the notion 'objectivity' is an impossibility — Marcus de Brun

This statement is a self-contradiction, because if objectivity is not real, then nothing can be objectively true, including the above statement.

no two things can be the same — Marcus de Brun

I think you misinterpret Leibniz's law of indiscernibles. The law states that no two things can be the same in every way, that is, have all the same properties. But two things can have some properties that are the same. Two things can have the same genus or species, or accidental properties.

Are you a human being? So am I. Yet I am not you. Although we are separate beings, we participate in the same species: human. 1 human + 1 human = 2 humans. No more, no less.

(1) Subjectivity is not necessarily entailed; inasmuch as people disagree on religions even though it is clearly an objective topic (E.g., if the Christian God exists, then He exists for everyone; and if not, then not). — Samuel Lacrampe

That's a good analogy actually. By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false.

Similarly with religion -- every religion has truth-apt statements. And that makes them objective. And they are false statements, i.e., there is not one true religion.

(2) I dispute the claim that the disagreements are strong; even for the case of the death penalty. People do not argue on the death penalty when it comes to simple cases like children jaywalking; they do only when it comes to complex cases like dealing with terrorists. E.g., if only put in jail, will they escape? Will they do it again once released? Will their buddies continue to terrorize because jail time is not a strong enough incentive to stop? etc. If we know the answer to these questions with certainty, then there would be very few disagreements; and these are matters of facts, not values. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values.

I agree that there is agreement for absurdly simple cases, but I don't know if there is agreement even for most cases. First, how would we determine such a thing? It would seem we'd have to know the opinion not only of everyone who exists now, but even people who have existed -- since moral difference is most clear when viewed historically, and not just by asking your neighbor. And that just isn't possible to know down to every detail. We have to make assumptions of some kind to determine what everyone ever has believed.

Given the changes in laws over time and the differences between even current countries, and persons within countries, I'd say that it is at least reasonable to believe that there is more disagreement than agreement with respect to all persons. I mean, we used to have a feudal society ruled by a single church. And now we have a democratic capitalist society with a plurality of religions. In what ways would all the people of the past agree with our current world? And wouldn't they actually disagree with it on what they consider to be moral grounds?

By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false. — Moliere

Great. To determine if morality is objective or not was the main goal of this discussion. Everything else is secondary. Now why do you claim that every moral statement is false?

I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values. — Moliere

Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values?

how would we determine [strong disagreement or not]? — Moliere

Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions. But I'll try to answer your objection anyways.

You point to the differences in political and economical systems, but believing that morality was always an end goal is a questionable assumption. The end goal of some of these could have been power only. It is hard to believe that the Nazi regime had morality in mind, instead of power. Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition (Source).

Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because the question I offered is not asking, "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?", but rather "Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment?" -- It's a question of how we interpret justice, and what we mean by justice. In the case of the death penalty it is thought of as just when the person in question has done something so wrong that the worst punishment we have is the only possible way to rectify what they have done. Justice, in this sense, is seen as a kind of balance. One person kills, and so is killed in return.

Another sort of justice would just be restorative justice. Killing a murderer only creates more death, rather than rectify the wrong. Seeing as we can do nothing to bring back the dead the debt owed by the murderer is unpayable, and so they are given some sort of life sentence.

Another sort of justice would be rehabilitative justice. Killing a murderer not only fails to rectify a wrong, it also misses out on what the truly just act would be: turning the murderer into a productive member of society. Justice, in this sense, is more about the health of a community than rectifying wrongs.

Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions — Samuel Lacrampe

I'd say this confuses truth with justification. So while we agree that moral statements are truth-apt, in that they seem to be describing things which are or are not the case invariant of one's point of view, what I am asking is how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree.

I'd say that this is not enough:

Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition — Samuel Lacrampe

For the reasons against the golden rule I already mentioned, one, and also because "moral systems" could just be read as synonymous with "systems with the golden rule". So any system with the golden rule is a system with the golden rule, meaning that definition-ally they'd all be similar. But this just begs the question.

I'd say that, for instance, the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. These were moral impulses of disgust and a fascination with human unity in the state. There is a certain desire for purity in Nazi emotions, as well as a desire to be rid of a previous embarassment and rectify wrongs done to the people. But I would call it an immoral system, in the evaluative sense -- but in the descriptive sense, just like capitalism, communism, or feudalism, I'd say that it counts as a system of prescripts for society, and so is in that sense at least a normative system. It would count when looking at whether or not people agree on goodness.

Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment? [...] — Moliere

I am not sure I understand your point. Your three options, death, life sentence, and rehabilitation, appear to aim at answering the two questions about stoping injustice and restoring justice; and they can be judged against these two questions to determine which one is most just, or mostly deserved. If not justice, how else would you judge which option is mostly deserved?

Note that if it works, rehabilitative justice is the best one, because being rehabilitated not only prevents further injustice, but can also restore justice a bit, by helping out the relatives of the victim.

how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree. — Moliere

A moral system is a system that applies to everyone about what ought-to-be, or good behaviour. It is evident that everyone views justice onto them as good, and injustice onto them as bad. Therefore everyone ought to be just and not unjust. Justice is therefore a criteria to determine the morality of an act.

the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. — Moliere

Again, a moral system is about good behaviour for anyone. Part of the Nazi system was to subdue other ethnic groups like the Jews. Surely no one, not even the Nazis, would view this behaviour done onto them as good. It is therefore not a system of good behaviour, and therefore not a moral system.