What bothers me, is that through your process philosophy, you have assigned to the limits (discrete and continuous) the status of not real, non-existent. But then you go ahead and talk about these limits as if they are somehow part of reality. You describe reality as being somehow forced to exist within these limits, yet the limits are said to be non-existent, not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

But in the process view, how would the contents be more real than their container?

So you are trying to impose your own non-process view on an understanding of process philosophy. And yes I agree, it doesn’t work. But that is now your problem.

You readily avoid the paradoxes by simply ignoring them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The paradoxes are a product of your metaphyics. So I can simply ignore them.

But in the process view, how would the contents be more real than their container? — apokrisis

I'm not saying "more real", I'm saying "both real". The problem is that you talk about the contents and the container as if they are separate things, but then you reduce them in principle to one and the same thing. If the two separate things are in reality incommensurable, then the result is paradox.

So you are trying to impose your own non-process view on an understanding of process philosophy. And yes I agree, it doesn’t work. But that is now your problem. — apokrisis

No, I'm not trying to impose any particular view, I'm just trying to understand your view. When you mention two distinct things "contents" and "container", then talk about them as if they are really one and the same thing, I want to see the principle whereby you unite them as one and the same. Then I can judge this principle. If you have no such principle then you are just talking contradictory nonsense.

This is what I have gleaned so far, tell me if I have anything wrong. You have first stated that the "container", being the limits such as the discrete and the continuous, is not real. These limits are just ideals we have, by which we model things. So when I asked you about "real limits", the "real container", you implied that the contents are somehow also the container. Is this what you are saying, that the contents are self-contained?

If this is what you are claiming, then the contents must have inherent within them, each of the two limits, the discrete and the continuous. And, each of these two limits must be equally real, but fundamentally different in order that there may be real separation between them for the contents to possess real activity. Now we need to account for the real existence of the discrete and the continuous (the container), and the separation between them, within the contents. Do you agree?

You have inverted the perspective such that the container is inherent within the contents. But this does not negate the need to determine the two real, and distinct, limits, the discrete and the continuous, and the real separation between them, which exists within the contents.

The problem is that you talk about the contents and the container as if they are separate things, — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. That is how you are talking about them. The way I would talk about them is relative to each other. So there would be a contents to the degree there is a container, and vice versa.

OK, so I had it all wrong, let me try again then. We were talking about the discrete and the continuous. These two make up the limits, so this is what comprises your proposed "container", the discrete and the continuous. Moving along, you assume "contents" as well as the container, something which is contained by the discrete and the continuous.

Now, the real existence of contents and container are spoken of in terms of "degree". The container (the discrete and the continuous) is real to the "degree" that the contents are real. Can you help me to understand this concept of existence, or reality, by degree? Let's assume that there is something with real existence. Could you say that this thing is 50% contents, and 50% container (discrete and continuous), making it 100% real or existent? Could a thing have 80% real existence, being 40% contents and 40% container?

Are you saying that the content is always equivalent to container? There is always the same amount of contents as there is container? But if the container is both discrete and continuous, as the limits have two extremes, does this mean that the thing is 50% contents, 25% discrete, and 25% continuous. Is it possible that a thing could be 40% contents, 20% discrete, and 20% continuous, making it only 80% existent?

Could you explain to me exactly what you mean by "there would be a contents to the degree there is a container, and vice versa"? As you can see, I'm not quite making sense of this.

Moving along, you assume "contents" as well as the container, something which is contained by the discrete and the continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

I chose to talk about the same general distinction in another way so as to broaden the view you were taking. So try to understand it that way rather than setting things up for further confusion.

To talk of contents and container is to talk about the systems view of physicalism. Everything that exists is the product of the process that is the formation of a global structure of constraints, a state of systemhood, which results - matchingly - in some locally emergent degrees of freedom.

So the container is emergent - some set of global boundary conditions or "habits" which stand for the system's defining final/formal cause. And the contents are emergent too - as the now definite degrees of freedom that stand for the system's material/effective cause.

Unpredictability regarding the contents has been stripped away by the nature of the container, resulting in a set of contents that is now definite to the degree that its material possibilities have been sharply restricted.

The discrete and the continuous do map to this view. Continuity becomes the global container - the constraints. And discreteness describes the now locally countable, because crisply individuated, degrees of freedom that are being "held" within the container.

