I agree with this absolutely. One of the motivations I had with picking a bone with Sam26 was to draw attention to the undercurrents of language. There's a lot of expressive, delicious and vital parts of language use that are pulled along by them. — fdrake

I actually agree with much of what you're saying. However, maybe what you're observing about my concentration on particular Wittgensteinian ideas, is not that I, or anyone else, is neglecting other important aspects of language, but that this emphasis is important to our understanding of philosophy. There are always other things that can be pointed out as important, and one should point them out.

I'm sure if we continue, we will find areas of disagreement as you probably have already. That's what makes the sharing of these ideas fun, and sometimes ego crushing. I know it pushes me up against the limits of what I think I know.

I agree with this absolutely — fdrake

That's a relief!

My posts tried to achieve this by situating the public/private distinction within the use of language — fdrake

Yes, I think it's an interesting move, and wanted to say that something similar happens with semantic distinctions that formally would require a meta-language. You might also look at Lewis's scorekeeping this way: the domain of discourse should be fixed before we start predicating, assigning truth-values, and so on, but instead the domain of discourse is (implicitly) negotiated as we go.

However, maybe what you're observing about my concentration on particular Wittgensteinian ideas, is not that I, or anyone else, is neglecting other important aspects of language, but that this emphasis is important to our understanding of philosophy. — Sam26

I think that's a fair appraisal of it. What do you think the differences in our viewpoints are?

Moreover, if I make a claim that a word is not used correctly, it's incumbent on me to demonstrate how it's incorrect. I've been making the claim that Christians generally use the word soul incorrectly, because much of the time it's exactly like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box. — Sam26

It might be incumbent on you to demonstrate this. But seriously, how do Christians use this word incorrectly, or how is it like Wittgenstein's beetle? It has an established usage among Christians, AFAIK.

I'm not necessarily criticizing your post, but only pointing out that use is not always a good indicator of the correct use of a word. Some people who read Wittgenstein necessarily equate meaning with use when it's not always the case. This same problem arises when we say that meaning has to be seen in context; and while it's true that both of these play an important role, we don't want to be absolutist about it.

The word correct has it's own problems, but generally we know if someone is using the word pain correctly or incorrectly. If for e.g., I'm learning English words and I confuse the use of the word pain with being happy, then it's clearly incorrect. This of course doesn't always mean that it's clear that a word is used correctly, sometimes people are just confused about the use of a word. Moreover, if I make a claim that a word is not used correctly, it's incumbent on me to demonstrate how it's incorrect. I've been making the claim that Christians generally use the word soul incorrectly, because much of the time it's exactly like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box. — Sam26

Ah, I understand 'use' differently from you I think; all the cases of 'pain' I briefly profiled count as 'uses', and none of them are either 'correct' or 'incorrect': they are simply uses simpliciter. One can speak of the 'correct use' of a word of course, but this is not how I understand Wittgenstein's own deployment of the term (in the context of 'meaning is use in a langauge-game'). The contrast-space of 'use' here would simply be something like 'not-a-use in a langauge-game, rather than 'incorrect use'. Like Luke, I don't really understand why the Christian use of the term 'soul' would not count as a use. One can argue that there are particular incorrect uses of the term from the point of view of a particular, historically-established langauge-game, but this would be largely trivial.

I think that's a fair appraisal of it. What do you think the differences in our viewpoints are? — fdrake

I'm going to turn the question around, since it's you who had the bone to pick. :razz:

It might be incumbent on you to demonstrate this. But seriously, how do Christians use this word incorrectly, or how is it like Wittgenstein's beetle? It has an established usage among Christians, AFAIK. — Luke

Yes, it's an established use among Christians, but just because something is part of a language-game, that doesn't mean it's correct usage, or more importantly that it has sense. My contention is that it has no sense, however, I'm open to another way of looking at it.

My point is that the way Christians use the word is exactly like the beetle analogy. They refer to this thing that's a soul, but what is it that they're referring too? Let's assume the beetle analogy for a minute. I can say many things about it in the abstraction, it's that part of me that continues after my death, or that it's this or that, but there's no way to confirm it. When I use the word pain there are outward signs that confirm that inner experience or thing, but there is nothing that can be associated with the word soul as used by Christians. Meaning is established as a rule-based agreement amongst people, and along with that, is the idea of being correct or incorrect. How do we know if we're even referring to the same thing?

