As an atheist, I consider the divide between the existence of a deity and its worship to be stark. I do not worship any such entities, real or imagined, and I would study any such being from an artistic and scientific perspective. I have long been avid for knowledge upon the most exotic strains of the multiverse, and I have been perplexed by the Big Bang. In the awe of the awareness which has proceeded my studies, I have craved to exhume more and more information. In every such tormented or reeling knowledge of fallen need, farrow ideals of unrelenting height becoming as a beeling, I have not found the solace of a God.

Some bias emerges from my own hope of lethe in quietus. I cannot imagine the noxious emergence into an eternal suffering which would inevitably consume me in the thrall of an omnipresence which would be my fate. Such a trial of eternity propels my hope for oblivion.

Mythology is a question of who. Many modern persons now accept the impersonal explanations of thunderstorms, of the changing seasons, and of the final days. In numerous cultures, these subjects were more commonly accepted as being manifestations of divine will. These times, in technologically advanced states, are of the enlightenment, and governments fund institutions such as space programs in order to gather empirical evidence. When we turn from the question of who, and conclude that much is caused by a what, then we begin to see a divergence and divestment from anthropocentrism. In the eventual discovery, we are forced to acknowledge the unreal rescarciation between our former inquiries and the notions of our existence, and the rimestock which has given way to empirical data. I do not know how precise are the most widely accepted models of genesis, but, based upon decades of peer reviewal, experimentation, and mathematical proofs, the scientific method offers a minimalistically biased tool for creating models of the universe.

As God is frequently cited as a noumenological being, it is arduous to offer an empirical rebuttle. However, it would be incredibly fallible to open oneself to these hordes of noumena- for any number of non-emperical ideas and concepts to exist- and thus deprive oneself of the observable. Why should we believe in any one noumenon when all are, according to belief by faith, equally plausible or intangible? For myself to function with any degree of rationality, I must make my decisions through deduction and analysis.

In such austere efforts to discover a perfected course for optimal logic, I have found that my bias occludes every conclusion. Therefore, I must venture more analysis and comparison to attain a sound conclusion. In my paradigm, mere faith only opens a series of convoluted pratfalls which are forever at the fore of any imagined obstacle to the world of coherence. While I adore the coalescence of falderolical conflicts and awful forces of the outside, such demesnes hold no place within my own sanctity. My own created universes must be kept to their pages.

And presuppositions have nothing to do with skepticism. — tim wood

Presuppositions are exactly what the skeptic questions. Descartes for example questioned the real existence of the material world, something which was taken for granted. The fact that something is taken for granted, is what leaves it open to skepticism.

What's missing is the account. The person is not missing. I think the easiest way here, instead of laboriously chasing you through old philosophies and in some cases yours and their errors - your briar patch, apparently - is to simply say that metaphysics itself is not grounded. The best metaphysics can do is work towards internal consistency. And this is just your point above. And for a remedy you would look for "principles." If you think about it, you'll see that any such principle you find cannot ground the enterprise. It's a little like a criminal undertaking to be the best criminal he can be, thinking he will thereby no longer be a criminal. And this would be a poor analogy and joke, except that history tells us this is exactly what happens time and time again! — tim wood

OK, suppose this is the case, what you describe (though I don't understand your analogy, of how the best criminal would not be a criminal at akk, because that's contradictory and exactly what we're trying to avoid). You seem to be arguing that "fundamental ontology" avoids this problem of not being grounded, and this is how it differs from metaphysics. Yet you describe fundamental ontology as being grounded in its presuppositions, so it's really nothing more than a form of metaphysics. The type of metaphysics you adopt depends on the presuppositions you employ, and these are the "principles" I referred to. The principles however, are open to skepticism and that's why we have a variety of metaphysical positions.

Here we are: we are here. It's useless to debate whether we're here: if we weren't, we wouldn't be asking. What are we going to do with it all? Squeezing this yields two questions: What is "we"? and what is the "it all" we're going to do with? Because the "it all" is the object to be done with (and indeed cannot be an "it all" without a "we"), the first question must be, what is the "we"? That is, the two questions are not equi-primordial. Think do-er and do-ee. Consideration of the do-er comes first. — tim wood

Oh come on, you can't say that it's useless to debate this principle. There are two glaring holes in this, which when analyzed create contradiction. First, what is "here"? We could say that "here" marks a point in space. Second, what is "we"? "We" marks a unity of people. Now we have a huge problem, the contradiction. A unity of people is composed of a number of distinct people which as distinct entities cannot exist at the same place. So it is inherently contradictory to say "we are here". "We" implies a plurality of entities, and a plurality cannot exist at the same place at the same time, which is what "here" implies.

