This seems to be raising a kind of 'Sorites' problem. If we wanted to say that there could be an alternative France in another possible world, exactly what characteristics would it need to have in order to qualify as being a France at all? — John

Mongrel is right that it is a matter of stipulation whether or not this alternative France is or isn't France. Actually, merely calling it an alternative France, as TGW suggested, give the game away, and reveals that it's still France that you are purportedly talking about, albeit France has it could have been, could be, or could become. This stipulation merely concerns the 'numerical identity' of the possible item that you are considering with the actual item. You are stipulating that it is indeed France that you purport to be talking about. It is an altogether different set of stipulations that we, as users of a shared language, are making when we specify the identity and individuation criteria that attach to the general concept that France necessarily falls under (i.e. the 'sortal concept'). Those two quite different stipulations can rub against each other. For instance if you are talking about France as it would be if mankind hadn't evolved from apes at all, then you purport to be talking about France, but you are identifying it with a geographical region, maybe, where the conditions of France's existence as a country aren't fulfilled. Hence you aren't talking about a genuine possibility at all, or you are misusing language. You are using "France" to denote a geographical area, something that isn't the same as the country that may occupy this area at some point in time. However, when you are talking about France not having Paris as its capital, you are contemplating a possibility, historical and/or metaphysical, that doesn't rub against any norm regarding the general concepts that France necessarily falls under. So this is a genuine and unproblematical possibility.

However, when you are talking about France not having Paris as its capital, you are contemplating a possibility, historical and/or metaphysical, that doesn't rub against any norm regarding the general concepts that France necessarily falls under. So this is a genuine and unproblematical possibility. — Pierre-Normand

More Pascal, Pierre. You're making up categories of possibility to cover over the underlying ambiguity.

Paris being the capital of France is contingent IFF you stipulate it as such. — Mongrel

If you are going to stipulate that some accidental properties of France are essential to it, then it isn't France anymore that you are talking about, but, maybe, some other entity that you wish to call "France". It is true that, given the already established norms that govern the use of the word France, some of its (so called) essential properties (e.g. its being some sort of a nation state) being indeed essential to is is a matter of stipulation. Those stipulations fix (part of) the sense of the name. I don't see having Paris as its capital being any part of it.

More generally, the equation that you seem to be attempting between (1) some property P being essential to X and, (2) P being stipulated to be essential to X, doesn't hold for Kripke. It may be essential to X being a sample of water that it be composed of H2O, and this being a matter of empirical discovery rather than stipulation. Likewise with Joe being the son of Sue and Tom. Neither Joe, nor anyone, may know who Joe's natural parents are, and yet know that whoever they are, Joe having them as parents is necessary.

More Pascal, Pierre. You're making up categories of possibility to cover over the underlying ambiguity. — Mongrel

It's not a different category. France could possibly have had another capital city than Paris just in the same sense (quite plain and uncontroversial) that Kurt Gödel could possibly not have been the author of the incompleteness theorems.

The idea that whether a property of an individual is essential or not is stipulated is not found in Kripke's works.

If you are going to stipulate that some accidental properties of France are essential to it, then it isn't France anymore that you are talking about, but, maybe, some other entity that you wish to call "France". — Pierre-Normand

Try this:

I wonder what would have happened if Napolean hadn't lost at Waterloo.

In the process of pondering this, I have conjured up some number of possible worlds, one of which is the actual world. In every one of them, the capital of France is... which ever city is was when Napolean was alive. Let's say I'm not sure. I look it up. It was Paris.

In all of my possible worlds, Paris is always the capital of France. Over the range of these possibilities, Paris being the capital of France is necessary. But Napolean's victory isn't.

But then I wonder, what if Napolean had lost two weeks later than he did. Now Napolean's victory is necessary across all my worlds, but the timing of it isn't.

See?

The idea that whether a property of an individual is essential or not is stipulated is not found in Kripke's works. — The Great Whatever

Read the very passage you mentioned earlier.

Try this:

I wonder what would have happened if Napolean hadn't lost at Waterloo.

