"Principles em-bodied... are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificantas "stand up straight" or "don't hold your knife in your left hand."" -Bourdieu by way of Dreyfus

Can a whole cosmology really be instilled by social practices?

Can a whole cosmology really be instilled by social practices? — frank

This is what comes to mind, although I'm not sure we're talking about the same thing - Christopher Lasch was a social philosopher with a psychoanalytical slant. In one of his books, I can't remember which, he talked about how different family structures create different types of minds in children. If I remember correctly, his examples included large pre-industrial farm families with strong fathers and smaller families in industrial communities where the father was gone most of the day and so was less of an influence.

That made a lot of sense to me. I need to go back and reread some of his books.

I think H's point is that Dasein is a fusion or relationship between subjectivity and the world of trees and cups which are basically what humanity makes of greys and browns. — frank

This jumps out at me, and I definitely think that I disagree with this, although I am not exactly sure what you mean. We as human beings can encounter the meaningful world in its disclosure to us. And I take it that this is entirely different from the notion that we have contingently human forms of interpreting the world.

L.W. puts it best: "When we say, mean, that such-and-such is the case, then, with what we mean, we do not stop anywhere short of the fact, but mean: such-and-such is thus-and-so." (PI, 95)

In other words, I don't see a bunch of splotches of grey and brown that I interpret to be a tree. I see a tree. Any other description misses the phenomenon.

I think there are fundamentally human practices that give meaning to what we sense. For instance, when we see a mass of grey and brown, it isn't influence from any particular culture that produces a declaration of "tree." It's something more fundamental that has to do with objects in space and time. — frank

So, to expand a bit, I don't think we need to "give meaning to what we sense" because we directly sense meaning. That's why, for example, I see someone cruelly whipping a donkey, I don't interpret the colors on my retina as a man whipping a donkey which I interpret morally as a cruel act. That would be ontologically clunky.

As for what is "more fundamental" than practices, let me interrogate a bit. Do you think this might not be our shared bodily forms of experience?

That's the sort of thing Dreyfus would point to, yes.


First of all, I didn't type it out, but it occurred to me in the midst of the OP: "This is amazingly hard to put into words." I agree with you that we directly sense the tree. There is a social practices aspect to the ontology of the tree. Further there is something Kantian about the ontology of the tree that I don't think varies from culture to culture.

Why talk about trees? I realize H was doing a different kind of ontology having to do with ways of being. I got caught up in trees because of what Dreyfus said about what Dasein is: it's not subjectivity. OTOH it doesn't leave subjectivity out.

What is Dasein in your view?

There is a social practices aspect to the ontology of the tree. Further there is something Kantian about the ontology of the tree that I don't think varies from culture to culture. — frank

Do you think you could expand on this?

What is Dasein in your view? — frank

Hard to answer, because I don't think that there is any such thing as Dasein outside of Heidegger's philosophy. Unlike Heidegger, I do not see any philosophical reason for dispensing with everyday words such as "person", "human being", "life", or even "subject", so long as we are working within a framework that makes those concepts responsible to the phenomena which we find in everyday being-a-person, which Heidegger attempts to describe, albeit in his unnecessarily mystical and abstract language.

Why talk about trees? I realize H was doing a different kind of ontology having to do with ways of being. I got caught up in trees because of what Dreyfus said about what Dasein is: it's not subjectivity. OTOH it doesn't leave subjectivity out. — frank

I thought you were talking about trees because it's a standard thing to talk about in these sorts of discussions. That's why God reminds us: "I don't merely have the visual impression of a tree: I know that it is a tree". (OC, 267).

I'm going to have to get back with you after thinking on it.

Yes, it's very useful to distinguish those cognitive abilities we have that we share with animals (that are therefore pre-verbal) from those that require the use of words and concepts. Schopenhauer distinguished between Reason (which uses words and concepts) and the Understanding, which we share with animals.

Obviously, animals can distinguish 3-d objects and their position in space, they can distinguish colours and textures, smells, etc. They can distinguish things as defined by such criteria. The dog can tell that the postman is a living 3-dimensional creature like them, arse-for-the-biting-of, but they don't know what "post" is, or the social role "postman." There's also obviously some language of emotions (mammals, with their more developed limbic systems, are distinguished by their ability to signal their inner states by various means - noises, touches, gestures, etc.). Some aspects of sex and gender would fit in here too - males and females are instantly recognizable to each other, and as with infant animals, some elements of "cuteness" probably cross species boundaries too (in fact by different aspects of the same principle, neoteny; usually a "lady" dog, say, is "prettier" - i.e. more neotenous - than a male).

There's a whole bunch of stuff like that. You can actually get along at a rudimentary level in life without much use of concepts and words at all - it can even be quite pleasurable (not for the chattering classes, for whom it could only possibly ever be a break, but for most normal people, who are generally fairly taciturn).