What is evident is that by taking this principle as a presupposition, you are avoiding the issue of unity. You are taking unity for granted, saying that a group of individuals are parts of a whole, we, and this whole exists in one place, here. But the nature of unity is a fundamental metaphysical question, such that we cannot simply take unity for granted, we need to describe what it is. Otherwise we are not accounting for, in our "fundamental ontology", whatever it is which unites parts into a whole.

But here's the danger. If the grounding of metaphysics in dasein is forgotten. then it grounds itself, or is grounded, opportunistically to whatever is available, often culture, and within that, often enough a hi-jacked culture. In a sense, then, metaphysics doesn't need ontology, but without it, it is not grounded except within the illusion of a grounding. You note that this is a problem, and indeed it is. You look for solutions within metaphysics - but that cannot be. The only other place is within the concerns of dasein understood as care(ing), which can be understood only through an analysis prior to metaphysics. — tim wood

You have a glaring problem in grounding metaphysics in dasein. You have assumed a unity which is not real. There are no principles which unite the individual parts into a whole, the whole is simply assumed, presupposed. A real being, as a unity of parts, must have something which unites the parts to make it a unity. We cannot simply assume that there is something there which is doing the act of unifying, without understanding what that something is, because perhaps it's not even there. Perhaps the assumption of unity is just a fantasy, a fiction.

But the questions to you stand: can you, do you, distinguish between metaphysics and (fundamental) ontology, do you recognize in the ontology a ground? — tim wood

No, I do not distinguish between fundamental ontology and metaphysics. Fundamental ontology, as described by you, is just a deficient metaphysics. It is a metaphysics which takes unity for granted, and this produces the contradictory fundamental principle of "we are here". Unity cannot be taken for granted because it is inherently contradictory to say that a number of distinct individuals exist at the same place. Therefore we must dig deeper into the nature of reality (metaphysics) to find principles to avoid this contradiction. We need to establish principles which allow distinct entities, parts, to exist together as a whole.

There are plenty of scientists postulating that timespace was a thing before big bang, but plenty of others postulating that timespace itself was nonexistent. The reason is simple. Because no one knows and Big Bang theory does not rely on unobservables such as the "universe" outside the unborn universe. Since I am no theoretical cosmologist, I cannot defend either position. — FLUX23

I don't think the question 'What came before time?' is important. As Keith Ward mentioned, God is behind ALL points in time. The essential argument here is that, because the universe is contingent (meaning, in this context, a collection of properties) it must be dependent on some necessary substance because you cannot have properties without some sustaining substance to keep them in existence.

Perhaps the closest we can come to this substance is the ontology of space itself; space is a real existence. That space, at least from a geometric point of view, did not always exist hardly matters because space can be a temporal instance of whatever substance it is that ultimately supports the properties of the universe.

So, the answer to your question comes down to the nature of this substance; is it Mind? Is this substance unaware that it is becoming a universe or is it doing this deliberately?

Presuppositions are exactly what the skeptic questions. — Metaphysician Undercover

By presupposition I mean the grounds of any question. What are questioned are the answers to questions. A presupposition is not made explicit until a question is asked, and then it stands as an answer and not a presupposition. The trick is that to question an answer is to ask if it meets or does not meet some criterion, usually if it is right or wrong, somehow. Sometimes if it's useful or not, and so forth. However, it is not the purpose or function of a presupposition to be right or wrong (or whatever); its business is to be presupposed (An Essay On Metaphysics, pp. 28-29). As such, it is nonsense to think of questioning presuppositions, the term being properly understood.

OK, suppose this is the case, what you describe (though I don't understand your analogy, of how the best criminal would not be a criminal at all, because that's contradictory and exactly what we're trying to avoid). — Metaphysician Undercover

Hitler and Nazi ideology can stand in as poster-child of metaphysics gone wrong. They didn't think of themselves as criminals (no doubt some did!). How could they? Their Nazi metaphysics excused, even grounded and required, their crimes. The same wind blows everywhere around the globe, though usually less catastrophically. Putin seems the current archetype, but even the fellow who litters with a candy wrapper is operating under defective metaphysics; i.e., "metaphysics" not grounded in understanding what it means to be.