In the process of pondering this, I have conjured up some number of possible worlds, one of which is the actual world. In every one of them, the capital of France is... which ever city is was when Napolean was alive. Let's say I'm not sure. I look it up. It was Paris.

In all of my possible worlds, Paris is always the capital of France. Over the range of these possibilities, Paris being the capital of France is necessary. But Napolean's victory isn't.

But then I wonder, what if Napolean had lost two weeks later than he did. Now Napolean's victory is necessary across all my worlds, but the timing of it isn't. — Mongrel

The possibility of Napoleon having won at Waterloo has little bearing on the possibility of Paris not being the capital of France at that time. Further, you can't make a contingent proposition necessary merely through restricting your attention to possible worlds where this proposition is true. A proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds. If you stipulate from the get go that you are restricting your attention to only those possible worlds where it is true, you hardly have shown that the proposition is necessarily true -- only that is is true wherever it is true!

If you are going to consider possible worlds in which Napoleon won at Waterloo, and restrict your attention to possible worlds where historical circumstances aren't so far off from actual circumstances that Paris wouldn't be France's capital, then, fine, you can do that, but you hardly would have shown (and not even stipulated) that France necessarily has Paris as its capital. You've merely stated that this far off historical possibility, and what other propositions can or can't be conjoined with this possible state of affairs, don't interest you.

About Nixon? That's not even on the subject.

The issue has more to do with the inadequacies of the a priori/posteriori and analytical/synthetic understanding of knowledge. Rather than types of knowledge, what the are trying to distinguish is different sorts of meaning-- a state of world (posteriori) compared to a logical truth (priori), an contingent act of language (synthetic) in contrast to a truth not bound to what is spoken or done in the world (analytical).

In each case, the priori/posteriori and analytical/synthetic understanding is meant to act as reduction of the meaning involved, such that we know it significance to knowledge. Such as, for example, that 2+2=4 is a logical truth known by definition while a presence of a elephant is known by observing the world. In the context of only asking about different types of knowledge, this appears to work because we are only considering ideas we already have. Our role in knowing is obscured.

Problems arise in a priori/posteriori and analytical/synthetic account of knowledge when we start to consider ourselves. Consider the synthetic posteriori of "There's an elephant in the room." According to it's distinction, I would know it by observing the presence of an elephant in the room. I don't need any sort of (necessary) a priori logical concept and cannot know about the elephant unless I've observed it.

Yet, where is my experience of the elephant and my language? In observing the elephant, I have not encountered either. How then can my knowledge of the elephant be synthetic posteriori? I'm relying on concepts and language which are not observed to know about the elephant. Without knowing what I saw was necessarily an elephant, I would not be able to think or say what I observed was an elephant at all. To know a posteriori requires a priori.

The analytical/synthetic discintion also collapses. If I was the only one speaking English, what I observed would still be an elephant. In my English, it is necessarily an elephant, no matter how anyone else speaks, how English changes or if my language is never spoken anywhere else. My concept of elephant and so my knowledge of what I observe is analytic-- it's known by definition in my language.

Now circle completes. If any posteriori is known by an analytic a priori (e.g. the concept of an elephant in the time and space in question), I don't even need to observe it to know about it. Let's say on the day before observing the elephant, I thought: "There will be an elephant in that room tomorrow." I have knowledge of the elephant in the room prior to (or even without) observing it. Knowledge about a state of the world does not require observation or direct experience at all.

Yet, knowledge itself is a state of the world. To know about the elephant, I have to exist in a certain way. I must have the concept of the elephant, in my language (as opposed any other language). In my life I must have learnt this language and about the object of which it speaks. Despite my concepts being analytic a priori, they are only given in the synthetic.

I could have been different. I might have spoken differently, known differently or not existed at all. What I am and the content of the world is not necessary. So despite any instance of knowledge being formed by an analytic a priori, they are all synthetic. At anytime, we may understand differently. This is even true of any analytic a priori knowledge-- we could all wake up tomorrow and understand 2+2=5.