Now, the real existence of contents and container are spoken of in terms of "degree". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. Degree of development. In the beginning, when everything is just vague, containers and contents would be hard to distinguish apart. A clear difference is what then emerges.

Could you say that this thing is 50% contents, and 50% container (discrete and continuous), making it 100% real or existent? Could a thing have 80% real existence, being 40% contents and 40% container? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I probably made a mistake given you such a concrete image to latch onto. I aimed to give you a stepping stone out of your worldview. You are not using it to avoid actually have to step out of that worldview.

Think of a cloud. As an object, it only has a vague boundary and so only vague contents. It is kind of contained, and kind of substantial. Fly into one and it goes all misty, damp, cold. But neither its form nor its material is particularly definite - certainly relative to our usual notion of a substantial object.

Or to give another example where the active nature of containment might be clearer, think of a tornado. It is a vortex that entrains all its contents with a direction. Stuff gets sucked into its shape. It become composed of a spinning air mass, plus anything else light enough to be swept along.

But it is hard to put a finger on a sharp boundary to that vortex. It is a container, a constrainer, with a vague outline. And its contents are also in a vague state. There is a general sort of directionality to all the parts, but also a lot of individual chaos still.

I chose to talk about the same general distinction in another way so as to broaden the view you were taking. So try to understand it that way rather than setting things up for further confusion. — apokrisis

OK, but our subject is the question of the existence, or non existence of the discrete and the continuous. Unless we relate this to the talk of container/contents, it is not an analogy (talking about the same thing in a different way), it is changing the subject. That is why I am confused, because I do not see this relationship and it appears like you are changing the subject.

The discrete and the continuous do map to this view. Continuity becomes the global container - the constraints. And discreteness describes the now locally countable, because crisply individuated, degrees of freedom that are being "held" within the container. — apokrisis

But that is completely different from what you said concerning the discrete and the continuous already:

When we speak of them, we are only pointing to the fact that reality must exist between these two reciprocally-defined extremes. Both represent the measurable limits to existence. And so existence itself has to be the bit that stands in-between. — apokrisis

Clearly you are saying here, that "discrete" and "continuous" refer to two "reciprocally define extremes", and that they are "limits to existence". But now, when you apply the container/contents analogy, continuity is represented by "the container" and is called "the constraints", which represents the limits, and "contents" represents the discrete.

So I assume that you have negated the need for "reciprocally-defined extremes". In the first post, these two opposing extremes appeared to form the limits, the constraints. But now the "limits" or "constraints" do not consist of both these two, the constraints are only one of these, "continuity".

The "discrete" now, under this metaphysics which you are proposing is not reciprocally defined by "continuous". It is not defined as the opposite of continuous. The discrete is the contents, whatever it is which is limited by the container, while the container is the continuous.

Since "the discrete" and "the continuous" are no longer represented as reciprocally defined extremes, I have two question concerning the nature of these two.

First, how is it possible for "the continuous" to limit or constrain anything? If the limits, or constraints, do not consist of opposing extremes, but continuity instead, how is it possible for constraint to actually occur? Let's say for instance, that continuity is like the infinite. How can the infinite actually constrain anything" "Infinite" means the exact opposite, unconstrained. Are you saying that the continuous, which is unconstrained, without boundaries, can actually act as a constraint?

The second question is what type of existence does the discrete have now? Let's assume that the nature of the discrete is to be bounded, constrained. So we assume a boundary, and this boundary is as you say continuous, so it must be like a circle, to provide that continuity, and also be a boundary. What lies within that boundary is the question. We cannot refer to the circle itself as the discrete unit, because you have negated "reciprocally-defined". You have posited something within the boundary, something which is constrained within which is distinct from the boundary. What do you think is the nature of this constrained thing? "Locally countable", "crisply individuated", and such terms, refer to what the container does, individuating the contents, by bounding it. But we have to assume that there is something distinct from the boundary, which is bounded or else there is no difference between discrete and continuous.

OK, but our subject is the question of the existence, or non existence of the discrete and the continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

That might be your subject. And the only way you understand any subject.