You seem to be arguing that "fundamental ontology" avoids this problem of not being grounded, and this is how it differs from metaphysics. Yet you describe fundamental ontology as being grounded in its presuppositions, so it's really nothing more than a form of metaphysics. The type of metaphysics you adopt depends on the presuppositions you employ, and these are the "principles" I referred to. The principles however, are open to skepticism and that's why we have a variety of metaphysical positions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you need to review what a presupposition is. Any - every - meaningful question involves presuppositions. Nor are they principles. You're not attending to their function but instead covering up that function in your "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" in quotes because a metaphysics that fails to recognize presuppositions for what they are is not metaphysics.

First is to repeat until learned that fundamental ontology is not metaphysics. — tim wood

Here is a problem. You appear to hold that ontology just is metaphysics. Yet how can it be?

"Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that explores the nature of being, existence, and reality. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in a "suitably abstract and fully general manner." — tim wood

Ontology is confronting the the question of what it means to be. Metaphysics: things. Ontology: what it means to be (not what it is to be, which is a metaphysical question). Two different inquiries with differing subject matter, methods, and purpose. It is as if you held that horses were to ridden, to be worked. I point out that to be ridden or worked they first must be cared for; there must first be a consideration of their being. And as it turns out, being concerned for that being, what it means to care for a horse, reveals some things about us as (in this case) caretakers. All of which is missing from your metaphysics. You can indeed ride or work a horse, but if not cared for....

You are taking unity for granted — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. Ontological analysis arrives at a unity.

and this whole exists in one place, here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. Is English your native language? You understand as a matter of simple understanding of the English wrord "here" that a group of people can be here in one place, yes?

But the nature of unity is a fundamental metaphysical question, such that we cannot simply take unity for granted, we need to describe what it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It may well be a fundamental metaphysical question as to what it is. But if a unity is resolved in ontology - what it means to be - then while it may be important to question in terms of metaphysics, it does not belong to metaphysics.
____

Ontology is by now established as an enterprise different from metaphysics - and it was anyway, notwithstanding my efforts here. As to it grounding metaphysics in the sense of being prior to metaphysics, we might argue that it must be because before any question can be asked, there must be a prior understanding of who is asking, and why. In most cases, that is taken for granted, unquestioned. And work gets done. But the history of the world shows clearly and tragically that sometimes metaphysics uniformed by ontology gets the wrong work done, or work that should no be done at all.

By presupposition I mean the grounds of any question. — tim wood

Oh, you had said that presupposing is the same as taking for granted. But "grounds" I take to be the evidence for something. When we take something for granted, our reasons for doing this, is other than evidence. So I understand "presupposition" to be completely different from "grounds"..

However, it is not the purpose or function of a presupposition to be right or wrong (or whatever); its business is to be presupposed (An Essay On Metaphysics, pp. 28-29). — tim wood

But "grounds" is how we distinguish between right and wrong. So if it's not the function of a presupposition to be right or wrong, then clearly a presupposition cannot be the grounds for anything. If the function of a presupposition is simply to be presupposed, then how is the presupposition of any use?

As such, it is nonsense to think of questioning presuppositions, the term being properly understood. — tim wood

Actually, what is nonsense is to even presuppose any presuppositions, in the way that you describe. If the presupposition cannot be used to help distinguish right from wrong, then it is completely useless as one could presuppose any random thing whether its right or wrong. And the presupposition, as you describe it, is absolute nonsense.

Hitler and Nazi ideology can stand in as poster-child of metaphysics gone wrong. They didn't think of themselves as criminals (no doubt some did!). How could they? Their Nazi metaphysics excused, even grounded and required, their crimes. The same wind blows everywhere around the globe, though usually less catastrophically. Putin seems the current archetype, but even the fellow who litters with a candy wrapper is operating under defective metaphysics; i.e., "metaphysics" not grounded in understanding what it means to be. — tim wood

Metaphysics can be bad, and metaphysics can be good, there's no doubt about that because it's supported by evidence. But your "fundamental ontology", is grounded by presuppositions, which as you say cannot function to distinguish wrong from right. Therefore the metaphysics which you propose is clearly a bad metaphysics because it provides no principles for distinguishing correct from incorrect. And since it provides no such principles it cannot adequately support any type of epistemology. Epistemology being grounded in the presupposition a real distinction between correct and incorrect. That epistemological presupposition is grounded in good metaphysics, not presuppositions.

