Actually, the way you approach this seems to be a rather modern way of looking at things: God must be a "thing", existing in the "real world", which typically is the physical world of space-time. God is quantitatively different from everything else in that he exists as a limitless and eternal being - but still as a being within Being. God may be infinite in time and space, but he still is within time and space. God is of the same qualitative order as the rest of the world.

A different take on God, whether that be an ancient, Scholastic or post-modern view (if we are limiting ourselves to Western philosophy) would say that God exists but not as something that can be referred to using exact and precise propositions. God is transcendent upon Being, the ground for existence that can only be analogically described as being "outside" of existence. From this perspective, God can hardly be described in any "scientific" sort of way, as if God were qualitatively similar to concrete objects.

This is partly an explanation and justification for the "mystery" surrounding divinity. If God cannot be described using precise propositional language, but rather can only be grasped negatively and analogically (or through revelation), then there will always be a gap between human reason and God. (This may help bolster religion's status but simultaneously throws into doubt the legitimacy of dogmatic, organized religion - if the divine is mysterious, and revelation personal, what could be right about proselytizing?)

Wouldn't fare well with scriptural accounts or among church/mosque folk.
Abstracts aren't sentient or causal, for example, but kind of inert.
Religious believers typically envision deities as active, alive.

Posty McPostface

God, in the Catholic tradition, building on the Greeks and several forms of Judaism, and some Persian sources, is the answer to the question about the first cause or prime mover in the sense that if someone knows how to tie their shoes, and they tie them, they unfold the possibility of shoe tying, god is thought, as it were, as the actuality of the possibilities of all that is. In other words, as the "not nothing" of nothing. Pure potentiality. As the "nothing can come of nothing", ergo, god must be, and must sustain what is perpetually. Basically, Laws of Nature, only, inclusive of morality. Remember the saying of Hawking: Where does the fire behind the equations come from?

The point in Plato isn't the "perect circle", rather that, interpreted in a Scholastic way, that circles always can be, they are ideas in the mind of god, even when none exist. The perfect circle simply names the mode of episteme or mathimatikos for the Greeks, not the Platonic issue of the 7th letter.

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How do they do the "↪Posty McPostface" link?

Remember the saying of Hawking: Where does the fire behind the equations come from? — InternetStranger

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At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
6.372
So people stop short at natural laws as something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate.
And they are both right and wrong. but the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained. — Wittgenstein

Mathematical proofs and geometric forms are the basis of explanation - they themselves are not among what is explained. That is because they are epistemologically prior to the phenomena that are explained by them; but this priority is something that has been forgotten by empiricism.

Regarding the nature of concepts:

First, the concepts that are the constituents of intellectual activity are universal while mental images and sensations are always essentially particular. Any mental image I can form of a man is always going to be of a man of a particular sort -- tall, short, fat, thin, blonde, redheaded, bald, or what have you. It will fit at most many men, but not all. But the concept "man" applies to every single man without exception. Or to use a stock example, any mental image I can form of a triangle will be an image of an isosceles , scalene, or equilateral triangle, of a black, blue, or green triangle, etc. But the abstract concept triangularity applies to all triangles without exception. And so forth.

Second, mental images are always to some extent vague or indeterminate, while concepts are at least often precise and determinate. To use Descartes’ famous example, a mental image of a chiliagon (a 1,000-sided figure) cannot be clearly distinguished from a mental image of a 1,002-sided figure, or even from a mental image of a circle. But the concept of a chiliagon is clearly distinct from the concept of a 1,002-sided figure or the concept of a circle. I cannot clearly differentiate a mental image of a crowd of one million people from a mental image of a crowd of 900,000 people. But the intellect easily understands the difference between the concept of a crowd of one million people and the concept of a crowd of 900,000 people. And so on. 1 — Ed Feser

"Mathematical proofs and geometric forms are the basis of explanation"

For whom? I would say physics doesn't explain at all, it describes what happens, and so treats math as part of the method. It has no ontological status. It is part of hypothesis understood as working assumption, if this then that. It is wholly indifferent to questions of ontological status of maths, and essentially indifferent to explanations. Theorems and mathematical works are applied as are levers. The idiosyncratic views of a Penrose, or some particular physicist are not forcible here.

