I think this is probably how those who wish to treat it axiomaticallly in some sense need to take it - something like a rule for thought, which is what @Srap Tasmaner seems to be getting at. But, certainly one way of looking at it is that the PSR pushes at that very supposed boundary between the epistemological and metaphysical. After all, your second paragraph seems to be making some Kantian-style metaphysical point about what couldbe for us on the basis that this is restricted by the PSR. Also, considering the use to which it has been put to in the past by Leibniz, Spinoza and Schopenhauer amongst others, it is pretty clear that some significant thinkers have regarded it as having metaphysical import (which does not, of course mean that it does just that there is some reason for thinking that it might). As @tim wood says, it's a bear of a topic.I take the PSR to be an epistemological, not an ontological, principle.
I take the PSR to be an epistemological, not an ontological, principle. So Thorongil is right to say that it cannot be refuted, epistemologically and logically speaking at least, because to do so would be to find reason that the principle does not obtain: a performative contradiction. — Janus
If there are natural events which are absolutely random, those events could never be anything for us — Janus
You cannot refute a principle on the basis of an assumption which the principle (arguably) entails is false: that's called question begging. — MetaphysicsNow
2. Every event has a cause — TheMadFool
2 and 3 seem to be saying the same thing. They too lead, inevitably, to a causal formulation of the Munchhausen trilemma. — TheMadFool
So, disproving or denying the PSR becomes a mere academic exercise having little effect on how we actually deal with knowledge seeking. — TheMadFool
Odd, perhaps, but if that's where a true principle or an apriori principle of thought or whatever it is taken to be leads, so be it: a principle that drives human discovery in one way or another is not to be discarded simply because it leads to apparently unpalatable results. Anyway, the whole freedom to choose/freedom of will/compatibilism/determinism debate has its own thread (several of them in fact), so that part of our discussion is better taken into one of those unless you think that there is an real argument that the PSR is undermined because it leads to determinism which in turn leads to the meaninglessness of the PSR (which is what I thought you were hinting at earlier, and which as I say is an interesting line of thought, but one which is entirely independent of the FWT).It seems odd that someone would give up the ability to chose which button to press, rather than question a cherished principle.
2. Every event has a causeThe MadFool
This is proved false by quantum mechanics.
Pseudo-random number generators are not truly random - their outputs are in principle predictable and explicable and at base a matter of cause and effect, and that feeds through into any measurements finally made on their basis that the measurements to take are "chosen" by such a machine. — MetaphysicsNow
Odd, perhaps, but if that's where a true principle or an apriori principle of thought or whatever it is taken to be leads, so be it: a principle that drives human discovery in one way or another is not to be discarded simply because it leads to apparently unpalatable results. — MetaphysicsNow
The FWT also holds if the decision is made by a random number generator, which exist BTW.
Well perhaps I chose an inappropriate metaphor - but the idea that everything is explicable is a motivation for pursuing explanations, and science is - amongst many other things - the pursuit of explanations.The PSR has never driven human discovery. It can't do that.
Why are you asking me for specifics like that - I'm not proposing that they should be used at all. All I'm saying is that the very notion of a pseudo-random number generator is that there is a causal determination of the numbers that they churn out.Which pseudo-random number generator do you propose to use? How will you map the output of the number generator to the buttons?
Not really - there are probabilistic conceptions of causality that are perfectly compatible with QM. — MetaphysicsNow
Yes: take a look here for instance — MetaphysicsNow
Probabilistic conceptions of causality attempt to keep some aspects of causality, but drop that specific conception of determinism, allowing that future states of systems have a probabilistic distribution, but are nevertheless in some significant sense caused by the existing state of the system, thus rendering causation compatible with (some interpretations of) QM. — MetaphysicsNow
The FWT is a conditional theorem to the effect thatif there are uncaused events of one specific kind, then there are other uncaused events. — MetaphysicsNow
The Principle of Sufficient Reason has been falsified by the Free Will and Strong Free Will Theorems of Kochen and Conway. — tom
... if the experimenter can freely choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particle’s response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire previous history of the universe.
The FWT would still hold if the choice was made by a pseudo-random number generator. — tom
Notice the antecedent. The rest of the argument is irrelevant (on this issue) as the principle of sufficient reason has already been rejected from the start. — Michael
As I mentioned earlier, I find it strange that people are willing to abandon science to protect a treasured principle.
I also mentioned earlier, that if it is not possible to choose which button to press, then the type of determinism that exists must be acausal.
I also mentioned that the PSR does not seem to survive either way. — tom
But please don't just leave it at that. It would take a very specific understanding of what free will amounts to for its existence to refute the PSR. Once that specific conception is explicitly stated, the issue then is what happens if we deny that free will in that sense exists?Just say that humans having free will falsifies the principle.
But please don't just leave it at that. It would take a very specific understanding of what free will amounts to for its existence to refute the PSR. Once that specific conception is explicitly stated, the issue then is what happens if we deny that free will in that sense exists? — MetaphysicsNow
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