I think you can tell by what people do with their eyes and hands when they're talking how verbally they think vs in images.

I suppose you're suggesting some underlying structure to thought: a structure we all share?

Introspection reveals to someone that some of their thoughts can be expressed in words. Not that all such thoughts can be expressed in words. It isn't as if Mr Chomsky can assess all possible thoughts through introspection, even though he is quite smart.

"If we all speak different languages, then that logically implies that there is a global language that comes before words, ie: we don't think in words."

I'm sorry, I don't see how you got from speaking different languages to a global language before words. Can you describe the logical steps for your thought process, please?



Can you give an example of a thought that can not be expressed with words in the context of someone that can speak?

Touching your partner in some way expresses some thoughts to them. A lot what's expressed has word labels but there isn't a translation between speech/writing and all of these non-verbal aspects of communication.

There's some witticisms expressed in particularly good chess puzzles too. The ideas expressed are a kind of motion and initiative you can then attribute to the involved pieces, and liken current positions on the board to previous games and these motion/initiative corpuscles if you're particularly skilled (which I'm not).

The first part I'm not so sure about. People can express intense desire, arousal, excitement, anticipation, comfort, belonging and any other emotion typically communicated through non-verbal communication. Such things, I thought, have evolved to supplement what is now our primary form of communication, verbal. But it is certainly a sound idea.

The second part is very interesting. I'm going to look that up, thanks.

If we all speak different languages, then that logically implies that there is a global language that comes before words, ie: we don't think in words.

Mr Chomsky's answer was "Introspection reveals to me that i think in words."

Babies obviously have thoughts, not in any language until they are trained. — Gary McKinnon

I would reply the big mistake is asking what we think in. The real issue is what constrains our thoughts to be about some thing in some particular way. And words, with their grammatical structure, are an immensely powerful means of constraining thoughts in a particular fashion.

So animals and babies "have thoughts". The brain itself is set up to work in anticipatory fashion. It must have some kind of image of what is just about to happen next in the world - what it would want to happen even - so as then to make sense of what does actually happen that is a surprise, or fail to meet some intention we had.

The mind is thus generally constrained by its long-term experience of the world and its short-term expectations concerning the world. Those focus its thoughts to be about certain things in terms of anticipations and plans.

Words - and the structure of ideas they encode - then add to what is already going on at that biological level. We don't think in words. But we certainly talk to ourselves to constrain our own expectations and behaviour just as we talk to others to do the same to them and their states of mind.

So language gives humans a unique ability to self-constrain their states of mind. Words limit our thought in a very particular and socially constructed fashion. They shouldn't be understood merely as symbol strings carrying some already present cargo of meaning.

You don't need an already present mentalese which forms the thought and then gets translated into overt speech. Instead, speaking is the skilled action of forming up a thought with grammatical clarity by applying a structure of limits on all the things that could possibly be going on in another mind ... or our own.

If I say "cat", you should not be thinking of horses, cake, Russia or a Sherman tank. You should be now limited in your conceptions to cat-like experiences and expectations. If I say "that black cat that's always crapping in your vegetable patch", then your state of mind should be that much more constrained in what it is thinking.

All that "thought" was always there in your head - potentially. But words and sentences build little fences that enclose states of active interpretation. It narrows what you are likely to be actually thinking to the point that it becomes highly predictable to me. We can be of like mind and communicate.

So yeah. Words don't carry the actual meanings themselves. They are a tool to regulate meanings - a way to restrict the natural roaming freedom of another's wandering mind. And once humans started regulating each others thoughts through language, it was a short step to turning the trick on themselves and regulating their own thinking in just as strict a fashion.

If we all speak different languages, then that logically implies that there is a global language that comes before words, ie: we don't think in words. — Gary McKinnon

This can confuse your readers. There is a global language that comes before words? Language is communication using words. Don't you mean "global communication" instead?

Potentially relevant bit of science reporting:

https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/03/although-they-cant-tell-us-about-it-infants-can-reason/

"The researchers claim that this increased pupil dilation [in infants] “suggests increased cognitive ability, possibly due to inference-making.” Why do the researchers think this? They used millennials as a control. Millennials can, usually, tell us what they are thinking—that’s how we know they have reasoning skills. But when they are presented with the same movies of plastic dinosaurs and flowers in cups and boxes, their pupils likewise dilated only when they had to infer which toy was where. (They also stared longer at inconsistent outcomes.) Téglás and co. conclude that precursors of logical reasoning are thus independent of, and even preliminary to, language."

