The tie, Bob says, is green, even though it looks blue. After a few days, John gets the hang of this way of talking. John has learnt a new way of talking. — StreetlightX
Importantly, this 'how' involves what Sellars refers to as a normative dimension of knowledge claims, an 'ought-to-say' over and above a mere 'is'. — StreetlightX
The normative claim is not about which constitutes knowledge, but about which is appropriate to use in discourse. — Pseudonym
There are two properties - its colour under natural light and its colour under electric light. — Pseudonym
But one knows or does not know the color of the tie. — StreetlightX
So it is his understanding of the meaning of the question which is wrong, not his knowledge of the tie's of colour. — Pseudonym
John was wrong about the color of the tie. — StreetlightX
No, I maintain the "the colour of the tie" is simply an ambiguous property — Pseudonym
For the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. And to admit this requires an abandonment of the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge “stands on its own feet.”" My own attempt to paraphrase this was to say that "one cannot simply 'read off' a claim of knowledge from a state-of-affairs". — StreetlightX
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