Clearly you are saying here, that "discrete" and "continuous" refer to two "reciprocally define extremes", and that they are "limits to existence". But now, when you apply the container/contents analogy, continuity is represented by "the container" and is called "the constraints", which represents the limits, and "contents" represents the discrete. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's so difficult? Being reciprocal is why the discrete and the continuous would map naturally to a hierarchical story of the smallest vs the largest. That is the nature of the relation being describe. The bigger one gets, the smaller the other gets.

A point can't contain the line, but it can compose the line in being its contents. And likewise, a line can't be the contents of a point, but it can certainly contain points.

How can the infinite actually constrain anything" "Infinite" means the exact opposite, unconstrained. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought it meant the space within which every possible number exists in bounded fashion.

The second question is what type of existence does the discrete have now? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a limit on any continuity - the least amount of continuity imaginable. Just as continuity is whatever is the least unbroken state of affairs that you can imagine.

So to the degree you can define the one, you can define the other.

You are simply showing that the two can't in fact be disentangled with arbitrary completeness. Just as my developmental approach concludes.

As I say, your non-process view of metaphysics keeps crashing into paradoxes because it believes in ontological absolutes rather than a logic of relations. You keep demanding to be shown something fixed and concrete that answers to your mechanistic conviction that reality has to begin in counterfactual definiteness, rather than definiteness being a relative outcome.

That might be your subject. And the only way you understand any subject. — apokrisis

Hey, you brought it up, not I. It is your subject, look:

So the mathematical debate seems to hinge on whether "the real" is discrete or continuous. — apokrisis

Remember that post? It's not my fault that when I try to engage you on this subject, you simply tried to change the subject. You brought it up, and made many very bold sounding assertions, but instead of backing up these assertions, you changed the subject, and claim that it's my subject.

What's so difficult? Being reciprocal is why the discrete and the continuous would map naturally to a hierarchical story of the smallest vs the largest. That is the nature of the relation being describe. The bigger one gets, the smaller the other gets. — apokrisis

But when things are related, and one is designated as the largest, and another is designated as the smallest, it is not the case that the largest contains the smallest. They are considered, and compared as separate entities, or else this relation could not be established. So if you begin by comparing the continuous to the discrete, asking which one is real, as you did, then you switch to saying that one contains the other, then you have changed the subject. You do not mean the same thing by "continuous" and "discrete" that you meant in the first place. Do you recognize that this is equivocation?

I thought it meant the space within which every possible number exists in bounded fashion. — apokrisis

This is nonsense, you cannot conceive of a number existing in space. This would require either a very odd definition of number, or a very odd definition of space, or both. The nearest thing would be to draw a number line, but that would be a representation, just like a numeral is a representation. You might conceive of a number line in the way you describe, but there is no "space" in this conception because it doesn't have the required dimensionality to qualify as "space". If you remove all requirements for dimensionality in a concept of "space", without replacing those requirements with other requirements, then "space" could refer to absolutely anything. And so, what you have said here is nonsense.

It is a limit on any continuity - the least amount of continuity imaginable. Just as continuity is whatever is the least unbroken state of affairs that you can imagine. — apokrisis

Wait a minute. You said that the continuous is like the container, it constrains, or restricts, limits the discrete. Now you are saying that the discrete limits the continuous. So now the discrete is the container, and the continuous is the contents. It appears like in reality you really have no way to differentiate the contents from the container. They both coexist and there is no way of saying that one is the contents and the other the container because each, the continuous and the discrete, seem to have features of container as well as features of contents.

This is exactly the point I was criticizing you on, which I was hoping that you could demonstrate a way of avoiding. I was saying that it appears like your metaphysics claims that the two, the discrete and the continuous, are inherently combined such that there is no possible way to separate them, and all of reality is just an indiscernible mixture of discrete and continuous, or container and contents.

Can you conceive of a way in which the discrete and continuous, as in the analogy of the container and the contents, can be differentiated from each other? If not, then there really is no container/content, or discrete/continuous, and all this talk is meaningless at best, or even deceptive or misleading.