"Paris" might by the capital of France now, and is knowledge formed by an analytic a priori concept, but tomorrow its capital might be Nice, if our language and conceptual practices were to alter in the right way.

While Paris is necessarily the capital of France, it is only so until Paris ceases to be the capital of France.

A proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds. If you stipulate from the get go that you are restricting your attention to only those possible worlds where it is true, you hardly have shown that the proposition is necessarily true -- only that is is true wherever it is true! — Pierre-Normand

Isn't that the definition of necessity though-- that there is no other possibility in the context?

Consider the proposition: "In our world, the capital of France is Paris." Is this true of our world? If so, how exactly are other possible worlds relevant? Why is Paris being true in all possible worlds a requirement if we are only talking about our own actual world? How would it even make sense to say necessity required the city of one possible world to be present in any possible world? Our Paris cannot be the Paris of another world.

To say that Paris is necessarily the capital of France in our world, we only need the truth that Paris is the capital of France in our world.

Necessity isn't the absence of possibility, just possibility's irrelevance. The capital of France isn't Paris because an alternative cannot occur. It's Paris because, at the moment, that is what is true of the capital of France.

Isn't that the definition of necessity though-- that there is no other possibility in the context? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Sure, something is necessarily true iff it can't possibly be false, and it is possibly true iff it isn't necessarily false. If "the context" defines the scope of generality, then this is just to say that generalized necessity is the dual of generalized possibility. 'Possibly' and 'necessarily' can thus be interdefined with the use of the negation operator. But if "the context" under consideration is the generalized conditions under which P is true, then saying that P is necessarily true in that context just is the tautological statement that P is true whenever P is true. That's not very philosophically interesting.

Consider the proposition: "In our world, the capital of France is Paris." Is this true of our world? If so, how exactly are other possible worlds relevant?

They are relevant to the evaluation of the modality of the statement, not to the evaluation of its truth. False propositions can not be necessary (since there is a possible world, namely the actual world, where they are false) but true propositions can be either necessarily true or contingently true. They are contingently true if there is a possible world where they are false, which is just to say that, while true, they possibly could have been false.

Why is Paris being true in all possible worlds a requirement if we are only talking about our own actual world?

Because when we are talking about the modality of the proposition -- its being necessary, possible or impossible -- and not just talking about its truth, then we are also talking about the world as it could or couldn't possibly be, and not just about the world as it is.

How would it even make sense to say necessity required the city of one possible world to be present in any possible world? Our Paris cannot be the Paris of another world.

'Possible worlds' aren't other worlds. It's just a fancy name for ways the world either is (actually) or could have been (counterfactually). It's a device for formalizing semantic theories of modal statements.

To say that Paris is necessarily the capital of France in our world, we only need the truth that Paris is the capital of France in our world.

Everything necessarily is, in the actual world, as it is in the actual world. This tautology says nothing about something being necessary or contingent simpliciter. Something isn't necessarily true if the world could have been such that it is false. This is what is meant when we say that there is a possible world in which (or at which, as it is usually expressed in the technical literature) it is false.

Further, you can't make a contingent proposition necessary merely through restricting your attention to possible worlds where this proposition is true. A proposition is necessarily true iff it is true at all possible worlds. If you stipulate from the get go that you are restricting your attention to only those possible worlds where it is true, you hardly have shown that the proposition is necessarily true -- only that is is true wherever it is true! — Pierre-Normand

Ok. Maybe I totally misunderstood. But I'm failing to see how my explanation doesn't follow.

Let's look at an example Soames considers. If Saul Kripke exists, he's human. We're going to see if this statement is necessarily true. The fact that the statement starts with "if" means we can judge it across all possible worlds. It works as necessary because we consider humanity to be essential to Kripke.

Now look at:

Karen said Paris is the capital of France.

To understand any proposition, you must examine context of utterance. On examination, we determine that Karen is talking about the actual France. So Karen could be understood to be saying:

In all possible worlds that contain the actual France, the capital of France is Paris.