I appreciate this citation of Descartes', it is clarifying here. Plato assigned the eidos to neither intellect nor imagination, ergo, it was no concept and no mental image. The same split is presupposed in Aquinas, and broken down by Berkeley, who is radically misunderstood due to the utter lack of education about philosophy that is now regnant.


"but this priority is something that has been forgotten by empiricism."

Its removal was celebrated as Positivism (metaphysically neutral physics). Just what is visible. I would say the deeper problem isn't that logic has no basis outside psychology, rather that the positive success has no part in reason. It is a rough empirical result.


The whole thing hangs on imputing concepts to the ancients. This is the common view, "Plato hypostasized the concepts". Hypothesis, in the older scholastic sense means throwing something under through imagination. The "hypostasis" the place beyond the senses, accessible to the imagination and intellect. But Plato was not speaking of concepts, but of the direct experience of seeing things under a genus. Each tree is a tree. He doesn't assign the genus to some region by dogma, he investigates them (or, the dialogues written by Plato show investigations of them, since he didn't write treatises or prescriptive essays).

I don't agree with Wittgenstein here: "And they are both right and wrong. but the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained."

Heidegger shows the openness of Plato very clearly in his analysis of the Symposium. Since the range of the idea or species of love is given from lower to best, or aristos, but the whole range is said about the eidos or species (in Latin). Plato was no scholastic formalist.

There is no forcible power in argument or doctrine placing the empirical experience of species in a specific region of reality, say, a brain.

"Mathematical proofs and geometric forms are the basis of explanation"

For whom? — InternetStranger

Well, within limits, for anyone. When Galileo said 'the book of nature is written in mathematics' he wasn't whistling Dixie.

But more broadly, it is a response to the rather oddly-worded question 'where does the fire in the equations come from?' (Actually I think the phrase was 'what breathes fire into the equations?'.) I take this to be a reference to what Wigner described in his well-known essay as the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences' - that Hawkings is commenting on the fact that mathematics is able to make predictions and reveal deep discoveries about nature; an example being Dirac's prediction of the existence of anti-matter purely on the basis of mathematics. How is that possible? Why is the universe like that? Is the question. And I think it's a very deep question.

But I think there is indeed a strong tendency to put natural laws into the role formerly assigned to the Divine Intelligence. But what this looses sight of, is that science doesn't explain the laws. The 'order of nature' is a given, but why it is, is a completely different kind of question to what can be discovered, given that the order exists. That is what I think Wittgenstein is commenting on.

Plato assigned the eidos to neither intellect nor imagination, ergo, it was no concept and no mental image. — InternetStranger

The thrust of Feser's post is that concepts are not mental images - they're what used to be understood as 'intelligible objects'.

"Plato hypostasized the concepts". Hypothesis, in the older scholastic sense means throwing something under through imagination. The "hypostasis" the place beyond the sense, accessible to the imagination and intellect. But Plato was not speaking of concepts, but of the direct experience of seeing things under a genus. Each tree is a tree. — InternetStranger

In Plato the idea of the form was first articulated but it was subsequently refined and
developed by Aristotle and later philosophers. Of course, Aristotle rejected the idea that the forms were real in any sense other than the manifest - that is the meaning of his 'moderate realism'. But much hinges on the the nature of Platonic reals. That is an unresolved issue in philosophy in my opinion (but I tend towards Platonist realism.)

@InternetStranger, not sure if you have any questions; but, I'm still interested in entertaining this topic if you wish.

@Wayfarer, thanks for the Wittgenstein quotes. I think they illustrate my affinity of treating God, as the unsayable and ineffable according to the Tractatus. If God is everything that is both the case and not the case, then we are unable to talk about those issues, IMO.

I'm not sure, but the above idea of 'God' is closest in form, IMO, to Spinoza's conception of a pantheistic being. Is that correct or am I wrong about this?

I think they illustrate my affinity of treating God, as the unsayable and ineffable according to the Tractatus. If God is everything that is both the case and not the case, then we are unable to talk about those issues, IMO. — Posty McPostface

That's why I claim that W's approach is basically apophatic.

the above idea of 'God' is closest in form, IMO, to Spinoza's conception of a pantheistic being — Posty McPostface

I studied a unit on Spinoza but suffice to say I found the style of the Ethics quite impenetrable. And also I completely part company with Spinoza on the question of determinism.

