With regard to compensating goods, what reasons or evidence are there to think that there are compensating goods for natural disasters that kill hundreds of thousands. Of course it's not impossible there are compensating goods but then nothing is impossible except formal contradictions.

I also want to ask something along the lines of how do we know that the good in this world doesn't simply make evil worse, e.g., by raising our expectations and hopes and then dashing them?

Firstly, as clarity, against an argument that God does not exist with the argument from evil, the theist need not prove that compensating goods do exist, the theist just needs to show that it is a possible explanation.

The compensating good for act of free will I think is pretty self evident.

The arguments on compensating goods for natural disasters are "no seeum" arguments.

Something along the lines of, if there was an abstract state of affairs that was a compensating good for some natural disaster would we be aware of it, and would we recognize it as such even if we were aware of it? Which leaves 3 possiblities:

We know the entire set of all possible abstract states of affairs - we would know a compensating good if we saw one, and there is none there - well since the set of abstract states of affairs are infinite this is clearly false.

We know a lot of possible abstract states of affairs, we would know a compensating good if we saw them, and we would recognize it as such - we don't see any, and we infer there are none - because we believe the sample size of the abstract we know of is large enough for us to know. Again - if the set is infinite - can you ever really feel confident you have enough data to form that inference?

Lastly - the infinite set of abstract states of affairs, could contain compensating goods, and even if we were aware of it, we may not recognize it as such.

So - the theist conclusion is there is at least a reasonable possibility that there are compensating goods that, if there, shows God could be operating in a moral way, could be all good, and allow for evil to exist.

I also want to ask something along the lines of how do we know that the good in this world doesn't simply make evil worse, e.g., by raising our expectations and hopes and then dashing them? — Michael Cunningham

just keep turning the coin over - how do we know that a positive outcome of the bad is it does not make the good better ???

Firstly, as clarity, against an argument that God does not exist with the argument from evil, the
theist need not prove that compensating goods do exist, the theist just needs to show that it is a
possible explanation.
Rank Amateur

I think I would agree with you that the logical possibility that there are compensating goods for evil prevents a deductive proof that an all-powerful and perfectly good God doesn't exist. However, not all arguments are aimed at deductive proof. If an atheist presents a large number of examples of natural evil, shouldn't it be incumbent on the theist to at least make a prima facie case that it's plausible to think there are compensating goods for a substantial portion of those evils? Otherwise, what reasons do we have for thinking there actually are some. That it's possible there are? But you claim that it's a "reasonable" possibility. I don't see any reasons. Anything is possible except a logical contradiction.

That's the point of my example about good causing evil. It's possible that "God" is a completely malevolent being who causes some good because the overall balance of evil is thereby greater. We have just as much reason to believe that God is malevolent as we have that God is benevolent. Would you agree with that? it seems to me that both arguments are the same.

With regard to free will, I'm less concerned about whether there are compensating goods. It seems to me that the key point is that, arguably, God is not responsible for evil that's the result of free will. Humans are. But I want to raise a couple issues in this regard: (1) Although I think that ultimately humans have a significant degree of free will, it's a lot more limited--by genetics and environment--than is apparent on the surface. Thus the free will defense defends God against being the cause of evil to a much lesser degree than many would think. (2) I think many theists, at least Christians, expect that God could, should, and does sometimes intervene against some free will-caused evil, e.g., in response to prayer. So wouldn't the noseeum defense also have to be brought into play for many free will-caused evils, e.g., the Jewish holocaust?

Thank you for taking the time to respond. I think it's a good discussion.

Although I think that ultimately humans have a significant degree of free will, it's a lot more limited--by genetics and environment--than is apparent on the surface. Thus the free will defense defends God against being the cause of evil to a much lesser degree than many would think. — Michael Cunningham

The issue with free will is, that free will itself is the compensating good. That it is a good that we are beings of free will, as opposed to some type of slave or puppet. The ability to chose freely leads to some of humans' greatest virtues. It they are not free choices, than they are not virtues. The problem is that if humans are free to chose - it brings in all the possibility of bad choices.