I think you need to review what a presupposition is. — tim wood

So far, your description of "presupposition" is pure nonsense, a grounding which cannot function to distinguish right from wrong. What more ought I review?

You're not attending to their function but instead covering up that function in your "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" in quotes because a metaphysics that fails to recognize presuppositions for what they are is not metaphysics. — tim wood

I cannot see that a presupposition, as you describe it, has any function at all within any metaphysics, whether you call it ontology or whatever.. I think that there is no place for any presuppositions in any metaphysics whatsoever. The purpose of metaphysics is to approach the nature of reality with an open mind, and that requires the exclusion of any presuppositions.

Here is a problem. You appear to hold that ontology just is metaphysics. Yet how can it be? — tim wood

I'm sorry to disillusion you, but that's just how the words are used. If the words are used, to refer in this way, then how can it be otherwise, unless you desire to use the words in an obscure way. Yes I know, you take this lead from Heidegger, but we need to see through these deceptive ploys.

Ontology is confronting the the question of what it means to be. Metaphysics: things. Ontology: what it means to be (not what it is to be, which is a metaphysical question). Two different inquiries with differing subject matter, methods, and purpose. It is as if you held that horses were to ridden, to be worked. I point out that to be ridden or worked they first must be cared for; there must first be a consideration of their being. And as it turns out, being concerned for that being, what it means to care for a horse, reveals some things about us as (in this case) caretakers. All of which is missing from your metaphysics. You can indeed ride or work a horse, but if not cared for.... — tim wood

We already went through this. You're just defining terms in an obscure way. That's unacceptable, and pointless to me.

But if a unity is resolved in ontology - what it means to be - then while it may be important to question in terms of metaphysics, it does not belong to metaphysics. — tim wood

Unity isn't resolved in your "fundamental ontology", it is presupposed. And presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. So your "fundamental ontology" needs to be dismissed as bad metaphysics.

And presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. — Metaphysician Undercover

Name anything you think or do that does not involve presuppositions. For that matter, name anything at all that is not in part named or understood through presuppositions. You wish to dismiss them, go ahead, see how it works.

But as to your dismissal of them, perhaps you might find out what they are, first. I named a book, above....

Name anything you think or do that does not involve presuppositions. — tim wood

Metaphysics. But let me be clear, as it appears like you misunderstood. It is not that the presuppositions are not there, or that they are not "involved", but that they are recognized as ungrounded, unreliable, and are therefore dismissed. Presuppositions are not accepted for the reasons I gave in the last post. They are prejudices, biases, and therefore unacceptable to metaphysics and the pursuit of truth.

To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles — Metaphysician Undercover

So metaphysics must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you list a few, or even one?

I could start with the first principle established by Aristotle's cosmological argument in his "Metaphysics" Bk.9. This principle, produced from a combination of empirical evidence, and logic, is a demonstration that if anything is eternal, it must be actual. As interpreted by Christian theologians this principle is represented as a priority of "actual" over "potential", such that there is a necessary actuality, God, to account for the reality of contingent existence.

The proposition is, then, if anything is eternal, it must be actual. Is that the principle? I scanned Bk. 9 and didn't see it. Let's look at it.

If anything is eternal, it must be actual.

Absent argument, it presupposes itself. You refer to an argument: it presupposes the argument. You describe the argument as comprising logic and empirical evidence. No presuppositions in logic? No presuppositions in empirical evidence?

The issue here is not in the merits of the principle, or indeed in the merits of the supporting argument, but that you argue that it is free of presuppositions because

presuppositions are nonsense to any good metaphysician. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or is Aristotle nonsense?

Please make explicit how your principle is free of presuppositions or try again. (Or find out what presuppositions are, and thereby how they're part of the machinery of thought.)

Absent argument, it presupposes itself. You refer to an argument: it presupposes the argument. You describe the argument as comprising logic and empirical evidence. No presuppositions in logic? No presuppositions in empirical evidence? — tim wood

Could you explain this? I don't see your argument.