And that is necessarily true. Why not?

Because when we are talking about the modality of the proposition -- its being necessary, possible or impossible -- and not just talking about its truth, then we are also talking about the world as it could or couldn't possibly be, and not just about the world as it is. — Pierre-Normand

Sorry.. just saw this. I think what you aren't considering is that you aren't free to choose the meaning of a statement. You have to bind yourself to the intentions of the speaker. This is why there are multiple ways to handle the same sentence:

Paris is the capital of France.

You have to consider how the speaker means "France." That's why it isn't necessarily true that the above sentence is contingently true. It could be necessarily true... if the speaker's intentions make it so.

Because when we are talking about the modality of the proposition -- its being necessary, possible or impossible -- and not just talking about its truth, then we are also talking about the world as it could or couldn't possibly be, and not just about the world as it is. — Pierre-Normand

For me this is the exact problem. If we were talking about Paris in our world, then we talking about what it is, not what it might have been or some other world entirely. To talk about our Paris is to exclude all other possibilities and worlds. Modality is what we don't want to talk about if we wish to understand the meaning of our Paris-- I don't want to know if Paris is the capital in some alternate history. I don't want to know if Paris can be a capital or not in some other place. I don't even want to know if Paris can be the capital of France in our world.

Modality doesn't tell me anything. Sure we can talk about it. Paris could be the capital of France in our world, but it leaves out all relevant information. If I say Paris might (or might not) be the capital (which is true), I don't have any information on whether I should treat it as a such. If someone says to me, "Go pick up the delivery in the capital of France," I'm stuck guessing. Paris might be the capital. It might not be the capital. Whether I can make the pick-up is down to a toss up. Is the Paris the capital of France? I have no idea. I'll only be able to tell with the addition of "Paris is the capital of France."

There is an ideality at play within the mainstream understanding of modality. Supposedly, if we can say "Paris being the capital" is a necessary true (in all possible worlds), then we have what we need to know Paris is the capital, otherwise it all still up in the air.

But this analysis ignores how Paris is of our world. Our Paris cannot be true in all possible worlds. By identity, any other Paris, whether a concept in modal analysis or an alternate world, is a different city. For Paris to the capital in all possible worlds is impossible. Not merely because there might be different states, but rather because our Paris in necessarily tied to our world. To say "Paris is (not) the capital in all possible worlds" or "Paris might be the capital" gets us nowhere. We can't draw what is true about the world from modality-- is the proposition "Paris is the capital of France" true? We don't still know. We won't until we learn whether Paris is the capital.

'Possible worlds' aren't other worlds. It's just a fancy name for ways the world either is (actually) or could have been (counterfactually). It's a device for formalizing semantic theories of modal statements. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. They're all a logical construction-- even the possibility of our own world. In our world, it is true the Paris may or may not be the Capital of France. This possible world is not actual. It's only a logical concept which indicates which states might be actual.

Mainstream modal analysis fails so often because it treats actuality like this possibility. People get caught in the trap of thinking knowing the possible world gives knowledge of the actual world. Everyone starts tripping up over how Paris could (or could not) be the capital of France rather than paying attention whether it is.

Everything necessarily is, in the actual world, as it is in the actual world. This tautology says nothing about something being necessary or contingent simpliciter. Something isn't necessarily true if the world could have been such that it is false. This is what is meant when we say that there is a possible world in which (or at which, as it is usually expressed in the technical literature) it is false. — Pierre-Normand

I know, but that's sort of the point. What use is knowing necessary or contingent simpliciter if our subject is the actual world? Since modality is only a logical construction, it can't help us if we want to know something about the actual world. All it can do is tell us about the possible one-- e.g. no short, tall, fire snowmen who are made of only sand. We can use it to disregard the existence of contradictory or incoherent states, but that's it. If is's not necessary by logic, the possible world can't make comment. So why exactly are we trying to use it to tell whether or not Paris is the capital of France in the actual world?