As I say, your non-process view of metaphysics keeps crashing into paradoxes because it believes in ontological absolutes rather than a logic of relations. You keep demanding to be shown something fixed and concrete that answers to your mechanistic conviction that reality has to begin in counterfactual definiteness, rather than definiteness being a relative outcome. — apokrisis

A logic of relations requires that there are things which are being related. If there is nothing which is being related, then any described relations are meaningless. "Smaller than" has no real meaning without something to refer to; "smaller than X" . Described relations cannot on their own produce, or lead to definiteness, as an outcome, because it is necessary that there is something substantial, definite, to begin with in order to produce definiteness at the conclusion. That's simply the way logic works, the conclusion cannot contain more "definiteness" than the premises.

Hey, you brought it up, not I. It is your subject, look: — Metaphysician Undercover

Err, reality as a process.

It's not my fault that when I try to engage you on this subject, you simply tried to change the subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just tried to prevent you going down your same old rabbit hole of non-process assumptions.

But when things are related, and one is designated as the largest, and another is designated as the smallest, it is not the case that the largest contains the smallest. They are considered, and compared as separate entities, or else this relation could not be established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Huh. The relationship is precisely what is established by the discrete being part to the whole that is continuity. The relationship is that of the downward acting constraints to the upward constructing elements or individuated degrees of freedom.

The nearest thing would be to draw a number line, but that would be a representation... — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean like a representation of a .... continuous, just waiting to be broken, space?

They both coexist and there is no way of saying that one is the contents and the other the container because each, the continuous and the discrete, seem to have features of container as well as features of contents. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are getting it ... by trying so hard to get it wrong! Spectacular. My job is done.

You are getting it ... by trying so hard to get it wrong! Spectacular. My job is done. — apokrisis

So I was right then. You talk about the discrete and the continuous as if there is some real difference between them. But when you describe the way that existence really is, you claim that there is no way of distinguishing between them within real existing things. Everything is a mixture of the two, and with respect to which features are discrete or continuous, which are the contents or the container, you cannot produce any principles for identification, because the two are fundamentally inseparable, and therefore cannot be identified individually. Sounds like the recipe for Zeno's paradoxes.

You talk about the discrete and the continuous as if there is some real difference between them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct.

But when you describe the way that existence really is, you claim that there is no way of distinguishing between them within real existing things. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are you talking about. This is modelling. So to the extent that we know the thing-in-itself, the dichotomy of the discrete and the continuous is the conceptual division that would describe a separation of the real - whatever that is noumenally speaking - towards its "real" phenomenological limits.

Thus if we are talking about our ontic commitments, then containers and contents are both equally "real" in that modelling sense. Likewise our notions of the continuous and discrete as the limits on possible existence.

This stands in contrast to more reductionist or monistic schemes that would want to make one or the other the "real". Or indeed, dualistic schemes that take a substantial rather than a process view of dichotomies.

So your problem is that you conflate the phenomenal and the noumenal in this discussion. It is one of the ways you keep tangling your feet.

because the two are fundamentally inseparable, and therefore cannot be identified individually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Back to front. The two are fundamentally separable because they can be individuated in terms of a reciprocal relation to each other. And by that same token, the two are fundamentally connected by being the two poles of that reciprocal relation.

What are you talking about. This is modelling. So to the extent that we know the thing-in-itself, the dichotomy of the discrete and the continuous is the conceptual division that would describe a separation of the real - whatever that is noumenally speaking - towards its "real" phenomenological limits. — apokrisis

OK, let's start from the beginning again, and see if I can understand what you're laying down. You have given me two distinct dichotomies, the dichotomy of discrete and continuous, and the dichotomy of the model and the reality which is modelled. The question concerns the reality of the discrete and the continuous. How do the two dichotomies relate to each other?

So here, we're back to saying that the discrete and continuous are only part of the model. However, you are saying that this model, which utilizes "discrete" and "continuous", describes a real separation within the real thing which is modeled. Am I correct in this description? If we use the discrete/continuous model, our description of reality implies a real separation between the distinct parts of reality.

Thus if we are talking about our ontic commitments, then containers and contents are both equally "real" in that modelling sense. Likewise our notions of the continuous and discrete as the limits on possible existence. — apokrisis

This is where you loose me. Within the model, the discrete and continuous are completely distinct. They are defined as incompatible, one cannot partake of the other. They are defined in such a way that the one excludes the other in opposition. So if we switch now to a container/contents model, we must either maintain this principle within the container/contents model, or else we are switching to model which is different from the discrete/continuous model.