Please make explicit how your principle is free of presuppositions or try again. (Or find out what presuppositions are, and thereby how they're part of the machinery of thought.) — tim wood

I never claimed the principle is free of presuppositions. As a principle, established before my time, if I accept it as a principle, it is a presupposition and therefore cannot be free of presupposition. What I said is that if one is to properly carry out the activity, metaphysics, whereby such first principles are established, one must free oneself of any such presuppositions. So I gave that as an example of a first principle, not an example of the activity, metaphysics, whereby first principles are established.. It cannot be "my" first principle without being a presupposition

So this is not "my principle", and I do not presuppose it, or any of the ideas which lead to it, when I practise metaphysics. It was an example of a first principle. Do you recognize the difference between a principle, and the activity of thought which leads to the existence of a principle? Metaphysics is the latter, the activity. Since it seeks "first" principles, to presuppose any principles would contradict this. Any principle which was discovered could not be a "first" principle if it relied on any presupposition. the presupposition would render it a "second" principle. The practise of metaphysics is to rid oneself of all such presuppositions, and seek a "first" principle. But metaphysics deals with first "principles". Notice the plural. That is because the first principle for me, if I practise metaphysics, will not be the same as first principle for you if you practise metaphysics. Do you recognize that this difference is the result of excluding presuppositions?

Was the universe created by purpose or by chance? — Devans99

I think it's about 1/1 000 000 that a benevolent god would force us all to claw and chomp the raw bit of reality in such a harsh world filled with things like child leukemia and the Ebola virus.

Factoring this in to your maths: .9375 x .0000001 x 100 = .0001 (rounding up).

That's a one in ten-thousand chance in my estimation.

Presuppositions are not accepted for the reasons I gave in the last post. They are prejudices, biases, and therefore unacceptable to metaphysics and the pursuit of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

To answer your question, metaphysics seeks first principles
— Metaphysician Undercover
So metaphysics must do more than asking about first principles, it must establish them.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Can you list a few, or even one? — tim wood

For clarity: I do not question the existence of presuppositions. When they constitute answers to questions - that is, when they are propositions - then they're fair game for interrogation. As presuppositions, they're not, and it is a mistake to think they are. All this is, or should be, unremarkable. Where it gets interesting is when the presupposition is a) buried so far down that it is never made explicit, and b) is foundational to the thinking that presupposes it. One such is that every effect has a cause. In many areas of science, this is still a fundamental presupposition of that science (i.e., not proved but presupposed - there is not proof of the presupposition).. But not all sciences, physics being an example of a science where the study of cause and effect has yielded to "field" theories and the like.

So, same question - or, please try again. Please exhibit a piece of "metaphysics" or a "first principle" that is free of presuppositions.

For clarity: I do not question the existence of presuppositions. When they constitute answers to questions - that is, when they are propositions - then they're fair game for interrogation. As presuppositions, they're not, and it is a mistake to think they are. — tim wood

I don't question the existence of presuppositions, I recognize that they are common place.

Where it gets interesting is when the presupposition is a) buried so far down that it is never made explicit, and b) is foundational to the thinking that presupposes it. — tim wood

My claim is that no matter how deeply buried the presupposition is, or if it is merely implicit (as most are), the task of the metaphysician is to root them out and determine the validity of each. Therefore the attitude of the metaphysician is that nothing ought to be presupposed.

One such is that every effect has a cause. In many areas of science, this is still a fundamental presupposition of that science (i.e., not proved but presupposed - there is not proof of the presupposition).. But not all sciences, physics being an example of a science where the study of cause and effect has yielded to "field" theories and the like. — tim wood

That science is based in presuppositions is irrelevant to whether or not metaphysics is.

So, same question - or, please try again. Please exhibit a piece of "metaphysics" or a "first principle" that is free of presuppositions. — tim wood

I already answered this. The thought procedure of metaphysics is free from presuppositions, or else it would not be "metaphysics" by definition. This is because metaphysics is a thought process which aims at determining first principles where "first" means free from presuppositions.

