As for metaphysics, of course it can't be proven that one metaphysics is true, and the others are false, because, for one thing, most are designed to unfalsifiably predict the same world and observations.

But some principles that apply to science also apply to metaphysics:

Definitions should be explicit, and consistently used.

A need for assumptions and one or more brute-facts discredits a metaphysics.

...as do unverifiability and unfalsifiability.

It doesn't prove it false, but it discredits it.

For example, Materialism doesn't hold up well by those standards.

My uncontroversial metaphysics does.

Michael Ossipoff
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I get it that people who have grown up into or adopted a scientific disposition may be a bit uncomfortable with propositions that are not amenable to empirical confirmation. — Arne

How are you defining empirical evidence? Isn't the rational method of philosophy just like the rational method of science in that one puts forward some reasonable general concept and then suggest that these kinds of particular consequences will serve as the truth-makers?

Science defines itself more by narrowing its domain to the physical or natural - speculative generalisations that might actually get cashed out in terms of perceptible particular consequences.

Or indeed, being more rigorous, science prizes mathematically framed conceptions in which the particulars are now numbers read off dials. Philosophy is happy with actual perceptions - what you might think you see, hear, touch and feel. Even a sense of "hey that is correct" - a psychological registering of a jolt of certainty - counts as the empirical validation for the reasonableness of some proposition.

But science is different in reducing the scope of the empirical to acts of measurement - numbers read off dials.

Sure we still need our eyes to do that. But epistemically, which of these activities are more withdrawn from concrete claims about the world, more reliant on modelled conceptions of what is the case?

The good old rational vs empirical divide soon breaks down on closer examination. Science is different largely due to the degree it reduces the empirical to an almost entirely idealist or conceptualised basis. Philosophy is either a case of anything goes - a form of cultural self-expression like poetry. Or where it gets rigorous itself, a more general polishing up of the habits of logical and critical thinking.

The ability to make well-formed propositions - that can be tested even in everyday life without instruments and experiments - is still a generally useful educated skill.

are you making your own statement or do you want me to answer questions? If it is the former, there is little in your statement I disagree with. If it is the latter, I would prefer to answer one question at a time. Please advise.

How are you defining empirical evidence? — apokrisis

I suspect mostly the same as you. Amenable to some form of measurement resulting from replicable procedures. And as empirically minded as the Greeks may have been, nobody ever expected Plato to provide empirical evidence of his ontological theories.

are you making your own statement or do you want me answer questions? — Arne

I want to start an argument obviously. That is going to be hard if you won't disagree. :)

indeed. Though I conceded the overlap in my very first sentence.

Isn't the rational method of philosophy just like the rational method of science in that one puts forward some reasonable general concept and then suggest that these kinds of particular consequences will serve as the truth-makers? — apokrisis

Yes. The rational method of philosophy and science share the same procedures for establishing propositions. However, the scientific approach rejects as non-scientific any and every proposition which is not at least in theory amenable to scientific proof. Philosophy does not do the same.

And unlike philosophy and with the possible exception of QM, the rational method of philosophy is not the only method of philosophy. Please see Thus Spake Zarathustra by F.W. Nietzsche.

In some ways, the rationale method of philosophy is continually over thrown yet always makes a comeback. it is the Freddie Kreuger of philosophical methods.

I suspect mostly the same as you. Amenable to some form measurement resulting from replicable procedures. — Arne

Fair enough. I'm reacting mostly from the point of view that sees a common method to what we mean by "rational thought".

CS Peirce in particular pinned it down as the three steps of abductive hypothesis, deductive reasoning and inductive confirmation. So creative leaps, formal logical expression, then a checking against reality ... whatever that then means. (Pragmatism being clear what it means, and science being distinctive in following that on the whole.)

And unlike philosophy and with the possible exception of QA, the rational method of philosophy is not the only method of philosophy. Please see Thus Spake Zarathustra by F.W. Nietzsche. — Arne

Seems like we are too much on the same page. Sigh.

(It won't last.)

