Hume is unique among philosophers in being more understandable himself than through any of his commentators. Just read Hume. Not that there's any shortage of folks discussing him.

And here's a little sideshow.

Hume is unique among philosophers in being more understandable himself than through any of his commentators. Just read Hume. Not that there's any shortage of folks discussing him.

And here's a little sideshow. — unenlightened

That's great resource links for David Hume studies. Thank you.

Thank you for the links. But do you have any links for people who are critical of Hume? I've only started reading him and I'm unimpressed. Were people in his day truly unaware of kinetic energy and the cause and effect of one billiard ball hitting another? Look at this quote:

“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connextion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."

All of science is based on cause and effect. What am I missing here?

Were people in his day truly unaware of kinetic energy and the cause and effect of one billiard ball hitting another? — Ron Cram

Hume was writing at a time shortly after Newton, when Newton and his theories had the status of the Beatles and their works - so Hume and the people for whom he was writing not only knew about Newton's mechanics but they were front of mind.

Hume's point was that people were mistaking a scientific theory that at base is simply a mathematical model for predicting future observations, for a metaphysical claim about the fundamental nature of things. The metaphysical claims, such as notions of 'cause', are interpretations of the theory of mechanics, not a part of it, and no end of confusion arises from confusing the two. Hume did his best to clarify the distinction, but human nature is incorrigible and people continued then, as they do now, to confuse metaphysics with physics.

I studied Hume under David Stove, who drew attention to the famous concluding paragraph of the Treatise:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

But, he would ask - if you take a copy of Hume's treatise in hand, and ask the question: 'does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number? Experimental reasoning concerning....fact and existence'? - in fact, it does not. So Hume's book typifies the fundamental problem with the positivism it was to give rise to: it falls victim to it's own critique. Comparing it to the mythical uroboros, the snake that swallows itself, 'the hardest part', Stove would say 'is always the last bite'.

Thank you for your reply. It was partially helpful. Try as I might, I cannot think of billiard balls and cause and effect without thinking of them in terms of physics and not metaphysics.

And if the answer derived from metaphysics is different from the answer derived from physics, which do you think we should accept?

Thank you for the links. I've only just glanced at the first one but it seems very interesting and worthwhile. I understand Hume to be saying that causation may exist but causation cannot be observed. That claim is exactly the kind of idiocy that I find so appalling among certain philosophers. When Mike Trout hits a home run, the ball makes a dramatic change of direction and increases in speed. That causation is highly observable.

And it’s very easy to observe cause and effect relationships when doing experiments with electricity. If you turn a light switch on and the light comes on, Hume might reply that we are simply observing an association. But if I tell him I’m going to turn the light on and off to the time of a song he knows, he might be more inclined to agree that the switch is controlling the light. But if his skepticism in the cause and effect persists, I know of one way to persuade him. I would sever the electrical wire connecting the switch to the light bulb so that the switch no longer works. If he is willing to hold the wires together, the switch works again. To explain the power of electricity, he only needs to hold one wire in one hand and the other wire in the other hand. Now the current flows through his body, completes the circuit and the light bulb lights up once again. Cause and effect is observable through experiment.

That's funny!

And if the answer derived from metaphysics is different from the answer derived from physics, which do you think we should accept?

We don't have to choose between them. They are different because they deal with different subject matter. Physics deals with predictions of future observations. Metaphysics deals with ontological claims.

We can accept neither, both or just one without contradiction. They cannot conflict.

However I would suggest that it is sensible to accept physics, as one cannot negotiate this world effectively without it. Whether to also accept metaphysical claims, and if so which ones, is much more individual.

It's an interesting demonstration of the extent to which philosophy allows of different interpretations that while you and I both have an affinity for the mystical, you see Hume as discouraging of it and I see him as encouraging of it.

"They are different because they deal with different subject matter. Physics deals with predictions of future observations. Metaphysics deals with ontological claims.

That's an interesting claim, but I don't think it is one Hume would agree with it. Hume was interested in making predictions. He wrote:

"But were the power of energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning."

We can know that a baseball hit on a certain launch angle at a threshhold velocity will go over the fence for a homerun. Hume seems to be denying the possibility of exactly this kind of prediction.

For the life of me, I cannot see why people respect Hume and his comments on cause and effect.

We can know that a baseball hit on a certain launch angle at a threshhold velocity will go over the fence for a homerun. Hume seems to be denying the possibility of exactly this kind of prediction.

Hume would doubt that we could know that. The doubt would rest on his observation of the problem of induction, which is related to this cause and effect issue, but not exactly the same.

Even if we sidestep the problem of induction by taking a principle of uniformity of nature as axiomatic, Hume's quote above stands because, without experience of bats and balls, we would have no reason to suppose that a bat hitting a ball would culminate in the ball travelling a long way. Newton's mechanics, which is the essential backdrop for an appreciation of Hume, was founded on empirical observation.