If it is your argument that there is no such thing as "metaphysics" as defined, as the search for "first" principles, free from presuppositions, and that pure metaphysics is impossible, then that's a different argument. However, we could take the definition as an ideal. We, as metaphysicians are always trying to free ourselves from all presuppositions, to search for the first principle in the most unbiased way possible, but like all ideals, it is something striven for but never obtained in an absolute way. Nevertheless, the attitude of the metaphysician is to reject all presupposition which become evident as presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit. Epistemology and science on the other hand accept presuppositions and use them as foundational.

Here's the problem, or I think it's the problem. It seems to me you a) want to uncover and learn what presuppositions are actually being presupposed (which is one definition of Metaphysics), and b) then want to "prove" them. So-called relative presuppositions, sure, when they are made into propositions. This is a distinction I do not think you're getting (between presuppositions and propositions, a distinction of purpose). And when you manage to get to an "absolute" presupposition, which by definition never becomes a proposition in the thinking in which it operates but is instead like an axiom, then it's useless to try to "prove" it, because usually it's not provable, or, because its function (axiom-like) is to be presupposed. God for example, is an absolute presupposition of Christian faith. People who fail to understand this are forever worrying at the question of God's existence and any "proof" of that existence. That failure is held to be the flaw in Christianity. But Christians announce their creed as, "We believe...". Now what, as a "metaphysician," do you do with that presupposition?

Nevertheless, the attitude of the metaphysician is to reject all presupposition which become evident as presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Reject whatever you like. Again: please provide an example of anything you got that even comes close to your program. The understanding that I have of Metaphysics is that it is the historical science of determining the presuppositions held by different groups at different times, and nothing further. because, as absolute presuppositions there's nothing else to be done with them.

Here's the problem, or I think it's the problem. It seems to me you a) want to uncover and learn what presuppositions are actually being presupposed (which is one definition of Metaphysics), and b) then want to "prove" them. — tim wood

No, (b) is not what I meant at all. When I uncover a presupposition, I said I seek to validate it. I do not mean to "prove" it, but to uncover the further presuppositions which support it. Then I need to investigate those presuppositions, etc.. In this way we seek a first principle, one which is not grounded in any presuppositions. So (a) is a correct representation of what I am saying, we seek to disclose presuppositions. But the second part (b) is what you are not seeing in the same way as I. The second part as I see it, is to "create" a principle which is not based in any presuppositions, and this is the first principle.

And when you manage to get to an "absolute" presupposition, which by definition never becomes a proposition in the thinking in which it operates but is instead like an axiom, then it's useless to try to "prove" it, because usually it's not provable, or, because its function (axiom-like) is to be presupposed. — tim wood

This is where we really go our separate ways on this subject. The "absolute presupposition" you refer to, I assume, is what I called the first principle. The problem is that the way I understand it, it is not a presupposition at all. It is created then and there by the thinking mind which apprehends it, so it is not something presupposed. Once the thinking mind gets past all the presuppositions, it is free to create whatever principle it wants, and this is not a presupposition, nor can it be said to be based in presuppositions. It is new, original, first.

Further, you say that it is useless to try and prove this "absolute presupposition", which I say is not a presupposition at all, but a first principle. But I think that it is necessary to prove the first principle. This is because it is a principle created by the free thinking mind of a metaphysician, free from any presupposition, so the metaphysician must necessarily prove it, to distinguish it from some random thought. So the metaphysician must prove the first principle to others, and the proof will be very simple and acceptable because it will be produced from empirical evidence rather than presuppositions. Then it may be accepted as an axiom, a self-evident truth, a simple principle which is immediately accepted due to the evidence.

God for example, is an absolute presupposition of Christian faith. People who fail to understand this are forever worrying at the question of God's existence and any "proof" of that existence. That failure is held to be the flaw in Christianity. But Christians announce their creed as, "We believe...". Now what, as a "metaphysician," do you do with that presupposition? — tim wood

So to take your example of God, let's assume that a metaphysician came up with "God" the creator
as a first principle. This would mean that prior to the conception of God, a metaphysician went through all the existing presuppositions to get to the bottom. Suppose there were numerous gods, one god for this, another god for that, etc., and these were the existing presuppositions. The metaphysician goes through, and dismisses these presuppositions, and creates a new first principle, God, the creator of everything, which is a completely new principle, not based in any existing presuppositions. Then the metaphysician needs to prove this principle in order that it be accepted by others. so a simple proof is offered such as, we see that there are existing things, and we see that there is a cause of existence of things, and this cause is God, or something like that, so that people accept God as the creator of existence. Remember, the argument at that time would not need to be complicated because the people were already predisposed, by the existing presuppositions concerning gods, to accept that gods are responsible for the existence of things.