If you trace the use of the word soul, and the way it's been used historically (outside of religion), it refers to the animation of the living body; and the animation of a body doesn't necessarily mean that there's something that survives the death of the body.

Am I saying there is nothing that survives death, no, I'm just saying that the use of the word soul in the Christian context has no sense.

Another word for soul is psyche. There's a branch of science devoted to it: psychology.

You may decide that the soul is not immortal. If Plato, for instance, asserts that it is immortal, his usage of the word is correct though you think his assertion is not.

If for e.g., I'm learning English words and I confuse the use of the word pain with being happy, then it's clearly incorrect. — Sam26

In @StreetlightX's sense thread, it occurred to me that we might look at the rules of language as permissives, or as enabling communication, rather than as constraints.

One way is this: "The word for that is 'thimble'", suggesting a natural predicative/model-theoretic approach -- you sort things into what "thimble" is true of and what not, which sentences including "thimble" are true and which not, etc. All the machinery of Frege-Tarski style semantics.

Another is this: "You can/may call that 'thimble'", that is, using "thimble" to refer to that is a recognized usage in our speech community, using it that way you're likely to be understood, etc. There is "correctness" here as conformity to convention, but conventions are not carved in stone, and you participate in their revision.

The permissive view deliberately leaves open a pair of possibilities: (1) finding new uses for "thimble" (as in Peter Pan, for instance); (2) finding other ways to refer to thimbles. (When Homer can't remember the word "spoon" he asks for a "thing you dig food with".)

Ah, I understand 'use' differently from you I think; all the cases of 'pain' I briefly profiled count as 'uses', and none of them are either 'correct' or 'incorrect': they are simply uses simpliciter. One can speak of the 'correct use' of a word of course, but this is not how I understand Wittgenstein's own deployment of the term (in the context of 'meaning is use in a langauge-game'). The contrast-space of 'use' here would simply be 'not a use in a langauge-game, rather than 'incorrect use'. — StreetlightX

One of the purposes of Wittgenstein's language-games is to show how it is that we mean something by our words, and how this comes about, this has been true since the Tractatus. This is important as we traverse this topic.

In his notes on On Certainty Wittgenstein is pointing out, as I understand it, that Moore's use of the word know is senseless, and it follows from this, I believe, that it's incorrect. Now I'm not saying that all senseless uses of words are incorrect, or that all language-games involving senseless words are incorrect uses, but that one of the features of incorrect usage is that the word is senseless. There are certain language-games where it makes perfect sense to talk in a senseless way, maybe to emphasize the senseless nature of a word, or to be funny. However, in some language-games using senseless words simply misleads us, especially in philosophical language-games. It's important to make a distinction between what's nonsensical and what's senseless. Without getting into a discussion of the differences between these words, suffice it to say that nonsensical tends to be a more radical misuse of a word than something senseless. A piece of nonsense tends to be completely devoid of meaning, whereas something senseless can appear to have sense, like the beetle example. The differences between these two words can be a bit vague, but I think you get my drift.

One more thing about correct and incorrect usage, since language is by it's very nature rule-based, it would seem to follow necessarily that one can speak of correct and incorrect uses of words; and of course in terms of Wittgenstein we see this especially true, I believe, in On Certainty. That said, not all language-games lend themselves to this view.

If someone was to compare the language-games of a primitive culture, where their knowledge was based on the movement of the stars, would it be correct to say that their use of the word know was incorrect? Note that in this example, the whole language is based around this notion, so it's not as though we could compare the use of the word know against other language-games within that language. All of the uses of know is this primitive language-game would revolve around understanding the stars and their movements.

Finally, there's more to Wittgenstein's language-games than meaning is just "not a use in a language-game," because the notion of meaning, which is at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophy, has to do with words having a sense. This gets back to my talk above about the word soul having no sense in much of the discourse of Christians. A language-game in itself may or may not have a sense, and that's one of the reasons I make the claim that one is being incorrect in terms of the use of a word or words.

