Is a physical mental state a contradiction? To truly argue that, you would need to provide your understanding of the word "physical." — Uber
This is interesting. Have you read Hart's The Engines of the Soul? He supports Cartesian dualism and does so along with the incorporation of the idea that the relation between mind and body is to be modelled in terms of energy transference and (by implication) constraint. So, if Hart is right (and of course I'm not saying he is) energy conservation won't demarcate the material from the mental. I suppose it might still allow for some sense of demarcating the physical, but from what? The abstract maybe, but we can do that with just the idea that the physical is whatever has spatiotemporal location can't we?Thus I've done what few people in this forum seemed to have any interest in doing: provide a general definition of physical stuff that at the same time demarcates naturalism from supernaturalism. Clearly God should not be energetically constrained! And the soul can apparently survive for eternity after death. So, very much a reasonable dividing line between the two realms.
any particular physical state is necessarily associated with any particular mental state
Thus I've done what few people in this forum seemed to have any interest in doing: provide a general definition of physical stuff that at the same time demarcates naturalism from supernaturalism. Clearly God should not be energetically constrained! And the soul can apparently survive for eternity after death. So, very much a reasonable dividing line between the two realms. — Uber
The basic idea behind most of cognitive neuroscience these days is the functionalist one that what a mental state is can be defined in terms of what typically causes it and what it typically causes. — jkg20
A problem with the view that the physical is whatever has spatiotemporal location is that physicists increasingly believe time and space are themselves emergent properties of quantum entanglement. So my definition covers those systems too (ie. the things that give rise to space and time). — Uber
Yep, but if or when there are, they will be physical and treat of physical events which are not spatiotemporal, so @Uber is right that his idea of the physical in terms of energy constraints is more inclusive than mine in terms of spatiotemporal locations. Of course, if one day physics drops the notion of energy, seeing even energy as an emergent feature of something else then things become more complicated. Of course, I'm probably making a mistake there in even treating energy as a kind of stuff, I've heard some physicists compare it to an accounting device that just has to turn out to be balanced when calculations are made.Not sure there are any viable theories of an emergent space.
Yep, but if or when there are, they will be physical and treat of physical events which are not spatiotemporal, so Uber is right that his idea of the physical in terms of energy constraints is more inclusive than mine in terms of spatiotemporal locations. — jkg20
Why do you have to operate outside of reason in order to show that reason is amenable to a naturalistic treatment? There seems to be no obvious contradiction in supposing that we can use the tools of reason to investigate what reason is and how it surfaced. — MetaphysicsNow
Kant understood that both everyday life and scientific knowledge rests on, and is made orderly, by some very basic assumptions that aren't self-evident but can't be entirely justified by empirical observations. For instance, we assume that the physical world will conform to mathematical principles. Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that our belief that 'every event has a cause' is such an assumption; perhaps, also, our belief that effects follow necessarily from their causes; but many today reject his classification of such claims as “synthetic a priori.” Regardless of whether one agrees with Kant's account of what these assumptions are, his justification of them is thoroughly modern since it is essentially pragmatic. They make science possible. More generally, they make the world knowable. Kant in fact argues that in their absence our experience from one moment to the next would not be the coherent and intelligible stream that it is.
Kant claims that nothing in our experience is just “given” to us in a pure form unadulterated by the way we think. Our cognitive apparatus is always both receptive and active. Variations on this theme have become commonplace in modern philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and linguistics. What we call “facts” or “data” are theory-laden or concept-laden. Hegel, Nietzsche, Sellars, and Kuhn are among those who have developed this insight. Some, like Hilary Putnam, take it further, arguing that so-called facts are value-laden since how we apply concepts like causality reflects our interests. As William James famously remarked, “the trail of the human serpent is over everything.” 1
Because I associate "mental representation" with semantics, and "material representation" with physical signs, I would re-phrase your conclusion as follows:
The signs (in this case, recipes and specifications encoded in different languages, i.e., physical information) are completely different, but their associated semantic information is the same. — Galuchat
Monism doesn't preclude the possibility of a spiritual realm. — Galuchat
Anil Seth's predictive theory of consciousness addresses the major points that you raised. He literally sees the brain as a biochemical prediction machine. — Uber
. Reason is prior to any objective process. So then: how do we know that reason is prior to objectivity? Did you not use an objective process to determine that reason is prior to objectivity? — Uber
Interesting tidbit to remember here: even if you fully accept the argument from reason, it does not mean that naturalism is false. It just means that it's not a rational belief. But it could still be true. Plenty of irrational and unjustified beliefs can be true, and often are. — Uber
By not mixing up terms and equivocating. The information is stored as neural memory in the brain. — Uber
This point matters because you seem to be making the same mistake as Lewis, using a kind of theoretical (read: BS) definition of reason that does not apply to how human beings actually think. — Uber
I reject the subtle implication that philosophy only cares about the human condition. That narrows philosophy too much. As a matter of practice, philosophers also study the wider state of the world and try to make sense of it. — Uber
Thus a physical thing is anything that has constrained states of motion. — Uber
So, your question ("So how can the information be the same as the material representation?") doesn't make sense to me. — Galuchat
If I define "object" as "actuality", can noumena be called mental objects? I agree that "mind" per se, does not exist, however; as a mass noun, it is the label we attach to the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce its behaviour. So, calling it simply 'that which grasps meaning' is a gross oversimplification (which we can explore in greater detail if you like). — Galuchat
The reason I wanted to say mind is what 'grasps meaning' — Wayfarer
