Here's the main competitor to universals. Let me know if tropes sound any more meaningful to you:

Trope theory is the view that reality is (wholly or partly) made up from tropes. Tropes are things like the particular shape, weight, and texture of an individual object. Because tropes are particular, for two objects to ‘share’ a property (for them both to exemplify, say, a particular shade of green) is for each to contain (instantiate, exemplify) a greenness-trope, where those greenness-tropes, although numerically distinct, nevertheless exactly resemble each other. — SEP

You could do, but you have three options; — Pseudonym

Clever. I'll opt for option 3, where some metaphysical statements are meaningful. That means Carnap's might be meaningful, with the qualification that it's the only exception to it's own rule.

Now is there a way to determine which metaphysical statements are meaningful and which ones aren't? Carnap argues that meaning is determined by verification and internality to a framework. But those like me who think some metaphysical statements are meaningful will disagree with his definition of meaning.

So basically, I disagree with his starting premises.

Now is there a way to determine which metaphysical statements are meaningful and which ones aren't? — Marchesk

It depends what you mean by 'meaningful'. In Carnap's sense it means 'has some inter-subjective sense'. By that definition then yes there is a test and every metaphysical statement made so far (apart from Carnap's) has failed that test, the test being that there is inter-subjective agreement about the statement, which there clearly isn't. The problem is, as Wittgenstein arrives at, the reason that Carnap's statement is the only exception is entirely because of the way he defined 'meaningful'. Everyone who disagrees with Carnap's statement does not disagree with it internal to its own framework (ie make the claim that there exists some metaphysical statement with which everyone agrees). They disagree with him because they dispute his definition of the word 'meaningful'. But Wittgenstein tries to show how it is not possible to accurately derive the 'right' definition for a word like 'meaningful' and so disagreements are dissolved.

They disagree with him because they dispute his definition of the word 'meaningful'. But Wittgenstein tries to show how it is not possible to accurately derive the 'right' definition for a word like 'meaningful' and so disagreements are dissolved. — Pseudonym

And where exactly does that leave us? Because it doesn't leave me agreeing with Carnap. I still find metaphysical statements to be meaningful, at least some of them.

It means that the only meaningful statement about metaphysics, is that metaphysics is not meaningful. Which does beg the question - why bring it up?

A professor I studied philosophy under, said of positivism that it was like the fabled Uroboros, the snake that eats itself. ‘The hardest part’, he would say, ‘is the last bite’.

This is a psychological question... — Snakes Alive

While I largely agree that the question of universals is more or less rubbish, it seems to me that its no less a jumping of the gun to say that the question is psychological. Could similarities and the classifications thereof not have something to do with 'the things themselves', as it were? Prima facie this does not seem an unintelligible path of inquiry. Perhaps the fact that we discern similarities between things and categorize them accordiningly also has something to do with our phisiologies, or our uses of language, or a mix of the above, which might also include psychology. Surely, one of the tasks of philosophy is to 'get the mix right', as it were. But to conclude at the outset that the type of question is psychological just is it's own kind of philosophical position, surely?

I have heard people discuss the question before, and read people discussing it, but none of these discussions have ever made any sense to me.

This sounds like a labored and pointless way of saying that things can be similar to each other. Seeing as this vocabulary seems to offer no intelligibility over the ordinary way of speaking, I'm inclined to reject it too as meaningless. Talking about "greenness-tropes" would seem to be, at best, a confused way of saying that something is green. So why not just say that?

What is a psychological question is how people come to recognize that two things have the same property. Obviously you can't recognize what isn't so, and so trivially in order to recognize that two things have the same property, they must actually share that property.

But 'properties-talk' is very fraught (no less fraught, I think, than 'universals-talk'): this little train and this small ball are both toys for Johnny - do they share a 'property'? (I'm not saying they either do or they don't: I'm just saying it's not so straightforward as you make it out to be. It's not clear that 'property-talk' is the right way to talk about similarity).

Talk about properties is part of ordinary language, and questions about properties are to that extent intelligible. So far as I can see, talk about universals isn't intelligible at all.

For something to have some property, say P, is just for it to be P. This exhausts the notion. For x and y to share P just means that x is P and y is P.

Indexing intelligibility to 'ordinary language' (if by this you mean 'language used commonly') is quite clearly wrong. People may and do come up with novel (and intelligible) uses of talk all the time. Outsourcing intelligibility to anthropology is a dead end.

Not at all. Language only becomes intelligible under conditions of use. Ordinary language has conditions of use, and so tends to be intelligible, although it might be vague or better-suited to some purposes than others. When you come up with novel uses of talk, you have no guarantee that said talk has any use conditions.

