The point is that in their works appear views that can be compared. Hume's alleged anti-realism and Newton's realism regarding "forces" being an obvious such view. — Πετροκότσυφας

Sure, and I just explicated that in my last post. However, I did not really see Ron Cram making any of these points. Rather, I just saw mixed up notions with regard to Hume's analysis of the foundation of cause-and-effect.

He might internalise the necessity aspect of causality but I don't think he makes it transcendental. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't know what you mean here by "internalise the necessity" but doesn't make "transcendental"? He does seem to indicate that cause and effect are indeed "custom" and "in us" rather than "out there" which opens the door for transcendental idealism. As far as having a full-blown Kantian version of this, he does not seem to provide that detailed an explanation. In other words, time/space/causality and categories of cognitively structured world are not present in his philosophy. He is more concerned, it seems, with establishing a skepticism of whether these laws are somehow "out there".

I appreciate that you are making an attempt to explain your thinking. It would improve your responses greatly if you could actually quote from Hume to support your point of view, as I have done.

I'm not here criticizing Hume's attack on induction, which has more merit than his attack on cause and effect and deserves a more detailed and nuanced response. I'm just criticizing Hume's attack on Newton's Law of Cause and Effect and his Laws of Motion.

Hume writes:
“There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavor in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.”

First of all, I disagree with Hume calling this 'metaphysics.' Even during the days of Aristotle, concepts of power, force and energy relate to physics and not metaphysics. Hume refers to 'necessary connexion' because it is impossible to establish cause and effect without a connexion between the two actions or events. This is what makes it necessary.

Hume again writes:
“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."

Let me state it again. Hume is wrong here. We are able "in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion... that binds the effect to the cause." Hume's statement is demonstrably false. Once a person has learned the nature and properties of kinetic energy and how the transfer of kinetic energy works, then one can recognize a new instance of that power at work even though they have never seen it in that setting before. A child can learn about the transfer of kinetic energy in school and will immediately recognize that cause and effect on the billiard table. Similarly, if someone has never seen electricity before, with a proper experiment he can immediately grasp that electricity is the cause of the light bulb coming on.

Our understanding of kinetic energy and electricity has nothing to do with human habit. It has to do with understanding how these forces work, the results they cause and the ability to observe this connection.

Hume does not argue that our powers of observation are so poor and untrustworthy that we cannot make observations that are true and reliable. When Hume argues against induction, he is arguing against our ability to infallibly infer the future or past based on what we observe. Hume's attack on cause and effect does not depend on his attack on induction. Rather, Hume's attack on induction depends on his attack on cause and effect.

Hume writes:
“All reasonings on matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses." Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section iv point 22.

By 'reasonings' Hume includes inferences or inductions. So, clearly, his attack on induction depends on his attack on cause and effect, not the other way around as you suppose.

Alternatively, you can also observe the transfer of kinetic energy when one billiard ball strikes another billiard ball and causes it to move. — Ron Cram

Hume's point in the 'billiard ball' example is that the cause (kinetic energy) is not actually observed, and he concludes that causation cannot be directly experienced at all. Unfortunately he focusses too much on the visual mode of perception, which is a common failing among philosophers.. 'Kinetic energy', on Hume's view, thus cannot be anything more than a merely inferential hypothesis.

The argument against this claim is that we can directly feel the force of our own bodies acting on objects and the force of objects acting on us. It is on the basis of our own experience as causal agents that we are able to conceive of the very idea of force or energy in the first place. Whitehead makes this very point in his distinction between the modes of experience: 'presentational immediacy' and 'causal efficacy'; if I remember correctly. I read somewhere Searle also making this point against Hume; but I can't remember where I read it.

Our understanding of kinetic energy and electricity has nothing to do with human habit. — Ron Cram

When billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B, must (some of) A's kinetic energy be transferred to B?

When billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B, must (some of) A's kinetic energy be transferred to B?

Yes. We can see the stationary ball move and we can hear the energy transfer. Also, if you observe a baseball bat striking a softball in a slow motion video, you can observe that transfer of energy also. The observation of transfer of kinetic energy is well established. And it must happen.

