The world is vague, not specific forms of the world. Minds and bodies don't pre-exist their logical structure. Bodies and minds are two categories of caused states in the world, constituted in particular logical structure.
There are no "formless fundamental bodies and experience bits" which are shaped in logic. Such a thing makes no sense-- bodies and minds have a logical structure. They cannot be prior to that logical constraint. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I would put "experience" in quote marks to show that even to talk about it is already to turn it into a measurable posited within a theoretical structure. — apokrisis
So the main difference is that you are taking experience as a brute fact. Essentially you are being a naive realist about your phenomenological access. Qualia are real things to you.
I would take qualia as being the kinds of facts we can talk about - given a suitable structure of ideas is in place. — apokrisis
Your approach is illogical. Either it is homuncular in requiring a self that stands outside "the realm of brute experience" to do the experiencing of the qualia. Or the qualia simply are "experiential", whatever the heck that could mean in the absence of an experiencer. — apokrisis
My way is logical. It is the global structure of observation that shapes up the appearance of local observables. And these observables have the nature of signs. They are symbols that anchor the habits of interpretation. — apokrisis
Yeah, apokrisis introduces a Logic which is actually illogical because it is supposed to exist independently of any mind, and this Logic is what structures the world. We all know though, that logic is mind dependent. Then with a big turn around, this Logic is called "mind-like". But this claim of "mind-like", or "mindfulness", is completely unjustified because this Logic has been thoroughly separated from mind in the premise.
So intention, attention, thinking, sensation, feelings, emotions, and all these things which are normally associated with mind, and are properly "mind-like", are irrelevant to apokrisis' metaphysics. Apokrisis has assumed a nonsense form of Logic, which operates within the wold, acting to structure it, operating independently of a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
the intelligibility of nature is a consequence of nature itself being a fundamentally semiotic or "mind-like" process. That is why Peirce described existence as the generalised growth in reasonableness. — Apokrisis
I would put "experience" in quote marks to show that even to talk about it is already to turn it into a measurable posited within a theoretical structure. — Apokrisis
My objection to your argument is going the other way to what you interpreted. I'm saying your formless bits of mind and body are incoherent to the semiotic theorist. The problem is not that you've interpreted the triad as formless, it is you are saying mind and body somehow have presence outside the triad. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Panpsychists essentially say the dualism dissolves in the fact that matter is experiential. — schopenhauer1
We all know though, that logic is mind dependent. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is giving short thrift to panpsychists like (presumably) Whitehead — schopenhauer1
Then use "sense" or basic perception if experience is too vague or too complex a notion for your material cause. — schopenhauer1
Oh come now. A baby or animal doesn't have brute fact experiences? It only becomes experience through some sort of linguistic filter? Blah. — schopenhauer1
You have to explain that better to be relevant in the conversation. — schopenhauer1
Either it is homuncular in requiring a self that stands outside "the realm of brute experience" to do the experiencing of the qualia. — apokrisis
No, I don't see how it could be that way. Logic is a process of thinking, reasoning. Clearly thinking and reasoning is what minds do, and it is not the case that thinking and reasoning is a process which starts without a mind, and then proceeds to produce a mind. I think that such an idea requires a misguided definition of "mind".Do we? Might it not be the other way around: that minds are logic dependent? — John
Could someone explain to me what is wrong with the homuncular approach? People speak as if this is some big fallacy, but until the homuncular approach is proven wrong, why should we be afraid of it? — Metaphysician Undercover
The most often argument against homunculi is it results in infinite regress. Each instance of experience is given in terms of the identity of a different being, so it results in an endless run of homunculi with homunculi. — TheWillowOfDarkness
The homunculus is incoherent by identity. If my experience was of a homunculus, I wouldn't be myself. — TheWillowOfDarkness
The homunculus account of conciousness literally says no-one exists. Quaila never belongs to anyone. — TheWillowOfDarkness
You assume your own conclusion that logic is dependent on mind, by saying that logic is a process of thinking or reasoning. Logic is what inherently constrains our thinking and reasoning; we don't actually know 'where it comes from'; how could we? — John
There is a coherent distinction between thoughts, thinking and logic; the inherent 'something' that determines how we think and which we formulate as logical principles that are understood to govern thinking, thinking which is the production of thoughts. — John
...we can think illogical thoughts... — John
You're saying that logic constrains thinking, and that is false, because you are making logic, which is a passive tool of thought, into something which actively constrains thought. — Metaphysician Undercover
But logic is not a "passive tool of thought"; on the contrary we cannot think cogently without it. I — John
A tool is a effective cause. A logical constraint is a formal cause. So you are confusing your Aristotelean categories here. — apokrisis
You are ignoring the part where I suggested that what we might call "thinking illogical thoughts" is really nothing more than associating concepts or names or mental images that don't have relation of logical entailment between them together. And even those kinds of 'thoughts' must have some kind of associative logic (as with poetry) or they are nothing more than utter nonsense; just meaninglessly contiguous pictures created by language. They are certainly not cogent thoughts. And you haven't risen to the challenge to present a thought which is not logical, so that we can see what kind of things you have in mind when you say that thoughts are not necessarily logical. — John
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