The understanding that I have of Metaphysics is that it is the historical science of determining the presuppositions held by different groups at different times, and nothing further. — tim wood

This is not metaphysics at all. What you have described is the history of philosophy. What would make you think that this "historical science" is metaphysics?

In this way we seek a first principle, one which is not grounded in any presuppositions. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I think that it is necessary to prove the first principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's an absolute presupposition of my political thinking, such as it is, that American style democracy, while at all times a work-in-progress, is the best form of government possible.

Simple enough and any number of people could have said it. Give it a "metaphysical' try. Remember, no presuppositions allowed!

The problem is that the way I understand it, it is not a presupposition at all. It is created then and there by the thinking mind which apprehends it, so it is not something presupposed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really! Example?

All right. You can adduce no examples. Let's forget examples. Make up something. Make up some intelligible proposition that is free of any presuppositions.

And, you're not arguing with me; you're arguing with a book, that I listed above. In briefest form, here are the main few sentences. If you want the rest, get the book (a good book that covers a lot of ground - worth the price). That at least will be a worthy opponent and if nothing else should inform you in some detail what a presupposition is.

1) Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question.
2) Let that which is stated be called a proposition.
3) Every question involves a presupposition.
4) To say that a question does not arise is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition that is in fact not being made.
5) The fact that something causes a certain question to arise I call the "logical efficacy" of that thing.
6) The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on it being supposed.
7) A presupposition is either relative or absolute.
8) By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another as its answer.
9) An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.
10) Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

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Now it could be that what you're talking about is hypotheses. These indeed are supposed, created, weighed and either kept or discarded....

It's an absolute presupposition of my political thinking, such as it is, that American style democracy, while at all times a work-in-progress, is the best form of government possible.

Simple enough and any number of people could have said it. Give it a "metaphysical' try. Remember, no presuppositions allowed! — tim wood

It's a political presupposition, not a metaphysical principle, therefore not a "first" principle. So what am I supposed to try, to turn it into metaphysics? To approach it as a metaphysician would require that I deny it as a presupposition, and seek the further presuppositions which ground it. What makes you think that democracy is the best form of government possible? Plato described democracy as the worst, other than tyranny, but explained how democracy inevitably degenerates into tyranny. I can't remember exactly why he said this would occur, but I think it's the result of democracy allowing the rulers to be the people with the strongest desire to rule. In reality, the task of being a good ruler is the most difficult job, so the ones most fitted to be good rulers recognize this and want the job the least, while those who want the job, generally want it for reasons other than to be a good ruler.

Really! Example? — tim wood

We did an example, the example of "God". But as I said, "free from presuppositions" is the ideal which is striven for. It will probably be never be completely obtained. That's why later metaphysicians who turn to earlier first principles, will discover presuppositions underneath those first principles, and need to discard them in search of the true first principle.

1) Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question. — tim wood

I don't agree with this one right off the bat. We very often make statements simply to inform people of things we know, which others do not know, without being questioned. These statements are not made in answer to questions. I walk in the door and say to my wife, "it's raining out". That statement is not made as an answer to a question.

When we deny the truth of 1) we introduce a completely different way of looking at the world from the one described by those numbered statements. From this perspective, when we make a descriptive statement concerning the world, like the one in my example, it comes from a desire to describe the world, not from a question about the world. This better represents the philosophical attitude which is more of an attitude of wonder rather than of questioning. So a philosophical "inquiry" is recognized as an investigation toward describing and understanding rather than as an interrogation.

This is key to understanding the rejection of your described role of presupposition. The question is particular, and pointed in a specific direction, by the presupposition. Wonder and inquisition is general, not necessarily directed in any particular way by any specific presuppositions.

*sigh* Go read the book.

Go read the book. — tim wood

You know, that just because it's written in a book doesn't make it true. Didn't I just demonstrate the first principle of the book to be wrong? Why would I want to read what follows?

From An Essay on Metaphysics (23).

"Prop. 1. Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question.