@creativesoul You might like this too.

it really does work like that, the pupil stuff.

Mr Chomsky's answer was "Introspection reveals to me that i think in words." — Gary McKinnon

You should have asked Mr Chomsky, "What are words, if not sounds and visual scribbles? You think in sounds and visual scribbles."

We all think in the form that our sensory impressions take.

When this topic comes up I like to mention this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Man_Without_Words

Does Chomsky think that this man had no thoughts for the first part of his life because he was never taught a language? How does Chomsky explain how we learn a language if we don't think prior to learning it?

Very cool (that may have just been the only psych paper I've read in my life from start to end, lol).

thoughts precede the method of communicating the thought. In fact I propose that many thoughts are far less unique and individual than most believe..there are no doubt infinite combinations of how they were inspired, processed, considered and ultimately acted on, or not, but in the end the ideas will keep coming around until they find the right steward.

Introspection reveals to someone that some of their thoughts can be expressed in words. Not that all such thoughts can be expressed in words. It isn't as if Mr Chomsky can assess all possible thoughts through introspection, even though he is quite smart. — fdrake

I'll just add some things to these comments.

The question, it seems to me, is, what does it mean to have a thought? How do we learn to apply the word thought? This is similar to the thread on beliefs, there are thoughts and beliefs that are expressed in actions, and it's the actions of a person that give rise to what we mean by thought, and what we mean by belief. Just as the word pain gets its meaning from observing the actions (moaning and screams for e.g.), so the inner experience is expressed as we act in the world. These actions then provide the backdrop for language and meaning.

I believe Chomsky goes wrong by thinking that thoughts are these inner private experiences, i.e., that accessing thoughts is a matter of introspection. For a belief, thought, or pain to have meaning there must be the outward manifestation, otherwise we could claim that rocks have thoughts.

What also seems clear is that for my thoughts to mean anything to you, there must be something in common, i.e., there must be something in common with my inner experiences and yours that is expressed in such a way that we all see that common thing. Language then grabs this outward commonality and calls it pain, thought, belief, intent, etc.

I believe Chomsky goes wrong by thinking that thoughts are these inner private experiences. . . . for my thoughts to mean anything to you, there must be something in common with my inner experiences and yours. . . — Sam26

I have parsed your words for brevity and do not want to take you out of context. However, I did parse as I did because the two "strike" me as inconsistent.

If experiences are inner, how could thoughts about them not be inner? And do I not experience my thoughts regarding my experiences? Would anyone think it odd to say "I remember I was thinking about my experience. . ."

I am puzzled as to why my experiences would be inner while my thoughts about them would not.

Perhaps the inner outer thing is just getting in the way. (as it often does).

Good comment.

I like that this treats language as external; constituted by public criteria, dealing with things (in a general sense) in our shared world; even when describing something internal, allegedly like our mental states. Broadly speaking, linguistic expression draws from and is part of a communal knowledge.

But I don't think this goes far enough. The inner/outer or public/private schema is driven, or perhaps haunted, by a personal criterion of epistemic access. What I mean here is that because it isn't possible to feel another's pain, the language cannot be about, or be have the meaning of, particular instances of pain, only pain insofar as it plays a part in language games.

Which is fine, mostly. We don't feel particular dispositions, emotions or sensations from others, even if two people, A and B, are subjected to the same pin prick, A does not feel the pain that B feels and vice versa. But why should this entail that A's pain and B's pain cannot be part of the language game? Contrast this to A's pain event and B's pain event, which will never be the sense of the words about them. My point is that A's pain event and B's pain event can still be part of a language game, because a comparisons can be made.

Seemingly because A's pain event and B's pain event are not the same event. Is it possible for them to be the same event (not just occur at the same time)? Probably not, at least out of the realm of sci-fi. Why should this entail that A's pain (not A's pain event) and B's pain (not B's pain event) cannot be the subject of a discussion, or the difference between them a driving force in a language game? Again, I read these two things being equivocated as a symptom of epistemic access.