Although it has to be said that human children can probably sense the "shape" of social roles before they have the words to plug into their own thoughts. We're exquisitely designed to follow social cues, etc., to "fit in." So a good deal of acculturation in the early years can indeed be pre-verbal too. (As is a good deal of infant thought - I remember as a small child having thoughts about the world that were like intangible shapes in the mind, fitting together or not fitting together along the lines of what I later recognized to be logic, once I had names for them. Human children - as opposed to animal young - already have a more sophisticated mental equipment, waiting for words, symbols and concepts to gradually take the place of the various idea-shapes they're already working out in a wordless way.)

But yes, once words, symbols, concepts enter the picture, the cognitive landscape is vastly extended, as is the possibility of various social roles, and acculturation to them.

Can a whole cosmology really be instilled by social practices? — frank

I feel like this thread must have split off from another conversation, but I like the question so I thought I'd have a go at it.

I'm split a bit on what you mean. In one sense of cosmology it seems obviously true that a cosmology can be instilled by social practices. You would just need a social practice which teaches cosmology to people, like a school or a church or some such. And we obviously already have institutions which do exactly that. Insofar that someone believes what's being taught, you'd have your cosmology instilled entirely by a social practice. That's just a straightfroward example. I don't know if "stand up straight" has the same effect as a school, though maybe in conjunction with many such norms, injunctions, habits, and so forth social practices could basically function the same as schools do.

Yes, it's very useful to distinguish those cognitive abilities we have that we share with animals (that are therefore pre-verbal) from those that require the use of words and concepts. Schopenhauer distinguished between Reason (which uses words and concepts) and the Understanding, which we share with animals.

Obviously, animals can distinguish 3-d objects and their position in space, they can distinguish colours and textures, smells, etc. They can distinguish things as defined by such criteria.

There's a whole bunch of stuff like that. You can actually get along at a rudimentary level in life without much use of concepts and words at all - it can even be quite pleasurable (not for the chattering classes, for whom it could only possibly ever be a break, but for most normal people, who are generally fairly taciturn).

Although it has to be said that human children can probably sense the "shape" of social roles before they have the words to plug into their own thoughts. We're exquisitely designed to follow social cues, etc., to "fit in." So a good deal of acculturation in the early years can indeed be pre-verbal too.

But yes, once words, symbols, concepts enter the picture, the cognitive landscape is vastly extended, as is the possibility of various social roles, and acculturation to them. — gurugeorge

Schopenhauer is definitely a great reference. Dreyfus stole an analogy from World as Will Vol. 1 which he seems to use quite a lot, about perception being a 'ground floor' and conception being the 'upper stories': “Those concepts which…are not immediately related to the world of perception, but only through the medium of one, or it may be several other concepts, have been called by preference abstract, and those which have their ground immediately in the world of perception have been called concrete. […] If it were not a somewhat too pictorial and therefore absurd simile, we might very appropriately call the latter the ground floor, and the former the upper stories of the building of reflection.”

While I think that your post takes Frank's questions in an interesting direction, there's still a glaring philosophical puzzle skulking in the corner: does the acquisition of concepts/language/practices sit atop this basic animal nature (e.g. perceptual capabilities) or transform this nature; in other words, are you arguing for a layer cake conception of human mindedness or a transformational conception?

Honestly, I've never quite been clear what Dreyfus's position on this puzzle is.

Dreyfus: "Thanks to our preontological understanding of being, what shows up for us shows up as something. As Heidegger puts it, using "actuality" this time instead of "being":

We must be able to understand actuality before all factual experience of actual beings. This understanding of actuality or of being in the widest sense as over against the experience of beings is in a certain sense earlier than the experience of beings. To say that the understanding of being precedes all factual experience of beings does not mean that we would first need to have an explicit concept of being in order to experience beings theoretically or practically. We must understand being-being, which may no longer itself be called a being, being, which does not occur as a being among other beings but which nevertheless must be given and in fact is given in the understanding of being. — Heidegger

"

A pre-ontological understanding of being is in play as we interact with the tree. It's not explicit in experience, though. That understanding is at the heart of what we are. We don't become aware of it until we reflect upon ourselves (in the way a philosopher would.)

But it's prior or more fundamental than the way any particular culture might divide up the world into things per its interests.

I feel like this thread must have split off from another conversation, but I like the question so I thought I'd have a go at it.

I'm split a bit on what you mean. In one sense of cosmology it seems obviously true that a cosmology can be instilled by social practices. You would just need a social practice which teaches cosmology to people — Moliere

The split is between my emerging view, Dreyfus, and whatever Heidegger was actually trying to say. My view carries more weight with me, obviously. :)

I think Bourdieu was touching on the bodily quality of social practices. As you walk through the day, notice how you position your body relative to other people, relative to things. These are social practices that can be unpacked to reveal an array of propositions.

Remember that it's circular, though. The propositions, having been distilled from experience, will subsequently impact future experience. This is one of the reasons it's important to be aware of the things you tell yourself about yourself (not to get psychological, but that's an example of the circle).

:up:

Dreyfus: "Thanks to our preontological understanding of being, what shows up for us shows up as something.

A pre-ontological understanding of being is in play as we interact with the tree. — frank

I read this post through four or five times, hoping to give you a good response, but I am having a lot of trouble understanding what a "preontological understanding of being" is supposed to mean in either of these two contexts.