That's not very philosophically interesting. — Pierre-Normand

I think it's the most philosophically interesting relation to modality. It represents the logic a describing the world. For us to say, logically, the capital of France is Paris, we need to now about Paris in our world. If I am to know where to pick-up the delivery, what I need to know is that Paris is the capital of France in the actual world. Far from being trivial, it points out the most important thing about knowledge: if it's of the actual world, then it must be knowledge of the actual world. We can't get there with modality. Possible worlds won't tell us anything about the actual world.

The supposed problems surrounding naming and reference stem from ignoring what the speaker intends with language.

Statements are mistaken to have a problem referencing if they are untrue (e.g. "Willow who is president of the US," talking about me) when that has no impact on reference. Just because I'm not US president, doesn't mean someone can't intend that I am. I can be referenced in untrue statements.

Furthermore, the true statement ( "Obama is the present of the US, not Willow" ) is a language used when someone points out the falsehood about me. The names "Obama" and "Willow" are used with meaning and reference to the world in this context.

To imagine either "Obama" and "Willow" as blank slates names is to miss the entire point of both statements and what each person is talking about.

To imagine either "Obama" and "Willow" as blank slates names is to miss the entire point of both statements and what each person is talking about. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree.

Let's look at an example Soames considers. If Saul Kripke exists, he's human. We're going to see if this statement is necessarily true. The fact that the statement starts with "if" means we can judge it across all possible worlds. It works as necessary because we consider humanity to be essential to Kripke. — Mongrel

Sure. Kripke is necessarily human iff he's human in all the possible worlds in which he exists. The possible worlds in which Kripke doesn't exist aren't relevant to the evaluation of this de re modal claim.

Now look at:

Karen said Paris is the capital of France.

To understand any proposition, you must examine context of utterance. On examination, we determine that Karen is talking about the actual France. So Karen could be understood to be saying:

In all possible worlds that contain the actual France, the capital of France is Paris.

And that is necessarily true. Why not?

In that case you aren't evaluating the de re modal claim, regarding Paris (as we ordinarily talk about it), that it is necessarily the capital of France (as we ordinarily talk about it). Neither are you evaluating the different de re modal claim, regarding France (as we ordinarily talk about it), that it necessarily has Paris (as we ordinarily talk about it) as its capital. Under the ordinary meanings of "Paris" or "France", as those words are normally used in English, neither of those de re necessities hold. Karen is free, for sure, to conjure up new meanings for those words such that one or both of those sorts of de re necessities would be true regarding the different objects -- which may coincide in respect of all their actual properties with France and Paris in the actual world) -- that she means to designate with the words "France" and "Paris", respectively. If the objects A and B have different de re modal properties, then they are two different objects, as follows from Leibniz law of indiscernability of identicals, under Kripke's (or Ruth Barcan Marcus') quite reasonable modal interpretation of this law.

Nothing about this shows that the truth of modal propositions depends on the meaning of the terms that we use to designate the objects those propositions are propositions about. It rather illustrates the rather humdrum fact that what propositions are expressed by our linguistic utterances depends on the meanings (either usual, reasonably intended, or merely stipulated for the occasion) of the words that we use to express them. Hence, for instance it is true of Kurt Gödel, but merely contingent, that he has authored the incompleteness theorems. However, someone could utter the sentence "Kurt Gödel is the author of the incompleteness theorems" meaning it is such a way that it is necessarily true as she means it (which could be a misuse of language, where what is said doesn't coincide with what is meant). This could be the case is she meant to be using "Kurt Gödel" as a descriptive name (and made it clear that that is what she meant to be doing). She would thus express a de dicto necessity that has no bearing whatsoever on the de re necessity that we quite reasonably deny when we claim that it is (metaphysically) possible that Kurt Gödel would not have authored the incompleteness theorems.

Said still differently: proper names rigidly designate, but it is of course required in order that an expression normally used as a proper name (e.g. "Kurt Gödel") rigidly designate that whoever is using this expression indeed be using it as the proper name which it is (relying on its already established use in her linguistic community) and not as something else (e.g. as shorthand for a descriptive phrase)!

