Big Bang is evidence for creator at 60% probability so combining probabilities: — Devans99

You are making up numbers off the top of your head from an imaginary sample space which is not based in empirical evidence at all and yet you are still doing it wrong. You multiple when they are mutually exclusive events otherwise you must use conditional probability.

It helps if you think about the probability space as a box. Let’s start with the proposition ‘the dog is nice’. Let’s assume you know nothing about this or any dog then the chance of the dog being nice is 50%. So imagine the probability space cut 50% / 50% ‘dog is nice’ / ‘dog is nasty’.

Now we can add a peice of evidence FOR the proposition. The owner says the dog is nice and we trust him 75%. So we already know that 50% of dogs are nice what about the 50% of dogs unknown? Well we can multiply that 50% by 75% and add it to the 50% we already had for dog is nice: 50% + 50% x 75% = 87.5%. Think of the original 50/50 probability space growing to 87.5/12.5 ‘dog is nice’ / ‘dog is nasty’.

So above is how you compute ‘evidence FOR’. ‘Evidence AGAINST’ is a different calculation:

Starting with dog is nice 50%
Now add a piece of evidence AGAINST: ‘the dog bit me’. 90% chance dog is nasty so that’s a 10% chance the dog is nice. So we take 50% x 10% = 5% chance dog is nice.

NOTICE THE CACULATION IS DIFFERENT DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE EVIDENCE IS FOR OR AGAINST THE PROPOSITION. — Devans99

When you update a prior with only one sample then the influence of the prior is overwhelming. You are limiting the influence of new data and maximizing the influence of your opinion.

That is not a meta-analysis. Furthermore meta-analyses are controversial as people tend to pick and chose the data they include rather then it being selected through an unbiased random approach.

When dealing with binary outcomes you could use a Bernoulli distribution. You should not use a normal distribution unless you have enough data. If you don't want to use a Bernoulli distribution and don't have enough data for the CLT then you should use a nonparametric approach or if your assumptions are met you can use a student t distribution.

Not that using a distribution would apply here, as it is distribution of the population or sample.

Also statistics is a data science. The key word here being data.

What metaphysical views it holds (if it holds any) and whether these views are the source or the result of something else, and to which degree, are questions that can't be answered without empirical research. — Πετροκότσυφας

But metaphysical questions are not answerable by empirical means. That is what makes them ‘metaphysical’.

[delete]

Right. So then there is the further question of whether there are universal elements in these beliefs and narratives. I think this is where it becomes a matter of interpretation. — Janus

I agree.

Campbell's Hero With a Thousand Faces comes to mind. Any thoughts? — Janus

I've not read it, but it appears to be highly relevant. Also, @Wayfarer would be a good source of information, since he studied Comparative Religion.

My current working definition of religion: a set of beliefs concerning the cause, characteristics, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs.

Donald E. Brown also considers morality to be a human universal. Albeit subject to interpretation, an investigation of the moral codes of the world's major book religions and systems of moral philosophy reveals similarities (i.e., universal elements).

That’s a fair comment. It is a question of history and anthropology as much as philosophy. My main interest has been, how is it that scientific materialism has become so influential in secular culture. And I’ve read quite a bit about that. I did an undergraduate degree in philosophy, psychology, comparative religion, anthropology and history, and several years ago an MA in Buddist Studies. So my opinions are considered, I’m not simply firing at random. [And I have never pursued a career in these subjects, nor published anything other than what is on these forums.]

I think a fair number of people here would naturally be of the view that the change in mentality or outlook that characterises the modern and post-modern world represents progress. In fact I’m regularly accused of falsely idolising ancient philosophy, as if there is anything they could possibly know, which we with our advanced technology and scientific genius don’t. Just the other week, one of the participants in this very thread expressed exasperation, that I thought the Platonic dialogues could have much of value to say about the mind, when they knew nothing of modern neuroscience. I encounter this attitude a lot, but I don’t think it understands the sense in which the Socratic dictum, ‘man know thyself’ cannot be something dependent on science and technology. People in Socrates’ day were still h. Sapiens, they eat, breathe, sweat, and die, the same as we do now. Sure we have huge benefits from medical technology and the rest, but self-knowledge can’t be reliant on externals, in my view.