I think Einstein is an excellent example of overlap. Though he was educated as a physicist, he was a philosopher. His theories did not derive from empirical evidence obtained from a laboratory. He worked in a patent office. Instead, his theories were derived in large part from his obsessive nature, his interest in physics, and his almost child-like imagination. And when he published those theories, they were met with very strong opinions of agreement or disagreement. But they were not met with demands for "proof." Instead, most of the ensuing empirical "proof" regarding his theories was provided by scientists who developed clever experiments for that very purpose. — Arne

While I agree with the gist of this - there is a conspicuous philosophical backbone in Einstein's theories - Einstein was not a metaphysician working in some rarefied abstract sphere. He was very well aware of contemporary developments in science, and his first major works were motivated by specific problems in physics, both experimental (the Brownian motion, the photoelectric effect) and theoretical (Maxwell's electrodynamics and its apparent inconsistency with the relativity of speed, the ultraviolet catastrophe). Arguably, his General Relativity was motivated more by philosophical considerations than any specific problems known at that time.

He was very well aware of contemporary developments in science, — SophistiCat

I conceded the overlap in my first sentence. My experience tells me that those interested in philosophy are more likely to be aware of developments in science than the average person and that those interested in science are more likely to be aware of the history of philosophy than the average person.

Most philosophy is not data drive while some is. Most science is data driven while some is not. And that matters when discussing science and that matters when discussing philosophy.

And besides, we all know the person demanding "proof" rarely makes such demands regarding ideas they agree with. In that sense, it is a form a fallacious reasoning that relieves the person making the demand of their philosophical duty to make a counter argument and to actually give some thought to ideas they do not like.

It is fallacious in the sense the it's motivation is to suggest that the argument being made is to be dismissed for reasons that have nothing to do with the soundness of the argument. And that is anti-philosophical.

I think we’re all in furious agreement here, Arne. Many scientists and philosophers would also concur. I think the gist of your argument is really directed against ‘scientism’, which is precisely the attitude that philosophical views require scientific evidence. Hopefully some advocate of that attitude will turn up to make it a contest. :smile:

You nailed it. "Scientism" is the word. Thank you. :smile:

You’re welcome Arne. And also, belated welcome to the Forum. I’m enjoying your posts.

I want to start an argument obviously. That is going to be hard if you won't disagree — apokrisis

I disagree.

You couldn't be more WRONG!!

Starting an argument with me is as easy as riding a bicycle.

And when I knock you off of that bicycle, you need to just back on keep going until I knock you off again.

My only worry about this kind of approach is that it defines the relation between science and philosophy negatively: the one is not the other. I think this is fair, as far as it goes, but I think the more properly philosophical approach would be to offer a positive account of their relation. If philosophy does not depend on proof, what then, is the place for 'proof' in philosophy? Basically I think simply saying 'philosophy is not science' is only a half-position. It calls for more.

I agree.

I am a research scientist though by education I am a lawyer. I work for a company who has acontract with the EPA. We assess and code scientific papers. Very of few of the papers meet our criteria for coding. There are very few papers rejected for lack of empirical proof. There are many papers rejected because there method is unsound. And most of those rejected as unsound contain sufficient empirical proof.

For me, I always considered the greatest common ground is the focus upon the nature of reality (philosophy?) and/or the reality of nature (science?).

By asking about the place of proof in philosophy, you have sort of answered your own question. But I would rephrase as what is philosophy's place in relation to scientific proof. And first and foremost, it is not philosophy's place to provide it. And for the most part, science adequately self polices itself regarding its own standards of proof.

And consistent with my OP, I assert it is philosophy's place to discuss when and where a demand for "proof" is reasonable, unreasonable, helpful, harmful, necessary, unnecessary, made in good faith, intended to obstruct, and so on. . .

Perhaps the thread will go in some of those directions.

I guess we will see.

↪Wayfarer
You nailed it. "Scientism" is the word. Thank you. :smile: — Arne

I'm not a proponent of Scientism, but I am a passionate defender of it's right to be considered just as valid a philosophical position as any other, so I will try to make a defence of it here.

