This account, in terms of endorsement and it's withholding, has the advantage of rendering talk of appearances as derivative or parasitic upon 'is' claims (claims of reality). That is, if this account is right, then we must first be acquainted with reality (or 'things in reality') prior to being acquainted with appearances; for to be able to withhold endorsement about claims (by saying 'it seems...') presupposes that we can already speak of things as they are. Following Sellars, there is thus a logical priority of reality over appearence, and thus no need to engage with the hand-wringing over how to 'get from mere appearance to reality'. — StreetlightX
The problem then isn't that we can't know reality prior appearance, but we can't even discuss a reality without appearances. — Hanover
so to ask how can I know the rock without reference to how it looks, smells, or taste seems nonsensical — Hanover
A rock's mass, size and shape, and molecular arrangement don't depend on how humans perceive a rock. — Marchesk
We don't realize the distinction between things as we think they are and how they actually are until we engage in some amount of introspection — Hanover
. It takes someone who is willing to examine the nature of reality some effort to convince himself that there might not really be a rock before him. And so Descartes' contribution was to examine this question and to doubt everything and then to locate which could not be doubted.
The problem with getting from mere appearance to reality is that of incoherence. It is not possible to describe an object without reference to appearance (or some other sensation), so to ask how can I know the rock without reference to how it looks, smells, or taste seems nonsensical. The problem then isn't that we can't know reality prior to appearance, but we can't even discuss a reality without appearances.
So am I understand this as having no epistemological consequences? In what sense, then, is it a response to Descartes? — Snakes Alive
Nothing about epistemology follows from that fact that 'seem' statements are syntactically more complex than statements not containing 'seem.' — Snakes Alive
That from this one can conclude that one must 'start' with veridical perceptions in any way, in the sense that one has to have had any, is nonsense – this would imply that any phenomenon that people say seems to exist must have been met with actually existing, which is not the case. Existence proofs would then be very easy – it something seemed to exist, it would!
this would imply that any phenomenon that people say seems to exist must have been met with actually existing
If something 'seemed' to exist, as opposed to what?Existence proofs would then be very easy – it something seemed to exist, it would!
Not at all. It only means that non-veridical perceptions can only be understood as non-veridical against the backdrop of a web of other, veridical perceptions. If one were to say that all perceptions were non-veridical, but couldn't explain what he meant by 'veridical', then he'd literally be talking nonsense. — csalisbury
If something 'seemed' to exist, as opposed to what? — csalisbury
Not so. Compare: it can seem like there is a witch, when there isn't. Must we have veridical witch-perceptions against which to 'compare' for this to be so? No, because it can seem like there are witches (perhaps it even has), yet there are none and have not been (let us assume). — Snakes Alive
There is no 'as opposed to.' Something that seems to exist can actually exist, or it can not. — Snakes Alive
Hegel pointed out the thing-in-itself to be an abstraction. What gets abstracted away is every concrete form of existence leaving the mind with an existence-operator without any predicates following. It is nonsense that this empty form of existence would make up for reality. It is a consequence of contradictions between reality and assumptions that were made. From this the mind extrapolates that any assumption could come into conflict with reality and ends with: nothing. But this extrapolation - again - is not real, it is thought.I'm drawing on Hegel here, but it feels like what's happening is that a general structure of explanation ( 'seems y because is x, under circumstances z')is precipitated from the vast variety of local, specific explanations. Once this general structure crystallizes into view, and we become conscious of it, we mistakenly treat it as itself something to be explained, rather than as the immanent texture of knowledge — csalisbury
Sure, but we need some sense of what it would mean were there such things as witches. In other words, we need some sense of what veridicality means. Where can we come by such an understanding? — csalisbury
To say that the non-veridical relies on the veridical is not to say that the seeming of any particular thing must rely on a prior veridical perception of some similar thing. — csalisbury
In explaining why there's nothing opposed, you immediately made recourse to existence and its negation i.e "is-talk". Could you answer another way without doing this? — csalisbury
Hegel pointed out the thing-in-itself to be an abstraction. What gets abstracted away is every concrete form of existence leaving the mind with an existence-operator without any predicates following. It is nonsense that this empty form of existence would make up for reality. It is a consequence of contradictions between reality and assumptions that were made. From this the mind extrapolates that any assumption could come into conflict with reality and ends with: nothing. But this extrapolation - again - is not real, it is thought. — Heiko
Sure, but who doubts this? Not Descartes. And it implies nothing about our epistemologically 'starting with' veridicality, or having had any veridical experiences. — Snakes Alive
We need some sense of what veridicality means. Where can we come by such an understanding? — csalisbury
So if I seem to see a witch, I must have seen something similar to a witch? — Snakes Alive
(bolding added)To say that the non-veridical relies on the veridical is not to say that the seeming of any particular thing must rely on a prior veridical perception of some similar thing. — csalisbury
How I could answer has nothing to do with epistemology, but again with syntax of language. It's perfectly possible that there are no veridical experiences whatsoever – that veridicality, however we are attuned to it, is a transcendental illusion of which we're doomed to make use. — Snakes Alive
So if I seem to see a witch, I must have seen something similar to a witch?
I get it, it sounds like a good formula, but if you actually try to apply it to the most banal examples, it doesn't seem to work. — Snakes Alive
The problem is that one cannot wait for something not to happen. The diversity is assumed to be infinite and anti-theses to be arbitrary while they are not. With such assumptions the realm of reality is already left behind and finally the conclusion made that nothing could be said about it.The impossibility of unifying the perceptual/sensual diversity of things into individual 'ones' forces us into the structure of explanation - explaining perceptual reality as the outcome of behind-the-scene forces. But then the same conceptual tendency that wanted - but failed - to unite the variety of perceptions into single 'things' leads to us to point to a united 'thing' in the invisible suprasensible realm. — csalisbury
If it was 'seems' all the way down, even the 'evil demon' would make no sense as a cause. — csalisbury
You seem to be ignoring the fact that distinctions between real and imaginary or hallucinated "seemings" are established intersubjectively. So, your witch example is irrelevant to the context of this discussion. Intersubjective notions of 'is' are founded upon collectively corroborated 'seemings". As Kant pointed out this intersubjectively established understanding of "is" when rationally analyzed leads to the "transcendental illusion' of naive realism. — Janus
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