So my considered view is that materialism whether it be scientific, neo-Darwinist, Marxist, or any other variety, is a mistaken worldview. It’s really a type of false consciousness. So I’m interested in analysing how it came to be, if not dominant, then at least extremely influential in modern culture. And my view is that in this transition, something of great importance that had been understood by classical philosophy has indeed been forgotten. It doesn’t mean that I think modern culture and philosophy don’t have any value, and that medieval and ancient philosophy were panaceas. But insofar as philosophy has become materialist, then I see that as a corruption of the original intent of philosophy proper. I don’t think there is any issue with science per se, but only science viewed as the source of wisdom, rather than practical power.

Philosophy does have a spiritual side to it - or rather, many of the influential schools of philosophy did, because there always were materialist philosophers as well. But the classical tradition of philosophy was not materialist; actually I am forming the view that Christian Platonism was the mainstream, or one of the main currents. So my view is that, during the medieval and early modern periods, in the debates over philosophy, religion, and culture, there were some influential views formed which have massive consequences for how humanity understands itself. But then, saying that, it is obviously an enormous topic, and so breaking it down into bite-size chunks is difficult, maybe even impossible. That is why, I suspect, much modern philosophy concentrates on some very specific or minute aspect of a philosophical technicality; differance, or whatever. The last ‘great synthesiser’ was Hegel, and his philosophy collapsed under the weight of its own verbiage [apart from indirectly giving rise to Marxism].

But if I were asked to try and articulate what exactly I think has gone missing from modern philosophical discourse, the answer I would give is: the vertical dimension. The ‘vertical dimension’ refers to the axis along which what used to be understood as wisdom and the grasp of higher truths used to lie. It is ‘the domain of value’, the source of real value. I can’t the use word ‘objective’ because it’s not objective, it transcends the objective. How it can transcend the objective, and yet still be real - this is precisely the kind of thing that has been forgotten. As a consequence, nearly everyone will reflexively, instinctively say that truth is what can be established or known objectively. If it can be known objectively, then it can be measured; if it can’t be measured, then it’s subjective, or social, or cultural, or personal; but it can’t be considered real. That’s the issue in a nutshell.

Here are some of the blog posts and web essays that I refer to from time to time which provide some background.

Review of The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Allen Gillespie - important recent book on the ascendancy of nominalism and voluntarism in medieval culture.

What’s Wrong with Ockham, essay on the ascendancy of nominalism and the consequences in the degradation of metaphysics.

Radical Orthodoxy

The Cultural Impact of Empiricism Jacques Maritain.

I’m also currently reading Charles Taylor’s massive book A Secular Age and McIntyre’s After Virtue.

By purpose.

Among the infinity of systems of inter-referring abstract-facts, and among the infinite subset of those that are life-experience possibility-stories, there's a life-experience possibility-story about the experience of someone just like you...you, in fact.

This physical universe is the setting for that hypothetical life-experience story.

That's the metaphysical explanation. We needn't get into matters beyond metaphysics..matters that aren't really discussable, describable, assertable or provable anyway.

You brought God into the discussion, and you must know that that's a meta-metaphysical matter, not subect to description, complete discussion, assertion, or proof.

Many agree with your impression that there's good intent behind what is. ...a meta-metaphysical matter.

I've read that Aristotle said that Good is the basis of what is.

Michael Ossipoff

shouldn't the question be whether the universe was created? why do you presume it was created? Perhaps it has always been or is a eternal recurring process of sorts?

shouldn't the question be whether the universe was created? why do you presume it was created? Perhaps it has always been or is a eternal recurring process of sorts? — Arne

This physical universe's physical history and physical mechanism, or even metaphysical origin, have nothing to do with the matter of meta-metaphysical origins, which is the "creation" that the OP is referring to. Speaking for myself, I say that the word "creation" is unduly anthropomorphic.