Sometimes it's necessary for technical disciplines to invent new words ad hoc, but then after the introduction of the coinage, the environment of professional use generally grants it some intelligible meaning (or does so mediately in terms of previously understood notions). In philosophy, this often fails to happen with coinages, since the words aren't employed in any capacity other than the arguments in which people use them. In other words, they exist only to allow people to argue.

Right, so the intelligibility of 'ordinary language' is itself indexed to conditions of use: this is entirely fair. But you've simply assumed without argument that properties-talk and psychology-talk are the right way to approach issues of similarity and categorization. I think you're sneaking in a theory - or at least the outlines of one - while pretending you aren't. I don't buy your 'nothing to see here' approach. I think you are complicit in what you deny.

I'm not claiming theory-neutrality. The choice here is between talking about something, and talking about nothing. If you have an alternate way to look at things that makes some sense, then by all means.

Though I don't know what is objectionable about talking about properties, and I have a hard time understanding what it would mean to say that things are similar, but don't share properties, or share properties, but aren't similar (in the relevant respect). To that extent I take there to be no theory, but just a banal rearranging of commonsense notions.

So if I said, I have a theory: things are similar in virtue of sharing properties, this would be very strange, because it seems that I've advanced not theory at all, but just sort of repeated myself.

Well, one can't obviously deliniate conditions of use prior to there being some circumstance in which they arise. All I'm saying is that to say talk of similarity and categorization boils down to psychology - as if this were not entirely contentious - is itself... entirely contentious. And ripe for philosophical engagement.

As for the deadly intellectual minefield that are 'properties': https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/

Talk of properties is part of our pre-philosophical heritage. I see no reason to think of properties as philosophers have. If philosophers want to talk about properties, it's their job to pay respect to the pre-philosophical usage, not vice-versa. For my part, talking about properties is perfectly intelligible and doesn't confuse me. If someone wants to show some problem with the notion, so be it.

All I'm saying is that to say talk of similarity and categorization boils down to psychology — StreetlightX

The point isn't that similarity is a psychological issue – I don't think that makes any sense. But the question of how people come to recognize similarities surely is.

But the question of how people come to recognize similarities surely is. — Snakes Alive

Oh?

alk of properties is part of our pre-philosophical heritage. I see no reason to think of properties as philosophers have. If philosophers want to talk about properties, it's their job to pay respect to the pre-philosophical usage, not vice-versa. — Snakes Alive

You do realize that many of the concepts from ordinary, pre-philosophical language have their issues upon closer inspection, right?

Or should philosophers just respect what the common man means by free will, for example, and not try to do any further inquiry?

I didn't say that. The point is that talk of universals does not merely "have issues" – there is no body there to have issues to begin with. It's just empty.

I'm not sure Carnap says what you seem to believe he says about metaphysics. Obviously, the questions of metaphysics have been debated for centuries, and those debating them have seemingly understood what each other were saying. And people can talk of dragons all they like, and know what is being referred to as dragons.

Carnap's criticism is a specific one regarding the misuse of language to make statements in metaphysics. That may be gleaned from the title of his essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." He says:

A language consists of a vocabulary and a syntax, i.e. a set of words which have meanings and rules of sentence formation. These rules indicate how sentences may be formed out of the various sorts of words. Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-statements: either they contain a word which is erroneously believed to have meaning, or the constituent words are meaningful, yet are put together in a counter-syntactical way, so that they do not yield a meaningful statement.

Carnap believes that metaphysics consists of pseudo-statements:

We do not regard metaphysics as "mere speculation" or "fairy tales." The statements of a fairy tale do not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they are perfectly meaningful, although false. Metaphysics is not "superstition "; it is possible to believe true and false propositions, but not to believe meaningless sequences of words. Metaphysical statements are not even acceptable as "working hypotheses"; for an hypothesis must be capable of entering into relations of deducibility with (true or false) empirical statements, which is just what pseudo-statements cannot do.

he point is that talk of universals does not merely "have issues" – there is no body there to have issues to begin with. It's just empty. — Snakes Alive

I've done my best to explain why it's not. Universals might be rubbish on closer inspection, but they're intelligible. If not universals, then something else is needed to explain similarity.

the questions of metaphysics have been debated for centuries, and those debating them have seemingly understood what each other were saying. — Ciceronianus the White

Part of what is striking about metaphysics, to me, is that this isn't so: those debating it do not seem to understand what they are saying, or what the other is saying. Hence the sympathy for the positivist position that metaphysics is not an area of inquiry so much as a sort of linguistic hitch, to be studied anthropologically as to its sources, but not really possible to be taken seriously on its own terms (and indeed, those who debate it seem not to take it seriously on its own terms either – it's a kind of game whose playing has other edifying effects).