So, what problem do I have with epistemic access being used as a criterion to demarcate that which may be a sense of a word (its use) and that which may not be the sense of a word (the invisible or maybe impossible referent of pain)? Just that epistemic access itself is part of a language game of knowing, philosophically transposed into the realm of language use simpliciter.

If we pay attention to the words people use when describing private sensations, emotions, states of mind, we can establish a kind of equivalence between them. Like two alcoholics on TV describing addiction unfelt by the audience. Establishing equivalence between things is something we do with words.

During the language game of pain comparison, people can offer a lot of adjectives to describe qualities of the pain. Some common ones are; sharp, stabbing, throbbing, blinding, maddening, dull, intense. There are words which connote different intensities of the sensation; like agony and discomfort. Those intensities can clearly be part of the language game, so why not something which is equivalent to the pains themselves within the language game?

If philosophy really is, ultimately, a form of therapy, it would be strange that it cannot discuss the preferences and proclivities which underly every linguistic act. Especially when real therapy is founded upon this idea.

Long story short: epistemic access and establishing equivalence are both part of word use, rather than a transcendental precondition of them.

If experiences are inner, how could thoughts about them not be inner? And do I not experience my thoughts regarding my experiences? Would anyone think it odd to say "I remember I was thinking about my experience. . ."

I am puzzled as to why my experiences would be inner while my thoughts about them would be not. — Arne

That's a fair question, and one that can be confusing. I'm going to be repeating myself for emphasis, and to word it slightly different for clarity (hopefully).

Our inner experiences must be separated from how we talk about inner experiences, viz., what we mean by saying we have thoughts. So what we mean by a thought or thoughts is not connected with my having a thought/s. Again, experiences, or what we mean by experiences, is not dependent (in terms of meaning) on something inner. This is not to say that the inner experience isn't real, but only that what we mean by experience isn't dependent on inner awareness. So both words, and many others, thought and experience get their meaning from what we observe in each other; and these observations occur in the open. It's not like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box where we can't observe what's in the box, i.e., we can see what it is for someone to mean something by their words, because we all can observe the thing in the box.

Your question is: "If experiences are inner, how could thoughts about them not be inner?" Again, good question, but I'm not saying that there isn't something inner happening, or that we're not expressing something inner. And yes, you do experience thoughts about your experiences. Again, what we mean by these words is not dependent on what's inner in terms of meaning, so if what I mean by these words is strictly based on something completely subjective, then the words have no foothold, thus no sense.

It really comes down to how we are using these terms, so if someone thinks that they're going to understand what a thought is, or what an experience is by observing what's inner, then they're confusing how it is that we come to mean something by these words.

I agree.

Thank you for the clarification.

But I don't think this goes far enough. The inner/outer or public/private schema is driven, or perhaps haunted, by a personal criterion of epistemic access. What I mean here is that because it isn't possible to feel another's pain, the language cannot be about, or be have the meaning of, particular instances of pain, only pain insofar as it plays a part in language games. — fdrake

I'm not sure of your point here. Are you saying that we have knowledge of private experiences, i.e., "I know I'm in pain?" Let's clear this up first. Much of what your saying I agree with, but this isn't clear to me. I'm specifically referring to your use of the phrase "epistemic access."

Your welcome.

Another way to think of some of this is the following: First the public (in terms of language and meaning), then the private. We can use words to refer to the private, but only if they have a public use, and that we understand that public use/meaning. The problem is that we want to reverse the process, and we do it without realizing we're doing it. We may even acknowledge the public meaning of words, but we end up falling back into ascribing a private meaning without realizing it.

For example, I might say that I understand what thoughts are based on our shared meaning of the word, i.e., the language-games that give meaning to the word. However, I might then think that because I understand this - that I can go on to say that I understand thinking or thoughts by thinking about my own thought, i.e., by introspection. It's here that we can easily go astray.