While I think that your post takes Frank's questions in an interesting direction, there's still a glaring philosophical puzzle skulking in the corner: does the acquisition of concepts/language/practices sit atop this basic animal nature (e.g. perceptual capabilities) or transform this nature; in other words, are you arguing for a layer cake conception of human mindedness or a transformational conception? — Ilyosha

I should think it's largely one thing built on top of another, but I'm sure there are also cross-connections all over the place. (For instance, sometimes conceptions can alter how things seem to us - certainly, on occasion, at first glance.)

I think Bourdieu was touching on the bodily quality of social practices. As you walk through the day, notice how you position your body relative to other people, relative to things. These are social practices that can be unpacked to reveal an array of propositions. — frank

The split is between my emerging view, Dreyfus, and whatever Heidegger was actually trying to say. My view carries more weight with me, obviously — frank

No worries.

I'm not sure how to respond to your quote of Bourdieu. But I'm more than happy to hear your emerging view.

What do you believe social practices can instill? And, for that matter, what do you mean by "instill"? Simply to make someone believe?

You first have to accept a division between unthinking behavior (second nature) and subsequent analysis (reflection).

Do you agree that we can divide human life up in that way?

Yes. Though I'm a little hesitant to call something second nature, just because I'm always leery of essences in general, but maybe that won't be an issue. Unthinking behavior and analysis are definitely different from one another, though. I think I can agree that human life has both in them, and they are different from one another.

A fair amount of your unthinking behavior was (one assumes) instilled in you from your observations of and interactions with other people. Imagine yourself unthinkingly sitting down to eat a meal. You probably don't think to yourself, "The vegan-bacon is a physical object. I'll put it into my physical-object-mouth and chew it with my physical-object teeth. Hopefully, this will help out with my pangs of hunger which are of dubious ontology, but all anxiety over dubiousness is quelled by my confidence that the hunger is the result of physical doo-dads in my physical brain."

From a certain point of view, we aren't getting closer to understanding anything about who and what we are by doing standard ontology. We're getting further away.

We witness in ourselves a pre-ontological understanding ( I think this is right?) of the world. That understanding arrives at vegan-bacon and teeth in an unthinking way. So the objects are there before us with their respective horizons (our expectations about them) without any analysis.

If we want to turn to this pre-ontological understanding, we'll immediately be struck by a challenge that does not exist in normal ontology. We can't eliminate ourselves from the picture we're analyzing as we commonly do in metaphysical discussions.

Some things are innate, though. Think of twins separated at birth.

Heidegger denies any innate essence. That conclusion is not drawn from witnessing the phenomenon. That is an interpretation of early childhood development. But my belief that there are innate features of background practices is also my interpretation.

I wonder if this tendency to inject interpretation threatens to derail any effort to discover an ontology of the background.

We witness in ourselves a pre-ontological understanding (↪Ilyosha
I think this is right?) of the world. That understanding arrives at vegan-bacon and teeth in an unthinking way. So the objects are there before us with their respective horizons (our expectations about them) without any analysis. — frank

I don't mean to be a pain, but I guess my problem is that I just don't understand what kind of work a philosophical concept -- namely, "ontology" -- is supposed to be doing in a general statement about what "we witness in ourselves". If the 'we' you refer to is philosophers, then I think, sure, there are forms of understanding which cannot be captured by ontology, that seems trivial enough. But I assume you mean 'we' in general; human beings as such. And most human beings don't do traditional-style-western-philosophy, so ontology has to be code for something like "conceptually carving up the world into objects". But in that case I think that the problems are a lot more complicated than they are being made out in this thread. For example, what role does the acquisition of concepts play in our non-conceptual "pre-ontological understanding" of objects? How do concepts integrate into our bodily practices?

You're right. "Ontology" is being used in weird way. I need a flowchart.

You're right. "Ontology" is being used in weird way. I need a flowchart. — frank

Do it! :lol:

Dreyfus has a chart for how "ontic" and "ontology" are used in various circumstances. I'm not getting it, though. I think I'm going to cruise on and come back to it later.

Dreyfus has a chart for how "ontic" and "ontology" are used in various circumstances. I'm not getting it, though. I think I'm going to cruise on and come back to it later. — frank

Wouldn't that be in reference to Heidegger's technical use of ontic/ontology? Or is the chart original to Dreyfus's work on skillful coping?

If you are referencing Heidegger, then I think the really interesting question that he fails to address -- which is open for you to make a compelling and original contribution -- is how we get from the pre-ontological to the ontological understanding.

H doesn't think much of traditional ontology. He thinks its more interesting to look at our background experience with an eye for what we can say about existence in that domain.

This is something Wittgenstein turned away from and H himself thinks his own project has to limited because it's hermeneutic ontology.

Dasein doesn't exist in the way that hammers do. Dreyfus says that for Dasein,

"To exist is to take a stand on what is essential about one's being and to be defined by that stand."

The meaning of that hinges on the way H sees human nature: as nonexistent other that self interpretation is essential. Human potential is wide open as far as H is concerned.