You may decide that the soul is not immortal. If Plato, for instance, asserts that it is immortal, his usage of the word is correct though you think his assertion is not. — frank

My point is whether the use of the word soul has sense, not whether there is something immortal that goes on after death. Besides even Plato can be wrong, and has been wrong about some ideas, even though I believe he is right up there with the greatest of philosophers.

My point is whether the use of the word soul has sense, — Sam26

It has many senses.

True, but not all uses of words that you think make sense, do make sense.

What would be an example of that?

Eh, I read Witty very differently to you.

I'm trying to see things from the beetle's point of view. People can be quite skilled at feelings talk, to the extent where from the sense of their behaviour; involuntary or habitual expression; you can read their inner states quite well. I take it that we can assess others' states of mind, feelings and emotions from what people say and how they say it, the latter is still part of sense. This is somewhat inferential, as @StreetlightX pointed out, but it can also be an accurate certitude depending on people, feelings, previous experiences etc.

The tendency to associate peering into people's mental lives; how they embody and express dispositions; as some kind of philosophical confusion - rather than something that we do all the time when engaging with each other, is part of what I'm criticising in (what I read as) your approach. So when you say things like:

I agree, although I wonder about the use of mine, i.e., these feelings I have are mine. I think this may generate confusion, viz., the tendency to associate meaning with my feeling, as opposed to the shared social construct of language. There is a tension here that seems to force us to acknowledge that there is a private world, but this private world doesn't give meaning to our linguistic expressions, but it's necessary. We also don't want to restrict language to the point that we don't allow for novel thinking and expression. So sense is not a fixed or contrived border, but moves and expands, but ever so slowly around the fixed point (fixed point may not be the best choice of words) of what we already know or believe. — Sam26

it's actually very clear when I refer to 'my feelings' outside of Wittgensteinian ordinary language analysis, you mean how you feel about things. Or, with a philosophical veneer, you mean something which you take as equivalent to your feelings (not identical). So when I say my piles are a 'sharp, throbbing' pain, you have a very good idea of how I feel if you have the prerequisite experiences and are familiar with the words. 'sharp, throbbing' is my formative transposition of the feeling into language, just like these posts are a formative transposition of how I see us philosophically at odds.

If I were to describe a less common affective state, say 'bodily dissociation' which comes with a chronic illness I have. You could find out what dissociation is and get an idea of what it's like to be in that state. You get 'an idea' of it, but you probably don't get 'the feeling' mapped to a similar one that you have had. What is said of an affective/embodied/sensorimotor state is a good substitute (sense being a good substitute for sensation) for having had that state.

I believe what I've said is in tension with your account. I'm not really sure where, it may just be a difference in emphasis. There's certainly some grit in our oyster, but I need help from you finding out where it is.

The contrast-space of 'use' here would simply be something like 'not-a-use in a langauge-game, rather than 'incorrect use'. — StreetlightX

Yes, I think this is certainly the right approach, and the proviso is only that a word that does not belong, that has no use in a language-game, is a word that has not yet been given a role, a use in the language-game.

What I think Wittgenstein is interested in blocking, as a sort of catastrophic misunderstanding, is taking a word as it used in one language-game, and bringing it into a another language-game where it is expected to play that same role, to have the same usage. The bare sign can readily be re-used. But if a word's functionality in a language-game is its interface, the way it connects to other words and how they're used, etc., there's no reason to expect that such a piece of machinery will even slot into another machine properly, that everything will connect so that it can function at all much less function here as it functioned there.

I have some qualms about this view. Machines are of course quite rigid and specific in their requirements. Sometimes you can take something quite generic from one machine and use it in another, but most of the time hardly any part from any machine will fit into another machine. What's more, machines are largely designed not to change.