Religion is meta-metaphysical, and is quite outside the applicability of physics, cosmology, or metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

ok. I think. :smile:

Obviously, with the countless logical proofs of the existence of God, I'm in the heavy minority here, but what makes you think that the origin of all of existence can be meaningfully understood by such a method? — John Doe

It's a matter outside of the applicability of logic, proof and words.

Michael Ossipoff

I'm not posing an objection as much as a skeptical worry that you're a flesh and blood animal employing concepts which you acquired in the course of participating in an earth-bound human form of life and it seems bad philosophical practice to investigate the nature and origin of both all that is and the existence of entities as such without first giving some consideration as to why you feel entitled to hold that these abstract concepts are capable of doing that sort of work. — John Doe

That is an extremely long sentence that I like even though I do not care for long sentences because they contain multiple ideas and I am not so good at following multiple ideas because they have a tendency to confuse me and be exceptionally hard to follow for people that. . .

But I do agree.

:smile:

It's a matter outside of the applicability of logic, proof and words. — Michael Ossipoff

I like that.

And I agree.

Wayfarer, if you don't mind, I'm going to add my two cents worth.

My main interest has been, how is it that scientific materialism has become so influential in secular culture. — Wayfarer

I agree, that's an interesting question.

I think a fair number of people here would naturally be of the view that the change in mentality or outlook that characterises the modern and post-modern world represents progress. — Wayfarer

We ought to evaluate the effects of such progress. The ideas of the modern world are based on the foundation of ancient metaphysics. The scientific progress brings into the realm of knowledge all kinds of new information, and this new information exposes and makes obvious, the deficiencies of ancient metaphysics. The progression of knowledge actually undermines the principles upon which it is supported. In this way, knowledge actually destabilizes itself. This cannot be avoided, because the foundation is the oldest, and cannot completely account for new developments which were not evident when the foundation was established. The result is that the fundamental principles must be re-worked to account for the issues encountered by the progress.

So the entire structure requires dismantling in order to rebuild.. It is not an easy task to study and understand fundamental ontological principles, but this is required. The modern tendency is to ignore ancient principles as outdated, and propose new, unsupported principles, which are really fictions, fantasies which are not supported by a thorough analysis of existence. That's the problem, ontology must reflect the true nature of existence, not just existence in the sense of the way that I like to think of existence. This means that it requires a complete understanding of things like matter, space, and time.

People in Socrates’ day were still h. Sapiens, they eat, breathe, sweat, and die, the same as we do now. Sure we have huge benefits from medical technology and the rest, but self-knowledge can’t be reliant on externals, in my view. — Wayfarer

Ancient Greece went through a very similar experience. At this time, the knowledge of natural philosophy had advanced quite rapidly. But fundamental principles from a more ancient time, such as the geocentric cosmology were being undermined and demonstrated to be inadequate descriptions to account for the reality which was exposed by mathematics.

"Self-knowledge" involves understanding the cyclical nature of the evolution of knowledge, which we can find within each individual each one of ourselves. We learn a system which works, taught from childhood, or developed on our own. It works, so we adhere to it, satisfied, and comfortable in our successes. But failure can never be eliminated absolutely, so the possibility of failure is always real. In our smugness we may be inclined to deny the possibility of failure, and so we sometimes blame our own failures on others, and other things. But this is only to ignore, or deny that our mistakes are our mistakes. There comes a time when we are forced to admit that our mistakes and failure are our own, and we must face the fact of having been wrong. That's reality, it is very important to be able to recognize when you have been wrong, mistaken, and face this instead of glossing over it, hiding it behind exceptions, other principles, as if the mistake isn't really a mistake. At this point, when we acpet the mistake, we can seek the reason for, and the source of the mistake.