Karen is free, for sure, to conjure up new meanings for those words such that one or both of those sorts of de re necessities would be true regarding the different objects -- which may coincide in respect of all their actual properties with France and Paris in the actual world) -- that she means to designate with the words "France" and "Paris", respectively. — Pierre-Normand

Right. I assume that Kripke means to address actual utterances because he specifically mentions the speech of average people. I also assume that it's understood that context of utterance always has to be considered when discussing ordinary language use.

So the meaning of a rigid designator can't be known in any other way than by attending to how it's being used in a particular speech act. You can't just say..." well it ordinarily means X." Agree?

Napoleon seriously considered Lyon as his capital. Merde.

I think we can wrap this up with agreement that Kripke left the relationship between the designator and designatum unclear. I shouldn't fill in that blank with an answer and present it as the correct way to look at it... even if my opponent doesn't have a better plan. So yea... sorry about that.

For instance if you are talking about France as it would be if mankind hadn't evolved from apes at all, then you purport to be talking about France, but you are identifying it with a geographical region, maybe, where the conditions of France's existence as a country aren't fulfilled. Hence you aren't talking about a genuine possibility at all, or you are misusing language. You are using "France" to denote a geographical area, something that isn't the same as the country that may occupy this area at some point in time. However, when you are talking about France not having Paris as its capital, you are contemplating a possibility, historical and/or metaphysical, that doesn't rub against any norm regarding the general concepts that France necessarily falls under. So this is a genuine and unproblematical possibility. — Pierre-Normand

The two cases you outline here seem to be just the same kinds of cases, differing only in terms of degree. If Paris had never been the capital of some geographical region, then the entire history of that geographical region, including what that precise geographical region was called and even the language itself that was spoken there could not have been the same. So, that precise geographical region would not have been called France, and all the people born in that region would have been different than the people that have actually been born there. As you no doubt know, due to the 'butterfly effect' only one tiny detail changed will over a long period transform everything radically.

The language that would have been spoken in that geographical region would not have been the same, nor the configuration of towns,villages, cities and trade routes. So just as in the case you imagined where humans didn't evolve at all; you could not be talking about a genuine possibility in relation to France, because France is more than merely a geographical region. This seems to lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is incoherent to speak about an alternative France at all. The most we could say about any purportedly alternative France would be that it was a country in roughly the same geographical region as France, and that a language was spoken there that had some similarities with French. It could not then be meaningful to speak about Paris (because there would not have been a city with that name there in the same location as the actual Paris) in terms of not being the capital of that alternative somewhat France-like region.

The two cases you outline here seem to be just the same kinds of cases, differing only in terms of degree. If Paris had never been the capital of some geographical region, then the entire history of that geographical region, including what that precise geographical region was called and even the language itself that was spoken there could not have been the same. So, that precise geographical region would not have been called France, and all the people born in that region would have been different than the people that have actually been born there. — John

It doesn't matter how very qualitatively different France might by in counterfactual scenarios that we imagine; It still will be numerically identical to the country that we call "France" in the actual world. Numerical identity and qualitative identity are two different concepts. It also is quite irrelevant what language French citizens would speak in the counterfactual scenarios that we imagine. We stipulate what country we are talking about, and we can imagine its citizens calling their own country whatever name they like without this making it into a different country. The Japanese don't call their country "Japan"; they call it "Nihon koku". It hardly follows that the country that they call "Nihon koku" is a different country from the country that we call "Japan". It's the same country that goes under two different names in two different languages.

So the meaning of a rigid designator can't be known in any other way than by attending to how it's being used in a particular speech act. You can't just say..." well it ordinarily means X." Agree? — Mongrel

Pragmatics makes a distinction between speaker meaning and conventional meaning ("Utterer's meaning" and "timeless meaning" in Grice). For Kripke it doesn't matter. We are either considering timeless sentences that contain proper names or utterances where the speaker makes use of proper names as they are normally understood. Else you are simply changing the subject away from the use of proper names.