Hume's point in the 'billiard ball' example is that the cause (kinetic energy) is not actually observed,

If the ball is moving, then you are observing its kinetic energy. Evidently, this is the point Hume doesn't understand. I agree with your second paragraph.

And it must happen — Ron Cram

When did you observe this? How did you observe this?

The usual argument here is that we presume nature to be uniform, but we cannot possibly prove that. Thus laws such as those you refer to have everything to do with human habit and custom, just as Hume claims.

“There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavor in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.”

First of all, I disagree with Hume calling this 'metaphysics.' Even during the days of Aristotle, concepts of power, force and energy relate to physics and not metaphysics. Hume refers to 'necessary connexion' because it is impossible to establish cause and effect without a connexion between the two actions or events. This is what makes it necessary. — Ron Cram

This is metaphysics because we are discussing the nature of forces- what it "is". It is not simply predictions, experimentation, observation, modelling phenomena, and data collection of the physical universe (things that science does).

Hume again writes:
“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."

Let me state it again. Hume is wrong here. We are able "in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion... that binds the effect to the cause." Hume's statement is demonstrably false. Once a person has learned the nature and properties of kinetic energy and how the transfer of kinetic energy works, then one can recognize a new instance of that power at work even though they have never seen it in that setting before. A child can learn about the transfer of kinetic energy in school and will immediately recognize that cause and effect on the billiard table. Similarly, if someone has never seen electricity before, with a proper experiment he can immediately grasp that electricity is the cause of the light bulb coming on. — Ron Cram

Again here, Hume is not doubting the science of kinetic energy that we observe. He is doubting that we have any basis for how observation comes about in the first place, as you can only use past observations to justify the future which is using inductive reasoning itself to justify itself. There is no basis for why our observations should hold consistently true each new instance except by custom. Now, you may disagree with his radical empiricism, but what you must understand is Hume is discussing the epistemology of inductive reasoning (which leads to the custom of cause-and-effect), not the findings that one may have from the reasoning (that one thing is caused by another).

Your debate about causation is unwittingly just a debate about realism (laws of nature real and "out there") vs. idealism (laws of nature are in our heads).

:up:

I think if Hume was wrong in the way that Ron Cram is claiming, then nobody would remember his books. What he's casting doubt on is based on his radical empiricism i.e. we can observe that an effect is preceded by a cause, but we never actually perceive something called 'a cause'. What we perceive are invariant conjunctions of events, things that always happen in a certain sequence. But they're not bound by force of logical necessity, being of the same nature as inductive observation; there's no reason why the ball A might not simply stay still when struck by ball B instead of careening away on some occasion. It's just that we never observe that happening, so we presume it won't ever happen; but again there's no logical reason why it can't happen.

That is why Russell remarked in his chapter on Hume that Hume's scepticism seems to challenge the very grounds of scientific prediction. But it's the also true that Kant more than adequately dealt with Hume's scepticism, in fact it was Hume's treatment of causality that famously 'awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers'.

I think if Hume was wrong in the way that Ron Cram is claiming, then nobody would remember his books. What he's casting doubt on is based on his radical empiricism i.e. we can observe that an effect is preceded by a cause, but we never actually perceive something called 'a cause'. What we perceive are invariant conjunctions of events, things that always happen in a certain sequence. But they're not bound by force of logical necessity, being of the same nature as inductive observation; there's no reason why the ball A might not simply stay still when struck by ball B instead of careening away. It's just that we never observe that happening, so we presume it won't ever happen; but again there's no logical reason why it can't happen. — Wayfarer

Excellent restatement of the point I was trying to make :). Indeed, great point about not perceiving something called "a cause".

That is why Russell remarked in his chapter on Hume that Hume's scepticism seems to undercut the veracity of science itself. But it's the also true that Kant more than adequately dealt with Hume's scepticism, in fact it was Hume's treatment of causality that famously 'awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers'. — Wayfarer

I think there is more nascent Kant than people think in Hume. At certain points Hume even refers to customs and habits as instinctual, which very much points to an innate synthetic a priori categorization. I don't know why that connection isn't made much as if they are opposed to each other.