But if I were asked to try and articulate what exactly I think has gone missing from modern philosophical discourse, the answer I would give is: the vertical dimension. The ‘vertical dimension’ refers to the axis along which what used to be understood as wisdom and the grasp of higher truths used to lie. It is ‘the domain of value’, the source of real value. I can’t the use word ‘objective’ because it’s not objective, it transcends the objective. How it can transcend the objective, and yet still be real - this is precisely the kind of thing that has been forgotten. As a consequence, nearly everyone will reflexively, instinctively say that truth is what can be established or known objectively. If it can be known objectively, then it can be measured; if it can’t be measured, then it’s subjective, or social, or cultural, or personal; but it can’t be considered real. That’s the issue in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

This "vertical dimension" I believe, actually involves the analysis of mistakes. That's why it is very important to recognize a mistake as a mistake; I have done wrong, I am guilty, etc.. (Confession, and consequently forgiveness, is at the heart of Christianity). By recognizing that I have made a mistake, I am inspired to look for the higher principles, higher than the one's I held when I made the mistake, in order to avoid the mistake in the future.

Modern epistemology gives the "mistake" an odd description. If one is correctly adhering to the principle, mistake is impossible, by definition of "correctly". So mistake involves incorrectly applying the principle, misjudgement by the subject. Principles which are to be followed are designated as objective, and mistake involves what the subject does with the principle. There is no room here for the possibility that the principle itself is wrong, as its usefulness has earned it the assigned designation of "objectivity". If similar mistakes are recurrent, then exceptions are made to the principle, variations, to minimize the possibility of mistake. This turns a very simple (wrong) principle into an extremely complicated principle which works, but is still inherently wrong.

[deleted]

Third penny in:

It is not an easy task to study and understand fundamental ontological principles, but this is required. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is not epistemology(!). That is, fundamental ontology is not to be confused with metaphysics. I am pretty sure you're good on this distinction - but are you?!

This is where the question arises:

That's the problem, ontology must reflect the true nature of existence, not just existence in the sense of the way that I like to think of existence. This means that it requires a complete understanding of things like matter, space, and time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ontology is prior to the metaphysics of existence and the things in the world (matter, space, time). Existence (as the object of metaphysical inquiry) and things presuppose being (aka dasein). The problems you so sharply outline above imho result from a leaving-behind of ontological understanding. I doubt if a rebuild in the sense of something new is advisable or even possible. The right way (it seems to me) is through a recovery of fundamental ontology, which once recovered is certainly subject to review.

To cycle back through and redo metaphysics and epistemology* without re-establishing fundamental ontology is simply to repeat errors in new and frightening ways. It's tempting to say that the politics of the moment, of Trump, of Russia and Putin, are the current edition of that nightmare, but i find those based on ignorance and the politics of ignorance. Which forces the question, ignorance of what? Ignorance of being and what it means to be. (I've got my Heidegger on - can you tell?)

*Can you add a well-crafted sentence or two or three on the exact difference between epistemology and metaphysics? The best I can do is that epistemology is about knowledge and metaphysics is about the asking that produces knowledge. And it seems perhaps ironic, from the standpoint of fundamental ontology, that neither is about understanding.

That is, fundamental ontology is not to be confused with metaphysics. I am pretty sure you're good on this distinction - but are you?! — tim wood

Ontology is a branch of metaphysics.

The right way (it seems to me) is through a recovery of fundamental ontology, which once recovered is certainly subject to review. — tim wood

If your intent is, as it seems, to separate "fundamental ontology" from the ontology which is understood to be a branch of metaphysics, then you'll have to make a case for this.

Your claim is that ontology is prior to metaphysics, but what do you mean by this? Ontology is a Latin, Christian study, metaphysics was taught by Aristotle before this.