Now, the discrete/continuous model employs two distinct elements which are mutually exclusive, by definition, therefore there must be real separation between these two elements within the reality modeled, for the model to be accurate. The question is, is reality like this, that it consists of two distinct elements which are necessarily separate by way of opposition, or is the model flawed. If I understand you correctly, you are saying that this model is flawed, reality should not be modelled by two opposing terms each of which excludes the other, by definition, such that there is a real separation between these two elements. You are saying that reality ought to be modelled more like container/contents, where there is no real separation between the two defining elements of reality.

So here is the problem I have, which I've been trying to relate to you. If we model reality in this way that you are proposing, how would we distinguish between, and identify, the two defining elements, the container and the contents, within the thing which is being modelled? If we cannot have principles of identity whereby the identification of one would exclude the possibility of the other, such as in the discrete/continuous model, then how would we ever know whether we've identified constituents of the contents, or constituents of the container? Do you see what I mean? Why would we model reality as container/contents if we cannot produce principles whereby the container can be isolated from the contents? If we produce such principles of exclusion, we just go back to the two distinct, mutually exclusive parts of reality, like the discrete and the continuous. If your argument is that reality just isn't like this, there is no separation of parts in this way, then why even apply a dichotomy within the model at all? If there is no such separation in reality, then to model it with any type of separation, like container/contents, presents us with a faulty model. Either the dichotomy is real, and we provide for real distinct parts in the model, or we completely dispense with the dichotomy in the model.

OK, let's start from the beginning again — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Let's see if you can just remember the definition of a dichotomy as that which is "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive". So there is a process of separation towards reciprocally-matched limits. Two contrasting limits on "the real" emerge into view according to the distance each can each put between itself and its "other".

They are defined in such a way that the one excludes the other in opposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't forget that they are also jointly exhaustive. So you have to have these two (the assertion about the mutuality of a pairing). And also only these two (the assertion about the exhaustion of any further possibilities).

You make the right noises about dichotomies only then to collapse everything back to your happy simplicities of pairs of terms that are then neither mutual nor exhaustive anymore so far as you are concerned.

I know it is a little bit complicated. But it ain't that complicated.

So here is the problem I have, which I've been trying to relate to you. If we model reality in this way that you are proposing, how would we distinguish between, and identify, the two defining elements, the container and the contents, within the thing which is being modelled? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is some other confection of misunderstanding you are attempting to concoct as a distraction.

Keep starting from the beginning until you accept how a dichotomy actually works - mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Dwell on that truth deeply. Really soak up the meaning in a way you can't forget or deny. Then maybe you will have the logical wherewithal to take a next step.

Yes. Let's see if you can just remember the definition of a dichotomy as that which is "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive". So there is a process of separation towards reciprocally-matched limits. Two contrasting limits on "the real" emerge into view according to the distance each can each put between itself and its "other". — apokrisis

Do you see, that this process which you describe is not suited to a dichotomy as you define it? The process might be a movement toward a dichotomy, or away from a dichotomy, as defined, but if there is such a dichotomy there is not room for process without breaking the terms of "dichotomy". Also, the dichotomy cannot describe the limits on the real because this would not be jointly exhaustive. Anything within the limits, being not the limits themselves, which is the entirety of "the real" would be excluded from the dichotomy under the designation of "jointly exhaustive".. That's what I tried to explain earlier. If you place limits on the real, then the limits are not part of the real. And according to your description, it is impossible that "the real" partakes in any dichotomy, limits or otherwise, because everything which is real is not mutually exclusive of everything else that is real, each being real. For these reasons there is no room for a dichotomy in your process philosophy. The dichotomy cannot be real, and must be disposed of, dismissed as a false premise.

You make the right noises about dichotomies only then to collapse everything back to your happy simplicities of pairs of terms that are then neither mutual nor exhaustive anymore so far as you are concerned. — apokrisis

That's because I normally use "dichotomy" in the more general and common way. In the most general sense it is a simple division into two, a separation. In a more strict sense, it is necessarily mutually exclusive, nothing can cross the line. This leads to the idea that things which are opposed to each other, like hot and cold, form a dichotomy. But notice how all things which are warm are excluded from that dichotomy. And in your definition, which is an even more strict, mathematical sense, "jointly exhaustive" is included. Do you see, as I explained above, that if we adhere to this very strict sense of "dichotomy", there is no room for any dichotomies in the reality described by your process philosophy? Dichotomies are fictions which ought to be dismissed as false premises.

