I can see no issue with defining as physical, everything that is subject to the laws of physics. And no, that isn't circular, because we know what the laws of physics are, to very high accuracy.
By tying down the physical to motion, don't we tie it down to the spatiotemporal at the same time? I was under the impression that you were trying to avoid that particular criterion for the reason that spacetime might be emergent.I could make things very metaphysically lean by saying something like this: physical things are just finite states of motion
What are counted as the laws of physics have changed and continue to undergo development, so you are okay that what counts as physical changes? — MetaphysicsNow
Also, what about other special sciences such as chemistry, biology and so on - are they studies of non-physical things? — MetaphysicsNow
why don't you class mathematics and logic as sciences — MetaphysicsNow
So far Uber's idea of linking the physical to energy conservation constraints seems the most promising. — MetaphysicsNow
Irrelevant. The point is that if you tie "laws of physics" to "current laws of physics" you rule out any further development. If you just mean "whatever becomes a law of physics" your original claim is vacuous because who knows what will be subsumed under future laws of physics in that sense.Remind me, when was the last time the Schrödinger equation changed?
I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. So, by your definition of physical, that would rule out chemical reactions as being physical. Unless, of course, you extend the scope of "physical law" to include laws of chemistry, and then I refer you to my previous post.You think chemicals don't obey the laws of physics?
So tom says that P entails that P?why don't you class mathematics and logic as sciences — MetaphysicsNow
Because they aren't.
How do you check for energy conservation?
Irrelevant. The point is that if you tie "laws of physics" to "current laws of physics" you rule out any further development. If you just mean "whatever becomes a law of physics" your original claim is vacuous because who knows what will be subsumed under future laws of physics in that sense. — MetaphysicsNow
I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. — MetaphysicsNow
I imagine it would depend on the circumstances - why, what's your point? — MetaphysicsNow
Show a little philosophical sophistication please, this is a philosophy forum after all. The fact that QM is useful and always will be does not entail it tells us anything about reality.Quantum mechanics will always work as well as it does, and nothing it has revealed to us about reality can be forgotten.
Show a little philosophical sophistication please, this is a philosophy forum after all. The fact that QM is useful and always will be does not entail it tells us anything about reality. — MetaphysicsNow
I think the laws of that cover chemical reactions do not reduce to the laws of physics - if by laws of physics you are specifically talking about the laws covering the so-called four fundamental forces. Certainly nobody has ever reduced them - the claim that they are so reducible is just that, a claim, and a pretty empty one at that. — MetaphysicsNow
Take the chemical laws of catalysis. Point me to the theoretical work that has reduced those to the laws of physics. If you are tempted to say "the laws of chemical analsys are laws of physics" then once again your argument that "the physical is what is the subject matter of physical laws" becomes "the physical is the subject matter of scientific laws", and then the question "Why aren't maths and logic sciences" remains one you have not addressed (other than to simply pronounce that they are not).You're not joking are you? I hope you are because the alternative is quite worrying.
Says the master of the technique of going silent when proved wrong.And you keep ducking the conservation of energy question, why?
Monism doesn't preclude the possibility of a spiritual realm. — Galuchat
I would have thought any monism would preclude the possibility of separate realms. — Wayfarer
Take the chemical laws of catalysis. Point me to the theoretical work that has reduced those to the laws of physics. — MetaphysicsNow
"Why aren't maths and logic sciences" remains one you have not addressed (other than to simply pronounce that they are not). — MetaphysicsNow
You don't use the principle of conservation of energy to check for the conservation of energy. You check for conservation of energy by measuring energy. — MetaphysicsNow
Says the master of the technique of going silent when proved wrong. — MetaphysicsNow
All great points. I identified some of these problems myself when I asked where do constraints come from and mentioned how in many cases we don't know. In some cases, certain constraints can be explained in terms of other constraints. For example, a limited version of the conservation of energy can be derived from Newton's third law. More general versions in classical physics can be derived through Noether's theorem, which relates continuous symmetries to conservation laws. But I admit that the idea needs more work and would be happy if you offered some suggestions to improve it. — Uber
In a general sense, I guess what I'm trying to do is put motion front and center, and then explain that things in the world can't just exist in any state of motion they like. The very concept is a bit tough for me to put into words. When I talk about actual constraints in physics, I can easily express them as equations or something to that effect. But I would want to avoid saying something like physical things are subject to equations that constrain energy, for the reasons you highlighted. — Uber
I could make things very metaphysically lean by saying something like this: physical things are just finite states of motion (ie. basically finite energy). And then when asked to explain what this means in the context of physics, I could delve into equations of constraint and things like that. Thoughts? — Uber
By the way, I am still waiting for the dualists to address the epistemological problem. The silence is deafening. — Uber