Do you have any specific quotes on Hume's view of time and space? I think the point is more subtle than you suggest. Impressions are from sense data in Hume's view and these seem to come together into habits and customs.. shorthand for internal categories, in my opinion. I don't know how empirical Hume was when he constantly reiterates that it is simply custom and not an actual reasoning "out there".

Also, Kant views time and space as a priori synthetic which was his own spin on it. Hume did not use that vocabulary, but again, I can see the nascent idea there in the idea of customs and habits.

Hume is considered empiricist basically because of his notion of impressions being from sense data. He seems to build our understanding up through these impressions into some synthetic learning process that leads to more abstract ideas. However, I think there is other times when he does seem to invoke an idea that habits are instinctual and it is not derived purely from synthetic knowledge. Or at least, there is something beyond just experience going on in the mind.

There's an SEP article on Kant's 'answer to Hume' - as SLX already pointed out, to really understand the whole issue of Hume and causation, that is to all intents the starting point for understanding Hume's critique of causation.

IN actual fact in that article, Kant also considers the early critics of Hume, some of whom echo exactly Ron Cram's argument. It's very similar to Johnson's argument against Berkeley, kicking a stone and saying 'I refute him thus'. The common-sense criticism of Hume simply says, 'common sense tells us that A causes B, and that's all there is to it.' Whereas, Kant really does understand what Hume has spotted, and then actually answers that. I won't try and abstract or summarise it, as it's virtually a semester's work to even read it.

IN actual fact in that article, Kant also considers the early critics of Hume, some of whom echo exactly Ron Cram's argument. It's very similar to Johnson's argument against Berkeley, kicking a stone and saying 'I refute him thus'. The common-sense criticism of Hume simply says, 'common sense tells us that A causes B, and that's all there is to it.' Whereas, Kant really does understand what Hume has spotted, and then actually answers that. I won't try and abstract or summarise it, as it's virtually a semester's work to even read it. — Wayfarer

Good points.

Hume stated: "At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact."

To me that is the question (in a nutshell, maybe not literally) to which Kant replied, but also leaving Hume open to the possibilities that Kant conceives.

It makes no sense to me to think that we see the kinetic energy; we see the ball moving is all.

The usual argument here is that we presume nature to be uniform, but we cannot possibly prove that. Thus laws such as those you refer to have everything to do with human habit and custom, just as Hume claims.

It is a presumption if one has limited evidence. Most people understand that proof is not absolute. Even in capital criminal cases, the prosecutor doesn't have to prove absolutely that the defendant is guilty. All that is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have that level of proof in this case. When a solid object is moving and hits another solid object, kinetic energy will be transferred. There is no reasonable basis from which to doubt that proposition.

This is not a purely mental exercise nor is it limited to our vision. We can feel the transfer of kinetic energy when our bodies are hit or when we hit a solid object. In another example I've used here, one can feel electricity move through his body and light the light bulb. The question of knowing cause and effect is not in doubt. And knowing that it will always happen that way is also not in doubt.

Hume's statement that our opinion here is based on habit and custom is simply false. We are talking about a situation in which we know the nature and properties of solid objects. If you want to know the nature of solid objects, you talk to a condensed matter physicist. It is not possible for a solid object of classical size to pass through a solid object of classical size. The kinetic energy of the first object MUST BE transferred to the second. There is no reasonable doubt.

Your debate about causation is unwittingly just a debate about realism (laws of nature real and "out there") vs. idealism (laws of nature are in our heads).

This is an interesting thought. Clearly, I am a realist. I've never considered Hume's position on this point. Is he considered an idealist?

Again here, Hume is not doubting the science of kinetic energy that we observe. He is doubting that we have any basis for how observation comes about in the first place, as you can only use past observations to justify the future which is using inductive reasoning itself to justify itself. There is no basis for why our observations should hold consistently true each new instance except by custom.