The problem comes down to philosophical statements about philosophy - meta-philosophy, my area of interest. What you're saying is that demanding proof of a philosophical statement is meaningless because it deals only with that realm which cannot be proven. This sounds perfectly sensible on the surface, but the problem arises in two main areas.

Firstly, the cry of "proof!" may well be levied in a philosophical argument, but what it often means is that the propositions has strayed into the territory of science. Consider as simple example of ordinary language philosophy. A counter-argument might run... "...but that's just not how we use the word 'x'". Here the ordinary language philosopher might either have cause to adapt their theory, but equally they might quite rightly cry "proof!". After all, language use is a thing in the real world, it can be measured. Dictionaries spend millions on research to work out that exact question, 'what does a word mean to the language users?', so a demand of proof to the counter-argument that the word is simply not used some particular way is not entirely unreasonable.

You can see how this extends in phenomenology, free-will, determinism, conciousness - in all these areas philosophers are very prone to making statements which rely on some empirical data which may or may not actually be the case, but is treated as if it is for the sake of the argument.

Second, there's the meta-position itself. Again, I think you might be misreading what the cry of "proof!" actually implies. In this second instance it's being used in the positivist sense that "if you cannot provide proof, then your statement is meaningless". Again, I wouldn't adopt this position myself, but I would defend it's right to be considered a valid position by the very token you're trying to use. On what grounds could you categorically dismiss the proposition that "all statements (except this one) about 'the way things are' without empirical proof of things actually being that way, are meaningless". You certainly couldn't dismiss it on the grounds of empirical evidence - you can't measure meaning. You could dismiss it as self-referential, but on what grounds can you categorically dismiss self-referential statements. The liar paradox, for example, can be solved for particular modalities (see Tarski) and that's a self-referential statement so they're not intrinsically impossible to analyse.

Basically, I think you mis-characterise Scientism. It's just saying that statements in public discourse about 'the way things are' should be empirically falsifiable. You may not agree, I certainly don't, but what you can't do is dismiss the position and yet still claim that those who hold it are unable to similarly dismiss other philosophical propositions as meaningless.

I'm not a proponent of Scientism, but I am a passionate defender of it's right to be considered just as valid a philosophical position as any other. — Pseudonym

There’s no meaningful distinction between ‘propounding’ and ‘defending’.

the cry of "proof!" may well be levied in a philosophical argument, but what it often means is that the propositions has strayed into the territory of science — Pseudonym

That’s what it must mean, for your argument to have any cogency. It’s the only argument you have.

Again, I wouldn't adopt this position myself, but I would defend it's right to be considered a valid position by the very token you're trying to use — Pseudonym

More double-talk. ‘I would say X, but X’.

Are you suggesting that you hold no positions to be valid yet not persuasive to you personally? That every position you hear must be categorised in those which you either wholeheartedly support and those which you deny outright? That really is a more dogmatic stance than I thought even you capable of.

The first five words of my post are "Though I concede an overlap"

Your third sentence says "What you're saying is that demanding proof of a philosophical statement is meaningless because it deals only with that realm which cannot be proven." Emphasis added.

1. At no point did I say it was meaningless. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of my argument is that a demand for empirical "proof" is less likely (perhaps significantly so) to be valid within the realm of philosophy than in the realm of science. Consequently, there is reason to suspect the demand may be less meaningful in one realm than in another. So your claim that I said a demand for proof is meaningless is at best an unreasonable interpretation of my position.

2. And staying within just your third sentence. At no point did I say that philosophy deals "only" with propositions that cannot be proven. What I did say is "by and large" those are the types of statements with which philosophy deals.

I also went on to say to the effect that most of philosophy is not data driven though some is while most of science is data driven though some is not.. So even if you mistakenly interpreted me as meaning "only" when I clearly did not say only, such an interpretation is clearly unreasonable in light of what I actually said.

So we are only into your third sentence and you have offered two extreme terms to characterize my non-extreme position and you have offered two unreasonable interpretations of what I actually did say. As a result and with all due respect, would it be unreasonable for me to suspect that you may be trying to make my position appear more extreme than it is? I sure hope you are not doing that.