Then maybe you will have the logical wherewithal to take a next step. — apokrisis

Actually, the question is do you have the balls to take the next step which is dictated by the logical wherewithal. Dichotomies are incompatible with your process philosophy. One or the other has to go if you want metaphysics with consistency. Which will it be?

Anything within the limits, being not the limits themselves, which is the entirety of "the real" would be excluded from the dichotomy under the designation of "jointly exhaustive" — Metaphysician Undercover

Together they exhaust other possible limitations to that aspect of reality.

And don't forget that what follows after a dichotomous separation or symmetry breaking is the arrival at the stable equilibrium of a triadic hierarchical state of order. You get an ending to the breaking when the two limits are in equilibrium with the contents they thus now contain.

Again, because you can't be bothered to study how all this works, you keep falling woefully short of any understanding. I have to keep explaining basic stuff again and again.

That's because I normally use "dichotomy" in the more general and common way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. You think it is a simple division. And the process view says it is irreducibly complex. Things only reach stability once the separating into polar opposites has arrived at a hierarchical balance where there is also now a connecting spectrum of concrete possibility.

This leads to the idea that things which are opposed to each other, like hot and cold, form a dichotomy. But notice how all things which are warm are excluded from that dichotomy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hardly. All things warm are now specified in concrete fashion because they are related to the extremes of a dichotomy. There is the hot in one direction, the cold in the other. So now the warm has its own definite and measurable location somewhere on the spectrum of possibility just established.

Dichotomies are incompatible with your process philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you understand about process philosophy? A big fat zero so far.

And don't forget that what follows after a dichotomous separation or symmetry breaking is the arrival at the stable equilibrium of a triadic hierarchical state of order. You get an ending to the breaking when the two limits are in equilibrium with the contents they thus now contain.

Again, because you can't be bothered to study how all this works, you keep falling woefully short of any understanding. I have to keep explaining basic stuff again and again. — apokrisis

But my point is that after any "symmetry breaking", there is no such thing as a dichotomy. "A dichotomy" may refer to a symmetry, but the symmetry has been broken. So if a dichotomy is a symmetry, then if the symmetry is broken, the dichotomy no longer exists. A "symmetry breaking" is not a "dichotomous separation", that is a false representation. It might be possible to describe the symmetry which is broken as a dichotomy of possibilities, but the breaking of the symmetry negates this dichotomy.

If I am woefully short of understanding here, then maybe you can explain how I misunderstand this.

Exactly. You think it is a simple division. And the process view says it is irreducibly complex. Things only reach stability once the separating into polar opposites has arrived at a hierarchical balance where there is also now a connecting spectrum of concrete possibility. — apokrisis

Let's maintain the model/real division. Remember, the separating of things into polar opposites is the model. Symmetry breaking is the real. A symmetry breaking is not a separation of things into polar opposites. A symmetry breaking cannot even be represented as a separating of things into polar opposites. These are completely different things, and it appears to me, like you are somehow claiming "separating into polar opposites" (dichotomizing) is a model of symmetry breaking. But this appears to me to be completely false.

You might insist that you've explained this "basic stuff again and again", but all I've seen is that you use these terms in this way again and again, as if symmetry breaking is a form of dichotomizing, but in reality these two are completely incompatible.

Hardly. All things warm are now specified in concrete fashion because they are related to the extremes of a dichotomy. There is the hot in one direction, the cold in the other. So now the warm has its own definite and measurable location somewhere on the spectrum of possibility just established. — apokrisis

The "extremes of a dichotomy" are the principles of the model. The warm things are real. You are speaking as if the model is right there within the real warm thing. In relation to the warm thing, hot is in one direction, and cold in the other direction. But these relations are the model, they are not a part of the warm thing.

What do you understand about process philosophy? A big fat zero so far. — apokrisis

That is a statement which reflects your capacity to explain. When you use terms in an idiosyncratic way, as you clearly do, then you must explain yourself, rather than repeating the same idiosyncratic phrases over and over again, if you want someone to understand what you are trying to say.