You issue of genetics or environment are to some large degree just observations of some continuum of a series of free will choices. More on this in a sec.

. If an atheist presents a large number of examples of natural evil, shouldn't it be incumbent on the theist to at least make a prima facie case that it's plausible to think there are compensating goods for a substantial portion of those evils? — Michael Cunningham

As above, well if you buy, as I do, that free will is a compensating good for evil acts of free will, that encompasses a great deal of them - For the others 2 points:

The first is are all evil due to natural disasters free of acts of free will? If you build your house on a cliff overlooking the ocean, is it an act of God or an act of free will if a storm knocks it into the ocean?

And this nature of causality can lead back to very small items that can have great impacts - the butterfly effect - my favorite example is suppose Winston Churchill's mother decided to sleep on a different side the night Churchill was conceived, maybe a different sperm would have fertilizes the egg, and an entire different human could have been born, and maybe Hitler would have won the war, and ....

The point is that we tend to look at individual acts, and use our limited cognitive abilities, and within our prejudices look for answers. So here are some questions along those lines.

The earthquake in Haiti kills thousands, some quite horrifically. How could God allow that to happen. Well if 10 years before that Bill Gates decided he didn't need all those billions of dollars he has and decided he wanted to return that side Hispaniola to its natural state and gave every body there $100,000 to move somewhere else. I understand that is crazy - but you get the point.

There are millions upon millions of human choices that if decided differently could have permeated into millions upon millions of different scenarios that could have changed the impacts or effects on much of the evil attributed to God. Awful storms kill thousands of people - the are awful storms on top of Mt. Everest almost every day - Is it the awful storm that kills or some chain of acts of free will that put the people in the way of the storm ?

Secondly - it is really not the main issue, or even needed by the theist - the main issue is cognitive difference between humans and God. And human hubris. In your point above you are just moving the issue of cognitive distance from - if there was a compensating good - would we be aware of it and recognize it, to, there is some right number of compensating goods that allow us to make a valid inference - and if there was such a right number we would be aware of it and recognize it as such. You are asking the same question in a different form.

Finally - again - the theist in these arguments has nothing to prove. The argument from evil is from the Atheist to the Theist - saying your theistic belief is not reasonable. The theist presents his case of compensating goods, based on cognitive distance as a reasonable explanation of how evil can exist, and God can be perfectly moral. And is not convinced his theistic belief is out side reason.

I agree that free will is a good start (though not more than that) that there can be compensating goods for evils. I'm still not sure that's the best defense of evils brought about free will. I take free will as a given. By definition, God is not responsible for evil caused by free will (though he could be expected to sometimes intervene to soften its evil results--that's what a lot of petitionary prayer is about). It seems unnecessary to show that there are compensating goods for free will. Are you saying that, because of the evil it allowed, God would not have given us free will if it did not contribute to greater good that non-free will? Then you're faced with the same computational problem as with natural evil. I'm more inclined to just give God a pass on free will evil and not do any computations. I'm not entirely sure we'd even be having a discussion like this if we didn't have free will--or at least the mental capacity that results in free will. We're having this discussion at least in part because we have free will about whether to believe that God exists. Hence we're morally culpable if God exists and we don't believe s/he exists.

I'm inclined to proceed like this. The starting point is that an all-powerful and perfectly good God would not permit evil. However, we then realize evil results in part from human free will--which we consider good. We also see the good that comes from at least some of the natural challenges that we face. They can help us develop and grow.

But then I have two serious problems: (1) even if all evils are outweighed by the good they create, aren't the means God uses often immoral? I don't think many of us would say that we should murder an innocent person so that several other innocent people can harvest her organs and continue to live. We can't defend the use of immoral means in order to create a greater good. Yet the argument, even if it doesn't necessitate the use of immoral means, clearly permits God to use immoral means. The only consideration is whether the means create greater good. Natural evil results in all kinds of death and suffering that is neither deserved nor fairly distributed. It sounds like God is thought of as an act utilitarian--though maybe not just in reference to humans. Through natural evil, God does countless things that we would put people in jail for.