Another important point to make is that just because people are using a word or words in a particular language-game, that doesn't mean that those words have sense. This is also true of context. There are language-games that are used in philosophy and theology that are senseless. For example, the use of the word soul by Christians. The way they use the word in their language-games, the word's meaning would be completely derived by the inner thing, something that's equivalent to the beetle-in-the-box. Note though that they're using the word/s in a particular context, and within their particular language-game, and yet they are using in incorrectly, i.e., it has no sense. This is not how the word soul is used outside their context or language-game; so language-games and context are definitely not absolute. It's much more nuanced than this. One has to look at the birth of the word among other things.

it really does work like that, the pupil stuff. — fdrake

ME: Don't do that stuff around here.
Him: I don't do stuff around here...
Me: Dude, your pupils are sooo big...
Him: He he. Ok.

The researchers claim that this increased pupil dilation “suggests increased cognitive ability, possibly due to inference-making.” Why do the researchers think this? They used millennials as a control.

Millennials - there's your problem, right there.

I'm not sure of your point here. Are you saying that we have knowledge of private experiences, i.e., "I know I'm in pain?" Let's clear this up first. Much of what your saying I agree with, but this isn't clear to me. I'm specifically referring to your use of the phrase "epistemic access." — Sam26

By epistemic access I imagine a relation between a person and thing such that the person can come to know the nature of the thing. Which is a bit of a fuzzy idea. What I'm trying to say with reference to epistemic access is that what is 'private' is beyond our reach - epistemically inaccessible - and what is public is not.

Then I'm trying to say that this is a bit weird, as that each sensation, disposition or emotion can be made equivalent to a series of expressive linguistic acts. The privation associated with any sensation is only the privation of the event of feeling only ever happening to one person, but absolutely nothing to do with the sense of speech acts about it. This works in the real use of language as if the privation can be circumvented by the use of language (which pace the Wittgensteinian background we're working in is language simpliciter) to treat my pain event as equivalent to another's pain event within a language game.

Another way to put this is the private/public distinction isn't something outside of language, we can go from one to the other by treating a sensation with language; expressing it. This renders the sensation equivalent to the expression despite that the sensation itself is not identical with the sense of the linguistic acts. Equivalence, there, is a rule to be followed and negotiated in talk of feelings and sensations.

It sounds like you're saying we have options in the way we talk about pain. For instance we could imagine a community that doesnt talk about pain at all. Surely their experiences of life would differ from ours.

Yet don't you believe these people will have something like the experience we call pain?

As an experiment, say we assembled 6500 people in a large hall, with each individual person speaking one of the 6500 languages of the earth. What I will do is place a black cat on a table on the stage for all to see. Everyone in the audience will see the same thing. However, each person will make different sounds, to describe what they see. This visual language is universal, but spoke language is not. There is no universal sound or noise for black cat, even though it looks the same for all, with each able to pick it out of a picture lineup.

The visual language is universal since eyes, optic nerves and the brain processing and assembling of data, works the same in all humans. These universal sensory languages use interchangeable parts, which are assembled into collective human patterns.

Although we all see the same thing; common sensory language, this internal data is not easy to transfer directly to others, since human brains do not have wireless connections. Audio language was developed as a way to transfer information, from the internal universal sensory languages, to people outside yourself.

For example, the scientist sets up and runs his experiment. He will watch, listen and smell, which is the same for any scientist running the same repeatable experiment. Translation for others comes last, using any of a number of subjective audio languages. Since these spoken and written languages are subjective and arbitrary; not universal, there is some loss during transfer. It is a good approximation, but not as good as being there, running the experiment, using universal sensory languages.

Say you were in the rain forest and discovered a new species of animal that is unique. There is no word for this, yet. However, the universal visual language nevertheless assembles the input data in your brain, so this new animal fits into patterns and/or categories. From this you give it a name. The invention of each word, started inside a person using one or more of the universal sensory languages.

I don't understand your post very well. Can you add some more detail please?

I don't understand this either Banno. If it's a joke I don't get the subtext.

I don't follow. "Soul" under the langauge game model would be sensical. It would mean that non-existent entity to which Christians believe a person's essence resides. That their internal thought varies from their public use (I.e. they believe it existent) would mean that meaning really isn't use only if you're willing to delve into the phenomenal state of Christians, something I thought you wouldn't do.

I was using Lewis to defend qualia. Funny.