If you ask me why two things can be tigers, I could give you a causal, biological explanation; but this is apparently not what you want. — Snakes Alive

You certainly can, but you're going to have to invoke universal processes like evolution and natural selection to do so. Also genes. What is a gene? It's a mechanism for passing information for how to build organisms along. All of that involves universalist language.

Tiger is an abstract concept for the individual members having similar characteristics. — Marchesk

I know what the word 'tiger' means, and I know what a tiger is. Something is a tiger in virtue of being a certain way, exemplified by certain members of the species you could point me to, or descriptions you could give of them.

If something is a member of the species pointed to, or has these described properties, it's a tiger.

Do I 'have the concept of' tiger? Well, what does that mean? Can I tell when something is a tiger? Usually. Do I know what the word 'tiger' means? Yes.

I'm not sure Russell is talking about what you're talking about — Snakes Alive

The question you asked was ‘what are universals?’ The chapter is called ‘the problem of universals’. The fact that you can’t make sense of it, is not necessarily a comment on what is being said.

It reads to me as very bad philosophy. I'm not sure I would quote that passage in support of anything.

The programming language above employs the concept of a universal in the form of the class Dog. Two particulars (objects) are created with unique names and weight. They share the same behavior of barking their name, weight and color. The color is also the same between them.

However, the code actually shares the bark function in virtue of the class. But the color property exists for both objects, it just happens to be the same.

This is clearly meaningful in a programming language, and examples are often taken to be modeling how we think about the world, with it's individuals and categories.

It reads to me as very bad philosophy. I'm not sure I would quote that passage in support of anything. — Snakes Alive

Russell is pointing out that "north of" is a universal relation that doesn't apply to any particular situation, but rather every situation in which one thing is north of another.

It strikes me that if someone asks "where is the relation 'north of' located?" the appropriate response is not to answer "nowhere," as Russell does, but to explain to them that they are confused, and there is something they don't understand about the way locations work.

If you ask someone whether Edinburgh or London exists, the obvious answer is yes. If you ask them if Edinburgh is north of London, the obvious answer is yes. If you ask them whether the relation 'north of' exists, or where it is, the only appropriate answer, it seems to me, is to ask what they mean, or to comment that they are deeply confused.

Questions like this demand not answers but therapy. That you're asking such a question shows that you're very, very confused about something, and we need to figure out what.

I don't see how this is possible since many people have made rational arguments for various metaphysical positions. — Marchesk

Some have made arguments that they thought were rational. I don't agree with them on that. If they were rational they would be conclusively persuasive to anybody that understands logic, regardless of that person's prior opinion on the conclusion. Yet they are not.

But it goes to the question of the nature of the existence of universals - which is the question you asked. The point Russell is making is that ‘north of’ has a meaning for anyone capable of understanding it, so it is a real relationship. But in what sense do such relationships exist? And the same can be said of natural numbers; they too are real for anyone capable of counting, but in what sense do numbers exist? Are they real, or are they artefacts of thought? And if they are artefacts of thought, then how come mathematical logic is so extraordinarily powerful in respect of the natural sciences?

Some have made arguments that they thought were rational. I don't agree with them on that. If they were rational they would be conclusively persuasive to anybody that understands logic, regardless of that person's prior opinion on the conclusion. Yet they are not. — andrewk

Doesn't that rule out any argument that people disagree on? It would certainly rule out Carnap's, since not everyone agreed with his anti-metaphysical arguments.

But in what sense do such relationships exist? — Wayfarer

This question, again, strikes me as confused, like asking 'what is the mortgage of jam?' How am I supposed to answer?

The only way I can construe a halfway plausible answer is: in the sense that some things are north of other things.

It doesn't really matter to my life whether universals are real, but it's interesting to think about sometimes, just like it's interesting to wonder whether the laws of physics really 'break down' inside a black hole, which is just as meaningful, except for the difficult math. — Marchesk

The difference between these two is that it is hard to imagine any experience that would answer the question about whether universals are real, but one can easily imagine one that would answer the question about physics inside a black hole. All one need do is sail one's spaceship inside the event horizon of a black hole and look around. Contrary to popular belief there's a long way between the event horizon and the point at which you get pulled apart by gravity ('spaghettified'). So there's plenty of time to observe.

Of course, one could never report back, but that doesn't matter. The doomed person's experience (and remember, we're all doomed - it's just a question of when) would differ according to whether the answer was yes or no.