Doubting "how our observations come about" is "doubting the science of kinetic energy." We are not talking about past observations or future observations. Those topics have to do with induction. As I have already demonstrated, Hume's attack on induction depends upon his attack on the law of cause and effect, not the reverse. The law of cause and effect can be shown in one demonstration.

If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you don't ask a speculative metaphysician - which is exactly what Hume is in this argument. It is ironic to me that Hume has become exactly what he despises.

If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you ask a condensed matter physicist. They can explain to you why classically sized solid objects cannot pass through classically sized solid objects and why kinetic energy from the first billiard ball will always be transferred to the second billiard ball.

Why would anyone believe Hume over Newton on this topic? Why would someone believe Hume over a modern condensed matter physicist?

Some here seem to think that I'm the first person to accuse Hume of attacking Newton's Principia. I submit this quote from a paper by Eric Schliesser called "Hume's Attack on Newton's Philosophy."

"This essay consists of five sections in addition to this introduction. First, I discuss Hume’s attitude toward Newton. Newton claims that natural philosophy should be the foundation for other sciences, while in the ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise Hume asserts the supremacy of the ‘science of man’. For Hume the human sciences can attain the high epistemic status of ‘proof’, while much of the physical sciences must do with lower forms of ‘probability’. Furthermore, Hume’s ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ do not replicate Newton’s fourth Rule; this opens a gap between the ontologies and methodologies of Newton and Hume. Moreover, Hume’s account of causation is designed to undercut the reductionist bias of natural philosophy. According to Hume the parts of natural sciences that go beyond common life can be evaluated from the point of view of the science of man. I end with remarks on the philosophic origins and significance of Hume’s attack on Newton’s natural philosophy."
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5382/

I may word things a little differently than Schliesser, but I'm not the first to notice Hume's attack on Newton.

It makes no sense to me to think that we see the kinetic energy; we see the ball moving is all.

When you see a moving billiard ball, you are looking at its kinetic energy. When you see a stationary billiard ball, you are looking at its inertial energy.

Here is another quote from Schliesser regarding Hume's view of Newton's philosophy:

"The full extent of Hume’s indebtedness to pre-Newtonian mechanical philosophy becomes evident once we realize that he accepts the mechanists’ view of what counts as a proper explanation. Hume writes about the nature of Newton’s achievements: ‘While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain’ (emphasis added). Hume treats Newton’s refutation of the mechanical philosophy not as a decisive advance in knowledge but, instead, as decisive evidence for the claim that nature will remain unknowable in principle. The way to make sense of Hume’s remark is to see that it reveals that he implicitly accepts the mechanists’ insistence that theirs was the only program that offered the possibility of intelligible explanation, even if it only offered hope of post-facto rational reconstruction."

And another quote from Schliesser:

"Hume’s anti-reductionism is made evident by the important assumption in his account of causation that all matters of fact are, in an important sense, alike. In the Treatise, he writes, ‘there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature.’ Moreover, ‘Passions are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of cause and effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them.’ Hume thinks that we apply the same type of inference about matters of fact, and that all facts have the same causal structure. In causal explanations there is, thus, no reason to privilege the motion of small bodies or any ‘lower level’ causes. Further evidence for his anti-reductionism comes from Hume’s eight ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ because it is ‘possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other.’ Thus, the relative neglect by scholars of Hume’s historical, economic, and political works is odd because these should reveal as much about his views on causation as do those on more ‘philosophic’ topics."

As you read Schliesser quoting Hume, are you not struck with the absurdity of Hume's comments?

He is saying there is only one kind of cause, so if you are looking at a cause of a moral necessity it is exactly the same as a cause of a physical necessity. Really?