You might find these two OP's of interest. Apologies if I have mentioned them to you previously as I have posted them quite a few times. They too are on the idea of apophaticism and transcendence.

God does not exist, Pierre Whalon. (The title is deceptive.)

What is the 'ground of being'? - post on Tillich's form of apophatic theology.

Also an article by Bill Vallicella on Russell's Teapot. (Caveat: I find many of Vallicella's philosophical analyses useful, but I detest his politics.)

That's why I claim that W's approach is basically apophatic. — Wayfarer

Yes, though I've wondered if his attitude changed with the Investigations. These questions about the status of God and such seem to be left out from the majority of his philosophy. I think the closest you can get to him addressing these issues are in his On Certainty.

Thanks for the articles, just browsed them... I can't say they present anything of substance, though that's simply a given and something that the reader has to do is a certain suspension of disbelief. It seems the only attitude that can be served by those sentiments are of an agnostic one or metaphysical quietude.

I can't say they present anything of substance — Posty McPostface

Actually Vallicella's article gives a pretty reasonable summary of classical Thomistic theism, although it doesn't address the rather quirky question given in the OP. But all three of those articles are clearly of Platonic or neo-Platonic heritage, so it's interesting you don't see anything in them.

Yeah, it may be because I've always assumed the Platonic or neo-Platonic stance on the existence of God or conceptual schematic for God's existence.

Thanks anyways.

Glad we cleared that up, then. :confused:

Spinoza ia not a pantheist. He's more or less the opposite: an acosmist.

For Spinoza, God is defined by the infinite nature not found in anywhere else. The necessary unity of reality which is not found as anything but is of everything. God is not found in everything. God is found nowhere but is of everything.

We might say the nature of God is not to exist because to exist amounts to a finite being. The infinity of God puts them outside such beginnings and endings. God is Real (i.e. the necessary infinite) precisely in that God doesn't exist.

What's the question? I'm easily confused.

Thanks.

Thanks for clarifying that!

What's the question? I'm easily confused. — Posty McPostface

Oh, it’s OK - I was just a bit nonplussed by your designation of those links as being ‘of little substance’ when I actually find them pretty profound. But, one man’s meat is another man’s poison, as the saying has it. Especially in regards to such recondite matters as these.

It was just me asserting that what they say in those links, I assume as a given being an agnostic and subscribing to quietism.

Right, I get you. I suppose I'm finding that agnosticism actually has another layer of meaning in that it converges with the 'way of unknowing' which is found in Christian mysticism and even Zen. 'He that knows it, knows it not; he that knows it not, knows it'.

Yes, the unsayable and all that. Aggravates the condition so to speak, hehe. :sweat:

At times it almost seems self defeating.

Then, is God an illogical concept, in that Meinongian sense? — Posty McPostface

God is illogical.

Omnipotency is a stone too heavy to lift. Omnibenevolence is a just the calm before an earthquake. Omniscience makes us autmatons with no choice in our lives.

That doesn't mean he can't exist.

God is illogical. — TheMadFool

No, God is a solipsist.

We might say the nature of God is not to exist because to exist amounts to a finite being. — TheWillowOfDarkness

:up:

At times it almost seems self defeating. — Posty McPostface

It's not, really, but has to tap into compassion. Otherwise it would be. In Buddhist parlance, 'awakening requires the two wings of compassion and emptiness'. One wing, and you go around in circles.

Yeah, it's one of those things that are so simple and elegant on paper, but the reality of undertaking the task is much much harder. I say this because of my Stoic attitude, which actually seems closer to Cynicism as of late.

I have a hard time being compassionate due to feelings of sadness and such...

Understand.

Impossible.

No, I meant to say 'I understand what you mean'. Might have left it a bit vague, though.

Oh, ok.

No, God is a solipsist — Posty McPostface

Perhaps I should've said our conception of God is illogical and not God himself.