Hume was not denying the possibility of making predictions. Rather he highlighted that (1) predictions are based on past experience and (2) no matter how large a volume of past experience we have, the prediction cannot be made with certainty because of the problem of induction.

Yes, Hume would doubt that. And it's ridiculous. There is no insurmountable problem with induction. Induction is the basis of science. One would think that with Newton's work in view that Hume would not make such silly mistakes.

Perhaps more importantly to our conversation, Hume is clearly discussing cause and effect with respect to making predictions. He's wrong in denying the possibility of predictions. And he's demonstrably wrong as science makes these predictions consistently.

Once again, I have to say that I have no idea why Hume has the respect of some philosophers. He doesn't deserve it.

I found this article online. This is exactly the kind of thing I'm looking for, but I would love to read an article critical of Hume's ridiculous attack on cause and effect.
http://articles.thephilosophyforum.com/the-argument-for-indirect-realism

see him as encouraging of it. — andrewk

didn’t have a mystical bone in his body. Thomas Nagel put him forward as an exemplar of ‘serene indifference to the spiritual’.

http://alisongopnik.com/Papers_Alison/Gopnik_HumeStudies_withTOC.pdf

One would think that with Newton's work in view that Hume would not make such silly mistakes. — Ron Cram

How fortunate for us then, that you have at last arrived at our forum to point them out to us.

Hume's significance is missed entirely if it is not recognized that the argument against induction ultimately resolves into in question of modality - that is, necessity and contingency. What Hume questioned was not 'cause and effect' (whatever that would even mean), but the modality of the connection between both: he denied - and rightly so - that the connection between cause and effect has the status of logical necessity. This is why Hume is rightly regarded as an empiricist: any connection between cause and effect must be 'extra-logical', it cannot rely on (formal) logic alone, but must be grounded in something 'wordly'. Hume articulated the unbridgeable gap between logic and existence in a way that no one serious about philosophy can pass over.

Any discussion - including the ones here - that do not take the question of modality into account when discussing Hume's challenge to induction ought to be committed to the flames.

Incidentally, Kant is where you go after Hume; if you're looking for a first step in response to Hume, Kant - and the entirety of transcendental philosophy - is the best place to go.

What Hume questioned was not 'cause and effect' (whatever that would even mean), but the modality of the connection between both: he denied - and rightly so - that the connection between cause and effect has the status of logical necessity. This is why Hume is rightly regarded as an empiricist: any connection between cause and effect must be 'extra-logical', it cannot rely on (formal) logic alone, but must be grounded in something 'wordly'. Hume articulated the unbridgeable gap between logic and existence in a way that no one serious about philosophy can pass over.

When I read this I think "This is exactly the kind of boil that must be lanced!" Cause and effect has a logical necessity because it has a physical necessity. At a minimum- if logic doesn't apply to the physical world, then it is worthless. When Mike Trout swings the bat and hits a pitched ball, the ball changes direction and velocity. The bat coming into contact with the ball is the cause of that effect. If Hume wants something 'wordly' then someone needs to introduce him to the idea of a transfer of kinetic energy. Hume's worthless diatribe against physics in the name of metaphysics cannot be defended.

I haven't read enough of Kant to analyze him. I know that he said Hume caused him to awake from his dogmatic slumber, but I cannot tell you if Kant ever got on the right track.

So this article you have linked is less helpful. It simply accepts Hume's statements as if he were making sense. Here's a quote from your article:

Hume shows that experience does not tell us much. Of two events, A and B, we say that A causes B when the two always occur together, that is, are constantly conjoined. Whenever we find A, we also find B, and we have a certainty that this conjunction will continue to happen. Once we realize that “A must bring about B” is tantamount merely to “Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A”, then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity.

This is, of course, nonsense. We know much more than just "the two always occur together." Taking the baseball example I've been using for the transfer of kinetic energy, we can experience this transfer in different ways. We can observe Mike Trout hit the baseball over the fence. We could also put our hand in the path of the bat as it is swinging. Of course, we suffer some broken bones but we will not have any misunderstanding of what caused the bones to break. It was obviously the transfer of kinetic energy from the bat to the hand. We are not limited to this "constant conjunction" Hume mentions. Philosophers are allowed to use more than one of our senses. We are allowed to think for ourselves. And I think David Hume is nothing but an anal fissure.

Cause and effect has a logical necessity because it has a physical necessity. — Ron Cram

At best this is a confused statement, at worst a meaningless one. It is clear what logical necessity is. It is supremely unclear what 'physical necessity' is, or how it relates to either logic or cause and effect.

"Logical necessity" can have several meanings. It could mean that a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Or, it could relate to modal logic as "a transfer of kinetic energy will cause something" in every possible world. I do not use it in this second sense. Rather, a transfer of kinetic energy will always have an effect in our world as surely as the fact a valid conclusion follows from the premises.