I suppose there is an issue about burden of proof here. The anti-naturalist seems to think that it is for the naturalist to show that his/her position is not self-refuting in some way, whilst the naturalist seems to think that it is for the anti-naturalist to show that it is self-refuting. I've not seen an argument to show who really has the burden of proof here. — MetaphysicsNow
Naturalism and ant-naturalism are just the dialectical poles that present two possible, or imaginable, perspectives. — Janus
So supernaturalists can be wrong in arguing transcendence over immanence, duality over unity. :) — apokrisis
Note how you are privileging perception over action. You are defining the dichotomy of subjective~objective in terms of an observer standing apart from the observable. So there is a representational paradigm at work here. And that is where the anti-naturalistic dualism stems from - this built-in sense that the mind stands apart from the world. — apokrisis
What are the structures and where do they exist? Ontologically, they are organized memory states in the brain. — Uber
the information only exists in your particular brain, but it's still physical. — Uber
You are thinking always from the point of view of the observer who stands outside nature. Your ontology is based on a transcending disconnect between the perceiving self and the actual world. — apokrisis
a proper naturalist sees consciousness in terms of habits of interpretance, embodied actions. The self and its world (or umwelt) emerge as triadic relation. That is the way to bridge a dualistic disconnect. — apokrisis
But a full four causes physicalism would include the idea of causation via top-down constraints. That is, formal and final cause as well. — apokrisis
Interesting tidbit to remember here: even if you fully accept the argument from reason, it does not mean that naturalism is false. It just means that it's not a rational belief. But it could still be true for other reasons. Plenty of irrational and unjustified beliefs can be true, and often are. — Uber
...but I think this approach can at least put to rest the interminable controversy over whether ontological priority belongs to mind or to matter, and leaves the way open for more interesting investigations. — Janus
True, but in a like sense naturalists could also be wrong in arguing immanence over transcendence or unity over duality (or plurality), since just as there is no transcendence without immanence and no plurality without unity, there is no immanence without transcendence or unity without plurality.
So...Hegelian sublation? — Janus
One can provide a sensible definition of physical things without worrying about the wavefunction and the measurement problem. Here is one candidate: a physical thing is any system subject to energetic constraints. These constraints could be conservation interactions for macroscopic systems, uncertainty principles for quantum systems (which covers any and all scenarios, regardless of whether the wavefunction actually exists or whether it's a mathematical construct), or any other constraint on how much energy a system can have or share with other systems. What is energy? They teach the kids that it's the ability to do mechanical work, but that ignores all other kinds of energy (heat, radiation, etc). The simplest and yet most universal definition of energy is this: different states of motion. This is the fundamental feature of all that exists. Over 90% of the mass-energy of a proton is fluctuating quantum fields; the rest is in the gluons, also furiously moving around. Thus a physical thing is anything that has constrained states of motion. Particles? Check? Fields? Check. Consciousness? Absolutely check. Try starving yourself and see how much rational thinking you can pull off.
Questions you might have:
1) Where do the constraints come from?
In the quantum case we don't always know, but it doesn't affect the reliability of my definition. All we need to be sure of is that these constraints are empirically valid, and the uncertainty principle most certainly is! Thank you 1000 experiments in quantum physics.
2) What is doing the moving?
If energy is motion, then we should want to know what's doing the moving. But having this knowledge also doesn't affect the definition. Let's say it's a car. Is the motion of the car somehow constrained? Absolutely yes. Let's say it's the sequence of thoughts inside your brain as you're reading this. Is the motion of the neurons in your brain constrained? Absolutely yes. The emergent consious states in your brain? Absolutely yes. If you seriously believe your ability to think has no constraints whatsoever, then see above. Or try to compute 3473.262427 x 2728292.9263 instantly without a calculator. Or try to think of fifty different and fully formed sentences in two seconds (fully formed and different, not vague notions or the same thing repeated!).
Thus I've done what few people in this forum seemed to have any interest in doing: provide a general definition of physical stuff that at the same time demarcates naturalism from supernaturalism. Clearly God should not be energetically constrained! And the soul can apparently survive for eternity after death. So, very much a reasonable dividing line between the two realms. — Uber
All we need to be sure of is that these constraints are empirically valid, and the uncertainty principle most certainly is! Thank you 1000 experiments in quantum physics. — Uber
I am saying that reason is always involved in this activity as a constituent of the process of cognition. How could it not be? That is how discursive thinking operates. So it can't be understood as the attribute of the brain as it transcends such objectification. — Wayfarer
I am saying that the naive scientific attitude is that there is an observer apart from the thing observed. Is that not the case? And isn't it the case that it was the 'observer problem' that came up in the early twentieth century that challenged that understanding? — Wayfarer
Well, what you're describing as 'a proper naturalism' might not be the mainstream view, which I think is considerably more 'mechanistic' than yours. — Wayfarer
You keep saying this, but what does it mean, in practice? Where does intention or intentionality enter the picture? Is that part of the schema at the outset, or does it only arise at the point where there are conscious agents? — Wayfarer
naturalism takes on that burden as epistemically foundational - nature is defined in terms of the observable. And supernaturalism has a history of equivocating. — apokrisis
A system that is closed for causation and yet also capable of open-ended complexification ... at least up until the time it runs out of sustaining resources. (ie: It is, in the end, a system closed for causation.) — apokrisis
And I would like everyone to remember the obvious (something often lost in philosophical debate): we are in a thread called the "non-physical." There's no way to even begin making sense of that unless we make some sort of sense of what's physical. And if the ultimate answer is "there's no way in hell to make sense of either one," then we are in a pretty terrible situation where hardly anything meaningful can be said about pretty much everything that is currently under discussion. It would all be a bunch of random people on the Internet talking past each other. It should be our group project to first come up with a good definition of physical. Doesn't have to be perfect, it just has to be good enough. — Uber
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