The statements of a fairy tale do not conflict with logic, but only with experience; they are perfectly meaningful, although false. Metaphysics is not "superstition "; it is possible to believe true and false propositions, but not to believe meaningless sequences of words. — Ciceronianus the White

Right, and he provides the criteria for what makes a statement meaningful. In that paper, it's anything which is logical or can be verified by experience. It's an empirical grounding of meaning.

those debating it do not seem to understand what they are saying — Snakes Alive

Is that because you refuse to acknowledge hat what they're saying is meaningful? Because I find it meaningful.

but not really possible to be taken seriously on its own terms (and indeed, those who debate it seem not to take it seriously on its own terms either – it's a kind of game whose playing has other edifying effects). — Snakes Alive

I don't agree with this. Most metaphysics might not have implications for daily life anymore than a math or physics problem. But that doesn't mean it isn't taken seriously by those who engage in it.

Is that because you refuse to acknowledge hat what they're saying is meaningful? Because I find it meaningful. — Marchesk

Yet you cannot explain what it means. Shouldn't that give you pause?

I don't agree with this. Most metaphysics might not have implications for daily life anymore than a math or physics problem. But that doesn't mean it isn't taken seriously by those who engage in it. — Marchesk

People take their paychecks seriously. Metaphysics, not so much – even professional philosophers can shout at each other during the day and go home at night to sleep, knowing that nothing whatsoever is affected by their colleague ostensibly holding a different opinion on some ostensibly deep matter.

Yet you cannot explain what it means. Shouldn't that give you pause? — Snakes Alive

I did explain it. Also, SEP has an in-depth article on the universals debate. Russell devoted a chapter to it. Plenty of people have found it intelligible. If you don't, then I don't know what to say.

Honestly, I feel like people are being disingenuous when they use this tactic in a discussion. Not saying Carnap was being disingenuous, because he provides an argument for his position, although I think his premises are wrong.

And a good reason for thinking Carnap's premises are wrong is precisely because plenty of people find arguments such as universals to be intelligible.

Right, and he provides the criteria for what makes a statement meaningful. In that paper, it's anything which is logical or can be verified by experience. It's an empirical grounding of meaning. — Marchesk

That's hardly surprising, though, is it? What else could it be grounded on but us, our experience and our use of language as living creatures that are part of the world? Language is an empirical phenomenon, its existence and its use are verifiable; why should its meaning be otherwise?

Part of what is striking about metaphysics, to me, is that this isn't so: those debating it do not seem to understand what they are saying, or what the other is saying. Hence the sympathy for the positivist position that metaphysics is not an area of inquiry so much as a sort of linguistic hitch, to be studied anthropologically as to its sources, but not really possible to be taken seriously on its own terms (and indeed, those who debate it seem not to take it seriously on its own terms either – it's a kind of game whose playing has other edifying effects). — Snakes Alive

I think it's more a question of misuse of language and the resulting bewitchment of our intelligence as Wittgenstein said. So, for example, as Carnap spoke of, the use of "nothing" as if it's a noun and the resulting confusion. It can involve the creation of new meanings for common words.

I think Carnap's claim is that metaphysics can be "meaningful" in the sense that poetry, art and music can be, but not otherwise.

Language is an empirical phenomenon, its existence and its use are verifiable; why should its meaning be otherwise? — Ciceronianus the White

Language use is empirical. Language understanding is cognitive. We can form concepts which are not empirical. Some of these can be applied to the world in order to explain the observable.

A metaphysical question is meaningful if it's content is intelligible. I'm convinced that universals, as an example, are intelligible. They may not exist, but they are a concept with cognitive content that doesn't involve contradiction.

Since we're part of the world, I think everything we do is part of the world as well and is a function of what we are and our interrelation with everything else in the world. That includes thinking, What happens when we read, see, speak, hear, etc. can be considered cognitive in certain respects, but is nonetheless a phenomenon existing in the world like anything else. Concepts are such phenomena; we form them, communicate them and discuss them as organisms in an environment.

However, certain of those concepts, ideas, thoughts, whatever you wish to call them, are not empirically verifiable as others are. They serve a different purpose, It's merely that we should distinguish one kind from another, and not treat them as the same or having the same function.