There's nothing 'if-then' about my experience. You're conflating experience with possibility. — Janus
Every "fact" in your experience corresponds to, implies, and can be said as, an if-then fact. — Michael Ossipoff
While I largely agree that the question of universals is more or less rubbish, it seems to me that its no less a jumping of the gun to say that the question is psychological. — StreetlightX
The point isn't that similarity is a psychological issue – I don't think that makes any sense. But the question of how people come to recognize similarities surely is. — Snakes Alive
There is no such thing as an "if-then fact" — Janus
; there are if-then propositions.
propositions are not facts.
It's not my experience, but an arbitrary add-on., an ad hoc, an 'after the fact'. — Janus
And that is the root of Marchesk's problem: after so many pages of discussion, not only can he not explain the answer and how it actually answers the question, he cannot even explain what the question is and why it needs to be answered. — SophistiCat
We perceive a world of individuals, yet our language is full of universal categories of properties and relations. So how do we reconcile the two? — Marchesk
ou need to spell out why these two conditions give rise to a problem. What problem? — Srap Tasmaner
How our language comes to have universal concepts when the world is full of individuals. What is it about the individual things that leads us to form universal properties and relations such that we can group them into categories? — Marchesk
Critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defence, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality.
(1) We can only think about what we have experience of.
(2) We only have experience of particulars.
∴ (3) We can only think about particulars. — Srap Tasmaner
What sorts of claims are (1) and (2)? Are they empirical? — Srap Tasmaner
(1) We can only think about what we have experience of.
(2) We only have experience of particulars. — Srap Tasmaner
Hume provides an example of a concept that is neither in experience nor from logic: causality. — Marchesk
Hume was wrong; he was tricked by his tendency to reduce perception to the visual; of course it's true that we don't actually see causality. — Janus
Every time you use or think the terms ‘is equal to’, ‘is’, ‘is not’, ‘is more than’, ‘doesn’t mean’, ‘must mean’ then essentially you’re relying on universal abstractions in order to arrive at a judgement. Even in order to arrive at a ‘neuroscientific analysis’ [or any scientific analysis] you need to do this. But you don’t notice you’re doing it, and if it’s pointed out you don’t see what it means. — Wayfarer
(1) We can only think about what we have experience of.
(2) We only have experience of particulars — Srap Tasmaner
I'd say this is really a question for phenomenology, not for psychology, or at least, only secondarily for psychology. — Janus
I would say they are claims about epistemology. Can epistemological claims be settled by psychology (or neuroscience)? I don't know. Not yet, anyway. — Marchesk
Or someone will cry out that it's meaningless to point this out, because metaphysics. — Marchesk
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