Pragmatics makes a distinction between speaker meaning and conventional meaning ("Utterer's meaning" and "timeless meaning" in Grice). For Kripke it doesn't matter. We are either considering timeless sentences that contain proper names or utterances where the speaker makes use of proper names as they are normally understood. Else you are simply changing the subject away from the use of proper names. — Pierre-Normand

Generally, when dealing with ordinary language use, one would look at an utterer's intention. And of course, pronouns can stand as rigid designators. There is no "normally understood" meaning to "you." It has to be gathered from the circumstances of utterance.

It appears to me to be blatantly obvious and unmistakable that Kripke is talking about ordinary language use in N+N.

But that's not the issue I was pointing to. It's sketched out well in the SEP article on rigid designators. What is the magic that attaches a rigid designator to a particular object in a possiible world? Though this may be unproblematic for you, the SEP article makes clear that it is an unresolved issue. Scott Soames follows a route involving propositions that makes a lot of intuitive sense to me.

And.. I'm not quite sure how with your having read it twice and the tons of secondary literature that you're blind to that issue. Maybe it's just a language barrier issue?

So what exactly is it that determines this "numerical identity"? What is it, that is, other than some quality or other, that makes the scenario of the 'France' where humans didn't evolve a "misuse of language" and other alternative scenarios where humans are thought as present not misuses of language?

And the issue is not about whether the inhabitants of France call it a different name than we do, but that the inbabitants of the purported alternative 'France' call it by a different name, in a different language, than the actual inhabitants of the real France do. So again what is it that makes an imagined purported alternative France numerically identical to the actual France?

So what exactly is it that determines this "numerical identity"? What is it, that is, other than some quality or other, that makes the scenario of the 'France' where humans didn't evolve a "misuse of language" and other alternative scenarios where humans are thought as present not misuses of language? — John

Numerical identity is a relation that holds between something and itself. If A and B are numerically identical, this means that "A" and "B" are two names (or definite descriptions, demonstratives or other singular referring expressions) that refer to the same thing. A country can't be numerically identical with the stretch of land that it occupies since this stretch of land existed before the country was founded (or built) and it can go on existing after the country has disappeared.

And the issue is not about whether the inhabitants of France call it a different name than we do, but that the inbabitants of the purported alternative 'France' call it by a different name, in a different language, than the actual inhabitants of the real France do. So again what is it that makes an imagined purported alternative France numerically identical to the actual France?

The question doesn't make sense. It just happens that we are talking about France as it would be in some counterfactual circumstances, and not some different country merely similar to it. Doing so makes sense inasmuch as the imagined counterfactual circumstances aren't such that France can't exist (or couldn't have existed) were they to obtain. France could still exist if its capital would move (or had moved, or had been different to begin with), but it could not exist if it never had had any inhabitants, just like a hockey team could not have existed without ever having had any player in it, although it could have remained in existence as the same team that it is while undergoing some player exchanges in the past, and just like you can remain in existence while many, or all, the molecules that make up your body are exchanged, etc.

But that's not the issue I was pointing to. It's sketched out well in the SEP article on rigid designators. What is the magic that attaches a rigid designator to a particular object in a possiible world? Though this may be unproblematic for you, the SEP article makes clear that it is an unresolved issue. Scott Soames follows a route involving propositions that makes a lot of intuitive sense to me. — Mongrel

The "magic" involved simply is stipulation. There may seem to arise a problem if you endorse some sort of modal realism (i.e. realism about possible worlds). But Kripke was quite opposed to modal realism. To talk about a possible world W such that A is red at W (while A is blue in the actual world) just is to talk about the way the world could possibly be if A were red rather than blue. Thus phrased, the question about trans-world identification doesn't arise.

Suppose you make the counterfactual claim that had your alarm clock not failed to wake you up, you would have arrived to your workplace in time (rather than being late, as was the case in the actual circumstances, let us assume). And someone asks you by what magic you know that this "you" who would have arrived at work in time would be you and not someone else. The question is nonsensical unless you are some sort of neo-Heraclitean who questions the persistence of substances through material and/or qualitative change. But that would be a different issue than the issue of trans-world identification.