(2) While some degree of natural suffering might be good for an individual, it seems implausible that hideous amounts of pain are good for that individual. It's "pointless" at least so far as that individual goes. Either the good result could have been achieved with much less pain, or the treatment destroys the patient, or the pain is an immoral means of obtaining the good result.

Anyway, I'm inclined to say that, for natural evil, any non-trivial amount of evil that meets the criteria in (1) or (2) above falsifies the proposition that God is perfectly good unless and until the theist can show (or at least make a plausible case) both that the natural evil is not immoral and that it is not pointless. The burden of proof shifts to the theist. That's how science works. It's an empirical argument. The skeptic has not "proven" deductively that God is not perfectly good, but s/he's overcome whatever evidence the theist has for saying that God is perfectly good. The logical possibility that God is perfectly good is not evidence that God is perfectly good.

How would you argue against the claim that God is a completely malevolent being who uses good to increase the amount of evil? The atheist could say that it's logically possible and therefore s/he does not need to show that there are compensating evils for the good that exists.

I wonder if the main point of saying it's logically possible that God is perfectly good is to allow room for faith, ie, simply believing that God is perfectly good without any reasons--except perhaps revelation in the Bible. Many theists don't want to be irrational in the sense of believing things that are formal contradictions, like God creating a round square. Using a noseeum argument to show it's logically possible that God is perfectly good, despite widespread evil, keeps theists from having to believe a formal contradiction. Then faith/belief enters the scene.

Thomas Aquinas made the impossibility of infinite regress arguments for God. Science found that to be true in the last century.

Thanks, will take the general agreement on the free will defense.

The argument on evil due to natural disaster is less direct. It is based on the congnative distance between God and man. You argument above has an implied premise that if there was a compensating good, we would see it, and recognize it as such. That may not be true. There is much good in the world, do we know the cause for all of it?

If you were watching 2 chess masters playing, and one lost a bishop early in the match, you may interpret that as a bad thing, yet it may have been a well planned loss in a strategy.

A bold discussion topic. Certainly one of the most interesting topics. I have been engaged in it most of my life. But when people begin talking about "proving" the existence/non-existence of God, I move on until the silliness passes. However, one of the issues that really does get me arguing is the oft unstated and mistaken presumption that reason and/or science are on the side of the non-believer. Reason and/or science are neutral on the issue.

You argument above has an implied premise that if there was a compensating good, we would see it, and recognize it as such. That may not be true. — Rank Amateur

Excellent point. I never heard anyone say they took the bad things in life for granted until they were gone. I have a roof over my head, I have food in my cupboard, I have gas in my car, and all I have to complain about is others may not be as fortunate and the weather was not so good today.

As many have said, it's critical to define what is meant by "God." I could define "God" as the laptop I'm using right now and prove to myself that "God" exists. — Michael Cunningham

As true as that may be, there is no real issue with that. If you wanted to define your laptop as God and then prove God existed, I am confident many (if not most) would shy away from engaging with you on the issues.

I am inclined to shy away from believers who feel the need to share their definition (of arguably the indefinable) while I am inclined to engage with believers who feel no such need.

Before talking about whether God exists, one must define what God is? — Corvus

Why?

I am confident of the existence of entities (though I do not think of God as an entity) on Jupiter and you may rest assured I cannot define them.

I agree with you regarding the being of the absence of the cup in a fashion. If there is a cup (an entity), then its presence or absence is a modal sate of its being. And the modal state of the being of an entity can affect the totality of involvements of a being in the world (in this case, perhaps a person who expected to use the cup and it was the only cup they had so they have to go to work without their coffee and that put them into a mood that affected their entire day). And in a cause and effect world, all causes are reducible to entities. Therefore, the absence of the cup is a causal entity in shaping the day of the person who expected the presence of the cup. And that is my understanding of Heideggerian ontology.

I think I would consider myself an agnostic with regards to the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, creator of the cosmos.