Rather, a transfer of kinetic energy will always have an effect in our world as surely as the fact a valid conclusion follows from the premises. — Ron Cram

And presumably you can present an argument for this assertion?

I don't need an argument. I use induction to make a valid inference. Induction can only be overturned by induction. You are welcome to attempt to prove me wrong. If you don't wish to take the assignment, I don't blame you. To attempt to do so would be a fool's errand and would overturn all of science and we should have to go back to living in caves.

But the status of inference is just what is in question. Begging the question does not solve it.

It's also worth mentioning that causality in nature is supremely differential: one can modulate the effects of causes by all sorts of means - score one for empiricism. Were cause and effect to have the force of logical necessity, both science and nature would be much poorer for it. Those who think Hume stands against science know neither much of science nor Hume.

I'm tempted to give you two different answers here. The first goes like this:

I'm not willing to debate the validity of induction. Induction works. If it didn't, we would still be living in caves. If you think a particular induction is wrong. that's certainly understandable. All you must do is show by induction that a particular induction is wrong.

But since we are discussing philosophy, perhaps I should go with my second response:

I'm working to develop a livable epistemology. Virtue epistemology attempts to answer the Gettier problem but it isn't apt (meaning it's unwleldy and difficult to use on a daily basis). I'm sensitive to the charge that all human thinking should not be based on presuppositions because that makes all human thinking circular. My new epistemology is built on the concept of the testable hypothesis. The proposition "My senses are basically reliable" is a testable hypothesis and a good starting point for a livable epistemology. My sense of vision can be tested by my sense of touch, etc. The answer is yes, my senses are basically reliable. The idea that induction is basically reliable is also a testable hypothesis. Are all inductions going to be correct? No. But inductions can be used to test other inductions until we come to a satisfactory level of certainty or probability about truth. If one wishes to challenge a particular induction, they must do so using induction. Trying to use deduction to challenge induction is a category error.

I'm not willing to debate the validity of induction. — Ron Cram

Then you're not willing to debate Hume. Which is fine, so long as this is acknowledged.

I'm working developing a livable epistemology. Virtue epistemology attempts to answer the Gettier problem but it isn't apt (meaning it's unwleldy and difficult to use on a daily basis). I'm sensitive to the charge that all human thinking should not be based on presuppositions because that makes all human thinking circular. My new epistemology is built on the concept of the testable hypothesis. The proposition "My senses are basically reliable" is a testable hypothesis and a good starting point for a livable epistemology. My sense of vision can be tested by my sense of touch, etc. The answer is yes, my senses are basically reliable. The idea that induction is basically reliable is also a testable hypothesis. Are all inductions going to be correct? No. But inductions can be used to test other inductions until we come to a satisfactory level of certainty or probability about truth. If one wishes to challenge a particular induction, they must do so using induction. Trying to use deduction to challenge induction is a category error. — Ron Cram

You have more in common with Hume than you might think, then. Like him, you seem to want to hew to a more anti-foundationalist way of thinking about the world. Hume often invokes incredulity (and a bizarre kind of anger) on account of his seeming radicality; which is unfortunate because Hume is a far more pragmatic, cautious philosopher than people give him credit for.

It's also worth mentioning that causality in nature is supremely differential: one can modulate the effects of causes by all sorts of means - score one for empiricism.

I'm guessing here, but using the baseball example I'm guessing you are talking about things like how wind might impact the ball hit by Mike Trout. Yes, that's true. The wind can make the ball go a longer or shorter distance and this is measurable. But it doesn't change the fact that the cause of the effect of the ball's change of direction and velocity is observable and well understood.

Were cause and effect to have the force of logical necessity, both science and nature would be much poorer for it. Those who think Hume stands against science know neither much of science nor Hume.

Hume disagreed with Newton on many things. But Newton was correct, not Hume. Let me give you a short quote from the paper "Hume's Attack on Newton's Philosophy":

"Thus, my claim is not that Newton did not figure importantly in Hume’s philosophy, but, instead, that Hume’s project is in many respects more hostile to Newton’s achievements – as available to well-informed eighteenth-century readers – than many recent interpreters have realized." http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5382/

Again, Newton was right. Hume was philosophically motivated and wrong.

Saying that Hume and I have the same attitude doesn't add much to the conversation. Our attitudes aren't important, correctness is. I do want to debate Hume's mistreatment of induction and his attack on Newton. Make no mistake, Newton stands for science.

But I'm also eager to learn why people still hold Hume in high regard when he is so obviously wrong and so obviously anti-science.

Again, Newton was right. Hume was philosophically motivated and wrong. — Ron Cram

But Hume was not wrong. You've all but admitted that short of begging the question, you can't even address Hume's problem. And Newton's picture of the world is anything but 'right' in any nuanced sense of the term. His linear conception of cause and effect is incredibly artificial, and is scientifically useful within only very narrow parameters. Like I said, it takes a poor grasp of both science and Hume to make the conclusions you do.