Numerical identity is a relation that holds between something and itself. If A and B are numerically identical, this means that "A" and "B" are two names (or definite descriptions, demonstratives or other singular referring expressions) that refer to the same thing. A country can't be numerically identical with the stretch of land that it occupies since this stretch of land existed before the country was funded (or built) and it can go on existing after the country has disappeared. — Pierre-Normand

So then, what can a country be numerically identical with? If the so-called alternative France did not have the same history, did not begin in exactly the same way as the actual France, and the only similarities they could plausibly have, given that they evolved to have different capitals, is that they both occupy roughly the same regions in their respective worlds; and the people who existed there (who could not be the same people except at the very divergent beginnings of their respective histories) speak languages that may ( although even this seems pretty unlikely given the flow on effect a different France would have on the rest of the alternative Europe) be somewhat alike.

The question doesn't make sense. It just happens that we are talking about France as it would be in some counterfactual circumstances, and not some different country merely similar to it. Doing so makes sense inasmuch as the imagined counterfactual circumstances aren't such that France can't exist (or couldn't have existed) were they to obtain. France could still exist if its capital would move (or had moved, or had been different to begin with), but it could not exist if it never had had any inhabitants, just like a hockey team could not have existed without ever having had any player in it, although it could have remained in existence as the same team that it is while undergoing some player exchanges in the past, and just like you can remain in existence while many, or all, the molecules that make up your body are exchanged, etc.

I asked "so again what is it that makes an imagined purported alternative France numerically identical to the actual France?" but you haven't answered the question. If I had an alternative history, given that I am a more or less self-contained biological organism; I would still be recognizable as myself. But in what sense could this be the case with a so-called France that had an alternative history. It simply wouldn't be France at all, because it wouldn't have had any of the same people, or the same configuration of villages, towns and cites, or occupy exactly the same territory or speak the same language. So on the basis of what could we think that it really is an alternative France?

The basis of identity seems to be the whole history of an entity. If France changed its capital tomorrow of course it would still be France, but this would be our actual France, not some imagined so-called alternative France. In any case, my original point was that it is not possible that Paris has not been up to now the capital of France (even it is counter-factually possible that it might not have been from some point in time), and that that is not something we have to go and check as we would with some empirical propositions such as for example that the deep ocean trench is not as deep as was previously thought, or that carbon dating turns out to be a totally inaccurate method, or that water now boils at 101 degrees C, and so on. So, none of the counter-arguments offered so far have convinced me that my original point that Paris being the Capital of France is more reliant on semantics than ordinary empirical claims, claims that have nothing more to do with semantics than that they are expressed in language, does not still stand.

I asked "so again what is it that makes an imagined purported alternative France numerically identical to the actual France? [/i] but you haven't answered the question. If I had an alternative history, given that I am a more or less self-contained biological organism; I would still be recognizable as myself. But in what sense could this be the case with a so-called France that had an alternative history. It simply wouldn't be France at all, because it wouldn't have had any of the same people, or the same configuration of villages, towns and cites, or occupy exactly the same territory or speak the same language. So on the basis of what could we think that it really is an alternative France? — John

It is not a "purported alternative France" that I was talking about; it is France. France would still be France if, counterfactually, at some point in time, its history had diverged from its actual history in some inessential respects. Likewise, if you actually went to work today, you would still be the same person if you had chosen to skip work instead. Your talk about "actual France" and "alternative France" -- as if those were distinct entities -- confuses you. There is just one France being considered in respect of its actual state (or history), or possible counterfactual states (or histories).

Maybe you are an actualist. Many of your comments point in that direction. Actualists believe that whatever P is actually true is necessarily true, and whatever Q is actually false is necessarily false. Hence, anything that is possible is necessary, on that view; there is no non-actualized possibilities. But that is a rather contentious metaphysical doctrine.