A god with the 4 omnis is a logically incoherent concept. It is impossible for it to exist so it is silly to be "agnostic" about it. You can make the positive claim that it doesn't exist. I see atheists all the time retreating to calling themselves "agnostics" because they are afraid to defend their position.

A god with the 4 omnis is a logically incoherent concept. — GodlessGirl

Why?

Why? There are lots of reasons. I will give you 2 for now.

1)Omnipotence alone is incoherent because of the omnipotence paradox. Can an omnipotent being create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it.

2) Omnipotence and omniscience together is impossible. If the god knows every true proposition about the future then he already knows everything he will do and cannot do otherwise. The omnipotent being cannot does not have the power to do anything different in the future then he already believes he will do.

If you think you have a refutation to either of these I will be happy to crush you.

If you think you have a refutation to either of these I will be happy to crush you. — GodlessGirl

:snicker:

Yeah so do you have a response?

The omnipotence paradox is a straw man, since it requires that God have a logically incoherent power. God could only be omnipotent if he lacked the power to do something that was logically possible. Demanding God do the logically impossible is like demanding he design a square circle.

The omniscience paradox is once again a straw man. For one, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then the capacity for God to change his mind would be logically impossible. But for classical theists, God is eternal and outside of time, so it is inappropriate to speak of God "making choices".

Furthermore, if you insist that God have the ability to bring about logical incoherency, then you have done a major disservice to your own atheism, because God can now bring it about that he exists, despite your arguments that attempts to prove that he doesn't. If God can make contradictions true, then he can make it true that he exists regardless of whatever argument you have.

The omnipotence paradox is a straw man, since it requires that God have a logically incoherent power. God could only be omnipotent if he lacked the power to do something that was logically possible. Demanding God do the logically impossible is like demanding he design a square circle. — darthbarracuda

I don't think anyone demands anything here, do they? :)
All there is to go by is a definition, there isn't anything to point at which makes us go "omnipotent!".

Simply declaring that X can do exactly what is logically possible, does not really solve the conundrum, but just pushes it one out and leaves it hanging there.
You still have to decide whether X can create anything or X can lift anything, because X seemingly cannot do both, yet omnipotence means both.
(That's an exclusive or by the way.)
Recall, we only have these weird definitions to go by.
So, both (create and lift), one and not the other (create or lift), or neither; you have four options to deal with.

Where things get even more hairy is when defining that X is atemporal.

The omniscience paradox is once again a straw man. For one, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then the capacity for God to change his mind would be logically impossible. But for classical theists, God is eternal and outside of time, so it is inappropriate to speak of God "making choices". — darthbarracuda

Right, atemporal renders decision-making impossible or incoherent.
Moreover, it seems that minds are strongly temporal altogether, meaning that an atemporal mind (and atemporal sentience) is equally impossible or incoherent.
(Poll: God is an incorporeal mind that's not spatiotemporal)
Something atemporal would inherently be inert and lifeless, maybe like abstract objects?

Supposing that X is temporal, on the other hand, does lead to something odd about "changing one's mind" while also being omniscient.
(Note, this is not about human "free will", but rather X's own "changing X's mind".)

1) It isn't a strawman. I am merely pointing out the problem with "omnipotence" It is logically possible to make a stone so heavy you cannot lift it. A human can do it. So you are saying god cannot do what a human can but god is infinitely powerful? LOL! When you say god cannot do it because his omnipotence would make it a contradiction you are saying that god is limited by his nature. So I point you to Plantinga's McEar argument (you seem like somebody who has never heard any of the arguments against their position). If what omnipotent means to you is that god can do anything that is in his nature to do then a being who the only thing in it's nature to do was scratch it's ear and it was able to scratch it's ear then by your definition it is omnipotent. LOL!

