This work is an investigation into the ground of the principle of sufficient reason. My original contribution is the claim that in David Hume's writing on causality we find an implicit treatment of the principle of sufficient reason. While Hume does not explicitly accept or deny the principle of sufficient reason, my claim is that in analyzing causality, Hume also provides us with an account of the principle of sufficient reason, since causality may be understood as the empirical manifestation of the more general principle of sufficient reason. I support my claim about Hume by presenting two opposed views of the principle of sufficient reason, that of Leibniz and Schopenhauer. In my exegesis of Leibniz and Schopenhauer, I show how Leibniz's presentation treats the principle of sufficient reason as legitimately metaphysical, and Schopenhauer in his dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason , treats the principle as a merely transcendental principle. These two polar views may be bridged, it is my claim, by looking to Hume's treatment of causality situated between them.
Assuming I understand Heidegger - a very large assumption - I read him as focusing finally on the word "is." — tim wood
Assuming I understand Heidegger - a very large assumption - I read him as focusing finally on the word "is." To be a something (not a nothing) is to be a being. The beingness of a being - the in-order-for-a-being-to-be - is grounded in the cognition of a being. That is, no thing is absent being the cognition of a being, the cognition being the ground/cause of the being. — tim wood
I believe he concludes the work by quoting Novalis or some other poet - "the rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms," or something like that. So the principle of sufficient reason has its obvious uses and justification, but, taken to an extreme, it ultimately cuts us off from the source of wonder that is Being - which, once again, is without "why?". — Erik
But what sort of principle is this? Is the PSR itself susceptible to proof? Must we take it as an axiom of sorts? Or is it just a general working assumption we make in order to proceed with proving other facts or theorems of interest? Schopenhauer argued that the PSR required no proof, in the sense that one “finds himself in that circle of demanding a proof for the right to demand a proof.” (Jacquette, pg. 280) Schopenhauer’s argument against proof is paradoxical: “This principle of truth requires no proof.” This is reminiscent of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem which utilized a form of the liar paradox: “This sentence is false”. According to incompleteness theorem a formal system is incomplete if a statement or its negation cannot be derived (i.e., proved) in the system. Is the PSR a provable truth? On its face this appears to be a valid question. If we use PSR as a sort of axiom, there is no further proof required, lest we fall into paradox, as Schopenhauer rightly claimed, in my view. — Unnamed
Schopenhauer’s argument against proof is paradoxical: “This principle of truth requires no proof.”
Admittedly I've only just started reading the article, but they appear to be helping themselves to the notion of free will, which is precisely one of the notions that the PSR bears upon, and if so, they are not so much falsifying the PSR but begging the question against it. I'll continue reading their paper, but the philosophical roughshod-riding they engage in at the begining gives me initial reason to doubt that they have anything philosophically cogent to contribute to the debate about the PSR. — MetaphysicsNow
The authors do absolutely nothing to establish that the antecedent is true, and do not even put any flesh on the bones of what they take to be "free will". — MetaphysicsNow
I have only skim read it - but as it stands my feeling is just to lump the authors into the category of competentent physicists but bumbling philosophers, and since the status of the PSR is a philosophical issue, they don't really have a great deal to contribute. — MetaphysicsNow
And, If I remember correctly, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not mentioned in either of the FWT papers
How do we know it's true if no proof is required? If it is an axiom, then seemingly the issue resolves itself. However, even assuming that introduces metaphysical baggage, I think. — Posty McPostface
The PSR precludes “brute or unexplainable facts” as well as effects without causes. It would preclude mere factual coincidence, one thing following another without reason. (SEP on PSR, pg. 3)
The PSR is not equivalent to the assumption that the world is a rational place open to our questioning. The principle has radical implications:
“Among the alleged consequences of the Principle are: the Identity of Indiscernibles, necessitarianism, the existence of a self-necessitated Being (i.e., God), the Principle of Plentitude, and strict naturalism.” (SEP, PSR at pg. 4)
The PSR assumes that the world is constructed with internal logic (reasons and explanations) completely accessible to humans. As we’ve learned in the last century this may be an unjustified assumption. Incompleteness, QM uncertainty, and objective randomness produce brute facts (concrete and abstract) that are just so without reason. If there are exceptions to the PSR then it becomes merely an interesting heuristic device –not a universal law of truth. But frankly, I think the jury is still out on what sort of truth we are dealing with here. — Unknown
Sly move - turning the PSR against itself. Indeed if it is to be treated as an axiom, it's truth might have to be taken to be a brute fact, and that would seem to indicate that the PSR is false. I suppose it is here that the exact formulation of the PSR becomes important. Loosely speaking its the claim that everything has an explanation. We could try restricting the domain of quantification to just events, say, in which case the PSR is not something that needs to be explained, since it is not an event. That seems like cheating, though. So let's assume we have to give an explanation even for the PSR, which would mean that there were principles upon which even the PSR would be based, but then those principles themselves would, by the PSR, have to have their explanations....and here we get to Schopenhauer's point. There might be an infinite regress here, on the other hand, perhaps we can construct a virutous explanatory circle where the PSR gets justified by some principles which in turn get their justification from the PSR.Would the PoSR not be itself a brute fact?
Interesting, how so? — MetaphysicsNow
Naively, the way to refute the PSR would be to establish that there are somethings that occur for no reason at all — MetaphysicsNow
Is the point that we would then need to answer the question "Why should the mere fact that something occurs for no reason at all refute the PSR" by relying on the PSR? — MetaphysicsNow
Well, and I'm not saying I agree with this, but I've heard some people claim that the virtual particles of QM are precisely things for which ex nihilo nihil fit (and with it the PSR) is false.ex nihilo nihil fit.
That is true, but I thought your position was that the FWT refutes the PSR. It doesn't, and precisely because of the fact that the theorem is a conditional whose antecedent bears on the PSR, and they don't establish that the antecedent of their theorem is true. — MetaphysicsNow
The PSR is refuted because the laws of physics disagree with it. The assumption being that an experimenter possesses sufficient freedom to press one of a number of buttons.
If the assumption of the ability to choose a button is false, then the laws of physics tell us that we inhabit a superdeterministic conspiracy. I'm not convinced that PSR has any meaning in that scenario.
We could try restricting the domain of quantification to just events, say, in which case the PSR is not something that needs to be explained, since it is not an event. That seems like cheating, though. — MetaphysicsNow
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