*Can you add a well-crafted sentence or two or three on the exact difference between epistemology and metaphysics? The best I can do is that epistemology is about knowledge and metaphysics is about the asking that produces knowledge. And it seems perhaps ironic, from the standpoint of fundamental ontology, that neither is about understanding. — tim wood

I think that what you consider to be "fundamental ontology", I consider to be ontology. But I believe metaphysics to be more than this, because it includes cosmology as well. And I don't think that one can adequately study fundamental ontology without studying cosmology as well. That is because "being" means nothing without context. One, ontology, looks to the internal, the other, cosmology, to the external. But neither of these has any meaning except in relation to the other. That is why metaphysics must consist of both, and it doesn't make sense to say that fundamental ontology is prior to metaphysics.

To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles, while epistemology follows the principles of knowledge established by metaphysics in an attempt to determine what does and does not qualify as knowledge. I agree that epistemology doesn't really touch on understanding, and that is an issue for some epistemologists who think that epistemology ought to establish the principles of knowledge. But understanding is the way that knowledge comes into existence, and metaphysics has an approach to this through "becoming" which is understood from cosmology. That is why metaphysics must establish the principles of epistemology, it reaches beyond the distinction between being and not being (knowing and not knowing).

To cycle back through and redo metaphysics and epistemology* without re-establishing fundamental ontology is simply to repeat errors in new and frightening ways. — tim wood

So metaphysis must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them. Perhaps this is what you mean by fundamental ontology. The problem which I described, is that as much as we seek to produce the best first principles, they will inevitably become outdated. So they must be produced in a way which will express to the best of our capacity, a clear understanding, yet allow themselves to be superseded, acknowledging that this understanding is not completion. This is how we might define "the ideal", it's always sought but never obtained. We can proceed for now, under principles which are to the best of our capacity, assuming that they are still not the ideal.

That is because "being" means nothing without context. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just exactly so. I'd continue, but I suspect you do not understand what you wrote. In short it means that metaphysics presupposes being and context - world - and without a preliminary analysis of that as ground, metaphysics has been - will, can only be - incomplete and error ridden.

Any argument you have is with Heidegger. And it is easy to argue against Heidegger, if you have neither read nor attempted to understand his thinking.

For clarity's sake, I take metaphysics to be, generally and mainly, the methods and techniques for finding answers to questions in the form, "What is that?" Example: a metaphysician answers "What is a gun?" by describing it as a device for explosively launching small bits of aimed lead at very high speeds. And to be sure, that is what a gun is. What about what a gun is for? What is a gun as a gun? What does it mean to have a gun? It is not the case that guns first existed, and then people found a use for them; rather, they are the results of beings who found in their being in the world a need to develop them. It is the analysis of these beings and what it means for them to be that is primordial, the analysis being in terms of a priori elements of being.

A sentence from a book: "The description, then, of how one exists in the world - what it means to be in the world - is the first step of the ontological analysis that provides the foundation or fundament of metaphysics. For this reason Heidegger describes his analysis as that of fundamental ontology." A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and TIme, (68).

Just exactly so. I'd continue, but I suspect you do not understand what you wrote. In short it means that metaphysics presupposes being and context - world - and without a preliminary analysis of that as ground, metaphysics has been - will, can only be - incomplete and error ridden. — tim wood

I don't know what you mean by "presupposes" here, and why does such presupposing produce the conclusion you declare. I agree that metaphysis will always be error ridden, that's exactly what I said. The first principles established by metaphysics must be written in such a way that they may be rewritten when the errors are disclosed. That's exactly what the post which you original replied to was about, errors in such principles. As I said last post, the ideal is striven for, but not obtained.

Any argument you have is with Heidegger. And it is easy to argue against Heidegger, if you have neither read nor attempted to understand his thinking. — tim wood

I don't agree that it's easy to argue Heidegger, because his terminology is vague and difficult to understand. That's why I think it's more likely that you don't understand what you wrote, than that I don't understand what I wrote.

For clarity's sake, I take metaphysics to be, generally and mainly, the methods and techniques for finding answers to questions in the form, "What is that?" Example: a metaphysician answers "What is a gun?" — tim wood

I don't think that this is right. Aristotle established metaphysics. He said, that prior to him the metaphysical question was why is there something rather than nothing. He explained why this is the wrong approach, and then went on to introduce the appropriate question for metaphysics as "why is there what there is, rather than something else". So you're right in the sense that the principal metaphysical question involves "what" there is, but it is really a "why" question rather than a "what" question.