Again, his "custom or habit" belies a sort of a priori (cognitive feat) going on here:


However, as we both agree Kant and Hume are "internal" about causation as seen here:


However, Kant goes on to build a comprehensive cognitive-based metaphysics (Transcendental Idealism) that proves necessity that is derived from forms of intuition/categories of understanding combining with sense experience:

The “formal [or “general”] conditions of experience” include the forms of intuition (space and time), together with all the categories and principles of the understanding. The material conditions of experience include that which is given to us, through sensation, in perception. Kant is thus describing a three-stage procedure, in which we begin with the formal a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in general, perceive various actual events and processes by means of sensation, and then assemble these events and processes together—via necessary connections—by means of the general conditions of the possibility of experience with which we began. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/

Indeed, Hume would never seem to idealize time/space/causality as a priori, but my point was that he is opening the door by pointing out our internal/psychological tendency for habit and custom. There is a hint of a priori truth, but he would never take it that far. He only went as far as skepticism and not an acknowledgement of synthetic a priori truths or conditions.

Doubting "how our observations come about" is "doubting the science of kinetic energy." We are not talking about past observations or future observations. Those topics have to do with induction. As I have already demonstrated, Hume's attack on induction depends upon his attack on the law of cause and effect, not the reverse. The law of cause and effect can be shown in one demonstration. — Ron Cram

It's tied together- the point being that there is no principle behind cause-and-effect. Yes, we will probably always think in terms of cause-and-effect, but the principle cannot explain itself (though Kant's answer was synthetic a priori truths).

If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you don't ask a speculative metaphysician - which is exactly what Hume is in this argument. It is ironic to me that Hume has become exactly what he despises. — Ron Cram

Ugh, you are showing a lot of ignorance here on what metaphysics and epistemology are trying to investigate. It is the BASIS for which we know things, not the actual empirical observations themselves. You must go a step BEYOND the mere observations for what they are discussing. Here look up anything about metaphysics and epistemology: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, https://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ . By not questioning the basis for our own reasoning, you are simply relying on scientism. Science itself has its foundations, even if scientists don't know that they are participating in this. Usually, scientists that deal in more abstract matters do in fact know a bit of philosophy of science and epistemology (though probably some better than others).

Why would anyone believe Hume over Newton on this topic? Why would someone believe Hume over a modern condensed matter physicist? — Ron Cram

Hume didn't presume to be a physicist. He was investigating the nature of human understanding.

I admire your tenacity, but there's still an apples-and-oranges problem here.

There's a well-known video of Feynman trying to explain how magnets work:

What's notable here is the idea that explanations only make sense within a given framework. What's more, explanations you give within a framework don't justify that framework. You can point to them as contributing to the coherence of the framework, but how far that gets you is debatable...

You can also point to them as instances of the framework's not yet having been disconfirmed (or "falsified"). And what you make of that -- further non-disconfirmation -- comes down to what Hume is talking about, the framework all frameworks slot into, expectations that nature is uniform and that induction will work. Even if you did want to argue that the success of some bit of mechanics as an explanation contributes to confirming this overarching framework, you'd immediately be engaged in circular reasoning. Unless, Hume allows, there's an alternative deductive justification for accepting induction.

That's nonsense to me I'm afraid. I understand the idea of kinetic energy and yet I don't see it when I look at a moving object. Do you think someone prior to understanding the notion of kinetic energy would see kinetic energy when they looked at moving objects? Of course you can say something like what they are really seeing is kinetic energy, but that would be an inferential claim about, not a phenomenological description of, what they are seeing.

Wow great debate on Hume.

I read someone in the previous posts said that Hume opposed to Newtonian Science? Is that justified comment? Because I also read from a book that Hume's whole purpose of writing the Treatise was studying and finding about human nature using Newtonian Scientific methods.

I read someone in the previous posts said that Hume opposed to Newtonian Science? Is that justified comment?

No. It's just people trying to put words in Hume's mouth that he never spoke or wrote.

If Hume had been arguing against Newton, he would have been written off as a loony, rather than being as respected as he was in his time. Newton had godlike status in 18th century Britain and nobody could have publicly said anything against his physical theories without being ridiculed.

Hmmm. That argument has a funny ring to it in talking about Hume, since many people feel there's another god Hume was interested in arguing against, only he was pretty careful what he said about it while he lived.