Language use doesn't appear to be nearly this rigid. I'm not trying to start a war about LW here, but I think this way of reading him, even if a bit of a caricature, is natural, widespread, and a genuine tendency within his thinking, even if it's not the whole story.

it's actually very clear when I refer to 'my feelings' outside of Wittgensteinian ordinary language analysis, you mean how you feel about things. Or, with a philosophical veneer, you mean something which you take as equivalent to your feelings (not identical). So when I say my piles are a 'sharp, throbbing' pain, you have a very good idea of how I feel if you have the prerequisite experiences and are familiar with the words. 'sharp, throbbing' is my formative transposition of the feeling into language, just like these posts are a formative transposition of how I see us philosophically at odds. — fdrake

I don't see how what I've said differs from this quote. Of course you mean how you feel about things. I'm not saying it's senseless to refer to inner experiences. I think you're misinterpreting my analysis. I'm saying it's senseless if there is no social way of latching on to your inner experiences. I thought we were in agreement on this issue.

Maybe this is where the disagreement arises. We both seem to agree that language is social and that meaning is established socially. So let's suppose that after learning what it means to have a pain, i.e., I've learned how to correctly use the word pain in a variety of contexts, I then go on to tell you that I have a pain in my foot; and as I tell you this, I show no outward signs of pain. So your talking about pain in a very subjective way, i.e., I'm relying on what you mean by pain as you express some inner experience. There is nothing in what I'm saying that poses a problem here.

So according to your interpretation of what I claiming, it wouldn't make sense, or have a sense/meaning to make such a statement. However, this is not what I'm claiming. My claim is that we learn the correct use of the word pain socially as we understand the objective physical cries, moans, complaints, etc. All of us learn the use of the word in this way. After we learn the correct use of the word we can reliably associate it with our inner experiences, and since this is true, generally it's also true that when we talk about inner experiences, even though there is no outward signs, I can be reasonably sure that you're using the word correctly. However, the sense of the word is learned by the outward signs.

I tried pointing this out when I talked about having a private language, and doing mathematics privately. It's very similar, i.e., it's true that having a private language is not linguistically possible. However, this doesn't mean that I can't do mathematics privately, once I've learned mathematics. The same is true of words having a sense when talking about private experiences. Once I've learned how to use the words correctly, I can refer to my private experiences even though you may not see any outward signs of my inner goings on.

Note two things about this: First, you've already learned the correct use of the word within a social context; and second, correction is done in a social context. So if you were referring to the pain in your foot, but later I find out that you weren't using the word to refer to pain, but to a feeling of joy, then of course there was no sense to what you were saying. But generally people use such words correctly to refer to their inner experiences, but only after learning how to do it in the social context.

Note two things about this: First, you've already learned the correct use of the word within a social context; and second, correction is done in a social context. So if you were referring to the pain in your foot, but later I find out that you weren't using the word to refer to pain, but to a feeling of joy, then of course there was no sense to what you were saying. But generally people use such words correctly to refer to their inner experiences, but only after learning how to do it in the social context. — Sam26

Once everyone knows how to use the words, I can say I've got foot pain, and the meaning is the pain? The use is to refer to the pain, meaning is use, so the referent is the meaning... This is rather strange to me. Because on one hand we've used the private language argument -which is a-priori, demonstrating a necessary feature of sense that it doesn't come into contact with any beetles in boxes -, and nevertheless we're using words in a way that makes the pain part of the sense!

No, the referent in my private use is not what establishes meaning. I thought I made this clear.

What part of saying 'I have pain in my foot' to my partner is private? I'm referring to the pain, she's a competent speaker of English, we both have the prerequisite social background which roots the word pain to pain behaviour...I can express my pain as part of the sense of that phrase.

Use is fluid, use modifies the meaning of words, language is dynamic, two competent speakers of English know how to use the word pain just like we can shout 'ow' when we stub our toes. Nevertheless the contours of sense have been determined beforehand, and apparently I cannot mean what I say.

We use established meanings, interpersonal understandings to push the envelope all the time. There's enough of a communal understanding of pain for me to go 'I have a pain in my foot' and people will understand that I'm expressing my pain. I take it as a given that 'I have a pain in my foot' expresses my pain, and thus my pain is bundled up interpersonal project of meaning, interpretation, innovation and habit that makes sense make sense.