It is the analysis of these beings and what it means for them to be that is primordial, the analysis being in terms of a priori elements of being. — tim wood

I disagree with this completely. Analysis of beings is the work of science not metaphysics. Metaphysics takes for granted, a separation, a distinction between what a thing is said to be, and what it actually is. This is the source of human error which I referred to. We, as metaphysicians do not seek to rectify this, it is taken for granted as inevitable due to the failings of the human mind, and science is left to analyze these things.

But you conflate two distinct things here, and that is why I disagree. The "analysis of beings", and "what it means for them to be that" is two distinct things. The former being science, the latter being metaphysics. The analysis of beings determines what they are. But "meaning" involves "why", as it generally relates to human intention. So when we ask "what it means for them to be that" we put "what they are" into the context of intention, asking "why". At this point, we must respect the division which I say the metaphysician takes for granted, between what the thing actually is, and what it is said to be. And we are faced with a huge division. One fork takes us towards what it means to us, what we say the thing is, and this is epistemology. The other fork takes us toward why the actual thing is actually what it is, and this is metaphysics.

But you conflate two distinct things here, and that is why I disagree. The "analysis of beings", and "what it means for them to be that" is two distinct things. The former being science, the latter being metaphysics. The analysis of beings determines what they are. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, I wrote hastily. But here's the division: near as I can tell, you start with the thing and try to determine what it is, or why it is, or what it's for. I suppose at one end of a continuum you can call this science and at the other end metaphysics, or not. I find this online:

"Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature of being, existence, and reality. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in a "suitably abstract and fully general manner", the questions:
What is there?
And what is it like?"

And I have no problem with this. But can you see what's missing?

What's missing is 1) any account of the person asking, and 2) any attempt to account for the presuppositions implied in the questions asked. Immediate examples: The questions "what is there?" and "what is it like?" presuppose that the "is" and the "there" are meaningful, as well as the notion that "it" is "like" something. And this is how the world works. We all presuppose all the time. At some point, just what those presuppositions are can be significant. One philosopher, R.G. Collingwood, has gone so far as to say that metaphysics, properly understood, is an historic enterprise undertaken in a scientific manner that identifies the absolute presuppositions held by various groups of people at various times. He makes a compelling case in a very readable way, here: An Essay on Metaphysics, R.G. Collingwood,
https://www.amazon.com/Essay-Metaphysics-R-G-Collingwood/dp/1614276153.

But this is not our subject. Here's the question for us: do you believe or hold that any analysis of the being doing the metaphysics or science, or anything else for that matter, whom the literature calls dasein, is any proper part of philosophy? Heidegger does: he argues that fundamental ontology comes before metaphysics as ground. He is not at all saying that fundamental ontology is metaphysics.

Now in my opinion, if ontology were completed before instances of metaphysics and the conclusions attended to, then many, many evil enterprises would have failed to thrive, being strangled at birth in their own respective ideological failures. But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground?

The third option, the universe always existed in one form or another for eternity.

No creation, No magic.

eternity — MathematicalPhysicist

Any account for "eternity" and what it means in this context? Usually the invocation of infinities or eternities signals the end of reasonable dialogue, either because the value is a real component of some real calculation, or because someone is invoking magic.

How do you make sense of "eternity"?

The third option, the universe always existed in one form or another for eternity.

No creation, No magic. — MathematicalPhysicist

I would vote for option 3 or something very similar. I would like to believe however that some kind of cosmos could be created, I just find it hard to believe there was ever a time before anything existed.