"When I speak of statements I do not mean only statements that are made out loud to someone else; I include statements made by somebody to himself in the course of solitary thinking. Similarly when i speak of questions I do not mean only questions asked him by someone else; I include questions asked him by himself.

"The reader's familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and he knows what the question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things. In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are. It is only by analyzing the thought which I expressed by saying, "this is a clothes-line" that I realize it to have been an answer to the question, "what is that thing for?" and come to see that I must have been asking myself that question although at the time I did not know I was asking it.

"Note. A question is logically prior to its own answer. When thinking is scientifically ordered, this logical priority is accompanied by a temporal priority: one formulates the question first, and only when it is formulated begins trying to answer it. This is a special kind of temporal priority in which the event or activity that is prior does not stop when that which is posterior begins. The act of asking the question begins and takes a definite shape as the asking of a determinate question before the act of answering it begins; but it continues for the whole duration of this latter. Unless the person who answered a question were still going on asking it while he formulated the answer he would have "lost interest in the subject," and the "answer" would not have been an answer at all. It would have been a meaningless form of words. By being answered a question does not cease to be a question, It only ceases to be an unanswered question."

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If this makes sense to you, get the book from your library, author R.G. Collingwood, and read it. You will not regret it. Or not.

The point is, that I don't agree already, so why should I read a book concerning what follows from a premise I don't agree with?

"The reader's familiarity with the truth expressed in this proposition is proportional to his familiarity with the experience of thinking scientifically. In proportion as a man is thinking scientifically when he makes a statement, he knows that his statement is the answer to a question and he knows what the question is. In proportion as he is thinking unscientifically he does not know these things. In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are. It is only by analyzing the thought which I expressed by saying, "this is a clothes-line" that I realize it to have been an answer to the question, "what is that thing for?" and come to see that I must have been asking myself that question although at the time I did not know I was asking it. — tim wood

The point is, that after a statement is made, we can think up a question which the statement is an answer to, but this does not mean that the statement is made as an answer to a question. This is alluded to here: "In our least scientific moments we hardly know that the thoughts we fish up out of our minds are answers to questions at all, let alone what those questions are." If an individual who makes a statement does not know that the statement is an answer to a question, then it is impossible that the statement was made as an answer to a question. The intent, in making the statement, was something other than to answer a question. So to represent that statement in this way, as an answer to a question, is a false representation. Notice that he calls this being unscientific, and of course metaphysics is unscientific. And the metaphysical statement therefore, does not require a presupposition as per 3).

Given that the universe came into being about 16 billion years ago and it came out of an energy which is beyond time space and object the design of the universe and the design of us the observers of the universe must have been inherent in the unmanifest dimension (the nothingness before the big bang) just as the design of a tree is inherent in a seed. This seems to be the end of logic and fact.
The rest is an unanswered question. Is God separate from us planning and designing our life and the universe? We need more facts to find the answer.
There is one more fact that is overlooked, it is the elephant in the room. In our conscious state we ask and inquire and don't get solutions so we suppose or calculate probabilities but it is just the mind that is puzzling over these questions and we can see the mind puzzling and then identify with it. The result of identification is to pronounce 'I am puzzled'. whereas in fact it is not 'I' the witness that is puzzled it is the mind that is puzzled and I am conscious of the puzzled mind.
If I know that the mind is puzzled, if I know that the mind is sad, if I know that the mind is cheerful and energetic then the mind is the object and I am the witness of the mind. This I is consciousness, a unique human quality.
Consciousness must be included in the logical arguments for creation because consciousness has content, it is not just an ability to know, it holds the seeds of creation or unmanifest desires.
So now the question of creation goes deeper. Where did consciousness originate from? This is definitely unanswerable until we can fine tune our consciousness to be able to see it. Then the next question arises. Can consciousness see itself? Also is consciousness and all its content God?

I think such questions are always unfair because they do not account for perspective. 'Chance' and 'Purpose' are significant depending on the meaning assigned to them. Is the inference here that 'chance' and 'purpose' are absolutely mutually exclusive such that the existence of one factor excludes the other or are they like two different mechanisms where the universe is supposed to have begun in one way and later managed to include the other in its operation?
I don't think the term 'chance' has any practical significance. Isn't it a word we use to describe things we don't know or fully understand yet?

[delete - dumb drunk joke]