappfe, judging from what little I have read of him, is woefully attached to his suffering in my view; and he, like Cioran, Schopenhauer and others of their ilk, seems to positively revel in it.

Your understanding of the meaning of Jesus, and the Christ, is inadequate and somewhat sad, but we all limit ourselves in the ways that suit us, I guess.

However, your justification does in fact lead to suffering, whether you mitigate it with other explanations or not, that is simply a fact- baby w/bathwater, splinters, and all other justifications aside. Mine effectively, whether too heavy-handed or not, prevents it. That again, is a fact. — schopenhauer1

Your position leads the premature cessation of all things good in life. That is also a fact. My position also prevents suffering; just not all suffering, indefinitely. I'm not against preventing suffering when it is good to do so, but I am against preventing suffering when it is bad to do so. You fail to make that vital distinction, and thereby reach the wrong conclusion.

I am not on the side of humanity, that is correct, but rather a particular instance of a potential human that has the ability to occur and thus the ability to experience the world's sufferings. — schopenhauer1

You believe that you are on their side. I will grant you that much.

Whether or not good is also in the world matters not to that which never was. — schopenhauer1

I find that comment amusing, since it is a redundant line of attack. It obviously works both ways, since, equally, whether or not suffering is in the world matters not to that which never was. But, perhaps more importantly, it fails to address the important counterfactual point that there would have been someone if your proposal had not have been enacted. That amounts to lost potential, and is a huge downside to your position.

Even if they go about exclaiming life's greatness retroactively, this does not have any ethical implications where it does seem true that preventing suffering would be ethical. — schopenhauer1

It might seem that way to you, but most people who think it through are able to realise that indiscriminately preventing suffering at such great cost would be far from ideal and cannot realistically be achieved, whereas a life worth living is ideal and can realistically be achieved.

No one usually feels sympathy for that which might have existed but did not get to experience joy. People are more likely to feel sympathy for the suffering that one would experience than the deprived joy that they may not. — schopenhauer1

If most people don't usually feel sympathy for that which might have existed, but did not get to experience joy, it is because that is an unusual situation to find yourself in. But for those who are unfortunate enough to have suffered as a result of a miscarriage or infertility, then the thought of what might have existed, but did not get to experience joy, can be devastating.

But I think that it was unwise of you to appeal to how people usually feel, because I will win hands down. How do people usually feel about premature extinction or ruling out the option of having children?