I have no arguments against this nonsense; I'm just the dunce, for now. Just here to throw some confetti. Confetti sometimes gets deleted, but sometimes it scatters widely and adds a nice dolup of humanity to an otherwise robotic landscape of laconic lunacy. The confetti isn't for you, tom; don't worry — Noble Dust
That anything that 'explains everything' explains nothing. — Wayfarer
That's what Deutsche takes to be his physical version of the (unproven/unprovable) Church-Turing thesis. — MetaphysicsNow
There are a handful of scientists who believe that the a universal computer cannot be realized, but that is a technical argument in computer science. — MetaphysicsNow
Whatever Babbage's Analytic Engine was, that it was the realization of a universal computer is what the computer scientists I am talking about deny. Specifically they deny (in fact they claim to be able to prove) that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on any machine capable only of a finite number of operations.The earliest known design of a universal computer is Babbage's Analytic Engine.
That says nothing to the question whether the principle applies to human beings.It is proved that current known laws of physics obey the Deutsch Principle. It is conjectured that all future laws must also.
Whatever Babbage's Analytic Engine was, that it was the realization of a universal computer is what the computer scientists I am talking about deny. Specifically they deny (in fact they claim to be able to prove) that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on any machine capable only of a finite number of operations. — MetaphysicsNow
That says nothing to the question whether the principle applies to human beings. — MetaphysicsNow
Really? You see no unifying principle at work?
The trend (if I'm correct) seems to be to look for a unified theory that ''explains everything''.
Do you think that's a dead-end enterprise? — TheMadFool
You can tell any number of 'just-so stories' about what is likely to enhance a species' "ability to survive" but it doesn't amount to anything — Wayfarer
I'm not sure why you think the first remark is funny - I didn't find anything particularly amusing about this paper — MetaphysicsNow
Specifically they deny (in fact they claim to be able to prove) that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on any machine capable only of a finite number of operations. — MetaphysicsNow
The claim made is not that computable functions cannot be computed, that would be a contradiction in terms. The claim is that there are computable functions that cannot be computed on specific types of computing machine (i.e. Turing machines and their extensions). Read the work of S.G. Akl if you are really interested in specific examples. — MetaphysicsNow
I didn't find anything particularly amusing about this paper — MetaphysicsNow
To the first question, I suggest you read the papers referred to - and note that the remark was about Turing machines and their extensions (Deutsche's universal model computing machine is an extension of a Turing machine).What has the Turing machine got to do with any of this, or Godel for that matter? What laws of physics do Turing machines obey?
No need to search for the garden inside the house.and the implications of that would be...??? — TheMadFool
I do. Introducing time into mathematics is really funny. Like "2+2=4, but only if you answer in less than 3 seconds. It's 5 otherwise."I'm not sure why you think the first remark is funny - I didn't find anything particularly amusing about this paper — MetaphysicsNow
To the first question, I suggest you read the papers referred to - and note that the remark was about Turing machines and their extensions (Deutsche's universal model computing machine is an extension of a Turing machine). — MetaphysicsNow
To the second question, is it a trick one? Turing machines (and their extensions) are abstract constructs, as such the notion of obeying a law of physics does not apply to them. — MetaphysicsNow
Take it up with Akl and co. - the paper I linked to draws a parallel between Godel's work on completeness and consistency in arithmetic and the impossibility of acheiving a universal computer. I have not read Rosen, but given what @StreetlightX says, it seems he (Rosen) also thinks there is an implication of that work on the Turing-Church thesis. Curious that Deutsche did not make any reference to Rosen's work.What has Godel got to do with any of this?
You don't seem to understand that in the Deutsche principle which you presume to be relevant to this thread, the universal model computing machine he is referring to is an abstract model, he is not using the term to refer to actual nuts and bolts and silcon-chipped physical machines. Computational universality is a mathematical construct. Deutsche's principle is about the extent of what that construct can be used to model. Read the paper you linked to, his brief discussion of what a UMCM is makes it clear that it is an abstract model.Right, they are abstractions obeying abstract rules, not real physical systems obeying the laws of physics.
Physical systems that obey the laws of physics may be emulated on certain other physical systems that possess the physical property of computational universality.
Babbage's Analytic Engine is a universal computer, as are PCs. These are all finite state machines. Ignoring the fact that Turing machines do not exist, they are not finite state machines. — tom
Take it up with Akl and co. - the paper I linked to draws a parallel between Godel's work on completeness and consistency in arithmetic and the impossibility of acheiving a universal computer. I have not read Rosen, but given what StreetlightX says, it seems he (Rosen) also thinks there is an implication of that work on the Turing-Church thesis. Curious that Deutsche did not make any reference to Rosen's work. — MetaphysicsNow
You don't seem to understand that in the Deutsche principle which you presume to be relevant to this thread, the universal model computing machine he is referring to is an abstract model, he is not using the term to refer to actual nuts and bolts and silcon-chipped physical machines. — MetaphysicsNow
The real point here, anyway, and one which you seem to be overlooking by getting bogged down in nitpicking about technicalities - presumably the aim being to catch me in an outrageous error - is whether the Deutsche principle applies to human beings andthat question turns on the philosophical question whether human beings are finitely realizable physical systems, about which the Deutsche principle has nothing to contribute. — MetaphysicsNow
Wrong, the Deutsche principle applies explicitly to two things and two things only, finitely realizable physical systems and universal model computing machines, neither of which in isolation nor in conjunction can be claimed to constitute all of reality without further argument. But I've had enough now, I'll go and join @Noble Dust in the dunce's corner.The Deutsch Principle applies to all of Reality, even humans.
Wrong, the Deutsche principle applies explicitly to two things and two things only, finitely realizable physical systems — MetaphysicsNow
No. — MetaphysicsNow
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