You're right, I wrote hastily. But here's the division: near as I can tell, you start with the thing and try to determine what it is, or why it is, or what it's for. I suppose at one end of a continuum you can call this science and at the other end metaphysics, or not. I find this online: — tim wood

But this is not necessarily the case. You cannot start with the thing, unless you take it for granted that "the thing" is something real. But taking 'the thing" for granted doesn't give you a real ground. That's the point Descartes was making, skepticism disallows you from taking the thing for granted, then all you have is thoughts and the appearance of a thing, and there isn't any point to asking what the thing is or is not until you give some reality to the thing. So we have the Kantian division right here, what are you handing reality to, and asking "what is it?", the appearance, or the thing itself.

What's missing is 1) any account of the person asking, and 2) any attempt to account for the presuppositions implied in the questions asked. Immediate examples: — tim wood

I don't think "the person asking" is missing. It is already implied, and taken for granted in the questioning, that a person is asking. So if any "thing" is to be taken for granted, it is the thinking thing, as Descartes claims. That is why we get that Kantian division. Are we asking about being as it is, or being as it appears to us.

So if we proceed to ask about "what" there is, we must distinguish between what we say a thing is (describe it based on how it appears to us), and what the thing is, in itself. Prior to proceeding to the latter, we must get beyond the Cartesian skepticism, and validate the existence of the thing itself. This is where metaphysics must establish principles. Kant asserted the real existence of the thing itself, but denied the possibility of knowing it. This is to deny the capacity of metaphysics to have any real impact. Accordingly, metaphysics cannot establish any principles of relation between the appearance and the thing. Berkeley was more skeptical and questioned whether the thing itself, as "material thing" was even real.

The questions "what is there?" and "what is it like?" presuppose that the "is" and the "there" are meaningful, as well as the notion that "it" is "like" something. — tim wood

Of course it's meaningful because there is a person asking the question. Unless the person is being completely self-deceptive and asking something which one has absolutely no interest in, then the question is meaningful to the person. What is "presupposed" is simply that the person is living, sensing and experiencing, and is interested in the nature of this experience.

But this is not our subject. Here's the question for us: do you believe or hold that any analysis of the being doing the metaphysics or science, or anything else for that matter, whom the literature calls dasein, is any proper part of philosophy? Heidegger does: he argues that fundamental ontology comes before metaphysics as ground. He is not at all saying that fundamental ontology is metaphysics. — tim wood

I really don't know what you mean by "fundamental ontology". This is the problem I find with Heidegger in general. He uses many terms in a vague and obscure way, which upon interpretation by different people creates ambiguity between the different interpretations. So discussion is fruitless because of this ambiguity, and it ends up appearing like Heidegger never really said anything important.

I believe "eternity" is a well-defined notion of endless time.

t \in \mathbb{R} if latex would work here.
No beginning and no end, the cosmos is created and destroyed everyday.
We have preconceived notion of a time interval of beginning and end, but then how can existence pop out of nothingness? You need to assume that something has always existed, may it be God, Universe, quantum fluctuations or what you have not.

From absolute nothing, nothing can come to be, and that's pure logic, no magic!
Where I take nothing as the absence of something, your mind cannot even imagine a situation of absolute nothingness, we always think of something, even when I stare at the thin air I think of something, I mean there's space between me and the air.

I agree that there's no room for dialogue, as in everything in philosophy, these matters have been discussed endlessly, I believe there's no room for creation because that would say that there is room for magic. When I find something in math, I don't create from nothing, I have a preconceived notion of arithmetic and geometric ideas.
How did anything come to be from nothing?
There's a universal mind that imagines everything, but he doesn't create anything, they are all part of him.

If something were to come from absolute nothing, then we should equation them the same.

Perhaps this is the barrier of the language that doesn't let us go beyond our limitations of communication.

dunno...

that all sounds very much like turning science into religion.

I was taught, science knows what it knows, and that is all that it knows. Said differently - science only makes truth claims about things science knows to be true. And it does not make any other truth claims.

I see no philosophic difference in a belief based on faith in an un-created creator, or a belief based on faith that science will someday know the answer to how the universe came to be.