It isn't a strawman. I am merely pointing out the problem with omnipotence. It is NOT logically impossible to make a stone so heavy you cannot lift it. A human can do it. So you are saying an all powerful god cannot do what a human can do. That god is limited by it's nature but it's still omnipotent? By that definition any being that can do anything that is in it's nature to do is omnipotent. I point you to Plantinga's argument McEar. The only thing in McEar's nature to do is scratch his ear and he is able to do that so by your definition he is omnipotent. That is silly.

Uh...if god's thoughts do not occur in succession that means he doesn't change his belief about what time it currently is. He is omniscient but he doesn't know what time it is? LOL!!!

LOL!

I don't debate trolls, sorry.

I believe that any successful endeavour to define 'God' must begin with a proper definition. However, according to the most common declaration that 'God is Omni-Scient/Potent/Present', I would venture that the proposition is true. Is not EXISTENCE/LIFE Omni-Scient/Potent/Present? (Scientists refer to it as Energy, Religion as God, etc.)

There are lots of reasons. I will give you 2 for now.

1)Omnipotence alone is incoherent because of the omnipotence paradox. Can an omnipotent being create a rock so heavy he cannot lift it.

2) Omnipotence and omniscience together is impossible. If the god knows every true proposition about the future then he already knows everything he will do and cannot do otherwise. The omnipotent being cannot does not have the power to do anything different in the future then he already believes he will do. — GodlessGirl

I think an omnipotent being (if such existed) can create a very heavy rock and refuse to lift it. It does not affect the omnipotency.
Omnipotence, Omniscience, Omnipresence are absolutes. Therefore, they are all identical. That is omnipotence=omniscience=omnipresence=any other absolute. Usually those who profess religion just like to use many words to say simple things or maybe its an attraction to grand gestures, who knows?

If a person knew they would go to work the next day, does it stop them from going to work? It also, does not prevent the person from doing something different. There is a lot of intelligence, if not wisdom, in knowing and doing.

I'm not advocating for the truth behind the existence of a 'religious' GOD, but I think it's unfair to discount something you do not know. Where are the facts, either in support or against?

Omnipotence entails that God can lift all objects that can possibly exist. An object that God cannot lift is therefore (broadly) logically impossible. Therefore his inability to create something he can't lift does not constitute a problem because omniscience does not entail doing that which is logically impossible.

God can't do something that humans can do (i.e. humans can create things that they can't lift). i.e. God can't make himself non-omnipotent. No problem here either: Omnipotence is part of God's nature. He can't be both omnipotent and ~omnipotent - that would be a contradiction.

the first question i will ask is this ...... if god is the alfa and the omega ..... he is everything within and without ...... how can you or anyone possibly fathom the depth of what you are trying to reduce to a 3 letter word .

in my opinion that is the first issue with the concept of god , it is limited by nature ..... why don't we try to explain what love is in 3 words lets see how descriptive we can get ....... you cannot use a word and describe that which is does not occupy neither time nor space


i have heard the same concept called energy , universal energy , Being , the unmanifested .... whatever name you assign to it simply not only will it not properly describe it , it will open the door for arguing ...because how do you look at an event with infinite depth and think you have a clue on how to describe it without it coming into conflict with the other 7 billion people that think they have god on lock down as well ......

good and evil are human concepts ....these terms do not exist beyond our minds .... you will not find an evil animal nor a good one ..... things are as they are , our judgment of an event or situations is what assigns a value of good or evil ...and those concepts are open to interpretation depending on which side of the fence you are standing on .....

if you want to know that which we should not try to describe , it will not be found through concepts and science .... it cannot be rationalized nor quantified .... for one simple reason. The mind is limited by time and space ...it cannot grasp beyond those boundaries ...... but .... we can feel and that is the only access you have at experiencing "god" and when you do , it will require no answers because you won't have any questions .


these answers are in every single person on earth ..... once you strip your self and your experiences , you accept life as is and forgive every moment ... you will enter a new state ...whether you want to call it a shift in consciousness , finding god or whatever term suits you best does not matter .... there is no difference between god and you ... it is one and the same .... the mind is the one that needs to go back to the toolbox where it belongs.

the truth is one ..... how people try to describe it , that is the issue . :)