The part where you're relaying a completely private experience, i.e., your experience is private. Of course if you're doing more than just saying your in pain, for e.g., screaming in pain, then it's completely appropriate.

Every time you post something, I don't see where we disagree. I'm just guessing as to where that disagreement is. I see where there is possible disagreement, but that's about it.

Yes, I think this is certainly the right approach, and the proviso is only that a word that does not belong, that has no use in a language-game, is a word that has not yet been given a role, a use in the language-game.

What I think Wittgenstein is interested in blocking, as a sort of catastrophic misunderstanding, is taking a word as it used in one language-game, and bringing it into a another language-game where it is expected to play that same role, to have the same usage. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, this all seems right to me. One way in which I would extend this though, is to attend to Witty's focus on grammar as a constraint with respect to the transposition of words/phrases/etc between langauge-games. I think Witty would agree that you that one can indeed plonk words from one language game into another and expect them to have the 'same role' on the condition that the grammar stays invariant. In some sense that's really, I think, the only stipulation on flexibility: don't let the (seeming similarities in) grammar misled you. Attend to that, and everything else is fair game (this is easier than it sounds, insofar as grammar is a function of our 'forms of life', our lived linguistic and extra-linguistic activities).

Again, I agree.

What I think Wittgenstein is interested in blocking, as a sort of catastrophic misunderstanding, is taking a word as it used in one language-game, and bringing it into a another language-game where it is expected to play that same role, to have the same usage. — Srap Tasmaner

It's not just catastrophic misunderstandings, but also subtle misunderstandings, so subtle that much of the time they're missed.

Give me my argument, that way I can see your interpretation of what I'm saying. Don't just quote me, but spell it out.

I take it that the private language argument shows that, well, language is necessarily social. This means that senses are established with reference to shared phenomena. Initially when people learn how words work, they'll have to mimic how they're used.

What I'm trying to say is that feelings like pain, dread, despair, joy etc are already part of the social ensemble/community of language users. This means that they are public phenomena not just because their senses are fixed with reference to what is shareable, but we inhabit a world where their expressions and embodiment are commonplace. People sufficiently competent with the language that contains those words can understand not just the words as shared, but the feelings underlying them as shared too.

This then means when I say something like 'I have pain in my foot', a feature of the meaning of the phrase is my pain. When I feel that way, it's ground so well trodden that everyone else can discuss my pain. If someone asks 'is it throbbing?' I would reply 'No, it's sharp'. And everyone would know what it meant.

The language game of describing my pain, say, doesn't just consist of expressions whose meanings are established in the community. It also consists in me using those meanings to paint a picture of my pain. In that regard, what I'm aiming at with the descriptions is an adequate account of my pain - the features of the pain guide my expression. This is not to say that the meaning of my expressions is what I intend by them, nor to say that the word pain means my feeling or a set of feelings.

What I'm getting at is, to borrow some Sellars from the recent threads, is that pain here is functioning as a token (the particularities of my expression in the pain discussion language game and how they relate to my current pain) as well as a type (the general patterns which give pain its shared sense). I'm using pain language to express my pain, and thus my pain can't easily severed from the understanding of the words (so long as the interpreter is playing the usual part).

In a similar regard, I'm trying to express my opinion on our disagreement, you're behaving in the way that's expected. We're both working towards a common understanding, which means transforming and expressing both our notions of what's going on. You can treat these posts as examples or attempts (tokens) of expressing my opinion, where my opinion also is functioning as a guiding type. Much the same for pain talk in the way I meant above.

It's not just catastrophic misunderstandings, but also subtle misunderstandings, so subtle that much of the time they're missed — Sam26

Or this whole approach is wrong, this is the sort of thing language takes in stride, and the only question is how well or poorly it's done. (All models are wrong. All analogies suck.)

I'm deeply suspicious of this Wittgensteinian "You think you're making sense but you're not, and it's so subtle you don't even know it, but I do." People ripping bits off one machine and shoving them into another, and making it work , making a machine do something it couldn't do before, or making a new machine -- this sort of bricolage might be perfectly commonplace. It's not a terrible description of uttering a sentence no one's ever uttered before and being understood.

I like it, sounds good to me.