Firstly, on the "reduction" of chemical laws to physical laws, there has been a lot of research into looking into the quantum mechanical basis of catalytic behaviour. That's certainly true, and MN should take a look at it. However, although I admit not being right up to date with the latest research, my understanding is that there had been no straightforward mapping of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis to the Schrodinger Wave Equation. — jkg20
Secondly, although I have not come across the "Criterion of Demarcation" before, just looking it up very quickly shows that it is a disputable and disputed philosophical criterion for making a dividing line between the scientific and the non-scientific. I don't think any philosophical dispute is going to be settled by appealing to a disputed philosophical criterion. — jkg20
Thirdly, this notion of measuring energy. We don't directly measure energy, it is calculated. For instance, you measure the mass of an object and its velocity - given a frame of reference of course - and you can calculate its kinetic energy relative to that frame. But in one sense of "measure" that would be enough to measure the kinetic energy of the object. — jkg20
No, I'm suggesting that the phenomena modelled by the equations of a law such as the Bronsted Law of Catalysis have no currently settled quantum model. That's the way things were a few years ago anyway, perhaps there's been a break through that I'm not aware of. I know that the advances in the availability of computing power have been pushing things along, but there was still a way to go last time I looked. But don't get hung up on the chemistry angle, the same point MN is making could be made for other special sciences: there is no quantum mechanical model for natural selection of species for instance, but it's at least tempting to think that natural selection is a theory which concerns physical things and events.Are you claiming that what is happening in a catalytic reaction does not obey quantum mechanics?
We need to employ the laws of physics to calculate the energy.
the Scientific Method.
It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? — Uber
Cool but that automatically deflates the canonical versions of Platonism, including the fairy tale varieties on offer from Wayfarer, where reason just magically permeates the mind first, and then conjencture and criticism come later.
This is precisely why philosophers of math abandoned Platonic realism in droves after Benacerraf. — Uber
isn't it possible that spirit (a different domain) is somehow part of the mind-body equation which determines the behaviour of a human organism (a neutral monist substance)? — Galuchat
Cool but that automatically deflates the canonical versions of Platonism, including the fairy tale varieties on offer from Wayfarer, where universal reason just magically "permeates" (his accepted terminology) the mind first, and then conjecture and criticism come later. — Uber
Under the correspondence theory, logical statements are said to capture something intrinsic about material reality, and that's what makes them true. — Uber
Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. We do not see integers, or hold sets. Even geometric figures are not the kinds of things that we can sense. ...
Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.
The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight.
I'm not an atheist. The problem involved is too vast for our limited minds. We are in the position of a little child entering a huge library filled with books in many languages. The child knows someone must have written these books. It does not know how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child dimly suspects a mysterious order in the arrangement of the books but doesn't know what it is. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of even the most intelligent human being toward God. We see the universe marvellously arranged and obeying certain laws but only dimly understand these laws. — Albert Einstein, from Einstein: His Life and Universe, Walter Isaacson
I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. — Uber
I share the skepticism of saying that physical things are those things covered by the laws of physics. — Uber
You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. ... Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. — Uber
It is an argument against Platonic realism by Paul Benacerraf. — Uber
It boils down to a simple question, which can be asked in different ways: how can universals communicate their properties to the human mind if not through physical causation? And if they do so through the latter, how are they not physical? — Uber
There is no successful refutation of this problem by dualists. — Uber
You seem to be obsessed with the ontological nature of constraints. But I have already acknowledged that I don't really know where they come from or "what they are like." To echo Newton, I feign no hypothesis. Maybe God set them there. Maybe they are eternal and fundamental conditions of reality. Perhaps the most basic ones did not come from anywhere; they are just the default states of reality. I am perfectly content not knowing their "ultimate nature," to the extent that a concept like this makes any sense. To me what matters most, although it's not the only thing that matters, is that these constraints are validated through rigorous empirical observations. — Uber
Obviously I do not actually believe that mathematical equations have any causal powers. It's not like the uncertainty principle in the form of an equation is doing any kind of constraining. — Uber
But in order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? — Wayfarer
...providing us with a nice performative contradiction. — Janus
Modern Platonic realism is a form of idealism which does not, in itself, provided a good representation of dualism. Aristotle sufficiently refuted Pythagorean idealism, and the form of Platonic idealism which is basically the same as modern Platonic realism. — Metaphysician Undercover
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