It seems reasonable to me to say that in the real world as well as in maths, a universal is the set of all objects that have the relevant property. — andrewk
We can take a feather that has fallen off a bird, and use it, in the absence of any legs, to establish the concept of a feather. Then we can develop the concept of a featherless being as one that has no feathers. Thus we have separated the notion of feather from that of number of legs. That's what I was referring to when I mentioned the diversity of examples in our world.We can in principle, and there are real-life examples of this. One of them is ancient: a human is not [just] a featherless biped. — Snakes Alive
Rudolf Carnap wrote several papers in which he argued along a similar vein of Hume and Wittgenstein that ontological questions are devoid of meaning. This is because in his view, questions of fact only have meaning inside the framework the terms of the question originated. So it's perfectly reasonable to ask whether real numbers exist in mathematics, but it's meaningless to ask if they exist in the world, since the world is external to the framework of math. — Marchesk
He also argued that questions of existence regarding the world must be empirically verifiable to be meaningful, with logic providing the tools for analyzing meaning.
There are abstract implication-facts, in the sense that they can be stated and discussed. What more "existence" should they have? — Michael Ossipoff
There are many reasons to think experience is not primary.
1. We have bodies upon which our experiences depend.
2. Our bodies were born.
3. Human bodies evolved.
4. The universe existed prior to human experience. It's also much larger than our experience.
And so on. — Marchesk
1. We have bodies upon which our experiences depend.
2. Our bodies were born.
3. Human bodies evolved.
4. The universe existed prior to human experience.
It's [this physical universe] also much larger than our experience.
but not really possible to be taken seriously on its own terms (and indeed, those who debate it seem not to take it seriously on its own terms either – it's a kind of game whose playing has other edifying effects). — Snakes Alive
The entities that are investigated in (most of at least) the sciences are phenomenally real enough for us — Janus
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical. — 6.522
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value -- and if there were, it would be of no value.
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.
It must lie outside the world. — 6.41
It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.) — 6.421
One of the crucial differences between the method of science and the non-theoretical understanding that is exemplified in music, art, philosophy and ordinary life, is that science aims at a level of generality which necessarily eludes these other forms of understanding. This is why the understanding of people can never be a science. To understand a person is to be able to tell, for example, whether he means what he says or not, whether his expressions of feeling are genuine or feigned. And how does one acquire this sort of understanding? Wittgenstein raises this question at the end of Philosophical Investigations. “Is there,” he asks, “such a thing as ‘expert judgment’ about the genuineness of expressions of feeling?” Yes, he answers, there is.
But the evidence upon which such expert judgments about people are based is “imponderable,” resistant to the general formulation characteristic of science. “Imponderable evidence,” Wittgenstein writes, “includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone. I may recognise a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one… But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference… If I were a very talented painter I might conceivably represent the genuine and simulated glance in pictures.”
I agree with this; although I would say some people do take it seriously, in the sense that they are emotionally invested in reality being one imagined way or another, even though those imagined ways are not really clear conceptions of anything substantive. — Janus
The only thing that matters is wether the argument is valid, and whether it's premises are true. — Marchesk
The only thing that matters is wether the argument is valid, and whether it's premises are true. — Marchesk
Do we think the Quine-Duhem thesis shows that no particular theoretical entity is "absolutely" necessary? (I.e., necessity is theory relative.) — Srap Tasmaner
But as to the existence of universals, I can't make any sense of the question. When I exercise my powers as an English speaker, I don't know what's being asked. And since I know of no other criterion by which to make a question framed in English sensible, I conclude that it's nonsense. — Snakes Alive
I wouldn't say so in the sciences, soft or hard; we don't have 'intuitions' of things like populations, physical forces, and so on. — Snakes Alive
What we come closest to having 'intuitions' of are tangible ordinary objects, but even these are thought of transcendentally: we project them as seen from 'infinite sides,' and we never have an intuition of their totality. So, treating things as 'objects' is itself just a regulative idea.
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