You cannot start with the thing, unless you take it for granted that "the thing" is something real. But taking 'the thing" for granted doesn't give you a real ground. That's the point Descartes was making, skepticism disallows you from taking the thing for granted, then all you have is thoughts and the appearance of a thing, and there isn't any point to asking what the thing is or is not until you give some reality to the thing. So we have the Kantian division right here, what are you handing reality to, and asking "what is it?", the appearance, or the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Taking for granted" in this sense is just the set of presuppositions in play that allow us to think or do at all. And presuppositions have nothing to do with skepticism. They can joust with each other, but to no end. As to Kant, many people - you apparently among them - imagine that Kant tells us we can't know the thing-in-itself. For knowing the world, Kant had practical knowledge: he had no problem knowing a chair was in fact a chair or counting his coffee beans. Where he drew his line was in just how, in the sense of scientific inquiry, we could have scientific knowledge.

What's missing is 1) any account of the person asking, and 2) any attempt to account for the presuppositions implied in the questions asked. Immediate examples:
— tim wood

I don't think "the person asking" is missing. It is already implied, and taken for granted in the questioning, that a person is asking. So if any "thing" is to be taken for granted, it is the thinking thing, as Descartes claims.

What's missing is the account. The person is not missing. I think the easiest way here, instead of laboriously chasing you through old philosophies and in some cases yours and their errors - your briar patch, apparently - is to simply say that metaphysics itself is not grounded. The best metaphysics can do is work towards internal consistency. And this is just your point above. And for a remedy you would look for "principles." If you think about it, you'll see that any such principle you find cannot ground the enterprise. It's a little like a criminal undertaking to be the best criminal he can be, thinking he will thereby no longer be a criminal. And this would be a poor analogy and joke, except that history tells us this is exactly what happens time and time again!

But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground? — tim wood

I really don't know what you mean by "fundamental ontology". This is the problem I find with Heidegger in general. He uses many terms in a vague and obscure way, which upon interpretation by different people creates ambiguity between the different interpretations. So discussion is fruitless because of this ambiguity, and it ends up appearing like Heidegger never really said anything important.

All right, I will define fundamental ontology. It will be my term and you can reply to me, no scary Heidegger to deal with. First is to repeat until learned that fundamental ontology is not metaphysics. Whether they are or are not united under some remote and abstract genus is irrelevant.

Here we are: we are here. It's useless to debate whether we're here: if we weren't, we wouldn't be asking. What are we going to do with it all? Squeezing this yields two questions: What is "we"? and what is the "it all" we're going to do with? Because the "it all" is the object to be done with (and indeed cannot be an "it all" without a "we"), the first question must be, what is the "we"? That is, the two questions are not equi-primordial. Think do-er and do-ee. Consideration of the do-er comes first.

The analysis of the "we" is fundamental ontology. To repeat, it is not and cannot be metaphysics. It is an analysis of the hierarchy of a priori concerns of the being that is the "we." (That being is the one who is here - or there - thus dasein.) A priori because the concern is prior to and conditions the experience of the "it all."

The analysis of dasein shows it is a being who exists temporally - with an awareness of time, is aware of his/her mortality, and has many modes of being, among them being authentic and inauthentic being. Authentic being is awareness of being-as-dasein; inauthentic the forgetting of being-as-dasein. The main mode of being is care, or concern with. The ground, then, of metaphysics lies in the concern - care - of dasein.

But here's the danger. If the grounding of metaphysics in dasein is forgotten. then it grounds itself, or is grounded, opportunistically to whatever is available, often culture, and within that, often enough a hi-jacked culture. In a sense, then, metaphysics doesn't need ontology, but without it, it is not grounded except within the illusion of a grounding. You note that this is a problem, and indeed it is. You look for solutions within metaphysics - but that cannot be. The only other place is within the concerns of dasein understood as care(ing), which can be understood only through an analysis prior to metaphysics.

Enough said, likely too much. Now you know what fundamental ontology is. The questions stand:

But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground? — tim wood