I'm not sure what my countering with the majority parts of your statements as opposed to the entirety has to do with the argument.

As I understand it, you are taking issue with people demanding proof of philosophical propositions, yes? So, I'm saying, of those situations you are taking issue with, many fall into one of two camps, both of which can actually be defended.

I haven't, to my knowledge, made any comment whatsoever about your view of the division between philosophy and science nor on the totality or otherwise of your definitions thereof.

1. At no point did I say it was meaningless. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of my argument is that a demand for empirical "proof" is less likely (perhaps significantly so) to be valid within the realm of philosophy than in the realm of science. Consequently, there is reason to suspect the demand may be less meaningful in one realm than in another. So your claim that I said a demand for proof is meaningless is at best an unreasonable interpretation of my position. — Arne

So, if I understand this correctly, you're saying that some calls for proof may be less valid in philosophy than they would be in science. I think that's a fairly uncontroversial proposition, but I'm struggling to see then why you would be "always a bit pained when I see a reasonably argued philosophical proposition met with the simple demand "proof."", and entreat us "If you disagree with a reasonably argued philosophical proposition, then make a reasonable counter argument. But do not demand "proof."". These sound very unlike the conclusions one would draw simply from a realisation that some philosophical propositions do not lend themselves to proof. Surely the excersice here should be to take issue with each request for proof on its merits then, rather than damn the entire practice to purgatory.

would it be unreasonable for me to suspect that you may be trying to make my position appear more extreme than it is? I sure hope you are not doing that. — Arne

You have said that you are always pained when you see a philosophical position met with a demand for proof. You have entreated us to "not demand proof", and when Wayfarer described you view as opposing the position "that philosophical views require scientific evidence" you responded affirmatively. Given this, and that the idea that "some philosophical propositions do not require empirical proof" is pretty much globally accepted already, I don't think is was entirely uncharitable of me to interpret your position as I did.

A demand for "proof" is not a counter argument to a reasonably argued philosophical proposition. Instead, it is a red herring and you know it.

A demand for "proof" is not a counter argument to a reasonably argued philosophical proposition. Instead, it is a red herring and you know it. — Arne

Whereas arguing that "... it is a red herring and you know it" is a much more reasonable example of a counter argument?

Whereas arguing that "... it is a red herring and you know it" is a much more reasonable example of a counter argument? — Pseudonym

No. It is a simplification of my thesis.

Going forward, there is no need for you to continue telling me what I am saying. I know what I am saying.

If you want to argue with what I say rather than what you say I am saying, feel free to do so.

But if you want to argue with what you say I am saying rather that with what I am saying, you will be arguing with yourself.

Have a good weekend.

If you want to argue with what I say rather than what you say I am saying, feel free to do so. — Arne

I'm having great trouble understanding what it is you're saying. As far as I can gather from your recent post, your argument is that some philosophical proposition are not amenable to the demand for proof, yet some are. You also seem to be accusing those who make demands for proof of disingenuity. This is where I'm getting lost. If you agree with the proposition that some philosophical propositions are amenable to demands for proof (the second half of your first proposition), then you are in complete agreement so far with those you seem "pained" by. They too evidently believe that some philosophical propositions are amenable to demands for proof, namely the ones about which you are debating.

So, if I understand this correctly, you're saying that some calls for proof may be less valid in philosophy than they would be in science. — Pseudonym

I can't help but wince a little every time I read something about proof in science in this thread. It's like the Scientific Method never happened.

I think you can safely assume that all parties are using the term 'proof' in the wider sense in which it is used in discourse rather than the narrower sense in philosophy of science. That's certainly how I've understood it in any case. I take it to mean simply that one should provide some measure of correspondence with repeatable inter-subjective sense data, not that one must provide the final and incontrovertible data that demonstrates something is the case.

I'm having great trouble understanding what it is you're saying. — Pseudonym

You are free to read it as many times as you wish.