If you ask them whether the relation 'north of' exists, or where it is, the only appropriate answer, it seems to me, is to ask what they mean, or to comment that the question is deeply confused. — Snakes Alive

The problem is accounting for how we can use north of in a universal manner when talking about the world. As Wayfarer asked, what makes north or the natural numbers so useful when dealing with the world? Is there something about the world that makes this so?

I fail to see how that question is meaningless.

The difference between these two is that it is hard to imagine any experience that would answer the question about whether universals are real, but one can easily imagine one that would answer the question about physics inside a black hole. — andrewk

And why do we need to be able to experience something in order for it to be a meaningful statement? Does all of physics include only events or things which can in principle be experienced by us? What about outside or light cone or other universes?

What do you mean by using it in a universal manner?

Are you asking how people tell when one thing is to the north of another?

It depends on what his argument is. If all it does is to point to the logical gaps in attempted constructive rational arguments then I think it would stand. But if it tries to erect some universal principle of the non-provability of any metaphysical argument, I think it would run into the difficulty you are pointing to.

What do you mean by using it in a universal manner?

Are you asking how people tell when one thing is to the north of another? — Snakes Alive

Yes, where that one thing is any thing that can have another thing north of it. That's what makes the relation universal.

Does all of physics include only events or things which can in principle be experienced by us? What about outside or light cone or other universes? — Marchesk

I would say yes, or at least all of physics that can be considered as science. In my lexicon other universes or events outside the light cone are metaphysics.

In my lexicon other universes or events outside the light cone are metaphysics. — andrewk

Does that mean you think it's meaningless to ask if an alien civilization exists one light year outside our light cone?

So a relation is universal if more than one set of things can have it?

So by "do universals exist" do you mean "can more than one thing have the same property, or be in the same relation to something else?" Then the answer is yes. The way you know this is that many things are to the north of many other things.

This question, again, strikes me as confused, like asking 'what is the mortgage of jam?' How am I supposed to answer? — Snakes Alive

All due respect, SA, this is possibly because you haven’t actually given much thought to the question. I think the question of the nature of the existence of universals, logical laws, abstractions, and so on, are interesting and also genuine questions. And questions that haven’t been resolved, so much as simply forgotten. So that you’re finding the question meaningless or absurd is a reflection of the fact that the way of thinking associated with universals has fallen completely out of favour - mainly due to the cultural influence of empiricism.

That chapter I referred to is not ‘bad philosophy’ - it’s philosophy. Betrand Russell’s exposition of such topics is as close as philosophy can come to being canonical. So, by all means, argue the case that universals are not real. But first understand what is at issue.

That chapter I referred to is not ‘bad philosophy’ - it’s philosophy. Betrand Russell’s exposition of such topics is as close as philosophy can come to being canonical. — Wayfarer

Asking "where the relation of 'north of' exists" is bad philosophy.

Betrand Russell’s exposition of such topics is as close as philosophy can come to being canonical. — Wayfarer

Russell was also a top notch logician, not that it makes his argument right. But he would likely have been aware of the critiques of metaphysics.

I return to the distinction I started with - between rational meaning and emotional meaning. I think for many people the question of whether there are other, advanced, non-human consciousnesses out there is of great emotional significance, even though it can never affect our lives one way or the other. It is emotionally meaningful, but not rationally meaningful.

So by "do universals exist" do you mean "can more than one thing have the same property, or be in the same relation to something else?" Then the answer is yes. — Snakes Alive

Right, so this leads to the question of what makes it so. Universals are one possible answer to that. Tropes are another. It doesn't really matter what the answer is for this discussion (I have no idea). Only whether it's meaningful.

In your case, it’s a misunderstood question. He’s asking that question to demonstrate that universals have no location. If I was to say ‘where is the number seven’ then that too is kind of a meaningless question, but it makes a polemical point, in that the number seven might be considered as real, but not ‘something that exists in a location’. Which is the point.

No, because I still don't know what a universal is, and saying that it qualifies as a possible answer doesn't make it so, because I have no notion of what they are, and so no notion of what they are supposed to "answer," or how.

To say that "the relation 'north of' has no location" is again deeply confused. Such a proposal ought to be bet not with refutation or argument, but therapy. If you say something like this, you are deeply confused in some way, and we need to take a step back and figure out how.

May I ask, have you ever given any thought to the question of ‘the nature of universals’ before this discussion?

We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not ‘whiteness’ that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality . One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts. — Russell

Bolds added.

No, because I still don't know what a universal is, and saying that it qualifies as a possible answer doesn't make it so, because I have no notion of what they are, and so no notion of what they are supposed to "answer," or how. — Snakes Alive

You do know what a category is, and you admit that particulars can have the same properties and relations. So a universal would be applying the category to the world to explain sameness.