The God that fits into our world - a sloppy designer, not so powerful and maybe a little spiteful - just isn't great enough for us. The problem, it seems, is with us and not God. He never claimed to be omnibenevolent or omnipotent or omniscient. It's us or, more correctly, 3 people (Moses, Jesus and Mohammad) who made that claim. I guess one has to take the word of people who can part an ocean, walk on water and fly off to heaven on a horse.

“When Galileo said 'the book of nature is written in mathematics' he wasn't whistling Dixie.” — Wayfarer

What Galileo said, if I’m not wrong, was something more like, mechanics is the language in which god wrote nature. Anyway, he said it in scholastic Latin intelligible to his dear friend the Pope. Math didn’t mean quite the same thing in the medieval world, remember, music was “math in time”. By the way, the reason for Galileo's difficulty was that vacuums are outliers, no one wanted to let in the doctrine of inertia because it was outrageously illogical! It played the outlier, a claim to a pure vacuum, against all experience of human beings at all times. You will admit, I’m sure, that still plays a role, since there is no real vacuum, but the ‘paradigm’ is still the model for thinking.

One needs to ask, what does Newton mean by hypothesis non fingo? This is prefigured by Galileo's thought experiment. And, empirically, it is the result of the telescope seeing the falsehood of the view that the perfect circle moves on the vault or ceiling of the heaven, which was not a metaphor.


“The 'order of nature' is a given, but why it is, is a completely different kind of question to what can be discovered, given that the order exists. That is what I think Wittgenstein is commenting on.”

He doesn't know how to distinguish between the Scholastics and the ancients. The medievals gave the Why, in god’s intellect. This is impossible in ancient thought, because phusis is said in contradistinction to nomos or law. The Greek, and now universally powerful idea of nature was modified by the Christians, and now has become Positivism.Phusis, also, is said in contradistinction to art, in the sense of not blind phusis, but knowingly making shoes. God’s art is a third step here.


“role formerly assigned to the Divine Intelligence”

This wouldn’t be intelligence. Thomas speaks of God’s sapientiae, wisdom, science skill. Phusis is wholly blind, man has art, e.g., shoemaking, God is sapient: he brings forward the good telos. Nature is blind for the medievals, it is that which is, but not that by which it is. Only the “person” has intelligence. It is removal of the intelligence or person. Persona Dei Verbi = logos! Math has no logos, no Word. No Christ = persona verbi! Ergo, this “intelligence”, as ‘rational’ ordering, is not properly rational ordering. It’s not Good, but blind.



“Aristotle rejected the idea that the forms were real in any sense other than the manifest -”

This is misleading. What Aristotle does is say, I see the accidents, the counters of the pink fingernails, the fingers, the hand, these belong to the man. He rejects the view that the man, substance, or idea in the abstract doctrinal sense is prior, he denies the changes are first, i.e., the long and short finger nail point to the fingernail as the place where the change happens. He says, there must be a ground for both, the hule, hyle, material! It is not at all what horribly silly people like Russel think. Wittgenstein was forced to kiss up to Russell you know, by imitating his trashy work at first. There’s no reality in Aristotle, there is ousia (as material, as true and false, as being and not being, etc.) which becomes hypostasis or foundation as “suppositum” in the medievals, and when it is qualified, it can be intelligent and “free” as person of god.

“ not sure if you have any questions; but, I'm still interested in entertaining this topic if you wish.” — Posty McPostface

“ Platonic interpretation of God as an abstract concept”

I think you place too much emphases on one part of Plato's "teaching". Was it teaching or open investigation? This latter is the only thing that makes sense, since who would want to merely "contemplate" concepts? How could that be a highest telos? No, living eidoi, which were open to thought! Eidos and idea refer to ordinary experience (still too, in modern Greek, if I am not mistaken), I see a Plane tree, and another, then a third. A pattern! This is direct experience.Idea ( ἰδέα) means, literally, straightforwardly: species (and not understood as mere taxonomic formalism). That is the Latin for idea. It's as though one would say tigers are “abstract”, but, tell it to someone who sees a tiger put its head and shoulders silently above the thick jungle!!! Species does not mean primarily the “tigerlyness”, instead of the tiger. That’s the subject of science, or knowledge. Reread the 7th letter without presupposing the “more-perfect” circle interpretation. He means, rather, the knowledge too, the tigerness, is through the idea. As is the tiger.